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Conflict and globalization

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Development, conflict and globalization

There is no universally accepted definition of development, but a neutral statement such as *process of innovative structural change in the economic, political and cultural fields*, gives many advantages. It allows historical interpretation of past processes and understanding of current ones, constantly calling attention on the true motor of development: *internal innovation* (something that no external aid can replace). Globalization tends to be reified by many authors: one hears that "globalization does this or does that". It is not so. Globalization, like any other development process (such as the agricultural "revolution" of the Neolithic or the Industrial Revolution), by itself does nothing. Rather, globalization is moved by the innovative activities of dynamic actors. It is not in itself a prime mover, although it may act as multiplier of these activities. Last but not least, a neutral definition leaves space for the negative sides of development, as no one can guarantee that innovations will not have adverse outcomes.

The main points to be borne in mind in a general theory of development are: the nature (static or dynamic) of the society, the interaction of human activity with the physical environment, the Centre-Periphery relationships (essential for historical interpretation), the stages of development (it is rather surprising that some geographers still make reference to the stages of old Rostow), and the unavoidable and ubiquitous conflict. Globalization is a process (or *the* process) of the highest importance, not only economic but also political and cultural. It is still an ongoing process. In rough approximation, we can say that, out of six billion human beings, only one billion people (belonging to the most advanced countries) are truly active globalizers. Three more billion (in particular India, China, Brazil and some others) can be regarded as passive globalizers, in that they are getting increasingly dynamic and being gradually included into the global world (although some of their regions might be more dynamic than the some comparatively static regions of developed countries). Only two billion people are still in a marginal position and unglobalized. Underdevelopment means precisely having too little dynamism and innovative capability to be included (yet) in the globalized world.

What about the enemies of the global world? In the poorer countries people seem to be aware of the advantages of globalization rather more than those of developed countries, a fact which no enemy of globalization has ever explained or even tried to explain. The enemies are mainly two: the noglobal movement and Islamic fundamentalism. Their conflictual relationship to the globalizing centres of the world is the leading theme of this volume, wich tries to attract attention to *facts*, not to vague "discourse". A dominant, and most unfortunate, trend of today's "human" geography is precisely "discourse", "relativism", "weak thinking", with the result that "geographers have developed a disturbing – even dysfunctional – habit of missing out on important intellectual and politically significant debates" (Dicken 2004). What is globalization? Beyond a vague perception of something having to do with "imperialism", and therefore "bad", a great many geographers and non-geographers are unable to go.

It is doubtful that such "weak philosophizing"

approach may provide much insight into real processes, first of all because if we accept relativism, why on earth should the very proposition "all is relative" be "true"? Why should we trust the "relativist", whose "truths" are, by definition, "relative"? Ah, but says the "relativist", what I say is true because I say it. Very good, then stay cosy in your coccoon and trouble us no more. But the broader question, "why so much discourse?" is still to be answered. What is the philosophical basis for this line of "thinking"? Its import is far broader than the mere field of geography, and concerns human society and human life as a whole. Let us try, briefly, to understand, or at least to guess. Hereby follow a few hints to help readers to understand (or guess) by themselves.

First hint: the moral law of Christianity is irksome to people who prefer doing what they like without moral hindrance (actually these are a great many people, whereby arise all the countless heresies, persecutions and black legends on "Inquisition", "Conquistadores", and the like). Second hint: since the 18th century culture and science have been overwhelmingly in the hands of declared atheists and agnostics (mostly black legend mongers; they call it "secularization"). Third hint: during the 18th and 19th centuries these people hoped to destroy Christianity by their new-fangled toy made up of "Aufklärung", "rationality", "positive thinking", "facts, facts, facts". Fourth hint: subsequently the toy began to break down.

The "herald" of modernity, Giordano Bruno, had become the darling of atheists because he had proclaimed the Universe to be eternal and therefore independent of God and Creation; unfortunately for him and his deluded followers, astrophysics began to discover that the Universe had a definite beginning and will have an end; moreover the materialistic theory of biological evolutionism, another milestone of atheism, has entered a deadly crisis, and for anyone who does not like self–imposed blindness it should be clear that science disproves the possibility of doing away with Christianity rather than helping to destroy it. This does not mean that Christianity ever needed "scientific" proof, or will ever need in future, but merely that atheists sought for proofs against it, fostered the illusion of having found them, and the "proofs" rot and became dust in their very hands.

Fifth hint: as the toy was breaking down, "Aufklärung", "rationalism", "positivism", "facts, facts, facts" were abandoned and "weak thinking" (behaving as if God did not exist, since "we cannot know"), "discourse" (behaving as if reality could not be known, and the only possible intellectual activity were to talk of what other people had previously said, in practice "talk, talk, talk" instead of "facts, facts, facts") became the new catchwords. These five hints taken together might bring to the unpleasant (for some) conclusion that their activity and "scientific" production is not the outcome of study and research but of an attempt to live without God, satisfying their vices, revolving endlessly around their poor selves, and therefore of corrupting soul, mind and body.

But there is more than that, and of the highest importance just for the problems being investigated in this special issue. After the multifarious contradictions of pagan philosophy ("everything is in flux"; "no, everything is unchanging"; "the world is made exclusively of matter", "no, it is a reflection of a world of pure ideas", and so forth), Christianity had taught mankind a vital lesson: the *principle of reality*. According to this principle, there is a real world over which we do not have any control. This comes as a consequence of the acceptance of the main essential reality: the existence of God. God is the Being by definition, His Name is "I am", as revealed to Moses in the Burning Thicket. Whether we believe in Him or not, this reality does not change. God does not stop existing because some people think (hope) that he does not, so that there may be no moral law and no final reckoning.

The very concept of God helped to realize the existence of other realities too, over which we likewise have no control. That is the great intellectual lesson of Christianity, and the very foundation of the ability to think. The progression of secularized thinking gradually undermined this ability. This was not done all at once: at first the principle of reality was upheld by Enlightment and Positivist "thinkers", when they thought that rationalism, materialism and atheism would be able to defeat Christianity. When, as we have seen, materialistic ideas began to totter, the old philosophy of scepticism (dating back to the hellenistic Age, with Pyrrhon of Elydes) was resurrected with a new label: "weak thinking".

To top all this, came superspecialization, whereby only "specialists" are entitled to judge within a given field, even if thinking in that field affects very deeply the life of all. Thus, for example, only specialized philosophers should be entitled to speak of philosophy. All the others are expected to be passive receivers, lest they be accused of overstepping the bounds of their own fields of research. However, philosophy, i.e. thinking, is too important to leave it in the hands of philosophers alone. The hasty demise of the principle of reality

and the prevailing scepticism, or agnosticism, or "weak thinking", whatever you call it, have catastrophic effects precisely in studies on conflict and globalization.

Due to the declining ability to think, terrorists and noglobals are able to spread their senseless slogans. Just due to the same loss of reasoning ability, the balance of terror is always to the detriment of the State actor, deemed to have failed to protect the victims, while no blame is attached to the terrorist criminals. Exactly this loss of brainpower prevents many people from understanding the radical changes of war, whereby it is no longer possible to distinguish clearly between military and civilians, and fighters may be utterly alien from any military establishment: the terrorist and his logistics supporters and propagandists, the pacifist who strives to prevent one side from defending itself, the judge who send terrorists free, the academic, the politician and the journalist who propagates "understanding" for terrorism and the "need" of yielding to their requests, the hacker trying to upset police and military files, the protester who smashes shops and banks and hurls stones and Molotov cocktails at the police, are all fighters. And precisely because of enfeebled reasoning power (and fear) most people prefer to deny the inevitability of conflict and of the clash of civilizations: it would be magnificent indeed if our wishes came true, but this is seldom (or rather never) the case, and wishful thinking is the most disastrous way of approaching any problem, particularly life and death predicaments such as those facing the Western world today.

All other civilizations have kept their own roots and cherish them, none more so than the Islamic one. The West is throwing away its heritage, destroying its own roots, apostatizing Christianity. Any attempt to defend what little remains of those roots is frowned upon as "narrow-minded", "racialistic", "sexist", "a stumbling block to international understanding". Anything the others do is not to be criticized, because "it is their culture". What culture is left to us? The levelling off of any trace of Christian and Western identity, with the prospect of starting again from a cultural Ground Zero, at the mercy of alien cultures and codes of behaviour. All this means one thing only: death.

This volume seeks to tackle the difficult task of probing into the interlocking processes of conflict and globalization rejecting "discorse" and self-imposed blindness, *looking at facts with true faith in human reason*, trying, with the aid of a group of valiant scholars in the fields of Geography, History, Economics and Linguistics, to understand ongoing processes and to suggest how this world of ours might be improved by defeating terrorism and bringing about positive and fruitful development.

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Carlo Da Pozzo

Geopolitics and globalization

Riassunto. - Geopolitica e globalizzazione

Con la "guerra fredda" si delineava uno scenario nel quale le tre maggiori superpotenze (USA, URSS e Cina) spostavano la competitività sul piano dell'informazione e dell'innovazione tecnologica, con l'ausilio di 'quinte colonne'. Il conflitto così controllato si trasformava in vantaggio, confermando il principio sistemico che la lotta fra le parti non è distruttiva ma è funzionale al mantenimento dell'ordine del sistema. Ma in USSR la crescita del complesso militare-industriale era ipertrofica a danno dell'industria civile, con diminuzione della produttività, stagnazione tecnica e impoverimento del paese, causa della scomparsa dell'URSS. A sua volta la Russia entra in crisi per gravi problemi etnici e politico-sociali. Anche la Cina entra in crisi: alla politica di riforme economiche e di apertura all'estero si accompagnano lotte politiche di vertice, campagne contro corruzione e criminalità, scontri sociali e conflitti etnici (rivolta di Lhasa del 1987, movimento islamico nella provincia autonoma dello Xinjiang-Uygur), mentre persiste il nodo di Taiwan. Negli USA al successo politico internazionale si unisce quello economico. Il Paese diventa l'unica superpotenza mondiale, ma si aggrava lo scontro ideologico-culturale con movimenti di oppositori, interni ed esterni, con esplicito riferimento alla globalizzazione. La dissimetria delle forze in campo è solamente in apparenza a vantaggio dell'attore "statale": la nuova guerra asimmetrica produce "la disfatta del vincitore" se quest'ultimo non capisce meglio il suo avversario e non sa opporglisi con flessibilità, in maniera coerente su spazi diversi. È una guerra soprattutto di informazione e comunicazione. Se la "disfatta del vincitore" sembra cominciare ad esser compresa dall'attore "statale", nella conduzione politica non si vede ancora una capacità di capire meglio l'antagonista, probabilmente perché la rete a maglie aperte di quest'ultimo, consentendogli congiungimento e scioglimento di elementi non sempre omogenei, ne maschera identità e strategia, trovando anche copertura nelle manifestazioni di dissenso interne all'Occidente. Comunque si vogliano intendere la dicotomia islamica del mondo (diviso in "casa della pace" dominata dagli islamici che vi applicano la "sharia", e "casa della guerra" dove gli islamici non comandano), lo spostamento dell'origine del conflitto dal piano ideologico a quello economico indebolisce l'attore "politico", obbligandolo a impegni considerevoli di energia per obiettivi potenzialmente anche contro-producenti.

Introduction

The present writer has pointed out earlier (Da Pozzo 1985) that it was only possible to keep investigating geopolitics by bearing in mind Raffestin's (1980) lesson on power geography, thereby turning the old political geography into a geography of territory viewed as a system arising from the interaction of energy and information displayed by the various actors. Within that context, the world system could be conceptualized as a set of subsystems integrated in various ways and at different levels of intensity, each subsystem reaching out with a different range of action, reflected by territorial control as well as by the internal energy-information balance and by the strategies adopted. The most effective indicator of such capabilities was given by the technologies employed in territorial control and warfare.

It is a well known fact that the greatest concentration of global range, highly destructive weapons belong to the USA and the USSR, and it is also a fact that China is swiftly catching up with the other two powers, thanks to its efforts in the field of mis-

siles. For the other members of the "nuclear club", i.e. the States which already have or can produce nuclear bombs (but it should not be forgotten that in 1975 an M.I.T. student has shown to be able to manufacture one), there is at the moment neither the will nor the capability to achieve a global range.

A "balanced" world system?

The contending "superpowers" (USA and USSR, including their respective allies, and China), though seeking to shun a direct confrontation for fear of mutual assured destruction, competed in the information field. The positive feed back of innovation in warfare technology (necessary for "security") on technological innovation (useful to society in general) was accompanied by the ongoing ideological-cultural clash and the help to the organization of "fifth columns" in the enemy camp. The overall result, at any rate, was the transformation of the three-pronged struggle into an advantage for all three, supporting once more the systemic principle whereby the struggle among the parts is not destructive but functional to the preservation of order within the system, in this case the global one (Da Pozzo 1991).

However, the simple observation that, already in early Seventies, USA and USSR together could destroy the whole pianet two times over, and that in the Eighties the global destructive potential rose fourfold, led many to doubt whether a process had been triggered whereby the growth of military hardware had become allometric, being increasingly unable to improve the productivity of systems, with looming instability hazards diffusing from individual States into the world system, precisely due to excessive expenditure of energy for that purpose.

The fall of the Berlin Wall (November 9, 1989) and the ensuing reunification of Germany (October 3, 1990) mark dramatically the end of the geopolitical scenario outlined above. The "system" was losing one of the superpowers: the Soviet Union. In fact, in the USSR the growth of the military-industrial complex during the Eighties was hypertrofic, to the detriment of consumer industries, while labour productivity declined, technology stagnated and the country grew poorer. Such hypertrophy grew largely as a consequence of Reagan's statement, on March 23, 1983, on the *Strategic Defense Initiative*, better known as "star wars". The outcome was that the USSR had no longer the strength to hold on. Almost a sym-

bol of that failure was the nuclear disaster at Cernobyl on April 1986.

Demise of the USSR and serious contradictions in China

An unmistakable token of the changed system was the *Intermediate Nuclear Forces* agreement, signed in Washington on December 8, 1987 by Reagan and Gorbacev. For the first time the two leaders agreed on dismantling missile launching sites in Europe operating within a range of 500 to 5,500 km, with attendant reciprocal local controls. On the same line, in 1991, the year in which the USSR met its end, the START treatise between USA and Russia reduced the number of nuclear heads to 6,000 each (SALT II of 1974 allowed more than 20,000 to the USA and over 26,000 to USSR). In 1993 START II reduced them to 3,000-3,500 (still enough, at any rate, to destroy the planet utterly), doing away also with multiple head missiles, and in April 2000 talks began for a further reduction to 2,000. At the same time, in 1993 Russia, Cina and USA signed the agreement, ratified in 1997 by 81 States, for banning chemical weapons; between 1995 and 1996 it was agreed to extend *sine die* the non proliferation treatise of nuclear weapons and various parts of the world were "denuclearized". In 1997 the treaty against the use of anti-personnel landmines was signed, it is due to become effective from 1999.

During the Eighties, China was beset by a serious crisis. Economic reforms and foreign policy openings (in 1980 it joined the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank) went together with lengthy struggles for political leadership (from the trial to the "Band of Four" to the Fourth Constitution), repeated campaigns against corruption and crime (1983, 1986, 1988-89) and, above all, heavy social clashes (suffice to recall only the widespread student unrest of 1986 and the Peking uprising of 1989), triggered by inflation, unemployment and a worsening of economic and spatial imbalances linked to a surge of economic and productive growth. In April 1989 student demostrations in honour of the reformer Hu Yaobang took place, in May the unrest spread to many other cities, with impressive demonstrations in which the population supported the students, who in Peking had permanently occupied the Tien An Men Square. On May 20, martial law was introduced in Peking, and the army occupied the square in the night between June 3 and 4 June, after playing havoc among the students, with thou-

sands of casualties; clashes continued for a few days in other cities too, and the ensuing repression of the communist regime was, as usual, ruthless: thousands of arrests and scores of executions took place. Martial law remained in force in Peking until January 1990.

The crisis in Tibet also reached a new pitch (Lhasa uprising in 1987) and in view of all this the very role of China as in international power was sharply cut down to size, so that its action seems to become restricted to its own immediate surroundings, where it managed to obtain from the USSR concessions in the Amur-Ussuri border dispute (1986) and to sign agreements with the United Kingdom (1984) for the returning of Hong-Kong, as well as with Portugal (1987) for that of Macao on the basis of the principle "one nation, two systems"; but, significantly, attempts to apply the same principle to Taiwan (backed by the USA) ended up in failure.

The USA emerge as the only superpower

In the United States, on the contrary, the Eighties, dominated by the Reagan presidency, are marked by favourable political developments in the international arena and medium term successes of "reaganomics". The new president, G. H. W. Bush, seemed to manage with no great problems the new order grounded on American hegemony, as well as upon its capability of intervention, military if necessary, in every part of the world (Panama crisis, 1989; First Gulf War, 1991). Long term problems inherited from Reagan's economic policy (budget and commercial deficit) and the renewed sharpening of social conflicts and of the "right to difference", occasionally with heavy unrest (racial disturbances in Los Angeles, 1992), do not significantly change the picture. Presidents and governments alternate in democratic fashion: they change some features of internal policiy, but leave foreign policy guidelines untouched. In this regard, the crisis in the Balkans is particularly instructive: initially (1991-95, clash between Yugoslavia, Slovenia and Croatia, and war in Bosnia) the active role is played by NATO but the intervention is still – as usual – under the umbrella of the United Nations, while in the following stage (Kosovo war) the action of NATO is, for the first time, without UNO warrant, due to Russia's and China's vetoes (March 1999). After eighty days of bombardments, Belgrad was forced to accept the peace plan, which the United Nations was going to ratify shortly after (and even before that, the Inter-

national Penal Court in The Hague had charged Milosevic for crimes against mankind). The uselessness of the Chinese and Russian veto shows that the USA were, and are, truly the only world superpower.

In Russia the disastrous heritage of the Communist regime is worsened by the "savage" onrush of an unregulated market system by a society desperately devoid of traditions of personal and economic liberty (we must bear in mind, among other things, the legacy of seven centuries of oriental despotism prior to the October Revolution). Another legacy of an unhappy history is political instability, going so far as to bloody clashes in the "Parliamentary uprising" of 1993). Even more serious was the explosion of ethnic conflicts, which, in the case of Chechnya, turns into a true and extremely serious open war. In this context, the only positive results were the solution of border disputes with China (1994), followed by the demilitarization of the same borders (agreement China-Russia-Kazakhstan-Kirgizistan-Tadzikistan of 1996), as well as the acceptance in the G7 group (Birmingham, 1999), which thus becomes a G8. From the year 2000, under President Putin, the Russian government regains a certain control over State and administration (curtailment of the power of regional governors, June 30, 2000), as well as upon dissidents and, above all, upon illegal activities. As a result, the economy began to improve, but the declared object of a return to a "Great Russia" was promptly dashed, symbolically, by the disaster of the nuclear submarine Kursk in the Barents Sea, and by the destruction by fire of the television tower at Ostankino (August 2000). A more favourable development occurred in 2002, with the set-up of a permanent NATO Council enlarged to the Russian Federation, aiming at a common policy in the fields of security and anti-terrorism.

In China the Nineties saw a renewed drive towards the market economy (dubbed "socialist" to keep the tattered cover of a crumbling ideology), with good success in nodal cities and ports, but the previous social and spatial imbalances were by no means solved; rather they tended to worsen. A stunning growth of industrial production went with a surge of inflation, of unemployment and poverty. Buying power was halved and the insolvency of the public debt officially declared. Even more serious was the emergence of alliances between State authorities, "new millionaires" and organized crime: a consequence of metamorphosis and adaptation of the Communist *nomenklaturas* (see Voslensky 1984) – a pattern commonly

observed at the demise of Communist economic sistems in the USSR and Eastern Europe, since the same *nomenklaturas*, never called to answer for their crimes, were in an ideal position to turn their political strength and previous economic links into growing economic power, moreover *nomenklatura* networks could easily be turned into crime mafia-like networks, due to evident structural and moral similarities between the two modes of existence.

Consequently, China suffers from serious tensions and violent clashes in the North-eastern industrial areas, while the coastal richer regions begin to agitate for autonomy, and in the ethnically non-Chinese West movements aiming at independence on ethnic-religious basis gather momentum: Tibet and the autonomous province of Xinjiang-Uygur are in uproar. The centralist, repressive response to any dissidence (in 1998 an administrative reform strengthened the already extensive repressive powers; in 1999 Falung Gong, a buddhist sect diffused even among senior party members, was prohibited) seemed to allow the government to regain control (although, in 2002, renewed unrest broke out in the industrial areas of Manchuria), and to obtain token prestige results (the first Chinese "spaceman" in 2003), as well as some recovery of an international role, however limited to neighbouring areas.

Together with the USA, China takes part, since 1997, to negotiations in Geneva for a solution of the conflict between the two Koreas. She recovers, on the basis of previous agreements, Hong Kong in 1997 and Macao in 1999. However, the traditional tension with Taiwan is far from eased, and is made even sharper by the clash for the possession of the Paracel Islands (claimed by Vietnam too) and the Spratly Islands (claimed also by Vietnam, Brunei, Malaysia and the Philippines). At the same time, relations with the West, indispensable for economic recovery, waver between favourable openings (specific agreements with the United States in 2000 and admission to the WTO in 2001) and hot clashes caused by well-founded Western allegations of dumping and unfair competition.

The 3rd millennium opens, therefore, with the USA as world leaders; but the American perception of their own primacy as a result of a "natural selection" resulting from the previous multipolar conflict led to a policy aiming at the interests of their own "system", as if there was no longer a "general system" or, more simply, as if they were the same thing. So, for example, besides international conventions still to be ratified (the one forbidding discriminations against women of 1979,

and that on the rights of children of 1989), there are positions ranging from a repeal (2001) of the Kyoto agreement for the reduction of greenhouse gases up to attitude kept at the mega-summit (60,000 delegates of 200 countries) in Johannesburg (2002), from the resumption by president G.W. Bush of the "star wars" project (abandoned in 1993 in the wake of the "disarmament" policy), up to the superfluity of UNO agreement to their own world operations (from the Balkans to Iraq).

The new globalized conflict scenario

In the absence of a State strong enough to withstand the American forces openly, conflict takes the shape of an ideological-cultural clash in the shape of a consent/dissent dichotomy towards the United States and, in more general terms, towards liberism and the "Western way of life", giving rise to antagonist movements, internal and external, more or less organized, all referring explicitly to globalization, generally thought to be a phenomenon peculiar to the contemporary age, but disagrees on its interpretation: for some it means economic growth, development of synergies, increase in the mobility of men and goods, diffusion of information and increase of innovation, while for others it is tantamount to increasing growth inequalities, cultural oppression, imposition of behavioural and economic models, potential loss of knowledge. Through ideology, globalization is viewed as a political process, that's to say as the consequence of conscious strategies by political actors, and this brings about a considerable obstacle in the evaluation of the consequences – real and not ideological – of globalization.

Far-reaching revolutionary socio-economic changes – such as the Industrial Revolution or the very globalization which is our concern – cannot in fact be governed by denying them, but by a management which, conscious of their nature and their potential consequences, must contrive the most suitable policies aiming at realistic objectives, bearing in mind that a choice of different options always exists. In the same way as geografic determinism is a false paradigm, the dogma of historical inevitability is a dismally false and potentially dangerous one. The Industrial Revolution was by no means halted by luddism, but was governed, in the countries which chosed to pursue it, by means of the first social laws since mid-19th century. The symbols and hearts of industrialization have been the machines and labour mechanization. The very same role for the present ongoing globalization is

played by the evolution of the infrastructural network, of the circulation and communication of information, which does not mean merely the ability of a single actor to act alone on the world scene.

With the line of Tordesillas of 1494, the Pope Alexander VI divided already in "global" fashion the whole world between Portugal and Spain. Shortly later, Charles V of Spain can say, not without reason, that on his empire the sun never set. The following century the East India Companies doubtless acted already as world-wide economic actors. However, within their planetary-size networks, the space-time dimension imposed by available technology caused these imperial spaces to be very fragmented: the first circumnavigation of the planet by the Magellan expedition is an adventure lasting three years (September 20, 1519 - September 6, 1522), and even in 1779 it takes nearly one year to take to Madras the news of the war declaration of Spain to England, bur twenty years later von Humboldt sailed from La Coruña (Spain) to Cumanà (Venezuela) in forty days.

Man overcomes the limits of space action of the time factor by mens of technological innovation. The onset of the infrastructural revolution is a vital part of the Industrial Revolution. Key dates are 1825 (the first railway line, between Stockton and Darlington) and 1914 (la first regular airline). The railways, the steamship, the car, the plane are the chief agents of this conquest of space. In the same period, covering the latter part of the First Industrial Revolution and the whole of the Second Industrial Revolution, one more momentous change takes place: the divorce between the transport networks and the networks catering for the circulation of information: while telegraph lines followed the railway lines, the telephone and the wireless developed quite independently of transport lines.

With the conquest of space, its Euclidean geometry measured in kilometres have been replaced by the new geometry of infrastructure and accessibility, grounded upon times and frequencies. It is a powerful geometry, which restructures the territory in depth: a strongly visible geometry, often on purpose, precisely as an exhibition of power. So, if the packet linked London and Bombay in mid-19th century in a month, and Jules Verne, around 1870 described a journey around the world in eighty days, in 1909 the "Mauritania" conquered the record of the North Atlantic crossing in just four days and a half.

However, money swiftly became the unit of measure of the new geometry, since in the overall balance between the factors cost and time, the former prevails on the latter, according to Smith's more general paradigm whereby industrial society develops its territorial construction. The classic model, which von Thünen devised, between 1826 and 1863, for agriculture, became the basic reference for any study of land use anywhere, so much so that, in current language, distinguishing between planned and unplanned territories one tends to forget that the latter are far from "spontaneous", but built according to the logic mentioned above. Even cost minimization for the maximization of profit produces spatial frameworks geared to local peculiarities and identities, to geomorphological, economic and web characters, bringing about well structured territorial mosaics and a peaceful coexistence between "global" and "local". Not by chance Von Thünen names his model "isolated State", and non surprisingly the logic of this model is still visible, in spite of the swift evolution of transport networks, in the landscapes of our contryside up to the Fifties and Sixties.

In the Seventies takes place that great transport revolution, of which the man in the street has a rather dimmed perception in comparison with other technological innovations, but which is the true harbinger of globalization and brings revolutionary change in society and geographic space. This revolution begins in sea transport and continues on land, making an updating of networks and strategies unavoidable: the unitization of the trasport cycle brought about by containerization triggers circuits around the world and erases or minimizes the previous spatial constraints on trasport cost. The monetary measure of space has shrunk, since cost differences between the various segments have disappeared, becoming independent from means of transport and natural conditions, due to the logic of "door to door" service. Passenger air traffic has reached the record of the Paris-New York flight with a Concorde in less than four hours, e about forty-eight hours for a trip around the world on regular flights. If cost differentials are still considerable between the elitarian Concorde (phased out in 2003, but probably to be replaced by similar or more advanced planes) and the other planes, the latter are subject to market laws, rather than to social utility, which tend to make them cheaper.

At the same time, the swift innovative evolution of computer science and computer networks is strengthening the transport revolution, by providing the necessary technological support and globalizing communications: the first Internet proto-

col dates back 1983 (see Cerf and R. Kahn), and from 1988 was spread by Harvard University, till the formation, in 1991, of ISOC, a non-profit non governmental organization, to carry out management at world level (in 2000 it grouped over 175 organizations and 870 individual subscribers in 170 countries).

The economic evolution of the most advanced countries reached the post-industrial stage, in which the highest profits no longer come from production of goods but from services, and in particular from finance. This is what the media recall us every day: we are "global", we know and see "the whole world", but in fact the world has gone "virtual", not only because we only see what very few news networks (CNN, NBC, BBC, Reuters, and so forth) decide we should see, but because it has dematerialized: money is exchanged electronically, the value of currencies is no longer linked to production and reserves but exchanges – from inland-built aquaparks to American supermarkets mimicking European or exotic landscapes, and even the artificial reproduction of sensorial emotions – seem to have replaced reality. Even traditional views of territorial organization are being challenged. Transport networks are visible, but information circulation has become more and more powerful and invisible, even in its infrastructures – by now basically satellites.

Ongoing territorial restructuring starts to explode the contradictions between previous patterns and the transition towards the new. Therefore the more visible characters of globalization, such as "diffusion" or "omologation", with their positive results in terms improving living standards (see, for example, the fall of mortality rates and the population growth of less developed countries thanks to the introduction of modern medicine), due to processes of concentration and hierarchization, lead to increasing economic imbalances and domination effects. If it is true that the administrative network of the political actor tends to immobility whereas that of the economic actor tends to functional flexibility (Raffestin 1980), there is no doubt that the social and spatial system is more favourable to the latter, and it is perhaps even too obvious that politics has become impotent to control the upheavals – economic and environmental – caused by globalization.

The huge migrations produced by wealth concentration and the new international division of labour, have practically done away with State borders. For example, paradoxycally, foreigners entering Italy without permit are defined "clandestine", "irregular" or even "illegal", yet they are not subject to any sanction. This is no Italian peculiarity, since also the *Protocole contre le trafic illicite de migrants par terre, air et mer, additionnel à la Convention des Nations Unies contre la criminalité transnationale* (2000) – ratified, however, by seventeen States only, besides dealing with the prevention and repression of the illegal traffic of migrants, does not suggest any sanction. Hence follows a further paradox: a State giving up its *raison d'être*, while these movements occur normally from low density areas to areas with a higher density, thereby worsening the problem of the concentration limit. Neither are environmental problems are suitably managed by the States, as shown by international agreements more destined to the show business than to practical implementation.

In the new scenario of contemporary globalization, the previous political system has become dissolved, with no well defined alternative system appearing as yet. We can see a single world State actor which, however, is far from possessing structure and means adequate to master the system. The network of independent States, strenghtened by stable alliances, did cover the whole world precisely thanks to the now defunct multipolar system. The synergic combination of energy and information functional to confrontation with "the other", does not work any longer, there being no similar opponent. The means for a confrontation produced and perfected for that strategic scenario are no longer useful in the changed conditions. Bearing in mind all this, the solution of a single super-State, viewed as a functional adaptation of politics to global conditions, seems at best farfetched, and doubtless it could not be reduced to a mere enlargement of the American block, as shown by the latter's weakness, if not clumsiness, in managing the latest developments.

In my view, the mournful attack of September 11, 2001 to the New York Twin Towers and the Washington Pentagon has little to do with previous terror attacks, (from the earliest hijackings of planes in the Sixties to terror outrages in Munich and elsewhere), neither has it been the first terror attack in the USA (suffice to recall the explosion, February 26, 1993 by Islamic terrorists at the World Trade Center in New York, which caused six casualties, and the car-bomb on April 19, 1995 by T. Mc Veigh against a federal buiding in Oklahoma City which caused 168 casualties and 500 wounded). Also the spectacular power whereby the September 11 attack has been carried out, as well as the symbolic meaning of the targets chosen (the hearts of business and defense), are far from being what really matters: The point is rather that

such a horrible outrage is a token of the new world system.

A return to localism?

The growing weakening of the political actor in governing the territory, and the demise of its organizational network within globalization, is linked to a return of the *espace vécu*, of strict territoriality as a feeling of spatial identity of human groups (Soja 1971, Fremont 1976, 1980), through increasing localisms and regionalisms on an ethnic and/or religious base. This is an ever present phenomenon in political conflict, but in the Nineties it multiplies all over the world, from former USSR to China and Africa, and, above all, it finds in the muslim religion an international "glue" which eventually brings about a unity and an alternative model to set against the "Western-liberistic" one in the ideological-cultural clash which accompanies globalization and has reached the level of extreme, irreversible violence.

State organization tends to stability and centralized network, The "ideological actor", instead, operates by open networks. "Un réseaux comme internet ou Al-Qaeda a une structure maillé et ouverte. Il n'a pas de structures fixes et se constitue au fur et à mesure de la connexion de ses divers élèments: Le système (...) est constitué de points névralgiques, dont l'ensemble constitue le centre de gravité de l'organisation terroriste" (Baud 2003). Both actors dictate laws and organizational management; but the while State actor, in Western democracies, is subject to the consent of the governed, the ideological actor, especially when it is also "religious", becomes self-referential.

On the ground, the State actor offers visible and territorialized targets in higher numbers than can be defended, whereas the ideological actor materializes above all in the adepts hiding as much as possible even its logistic supports, included the financial ones (it is utterly impossible to spot and seize the *zaqt*, the "donations of the believers" which feed Al-Qaeda). The apparatus, often even hypertrofic, and the military philosophy of the State actor are still stuck to the open battle of armies; those of the ideological actor embody the latest evolution terror and guerrilla technology, whose scenarios and sanctuaries were already seen by Debray (1967) to be shifting from the mountain to the city. There follows also a difference in the choice of targets: rigorously military and to be hit with extreme precision with the smallest possible number of victims in the former case, indiscriminate and with the highest number of victims in the latter. For example, in Iraq in October 2003, for the first time in history, an unmistakable Red Cross hospital has been the target of a bloody terror attack.

The defeat of the winner

The asymmetry of fighting forces is only seemingly in favour of the State actor. J. Baud (2003), speaks of "the defeat of the winner" if the latter does not understand better its enemy and its strategies and knows how to oppose it with flexibility, in peace and war, coherently in different spaces, in the persuasion that "(...) *le succès n'est pas associé à un nombre de morts, mais à la réaction provoquée par les destructions. La guerre asymétrique n'a ni visage, ni solution unique (...)*".

It is a war in which the most important feature is information: this is obvious from the statements of terrorists and the means they use. Let us bear in mind, for example, the slogan by Khomeini of the USA and the West seen as "the great satan", and the *Jihad*, against them, sometimes even repeated by leaders of Arab States, and the actions of armed fundamentalist movements, from the Palestininians to Al-Qaeda. From the opposite side we have the statements by Bush (2002) on "rogue States" and the "'axys of evil" (Iraq, Lybia, Iran e North Korea). As to action, let us consider the spectacularity of the action and the suite of new technologies: the "war broadcast live" by television networks (from CNN to Al-Jazeera) or, on the line of the questions without answers listed by Hoffmann (2002), we must ask ourselves why terrorists do not use missiles or teleguided weapons instead of homicides-suicides. The founding innovations of globalization are part and parcel of the "new wars": not only the whole electronic technology goes into providing increasing precision to military hardware, but computer science and networks have become key components of intelligence opertations (bear in mind, for example, the Echelon system), as well as in the formation of new strategic dimensions in infosphere and cyberspace, where both sides come to grips every day in the use of mass-media and with actions on Internet.

However, the "defeat of the winner" is beginning to be understood by the State actor in the conduct of military operations. Witness of that is the management of wars in Afghanistan and Iraq with a conscious attempt to cause the lowest possible number of victims and the "minimum force" reactions to guerrilla and terror attacks. It is in the

political management that the ability to understand better the opponent is still faulty, probaby because the open structure of the enemy, which allows formation and dissolution of groups, not always homogenous, contributes to mask identity and strategy, being also well supported by the spectacular manifestations of dissent which exploded in the Nineties against the Western world. Beyond the traditional functions as "fifth column", the medley of "movements" ("people of Seattle", Third World mongers, ecologists, animalists, noglobals, "blocks" of various colours, and so forth). These, by uncritically accusing "globalization" of every possible environmental "damage" and of every possible human difference and social injustice of the planet stresses only and exclusively the economy, and meeting the broadest consensus of pacifist and "humanitarian" associations, so that even many politicians become convinced, in the end, that this is the true reason of the conflict.

But the origin is instead openly ideological, as also people of the "movements" would understand if only they listened to what the other side is saying. Osama Bin Laden was absolutely clear, in the three points of the declaration of the World Islamic Front (February 23, 1998): the USA have been occupying for seven years the "sacred" land of Islam in its most "sacred" part (Saudi Arabia); the USA, with the alliance of "crusaders" and "zionists", persist in devastating war initiatives to "destroy and humiliate" the muslims; this objective, together with the economic one of the possession by "crusaders" of local resources, is abetting the occupations and the massacres made by the "zionist" State. Whatever meaning we give to *jihad* (occasional "holy" war against a particular enemy) and *gharb* (permanent cleavage and conflict) and their dichotomies of the world, divided into *dar el-Islam* (house of Islam) e *dar el-kurf* (house of ungodliness), both in the sense that the latter <u>must</u> become *dar el-kurb* (house of war) to be conquered to the "faith", as stated by Mohammed in his Letter to the Persians of 633: "Become muslims and be saved (...) otherwise I will march against you with men who love death as much as you love wine" (Reysset & Widemann 1997), or in the sense that it <u>can</u> become *dar el-kurb*, and only partially, bearing in mind that the *jihad* is basically a war of defence (Baud 2003), it is in any case a fact that the shift of the conflict from the ideologiocal arena to the economic weakens the political actor, obliging it to lay out a considerable energy expenditure for objectives which may even be potentially counterproducing.

Shifting conflict paradigms

Let us bear in mind a few examples. The environmental problem, for instance: no doubt Western technology and mode of production may bring about environmental damages which must be countered by suitable, and costly, actions by the producers themselves (and this is being increasingly done); but, in strictly ecological terms, a no less serious environmental threat is the exponential population increase just in countries with Islamic majorities and in general in Third World countries, whose governments are always ready to upbraid the West for all and sundry evils (the noglobals accurately shun this point). The "rich" Western Sates have started long ago to act against hunger and poverty by international aid and cancellation of debts, whereas Arab petrodollars are signally absent from the scene of aid to the Third World. On the contrary, by causing successive oil crises, the Arab oil producers have damaged especially the poorer countries (without forgetting how much of oil revenues were used to feed terror movements in Palestine and elsewhere).

The "moral obligation" to intervene in the struggle against hunger and poverty (referred to also by the UNO, for example in the *Human Development Report* of April 1992) is being laid only upon the West on the basis of the mistifying idea (held by noglobal movements and literature, also geographic, smacking of "Third World-ism") that Western wealth is based on the "exploitation" of poorer countries (Johnston & Taylor 1986), in spite of the fact that wealth differentials can be interpreted far more convincingly as a consequence of *internal* factors (Kohlhammer 1992). Economic statistics show, *inter alia*, that rich countries do not consume more than they produce, that they exchange among themselves more than 70% of the entire world commerce, that in the export of raw materials the share of industrialized countries is twice as much that of the others and, with the exception Persian Gulf countries and the sub-Saharan Africa, underdeveloped countries export more manufactured products than raw materials. From the very beginning of the Industrial Revolution, in Britain, internal factors (both in terms of intellectual resources, i.e. innovations, and of raw materials, with the only exception of cotton, important but not decisive) were clearly predominant (Biagini 2004).

The upshot of all this is that the Third World exploits and blackmails the First: "That we live at the expense of Third World countries, that our wealth is based on the misery and exploitation of

the Third World is a very widespread prejudice: in the ranks of the Left and among Greens of every hue, among "open" Catholics, pacifists, men of good will (moderate and extremists), the most literarily inspired authors and their sensitive readers, in short: among Beautiful Souls". In a note, Kohlhammer explains: "I borrow this term from the hero of the Third World, Saddam Hussein" (see Bittermann 1991, Kohlhammer 1992).

One must also bear in mind that, out of nearly 175 million migrant estimated by UNO in 2000 (United Nations 2002), 60% is in developed countries, whereas for 16 more million refugees 81% is in less developed countries. The former percentage might even appear lower than expected, although it does not overturn expectations, contrary to the views of Caritas, which estimates that there are more migrants in developing countries (98,678,000, or 56,3%) than in advanced ones (76,441,000, or 43,7%). In fact, the UNO report gives 104,119,000 migrants in "more developed regions" (59,6%) and 70,662,000 "less developed regions" (40,4%), of which 10,458,000 in "least developed countries". It is doubtful whether these statistics possess any credibility. It seems that even the United Nations give for the same year 2000 diverging figures, as not even the total coincides: 175,119,000 according to Caritas and 174,781,000 for the UNO.

But considering that the United States alone receive 20% of migrants and Europe (fifteen countries) the 15.1%, the concentration is evident: in comparison with a world average of 3 migrants upon 100 residents, the figure for the USA is 12 to 100 and for Europe 7 to 100. These comparisons appear meaningful, as they do not depend upon statistic forcing (smallness of the reference figure) or upon exceptional events (natural calamities or local wars). Moreover, in all official data immigration is clearly underestimated. Not only the impossibility to estimate its clandestine component, but also its doubling in the last twenty years has prompted the comment that it is "no passing phenomenon, but a structural dimension of society". For example, in the case of Italy, in comparison with 1,512,324 residence permits, the organization Caritas estimates 2,469,324 presences "regular foreigners", but does not even attempt to quantify the "irregulars". Data on economic activity are also unreliable, as well as those on remittances, and the average amount of such remittances for each "Gastarbeiter". The so-called "informal" economy (*lavoro nero*) and illegal activities are therefore deemed to be of unknown, but most probably huge proportions. Finally, migrant flows are managed and exploited with increasing profits by truly criminal organizations, against which the United Nations have published two Protocols in the year 2000.

Precisely the latter feature brings to the fore the problem of the weakening of the "State" actor. If the clandestine passage costs, according to the route, from thousand to ten thousand dollars, while the pro capite income of the fifty poorer States ranges between 100 and 500 dollars a year, the outcome can only be the transformation of the clandestine into a slave of the organization paying for his journey (Marotta 1997): the result is an increase of labour force for the informal economy if all goes well, but often for criminal activities; but in both cases the damage for society al large and the "State" actor is evident. Neither is it to be forgotten the active presence, among the crowds of illegal immigrants, of members of the fundamentalist organizations mentioned above (shown even more than by the statements of the immigrants, by the itineraries and the location of the bases supporting the immigrant flows) and the alarming picture is complete. Even without accepting the hypothesis of deliberate invasions (Tani 2002), it is undeniable that, due to immigration, the rising percentage of muslims in Western Europe is creating problems. As a consequence, the limits between tolerance of minorities, and dissent of laws and cultures from those of the majorities, appear rather ambiguous. Even the declaration of 1988 of Europe as *dar el-Islam* (Kepel 2000), could be rather optimistically understood as a move towards reciprocal tolerance, or as prompting to muslim communities to apply the *Sharia*, which, as all know, is not precisely compatible with European laws.

Paradoxically, in their support of the abatement of any frontier and the absolute right to mobility, "noglobal" movements find their better and more powerful ally just in those "economic" actors whose world-wide strategy comes under "noglobal" attack. If the different attitude towards migration, is one of the classical examples of the diverging strategy between the "economic" actor (favourable to open frontiers) and the "political" actor (inclined to control migration), the present identity of opinions between the Caritas and the World Bank attributing the need of migration to a lack of equal distribution of world wealth: a populistic attitude that has little to do with equity, and also clashes both against the biblical principle to earn bread with the sweat of the forehead as well as against the liberist principles underlying loans and bank policies. However, the paradox can also throw new light on the global system.

The need to strengthen the role of politics

The collapse of the Berlin Wall, besides marking the disappearance of one the great world powers, marks the fall of the prevalence of its model of priority of the "political actor" upon the "economic", and the latter is further strenghtened by the territorialization generated by globalization, which the "political actor" seems unable to govern. Moreover the "economic actor" enjoys the advantage, like the "ideological actor", of an open and flexible network, and also capitalizes on the notion that his "economic support" is "indispensable" to the "political actor". It follows a feedback whereby, as the economy rules, politics is regarded as responsible for new or lingering problems, internal or external, and therefore becomes the target of far-flung attacks which weaken it and increase its submission to the economy.

It is a perverse feed back, on the same line as that eccess of economicism which, as already stressed several years ago (Da Pozzo 1991, 1992), marred an understanding of ecosistems and, after producing multiple disasters, claimed to be able to solve problems by further "economic" inputs. In conclusion, if the idea that innovative information capable to bring about a replacement of oil with a different energy source will deprive the "antagonist" actor of his main support is probably true, a different pattern of relationships between the "political actor" and the "economic" is called for, lest another "antagonist actor" emerge, supported by some other pressure group linked to the new energy source.

It is therefore plain, in systems logic, that increasing allometric growth plunges the system into a crisis: but the ideologization of problems mentioned above is obscuring the economic allometry. In other words, many do not realize that phenomena of "concentration", "specialization", "continuous growth" (of income or population, no matter), and so forth, are all processes moved by the present logic, but opposed to those ruling the ecosystem. Bearing in mind that the same economicistic approach is applied to the measures for environmental protection, which calls for a reorientation, including a speedy recover of strength and credibility of the "political" actor, not in ideological terms denying the value of globalization, but aiming at reorganizing space on the basis of rational strategies.

Besides the large scale processes outlined above, the economic literature of Anglo-Saxon countries increasingly stresses the need of "glocal" (global+local) development to give space to the local ability to manage rules and global flows. I am persuaded that a geographic glocal should be developed, based on a renewed governance of the territory, the seat of local day to day activity. This is where the political actor has, nowadays, the greater practical opportunity of balancing the economic actor, thereby tempering market logic with a planning practice grounded on scientific rationality, introducing zoning controls and building a network of local success stories. This may allow the realization of the overworked (to nausea level) "sustainable development" not in its belittling economic meaning, but in the broader and desirable sense of way of life sustainability.

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Massimo De Leonardis

Conflict in inter-state relations

Riassunto. - I conflitti nei rapporti interstatali

La guerra è antica come il mondo. Il vero problema è se mai spiegare l'origine del pacifismo che è estremamente recente e risale alla reazione emotiva ai massacri delle due guerre mondiali. La guerra è cambiata moltissimo nel corso del tempo, sebbene le linee essenziali siano rimaste sostanzialmente simili. Oggi sono scomparsi sia la dichiarazione di guerra sia il trattato di pace. I conflitti sono divenuti endemici. Il fatto che l'Europa sia stata scarsamente coinvolta in guerre aperte dopo la fine della seconda guerra mondiale, almeno fino ai conflitti in Bosnia e nel Kosovo negli anni Novanta, ha creato un senso di falsa sicurezza. Inoltre l'interesse alla pace maschera il fatto che alcune nazioni vogliono conservare lo staus quo senza dover combattere, ed altre vogliono cambiarlo pure senza dover combattere. In realtà non è con il pacifismo che è stata vinta la guerra fredda contro il comunismo, e neppure col pacifismo può vincersi la guerra contro il terrorismo. In quanto idea astratta portata avanti senza badare alle conseguenze reali, il pacifismo è moralmente assai meno difendibile del realismo, che si limita a prendere atto dell'inevitabilità dei conflitti.

Political systems, international relations and types of war

"War appears to be as old as mankind, but peace is a modern invention" (Sir Henry Maine, quoted by Howard 2000). This sentence of a 19th century English legal scholar gives expression to a proven fact. On the constant presence of war in history we might provide anthropological, psychological, sociological explanations (Wright 1942). To limit ourselves to historical ages, from the bat-tle of Thermopylae to the Hiroshima bomb, war has known countless varieties; however, *The art of war* by Sun Tzu, dating back to the 6th century BC is still reprinted and studied in military academies. Some "novelties" are not so new under a conceptual viewpoint after all.

Theological explanations are also possible (*Gaudium et spes*): a Catholic knows well that "insofar as men are sinful, the threat of war hangs over them, and it will hang over them until the return of Christ". It is known that von Clausewitz (1980) defines war as "not (...) a mere political act, but a true *instrument* of politics, a follow-up of the political procedure, its continuation with other means". Since man is a "political animal", a close relation must exist between human nature and war. War, in fact is more ancient than political institutions, "war antedates the State, diplomacy and strategy by many millennia" (Keegan 1994). We are going to examine here above all the evolution of war in the contemporary age, and its link with changes in international relations (Best 1980, 1982, Bonanate 1998, Bond 1984, Howard 1983).

The fact that war was regarded as a "natural" phenomenon, did not exclude a condemnation of its evils. Without indulging to pacifism, the Church, from St. Augustine onwards, made clear the rules of just war, both as *jus ad bellum* and as *jus in bello*. Humanists also entered the fray: Erasmus from Rotterdam defined Mars "the stupidest of all the (...) gods", in an essay attacking war on emotional rather than rational grounds (Howard 1981). By will of rulers, "the exhortation to peace, accompanied by detailed and dramatic descriptions of the benefits of peace, opened with long

preambles the treatises of the 15th and 16th centuries", moving "from a discourse centred on religious precept of peace to a concern for the disasters caused by war", even if sometimes such harangues were just opening statements to war alliances and therefore "there was a strident gap between expressions of generous, utopian intentions, and the harsh realities of the implacable unfolding of history" (Annoni 1996).

Just at the outset of the modern age, wars became far harsher than those of the Middle Ages, which were instead comparatively bloodless and chivalrous (Contamine 1980), (at least between Christians). In the 16th century and the first half of the 17th, ruthless conflicts erupted, in connection both with "military revolution" (Parker 1988), entailing the diffusion of gunpowder, new weapons and new organizational models, and with ideological factors linked to the religious strife brought about by the "reformation". After the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, however, war was fought in a more restrained way, again for reasons both technological and "ideological". Professional armies were a precious asset in the 18th century, and commanders were reluctant to risk decisive open battles. Wars unfolded regularly from beginning to end, an arrangement which was done away only with the First World War. The pattern was as follows: a crisis regarded as unsolvable by means of negotiations, an ultimatum or an incident, followed by the formal war declaration; after hostilities came an armistice then, after a period of variable length, a formal peace treatise (Holsti 1996).

The international system born at Westphalia assumed a homogeneous European society of sovereign States, whose ruling policy was equilibrium; religion was no longer a motive for conflict, whereas ideology was not yet one. There were no absolute enemies, but only rivals, who, thanks to the widely spread custom of the overturning of alliances, could become the allies of tomorrow (Luard 1992). War, therefore, did not aim to the annihilation of adversaries. At the same time, in the 18th and 19th centuries, as the international acknowledgement of the spiritual overlordship of the Church had come to an end, and the concept, derived from Machiavelli, of sovereignty as a blanket legitimization of the actions of the State, both led to discussions on "just war" being left aside, so that international law "has (...) no alternative but to accept war, independently of the justice of its origin, as a relation which the parties (...) may set up if they choose, and to busy itself only in regulating the effect of the relation" (Anderson 1933). Utopian writers hatched project after project of perpetual peace by means of societies of States: all these projects had to wait for the 20th century to be tested, and to be found unworkable.

With the French revolution, war became again a totalitarian affair, with the *levée en masse* and the strategy of Napoleon, based on a decisive open battle, and the ideological proclamation of the revolutionary "crusade". "*Il faut déclarer la guerre aux rois ei la paix aux nations!*", cried out MP Merlin de Thionville at the war declaration of April 20, 1792; "*paix aux chaumières, guerre aux châteaux!*", wrote the philosopher and scientist Condorcet (Tulard, Fayard & Fierro 1988). The revolution unleashed a civil war inside (with its Vandean climax) and in the invaded countries, where the armies of revolutionary and Napoleonic France found allies, but especially opponents, such as Catholic and monarchic insurgents (Godechot 1961, Viglione 1999): a pattern destined to be repeated in the Second World War, with collaborationists and anti-Nazi partisans, and which would have been repeated if the cold war had become hot and Soviet armies had invaded western Europe, finding road companions, but also anticommunist fighters. Sovereigns in past times had sometimes supported rebel subjects to other sovereigns with whom they were at war, but not without moral scruples and attaching no ideological connotations to the fact. ("*Mit Gott, für König und Vaterland*", motto of the Prussian *Landwehr*, can be regarded as the conservative answer to the revolutionary "nation in arms"). Those who supported the enemy were quite simply regarded as traitors. With the Nazi and communist "internationals", the problem of "twofold allegiance", either to the State or the ideology, arose again.

Between 1815 and 1914, the international system was substantially ruled by the "European agreement" of great powers, with episodes of closer or lesser cooperation and awareness to belong to a common "European society" and, in the final stage, a rising difficulty to contain rivalries and nationalistic thrusts. Ideology, in this case the principles of liberty and nationality, at least till the unification of Italy, played an important role, but in any case constantly in connection with classical principles of power politics, so that even the great revolutionary explosion of 1848-49 did not upset peace among the great powers. The wars of that century were short, limited to some powers only at a time and had no social consequences. "Before 1914 war was almost universally considered an acceptable, perhaps an inevitable and for many people a desirable way of settling international differences, and (...) the war generally foreseen

was expected to be, if not exactly *frisch und fröhlich*, then certainly brief; no longer, certainly, than the war of 1870 that was consciously or unconsciously taken by that generation as a model" (Taylor 1954). "Perpetual peace is a dream, and not even a beautiful dream – stated Marshal Helmut von Moltke, and Wilhelm II: "War is an element of the divine order of the world. In it are developed the noblest virtues of man: courage and self-denial, fidelity to duty and the spirit of sacrifice; soldiers give their lives. Without war, the world would stagnate and lose itself in materialism" (Best 1980).

In the ages considered so far, as well as in the previous and following ones, two models of war emerged alternatively: between opponents fighting over matters of interest, but within the framework of a shared institutional and value system, or between enemies divided by irreconcilable *Weltaschauungen* and political systems (Miglio 1988). As Raymond Aron (1992) points out, as to ideology, international systems can be homogenous or non homogenous: the former will fight wars of the first type, such as between Westphalia and the French Revolution as well as between 1815 and 1914, the latter are going to unleash wars of the second type, such as the wars of religion, those of revolutionary and Napoleonic France, the Second World War. Von Clausewitz (1980) aptly stressed that the appearance of an actor, revolutionary France, by its rejection of the ruling system, led to absolute war.

Solid interests are negotiable, but not *Weltanschauungen*. Speaking of *Realpolitik*, national interest, or diplomacy based on ideological principles, it is worthwhile to quote Aron (1992): "The concept of national interest implies simply that rulers are concerned mostly of the nation of which they are responsible, of its security and its existence, that they do not set themselves overambitious objectives, they do not harbour illusions as to the resources at their disposal and do not dream to change the world. Vague slogans – a world safe for democracy, collective security, and similar – end up normally in wars spreading and getting gangrenous. Far from being guilty, the egoism of nations is reasonable and even moral. Diplomats inspired by idealist views let themselves be misled by a cherished dream of a universally valid conception of national or international society. So, idealism degrades into imperialism". Also Morgenthau (1951) points out that realism is far more moral than irresponsible idealism, which busies itself with good intentions disregarding results.

The multifarious reality of history constantly compels to bear in mind exceptions to rigorous taxonomies. With reason Howard (1981) defines

"bold and unhistorical" the statement by Montesquieu that the "the spirit of monarchy is war and enlargement of dominion: peace and moderation are the spirit of a republic". In the various ages, besides the prevailing type of war, there might have been others, perhaps in different geopolitical areas; within the same conflict various kinds of war can coexist. The Second World War witnessed chivalrous episodes worthy of the Middle Ages and ruthless brutalities. After 1945, as well as after 1990, it seems conflicts of past ages have all left their own legacy.

The impact of the first world war

There is no doubt that the Great War ("the first conflict in which the main combatants suffered more casualties by enemy action than by disease", see Bond 1984) upset the perception of war (Mueller 1991). Until that moment, ruling opinion had it that having resort to military force by a State was entirely legitimate, that it was the most typical attribute of sovereignty; war was also extolled as an experience in which the noblest virtues of man came to the fore. The Great War, so long, bloody, total, midwife of dreadful socio-political upheavals, different from the short non general conflicts of the 19th century, gave rise to new ways of thinking. During that conflict three "new diplomacy" patterns arose: wilsonian, bolshevik, and that of the Papacy, which all repudiated, more or less in good faith, the war. In reality only the Church was going to keep faith to a "pacifist" position. The communists exploited the weariness towards war to achieve power and consolidate it, they made peace, bidding their time in order to develop the military power of the Soviet State. The United States, after the utopias of the Twenties and Thirties, have made of military force one of the pillars of their empire, neither could it have been otherwise.

At the top of the fond hopes placed on the new concept of "collective security" (Andreatta 2000), war was naively "outlawed" by the well-known Kellogg-Briand Agreement of 1928, whose article 1 read: "The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare in the names of their respective peoples that they condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, and renounce it, as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another", admitting therefore only a war declared by the international community against a country acknowledged as aggressor by the Society of Nations. In some enlightening pag-

es of 1932 and 1938, Carl Schmitt (1972) submitted that agreement and the Society of Nations to a pressing critique, forecasting that their effects were going to be not the giving up of force in international relations, but merely the disappearance of war declarations. Already the war of 1937 between China and Japan was not formally declared, because none of the opponents had any interest to do it, and the same occurred in all conflicts following the Second World War. After 1945, a "typical war" does not begin with a declaration of war, often does not lend itself to a precise identification of the opening date of hostilities, can last tens of years (as the Vietnam conflict, in its two stages, French and American, or the uprising in Eritrea begun in 1961 and ended only in 1991, with occasional fighting still erupting on the border between the two countries), and does not end with a formal peace treaty (as the war in Korea) (Holsti 1991).

Again, Schmitt had foreseen that "An imperialism based on economic grounds will naturally endeavour to create a world situation in which it can employ openly, to the extent which is necessary to it, its means of economic power, such as credit restrictions, embargoes of raw materials, devaluation of foreign currency and so forth. It will regard as 'extra-economic violence' an attempt by a people or another human group to avoid the effects of these "peaceful" means. For example, in 1941, Japan, faced by measures decreed by Washington, such as the oil embargo, the "freezing" of Japanese assets in the United States, and the restrictions to commerce, resorted to "extra-economic violence" and launched its planes against Pearl Harbor.

The more insightful observation by Schmitt (1972), however, was this: "If a State fights its political enemy in the name of mankind, what it really fights is not a war of mankind, but a war whereby a given State seeks to master, against its opponent, a universal concept in order to become identified with it at the expense of its enemy (...) The concept of "mankind" is a particularly suitable tool for imperialistic expansion and is, in its ethico-humanitarian form, a specific means of economic imperialism. In this regard, though with a necessary adaptation, a saying by Proudhon, is particularly to the point: "he who talks of mankind, wishes to deceive you". Here are the far origins of a new tongue of Orwellian hue, already emerging in 1914 with the slogan, *summa* of the idealistic illusions (or hypocrisies?), by H. G. Wells on "the war to end all wars", which came to a climax in 1999 in the oxymoron of the "humanitarian war" (Howard 1981). But is it true progress to call a war "international police operation" or "peace enforcement"?

"In the fifteen years after the First World War, – wrote Edward Carr (1951) – every Great Power (except, perhaps, Italy) repeatedly did lip-service to the doctrine by declaring peace to be one of the main objects of its policy. But (...) peace in itself is a meaningless aim (...) The common interest in peace masks the fact that some nations desire to maintain the *status quo* without having to fight for it, and others to change the *status quo* without having to fight in order to do so". If there has been a century scourged by wars which, to a far greater extent than in any other age, were violently ideological, this has been precisely the 20th" (Garibaldi 2001).

The cold war

The moral condemnation of war was even greater after the Second World War, not least because of the dreadful devastations suffered by Europe. The dismissal of the use of military force from the horizon of possible options, however, was far stronger in the defeated countries, Germany and Italy, than in those which had won, or thought they had, Great Britain and France, all the more because the latter had to face decolonization conflicts in their vanishing empires.

A wholesale war, however, was made impossible above all by the equilibrium of terror: the so-called "mutual assured destruction". War in Europe was only "cold". The Old Continent stayed in peace for 45 years; but the cold war period was not so peaceful overseas, where the two blocks clashed in the so-called "wars by proxy", from Korea to Vietnam and Afghanistan, to the manifold communist guerrillas. Whereas in Europe a phony war, "rich and virtual", was being fought, elsewhere true wars erupted, dirty, "poor and solid". The widespread perception of a forty years peace period, followed by a conflict-ridden post-bipolar world, must be revised. According to a study, between 1951 and 1985 there have been 174 conflicts, lasting in average five years, with a prevalence of civil wars (but with a sizeable participation of external actors) on inter-State wars (which, according to Holsti, in their classical form have only been 18% of conflicts after 1945). The areas more frequently plagued by war were, in decreasing order, Africa, Asia, Latin America, the Near and Middle East. A further estimate gives, in the whole period after the Second World War,

376 conflicts (Coccia 1988). Studies of the *Center for International Development and Conflict Management* of the University of Maryland for the period 1945-1990, basically supported by researches of other organizations such as Sipri of Stockholm and the University of Heidelberg, have shown that, during the cold war age, the number and intensity of local wars had been increasing, and had reached a climax immediately before the collapse of the Soviet regime. In the Nineties, conflicts gradually diminished.

The distorted perception of almost half century of peace, followed by ten years of conflicts is probably due to the fact that, in the Nineties, war reappeared in Europe, NATO has fired its first shots in anger, and the Armed Forces of countries such as Italy have newly undertaken large scale military operations abroad, whereas previously they had just garrisoned a "Fortezza Bastiani": this being the name of an imaginary fortress from a novel entitled *Il deserto dei Tartari*, where an attack is constantly expected but never takes place until it is too late for the main character to take part in the struggle (Buzzati 1940).

Cold war armies were not engaged in warfare: they only existed as a deterrent. Nowadays, on the contrary, they must be ready to fight in foreign lands, whereas conscript armies for border defence are outdated. Thus the present trend towards building professional armies is irresistible. But, except Yugoslavia, all the rest of Europe has stayed quiet. None of the wars which could reasonably be hypothesized, such as between Rumania and Hungary for the Transilvanian Hungarian minorities, between Greece and Turkey for Cyprus, or an intervention from Moscow in support of Russian minorities, have taken place. At least in the short term, war seems to have disappeared from Europe. Even in the Middle East, after the four Israeli-Arab wars between 1948 and 1973, the escalation from intifada to terrorism and its repression have not triggered a renewed attack upon Israel from the surrounding countries.

The cold war exercised a function of structural control on extant ethnical and sub-national ambitions, which, being no longer repressed, have been able to achieve pride of place. Moreover, the "end of the cold war has finally wiped out the interdependence between local conflicts and the global conflict", which can be a desirable development, but can also lessen the predictability and the opportunity of crisis management (Clark 2001).

The upshot of the rise of new nuclear powers are the object of contrasting evaluations. For some, a higher number of nuclear powers increases the probability of an atomic war. Others, however, in the persuasion that nuclear weapons have preserved peace during the cold war and that the same effect might be obtained nowadays too, maintain that we should applaud nuclear proliferation instead of deploring it, and that, within a nuclear context, States behave more cautiously. Perhaps the relationships between India and Pakistan are under control just because they are both nuclear powers, and perhaps Iraq would not have attacked Iran if Teheran had been a nuclear power. This thesis, however, raises several objections. Even more than during the cold war, nuclear weapons could escape governmental control, by mistake or insubordination. A situation of nuclear inequality between two rivals could induce the opponent, persuaded to enjoy a significant advantage, to unleash a "pre-emptive strike". Furthermore, there is the problem of the "mad tyrant or mad State", giving little heed to the safety of his own society, regarded as "impure", and therefore fearing no disastrous losses (Waltz 1981, Nicholson 2000). It is doubtless difficult to stop the proliferation. As the redefinition of regional geopolitical balances calls for the consent of the American superpower, the medium or small powers are tempted to raise their contractual weight by going nuclear.

The post-bipolar disorder

The West has won the cold war with the USSR, and for ten years has thought that the world was certainly far less peaceful than hoped, but that anyhow there was no new strategic threat. But 11 September 2001 has revealed a new enemy: Islamic terrorism. Truly, an unlucky Secretary General of NATO, Willy Claes, already in February 1995 had pointed out that "Islamic fundamentalism had emerged as perhaps the greatest threat to Western security since the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe", but had been compelled to a diplomatic recantation (Claes 1995). In the same diplomatic mood, NATO and chancery documents now talk of a threat of "international terrorism", without being more precise as to its origin. To defeat Nazism, the Anglo-Americans had supported the Soviets, and Liddell Hart (1950) had wondered whether it was wise for Westerners to help those communist resistance movements, such as that of Tito, which were going to introduce

totalitarianism in their own country. The same question should have been considered by the Americans, who supplied the *mujaheddin* to defeat the Soviets in Afghanistan and supported Iraq to contain Iran.

The conflict between Islam and the West shows analogies and differences with the cold war. The greatest difference concerns the absence, today, of a global military threat of a traditional kind, which, however, was nullified by the fear of a nuclear catastrophe. Nowadays, instead, Islamic terrorists display an archaic death wish and a vocation to suicide-homicide religiously motivated. Ecumenic idle talk cannot hide that fact that Mohammed has been the only founder of a religion who was also a military chieftain and that Islam began immediately to expand by aggressive wars. For a complete military history of the wars between the Christian nations and Islam, from the early Arab conquests of the 7th century to the present, see Leoni (2002). If the strategic dilemmas of the equilibrium of terror are no longer a present concern, we face today a serious threat of mass destruction weapons against our societies. The chief analogy is that West, as during cold war, is again obliged to fight both an outside enemy and an internal one. The Communist parties and their road companions made up then the fifth columns of the enemy, whereas today the fifth column is represented both by non-integrated Islamic masses and, in more ambiguous fashion, tough no less serious, by those who repudiate the Christian religious tradition. Now, as then, the liberal West grants its internal enemies a freedom denied dissenters in the opposite camp.

It must be constantly borne in mind that the cold war was won by the West by no means through "dialogue", "compromise, lay or ecclesiastical *Ostpolitik*. The Helsinki conference of 1975 was but an accolade *de jure* to the *status quo* of the Soviet unrestrained dominion in Central-Eastern Europe, in a climate of resignation to the situation, which in Italy took the form of a deep mistrust in the possibility of opposing the accession of Communists to power. According to some historians, this was compensated by the "third basket" of the Helsinki Conference, that concerning "human rights", which allegedly had a decisive impact in the collapse of USSR. But according to Sergio Romano, "the Soviets cashed the provisions concerning borders and signed with a shrug of the shoulders those on human rights", which became "a mere *banderilla* to be driven from time to time in the back of the Communist bull" (Romano 2001). The Soviet block collapsed when the new

Pope John Paul II swept aside the prudence of *Ostpolitik* and President Reagan launched his military challenge to the "empire of evil". Likewise, on the eve of the attack against the Taliban regime of Afghanistan, many counselled prudence, stressing the hazards of protracted operations, the need to interrupt them during *ramadan* to avoid provoking an Islamic revolt and a crisis of the anti-terrorism coalition, the fear of destabilizing Pakistan and other Muslim States or of unleashing reprisals from terrorists. Nothing of the kind has taken place and firmness has delivered the goods, although the victory has not been decisive so far.

Even refraining from uncritical acceptance of Huntington's (1996) approach, it would be hard to deny that the tensions between the West and Islam generates problems of the highest severity, since both civilizations aim at universality and possess a considerable "aggressive" potential, the West by the explosive power of economic globalization and the Muslim world with its militant and totalitarian faith. In Huntington's view, in order to avoid major wars between civilizations, the core States of each of them must abstain to interfere in the conflicts of the other (abstention rule) and negotiate to contain conflicts between Western and Muslim States (joint mediation rule). The West, moreover, should not seek to meddle in conflicts between other populations when these have no consequences or little consequences" for it, and should accept that Western intervention in the affairs of other civilizations is probably the most dangerous source of instability and potential global conflicts in a world based on plurality of civilizations.

Also a French author, Pierre Lellouche (1994), maintains that the great revolution of 1989, far from being a token of victory of the European model at a world scale, points out instead the end of the great European ideological and strategic models which have given this century its imprint: certainly communism, and perhaps European-style democracy. In short, we may have reached the autumn of the white man, on a planet whose population, in the next fifty years, will surge from five to ten billion. A world in which the European, the American, the Russian will have become small minorities, with a proportion of one to ten. In this regard, Paul Kennedy, quoting an Iraqi poster which reads "Beget a son and you will have driven an arrow in the eye of your enemy", identifies the challenge of "how to use the power of technology to meet the demands thrown up by the power of population" (Kennedy 1993). This, after all, is nothing new, because, historically, from the Per-

sian Wars of the 5th century BC onwards, the West has sought to balance the imbalance in numbers by means of a superiority in science, technology, organization and training. The truly new fact is that today the "barbarians" have massively lethal technologies too.

After the Twenties, a further time of great illusions were the Nineties, begun, at the time of the Gulf War, with hopes in a "new world order", bitter disappointments in Somalia, in Yugoslavia and elsewhere, with the Kosovo war in the name of "human rights", a hoped-for prelude to a general triumph of international justice. The use of military force seemed permissible only in operations containing the prefix "peace", or labelled "humanitarian", both reeking of ambiguity. Soldiers had to become something like policemen, social workers, licensed nurses, in a climate of international hypocrisy hiding the hard and classical realities of power politics.

Campaigns for democracy, peacekeeping operations and "humanitarian interventions", which had characterized the Nineties, inevitably lost significance after September 11, not only because military resources cannot be wasted on non vital objectives, and it will be necessary to turn a blind eye on the violations of human rights made by anyone willing to help in the fight against terrorism, but also because, as stressed above, an idealistic diplomacy aiming at exporting Western values is regarded by the other cultures as a form of imperialism which adds to the economic impact of globalization. War and diplomacy must again serve national security in its full meaning, and the hierarchy of world power newly regards military force as its basic reference (Galli della Loggia 2002).

Can we hope to be moving towards a wholesale reduction of the use of force, thanks also to the diffusion of democracy and the free market, as hoped by Bonanate, Armao & Tuccari (1997)? In this regard, we must draw a clear distinction among geopolitical areas. The refusal of war is apparently circumscribed to industrial States having a liberal democratic political system. Such States, *in the relationships with one another*, have phased it out duel, slavery and human sacrifices. This, however, has not taken place in the Third World, whereby a dichotomy arises between two types of worlds living in greatly different ages: on the one hand a cosmopolitan and comparatively peaceful society, on the other static societies in which traditional conflicts, myths and prejudices keep flourishing. Some Third World States still rely on military force to acquire a regional hegem-

ony (Jean 1995a, 1995b, 1996). The nuclear tests of 1998 in India and Pakistan and the ensuing outbreak of enthusiasm among the lower populace of those countries, the war between two extremely poor States such as Ethiopia and Eritrea, but also the desperate efforts of the USSR to keep up in the nuclear power race, and the over three million soldiers of China (disregarding the territorial forces, estimated in 17 million in the early Eighties), are exceedingly significant indicators of the enduring importance attached to military power as a factor for international status.

To speculate whether an entirely democratic world will phase out wars is an empty intellectual exercise, in view of the extreme unlikeness of the precondition. It is instead of considerable interest to study whether democracies operate internationally in an appreciably different way from other political regimes (1997). It is a fact that democratisation has led to an increase of conflicts in the former Soviet empire, due to the so-called self-determination dilemma. According to Howard (1981), the sole cultural factor seems an absolute precondition for a successful establishment of democracy is a sense of identity or national unity. Therefore, "The only cultural factor that would appear to be an absolute prerequisite for the successful establishment of democracy is a sense of national identity or unity (...) For countries like the Soviet Union or Yugoslavia, then, the process of genuine democratization must be preceded by a period of national separation, which is, and promises to be, a painful and bloody process, give the physical intermingling of peoples" (Fukuyama 1991-92). Countries in transition towards democracy often become more aggressive, and is far from guaranteed that democratic countries will be friendly to the West: Iran, for example, is doubtless more democratic than Saudi Arabia, but is not pro-American (or, unlike the latter, does not pretend to be). On the other hand, the history of the First World War shows that, when a messianic interventionism prevails, whether genuine or hiding power interests, democracies fight to destroy dictatorships, and such "crusades" do no leave space for compromise.

Another widespread opinion needs to be at least partially questioned: that the existence of strong sovereign States is a factor in the outbreak of war. In fact, wars break out nowadays precisely where the State is weak. Strong States are a vital factor in keeping both internal and external peace, whereas a weak State is prey to a vicious circle. The latter does not possess the ability to create legitimacy by providing security and other

services, while it indulges in predatory practices both inside and outside, and therefore all it does to become a strong State in fact just makes it weaker (Holsti 1996). Rousseau correctly maintained that "If one had no sovereign States one would have no wars", but not less correctly Hobbes stressed that in that case we would not have peace either (Howard 1983), and that a world without armies – disciplined, obedient and law-abiding armies – would be uninhabitable (Keegan 2001).

Already before the attacks to the Twin Towers, the only remaining superpower, the United States, regarded the use of military force as a basic component of their foreign policy, although, since the end of the cold war, American forces were reduced comparatively more than the European, and the US defence budget was also reduced proportionally to those of the European States. Even prior to the suicide attacks of 2001, however, the United States, having a gross internal product less than half than of the other G7 countries taken together, spent for defence more than twice as much as the other six countries. Besides being larger, the funds spent for defence in America were differently allocated: 30% of the American defence budget is destined to research and development. In Europe, only Great Britain and France approach this level, while the European average is 10-12%, for a total of 10 billion dollars against 35 spent by the Americans.

In particular, the difference between the European and the American armed forces concerns the C4I sectors (command, control, communication, computers and information) and the strategic transport capability. The British position as a world power in the 19th century was essentially supported by the ubiquitous presence of the Royal Navy, and by the same token, nowadays the United States are the only NATO country capable of deploying and supporting for an extended period sizeable forces far from their territory, while the static forces of continental European countries, largely made up until recently of recruits, appear like "dinosaurs" or, according to the definition of former SACLANT general John J. Sheenan, a constabulary. This gap is a consequence of the cold war, when European armies were expected to provide the mass of troops for the clash on the Central European land front (and at the threshold of Gorizia), and were already close to the potential battlefields, whereas a large part of the American forces had to be ready to reach the frontline as quickly as possible to support their 350,000 comrades-in-arms already deployed in the Old Continent.

Historically, the United States, after the Second World War have been more inclined than Europeans to cut with the sword the tangles of international politics, and this trend became more marked after 1956, a year marking the end of military sovereignty of European powers. However, they have shown a tendency of breaking up the engagement before having achieved a decisive victory as well as a reluctance to deploy land forces, as shown by the wars in Korea, in Vietnam, in the Gulf and by the expeditions in Lebanon, Somalia, Bosnia and Kosovo. The reason for this, as pointed out by Edward Luttwak (1994, 1995), is that all post-industrial nations, having a zero population growth, are practically, largely demilitarized and therefore ready to accept only a "post-heroic" type of war. In the case of the Americans this is also linked to the "Vietnam syndrome": By intensive exploitation of high technology, the deployment of land forces and casualties must be kept to a minimum. Consequently, as in 18th century wars, it will be necessary to be content with slow and partial results, when to do more would cost too many American lives, and to do nothing would be damaging for international order and the self-esteem of the United States. Evidently, in the Afghan war, American public opinion was prepared, in the name of a clear national interest, to tolerate higher casualties than in the case of the ambiguous intervention in Kosovo. However, no clear-cut conclusions can be reached on the matter, as the actual task on the ground against the Talibans has been mainly carried out by the *mujaheddins*.

New wars?

The Nineties were characterized, for the Westerners, by peace-imposing and peace-keeping operations in ethnic conflicts and by the "humanitarian" intervention in Kosovo.

Ethnic conflicts and civil wars are no immediate and direct threats to the security and interests of the West, but rather postponed and indirect. According to a pragmatic view of international society, an intervention should be attempted only if there are risks for international security, bearing in mind that no one is prepared to sustain heavy costs or casualties merely to uphold values and that the use of military force can be far from decisive. According to Jean (1995a, 1995b, 1996), there are no military solutions to an ethnic conflict or a civil war. Force can only bring about the preconditions making a political solution possible. It can do some things but not others: for instance

it can separate two ethnic groups, but cannot oblige them to live together. Conditions for successful peace enforcement operations are: "Clear and achievable political goals; political will to enforce the ceasefire; commitment to contribute substantial forces; assignment of all troops to an integrated command structure; international legitimization of the intervention; political support for the use of force when national interests are not at stake" (Mazarr 1993). But the West lacks the necessary tools, i.e. the rough infantries who conquered its empires in the past, essential for the success of operations of this kind, of low intensity and long duration, during which Western technological superiority cannot be easily brought into play (Jean 1995b).

The case of Bosnia has shown on the contrary that UN soldiers have been unable to secure peace, being devoid of the credit of NATO troops, whose military force is a precondition of humanitarian intervention.

Evaluation of the Kosovo war is highly controversial, and likewise controversial is the concept of "humanitarian interference" (De Leonardis 2001). One declared goal of NATO military action was to prevent a "humanitarian catastrophe", but this has become far more serious just after the onset of bombardments (according to the OECD, on March 23, 1999 there were 69,500 Kosovar refugees, but they had soared to 862,979 on June 9). The other goal was to oblige the Yugoslav government to accept the solution of a broad autonomy for Kosovo. The outcome is self-evident: the utter impossibility to persuade the two ethnic groups of the region to live together, and a drive to an independence which no one said to be prepared to foster. In general, the display of a new international engagement in favour of human rights and against repressive actions by governments seems to have missed the target. On the contrary, the attack autonomously decided by NATO has legitimized unilateral intervention by powers which, due to their importance and the availability of nuclear weapons, do not fear American interference, and in fact Moscow, in entirely reasonable fashion in terms of *Realpolitik*, has carried out a harsh repression in Chechnya, while the West acquiesced uneasily. on the one hand, a feeling of insecurity has been fostered among leaders fearing external intervention, and this could lead to an escalation of military expenses, including those for nuclear hardware. On the other hand, by claiming that action in Kosovo and not elsewhere was due to the fact that this is a European region, has lessened the credibility of intervention in other continents, where dictators could therefore feel secure.

At the press conference of April 25, 1999, concluding the NATO summit in Washington, Mrs. Albright, in reply to a question on the risk of an escalation with other ethnic minorities of former Yugoslavia, beginning with the Hungarians of Vojvodina, entering the struggle to achieve autonomy, replied: "I think we should see that dealing with these issues in a military way, or by use of force or violence, is not the way to solve anything. It just adds to the problems." (Press briefing concluding the NATO 50th Anniversary and Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council Meetings, Washington, April 25, 1999, http://www.usia.gov/topical/pol/eap/alberg25.htm). A humanitarian war risks to raise dangerous expectations, as the world is full of potential ethnic wars, which could be stirred up by the example of Kosovo.

The credibility of the military instrument has been undermined by the abuse of a caricature of Churchill's rhetoric, whereby Clinton has misused the term "genocide", describing for instance the Kosovo conflict as "a great battle between the forces of integration and those of disintegration; between the forces of globalism and those of tribalism", and above all the misuse of the concept of "vital interests", which usually points to something which could not be renounced, something essential for national security, which, if threatened, must be defended in full strength of arms. By defining "vital" the intervention in the Balkans, the Clinton administration has devalued the term. By showing from the very earliest day an obsessive preoccupation to avoid casualties among its own soldiers, it has deprived of any credibility its own statements or, worse, has given a clear sign of being unprepared to risk a "great battle", for a "vital question". By fighting a conflict in which casualties have been almost entirely among civilians, overturning the traditional logic of war and a relapse from the rules laboriously worked out over the centuries, the prestige of the military institution has been undermined and strengthened the arguments of pacifists and antimilitarists. An intolerable asymmetry has emerged between the well sheltered soldiers of the alliance and the infinitely vulnerable civilians whom the expedition was supposed to save (Alan Finkielkraut, interviewed in *Corriere della Sera*, May 29, 1999). Zbigniew Brzezinski (*Corriere della Sera*, June 16, 1999) has admitted that to the rest of the world the war American-style smacks of high tech racism. Its hidden precondition is that the life of one of our soldiers is more worth than those of thousands of Kosovars.

In fact the American government did not even dare to call things with their proper name. The secretary of State Albright refused in the Senate to reply to the question whether that was a war. The Secretary of Defence Cohen stated that the American troops were engaged in hostilities, in an armed conflict, but, defying ridicule, has declared himself "unqualified" to say whether this falls within the traditional definition of war. The oxymoron "humanitarian war" is only one of the examples of the neolanguage of an Orwellian hue (Manning 1999), whose origins date back to the age of the First World War. This neolanguage has run rampant particularly in Italy: the *Centro Alti Studi Militari* (Centre for Higher Military Studies) has become *Centro Alti Studi Difesa* (Centre for Higher Studies on Defence), the *Istituto di Guerra Marittima* (Institute for War at Sea) had changed name into *Istituto di Studi Militari Marittimi* (Institute of Maritime Military Studies) to avoid annoying the hypersensitivity of the left-wing municipal administration of Venice. A "policy of armaments" is no longer to be mentioned, but "policy of defence materials" is politically correct instead, and so on in such priggish way. The author listened with some bewilderment a prestigious "pacifist" political scientist harangue the officials of the *Scuola di Applicazione dell'Esercito* (Army Application School) in Turin saying that their institute was not a school for preparation to war, but a place where a culture of peace and democracy was to be built to avoid war. One might well ask where should our officials learn to avoid being killed (and therefore sometimes, unavoidably, to kill the enemy) when the government sends them to Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and so forth. Perhaps they should demand that the prestigious political scientist be sent in their stead.

The hypocritical *langue de bois* has also infected the increasingly long-winded documents of NATO. The Strategic Concept of 1999 reads that the forces of the Alliance must anyway be able "– in case of conflict – [to] conclude the war rapidly obliging the enemy to reconsider its own decision, to suspend the attack and withdraw", avoiding to state simply that it is necessary "to defeat the enemy" or "win the war". Quite correctly, Admiral James O. Ellis Jr., Commander in Chief of NATO for Southern Europe (CINCSOUTH) and Commander of the Sixth American Fleet, in the message for the Navy feast of October 13, 1999, used instead a far more warlike language: "America will continue to need a navy capable to sail anywhere, fight when necessary and in this case win unhesitatingly" (cit. in *Panorama*, October 10, 1999).

After September 2001, anyway, such hypocrisy is utterly outdated. Whereas the "new" characters of wars brought little worries in the Nineties, as the West could stay out of conflicts which did not threaten it directly (one had only to switch off the television set to avoid seeing the victims), nowadays these entail a deadly challenge to our society: the prospects of an attack by means of WMD against a Western city are surely less apocalyptic but are perhaps more likely than those of a nuclear holocaust of the cold war age. "The probability that a missile armed with WMD would be used against US forces or interests is higher today than during most of the cold war and will continue to grow", according to a CIA report (2000).

The traditional relationships of State sovereignty with the monopoly of force and territorial rootedness have slackened in the last ten years. Terrorists and criminals "often command large arsenals previously affordable only to tax-raising governments, [but] they do not obey the rules that sovereign governments observe" (Keegan 2001). Forcefully comes to the fore a new kind of organized violence, which blurs the traditional difference among internal and external conflicts and transnational wars, between wars waged by "legitimate actors" and private wars on the brink of organized crime, between external aggressions and uprisings, between legitimate repression of violent groups and large scale violations of human rights. The fighters of these conflicts, besides regular armies, are paramilitary units of local warlords, mercenary groups, criminal bands, police forces, units detached from regular armies. Differences between legitimate and non legitimate fighters become blurred, as well as between fighters and civilians, and among soldiers, policemen and criminals. Moreover, irregular fighters have advanced technologies at their disposal, such as non-identifiable landmines, light weight user-friendly weapons which can be used even by children, cellular phones; they finance themselves with plunder, black market, external assistance, such as aids by ethnic and religious diasporas, "taxation" imposed upon humanitarian assistance, support by neighbouring governments, illegal commerce of weapons, smuggling of drugs or highly valued goods such as oil and diamonds. Each of these financing sources requires a continued support of violence. Nuclei of war economies exist in the Balkans, in the Caucasus, Central Asia, the Horn of Africa, Central and West Africa.

There is growing trend of civilians becoming the main victims of armed conflicts. At the beginning of the 20th century, the ratio between mili-

tary and civilian victims was eight to one; already in the Second World War the two scores were alike; nowadays the ratio is one soldier to eight civilians. This statistics is to be compared to another one according to which, in the 20th century, 119 million casualties have been caused by infra-State conflicts and 36 by inter-State ones (Roche 2000). The latter, as already pointed out, are decreasing and involve mostly small and medium powers outside the West (but India and Pakistan are far from small). It is obvious that the prevalence of infra-State conflicts leads to an increase of civilian victims. Until a short time ago, the inhabitants of the West, could feel secure, as their countries seem to have abolished both interState and civil wars. Moreover, after the end of the cold war, all armed forces are becoming professional and the States do not any longer ask their citizens to shed their blood. But nowadays the menace of terrorism hangs on our heads and Western civilians are under the threat of death too.

The "new" wars have prompted attempts at taxonomy building, definitions, strategic thinking. Already during the cold war, in the United States the definition "low intensity conflict" had been coined to indicate la guerrilla or terrorism (Cecchini 1990). In the Nineties, such terms were concocted as "informal wars", "privatized wars", "post-modern wars", "third kind wars" (the first type being the limited wars of the ancien régime and the second the wholesale wars of the 20th century). The term "wars of the peoples" was also used. The panoply of modern conflicts includes military operations other than war, operations by armed forces carried out in absence of a state of war, which is no longer formally declared, non military war operations, or the hostile use of every human activity, such as the attack by hackers to computer systems, the unethical use of the mass media, financial wars aiming at the destruction of the economy of a country. The result is the nearly wholesale elimination of any delimitation between what is war and what is not, between the military and the non military sphere. War has disappeared, because it has no longer any limit: everything is "war". In spite of that, strictly military factors preserve their specific characters, while peace as such has utterly disappeared.

Some have thought to uncover a new phenomenon: "asymmetrical wars". Actually "the asymmetrical threat is as old as military strategy and it arises when one of the contending parties, too weak to fight on a level, chooses behaviours and tactics other than open fighting. There are three types of asymmetrical threat: guerrilla i.e. partisan war, including urban terrorism, the use, or threat to use weapons of mass destruction, or cyberterrorism (Rapetto & Di Nunzio 2001), i.e. all actions acting on the vulnerability of society and its institutions, increasingly dependant on computer networks. Asymmetrical war, including these three categories, has always existed, though in different forms, but only in the global village has it become a mortal threat.

In fact, during the anti-Western guerrillas (in many of which communism and anticolonialism were tightly linked) several characters of "asymmetrical wars" had come to the fore. In Vietnam one saw the concurrence of "technological illusion" and moral weakness which brought the Americans to defeat. Western military thinking has come so far as to conceive the utopia of a war fought almost entirely by robots, with just a handful of men to service them. Already in Algeria and Indochina, in the Fifties and Sixties, there had been a crisis of infantries, traditionally the backbone of all armies, due to the lack, among the Western peoples, of the ability to face fatigue, sacrifice and finally death, which is typical, instead, of preindustrial societies (Galli della Loggia 1982), so that the French and the Americans had to rely on special corps, the Foreign Legion or Green Berets. In Vietnam, American hyperfed and hyperequipped soldiers, napalm bombings, sensors placed in the forests, did not succeed to do away with the Vietcong, who subsisted on a handful of rice, infiltrated through the "Ho Chi Minh path" and, unlike the Americans, were persuaded to fight for a just cause.

Thus it became evident the huge dichotomy between the technological war of the West, seeking to minimize risks for its men, and the "dirty" wars of tribes, ethnic, political and religious groups of the "other world" (which could also be in Europe, see Bosnia and Kosovo!), where human life is of little value and is spent easily. The anti-personnel mine, the Kalashnikov or even the *machete* (which in Rwanda and Burundi has caused a number of casualties five times higher than those of the Hiroshima bomb) still rule the battlefield. It would be for the West a serious mistake, already made in Vietnam, to give for granted an easy victory of its way of fighting on the other. However, against the guerrillas following the Second World War, the British achieved many successes (Pimlott 1984), the most important in Malaysia, following a politico-military strategy based on co-operation with indigenous conservative leaders, strictest respect for local cultures and traditions, economic help and administrative support to do away with discontent, training of friendly regular

forces, limited use of warplanes and artillery to avoid casualties among the civilians whose support was sought, high fighting spirit of special forces operating in close touch with the local people, aggressive patrolling of frontier areas to prevent guerrilla fighters to receive supplies or to escape. The imperial experience of London is still precious in operations against terrorists and the States supporting them.

One has to face the problem of a possible "uselessness of the 'Western way of warfare' when confronted by an opponent who refuses to share its cultural assumption", because "war embraces much more than politics: (...) it is always an expression of culture, often a determinant of cultural forms, in some societies the culture itself". Differences in the conception of war is one of the most striking unlikenesses between Western civilization and Islam. While the West, beginning with Medieval Christianity, century after century, has worked out comprehensive rules to "civilize" war, under Islamic law, for example, "women and children might be spared unless they fought against the Muslims (...) The elderly, lunatic, blind, handicapped, sick and so forth (...) might be killed or spared (...) The prisoners who become converted after capture might be spared – but not necessarily" (Piacentini Fiorani 1996). Allah has never been a pacifist neither has become so today, whereas many Christians are loath to use weapons even in self-defence.

In conclusion, we are bound, unfortunately, to point out, turning to the sentence by Sir Henry Maine quoted at the outset, that peace is an invention still in great need of improvement. Nowadays Luttwak has even come to overturn the slogan of American pacifists of the Sixties and Seventies, *give peace a chance*, maintaining that sometimes it is necessary to "give war a chance", meaning that military operations postponed or not carried out to the end do not solve crises, and even worsen them, or lay the basis for new conflicts. In this line, the Bush administration has formulated the concept of "preventive war", which nowadays is a shock to many, but is not very different from what *anti-appeasers* maintained against Hitler. Today, for sure, no responsible statesman could plan military budgets on the basis of the *ten years rule* (no war foreseen for at least ten years), adopted in 1919 upon urging from Churchill, and which the British military commands abandoned only after the accession of the *Führer* to power.

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Emilio Biagini

The intifada of Genoa *

> Give a horse to the man who has told the truth:
> he will need it to save himself (Popular Italian
> dictum).

Riassunto. - L'intifada di Genova

La città di Genova, afflitta da lungo tempo da nume-
rosi problemi non risolti, ha avuto il dubbio onore di
ospitare la riunione del G8, presentata dalla giunta co-
munale e dal governo dell'epoca, entrambi di sinistra,
come un'occasione per ravvivare un'economia e una
società decisamente stagnanti. Tuttavia, la città è stata
vittima di gravi devastazioni da parte di folle di estrema
sinistra sia locali sia convenute da ogni parte del ricco e
annoiato mondo occidentale per contestare la riunio-
ne, potendo anche contare sull'appoggio della sinistra
locale e della sconsiderata compiacenza di taluni eccle-
siastici. Risulta assolutamente impossibile, sulla base di
osservazioni dirette sul terreno, distinguere i violenti
dai "pacifisti", sia per le dichiarazioni incendiarie dei
leader sia per l'effettivo comportamento dei dimostran-
ti. Messaggi su Internet di contestatori avvertivano loro
conoscenze femminili di non venire perché sapevano
bene che si sarebbe scatenata la violenza: vi era dunque
premeditazione. Anche coloro che si sono astenuti dal
compiere direttamente atti di violenza li hanno comun-
que favoriti, sia perché non li hanno né isolati né de-
nunciati, sia perché ingombrando le strade hanno po-
sto le forze dell'ordine nel dilemma di intervenire coin-
volgendo i cosidetti "pacifisti" ed esponendosi a critiche
per questo, o non fare nulla ed essere accusate di iner-
zia. Ottima è stata invece la decisione del governo di
centro-destra di chiudere lo spazio aereo intorno alla
città, ciò che ha probabilmente scongiurato un attenta-
to analogo a quello contro le Torri Gemelle; è infatti
accertato che un fratello di Bin Laden (certo non in
visita turistica) era presente a Genova durante il G8. Lo
stress causato dai disordini ha portato pure un decre-
mento del tasso di natalità.

Introduction

Meetings among heads of State and govern-
ment leaders are rather common, but when these
involve the greatest economic powers they obvi-
ously attract greater attention and involve serious
law and order and terrorism problems. The annu-
al G8 meeting is an occasion of high visibility not
only for political leaders and the host city, but also
for antagonist groups.

The meeting of 20th-22nd July 2001 in Genoa
might have been an occasion for revitalizing a city
suffering from serious decay: Liguria and its capi-
tal have the primacy in Italy for abortion and sui-
cides, especially among the youth. Genoa is a city
humiliated by long neglect and incompetent polit-
ical leadership, marked by showy cultural initia-
tives having scanty economic impact. During the
last thirty years, no significant public works have
been built. The population is heavily declining
and aging (average age is 46), and this generates
poor economic dynamism and stagnation of ideas
in politics and other walks of life. The brain drain
to Milan and other Italian cities is massive. Fore-
gone opportunities are legions, as shown for in-
stance by the huge delays in tackling transport
problems, exemplified, for instance, by the saga of
the Underground Railway, fruitlessly discussed for

more than a century, eventually started, but the most expensive and slowest to build, and by the fabled "third railway route" over the Apennines, absolutely necessary for swift links with Milan. As a result, Genoa has been all but cut out of the "Golden Triangle" (Milan, Turin, Genoa). Add to this the devastation of the nuclear industry, in the Sixties and Seventies, just when the early projects for intrinsically secure nuclear reactors were being developed. A highly significant case is that of the gigantic floating drydock, built at great expense, left lying useless for many years, and the object of long fruitless discussions (it was even mooted to turn it into a theatre, to be allocated, of course, to the Left-wing self-styled "intellighenzia"), and eventually sold for a song to Turkey, which is operating it with high profits.

A clumsy organization

As is well known, until the political elections of 13th May 2001, Italy has been nearly uninterruptedly ruled by Centre-Left coalitions, while the municipality of Genoa is still governed by the Left. In 1998 the Centre-Left government, evidently pursuing the goal to aid its own candidates in the imminent regional elections, decided to hold the G8 meeting in Genoa, allotting several million euros for cosmetic embellishments of the city. However, the impending political elections boded ill for the Left, and this fact was known long in advance thanks to many pre-election surveys.

Left-wing parties reacted unleashing a furious personal campaign, in the State television network RAI and in the largely Left- controlled press, against Mr Berlusconi (Vespa 2001), a campaign still running unabated. At the same time, the Centre-Left government ceased to busy itself actively of the problem of law and order in Genoa in order to leave the hot potato entirely to the forthcoming Centre-Right government (Vespa 2001). The latter government took up power just a month before the G8 meeting, when it was no longer possible to do anything to remedy the preparations made (or mismanaged) by the previous government.

Similar cases had previously shown how dangerous it was to hold a meeting of that kind in a large city. The choice of Genoa, moreover, was singularly unfortunate, due to the extreme difficulty to keep under control the maze of lanes of the city centre, and also because "red" Genoa (called by some "the Italian Stalingrad") traditionally has strong bases of extremist extraparliamentary

groups. Also the decision to block all entries to the seat of the meeting in Palazzo Ducale, was taken by the previous government and implemented by officials who owed their posts exclusively to previous Left-wing governments.

These officials were later harshly attacked in Parliament for alleged incompetence by the very same Left-wing opposition, implying, of course, that the Centre-Right government was the sole responsible for what had happened, i.e. for the fact that the G8 meeting in Genoa, from 20th to 22nd July 2001, had been used by Leftist extremists as an excuse to unleash a spate of arson, devastations and aggressions to the police forces. Banks, shops, care hire firms, private cars, bus stops, petrol stations were gutted. The mobs set garbage containers afire and used them to build barricades. Unrest and devastation were by far the worst since the Second World War.

A previous case of left-wing engineered civil unrest

A comparison can be made with the unrest of 30th June 1960, in Genoa, also unleashed by Left-wing extremists, aiming at overturning the Centre-Right government headed by Mr Tambroni. In that occasion, mob intimidation against a democratically elected government was highly successful. Mr Tambroni resigned and a historical turning point in Italian politics took place.

The votes of the Right were "frozen" on the basis of the debatable ideology of the so-called "costitutional arc", making it unavoidable an alliance between Marxists and alleged "Christian Democrats" based on the infamous "Cencelli handbook" (a blueprint for the apportionment of all key posts in public administration, the media, the banks, the publishing industry, and in all other vital sectors of national life, which became a coveted booty to be shared among the Centre-Left parties).

This arrangement brought considerable advantages, in terms of power, prestige and money to the party bureaucracies involved (occasions for personal enrichment for Christian Democrats and their table cronies, while the more "austere" Communists used the money to finance the party). Benefits to Italy as a whole were at best dubious. While the "Christian Democrat" ruling clique (nomenklatura) was busy taking over most mininisterial posts and key posts in the economy, the Left-wing nomenklatura, and particularly that of the Communist Party, was able to occupy a huge

number of key posts in the Law Courts, the media, the schools, the universities, where entire faculties are invariably of one colour, and non-communists are sometimes afraid to express their opinions.

Another adverse consequence was that the ensuing lack of political turnover inevitably brought forth corruption: governments lasted just a few months (so very little real government activity took place after 1960), but the people in power were invariably the same (unless they died), so that opportunities for squeezing money out of the State were very promising, ann the probability of discovery appeared low. "Tangentopoli" (bribetown) ensued, when the Communists thought to be able to destroy judicially all other parties and take over. However, the unrest of that fateful 30th June – in spite of having brought forth such drastic changes – took place in one day only, was confined to the central De Ferrari Square and did not involve the common citizens and the production structures to any considerable extent.

The unrest of the 30th of June was obviously engineered by the Communist Party. On the contrary, the three days of true "intifada" of 2001 defy a single ideological label. Due to the deep ideological and political coma of the Left at worldwide level, the ideological hues of the various antagonist movements have become extremely diversified. They also seem far more vital than the organized parties of the left. The latter appear rather inclined to side with the movements (sometimes passively, occasionally with doubts and criticism), rather than being able to shape and control them.

The "official" Left in a quandary

In order to put such weakness and confusion of the "official" Left into proper focus, it is useful to consider some remarks coming just from men by no means belonging to the Right. On the *Espresso*, a journal well known for its relentless attacks and coarse mockeries against Berlusconi and his family, as well as totally bent on sanctify the judges of the Milan pool, Giampaolo Pansa commented at the time: "When the history of the chaotic days of Genoa will be written, someone will have to remember that the last political event immediately before that, has been the utterly grotesque news that the leading politicians of the "Democratici di sinistra" (the post-communist party), on the evening of Tuesday July 17, had decided to take part ot the demonstrations against the "Empire of Evil" called G8. And they invited to march not only the heads of the party, ie themselves, but also their

followers. Why do I say this is grotesque? Because, when they had Italy under their sway and Massimo D'Alema was the premier, the "Democratici di sinistra" were precisely those who offered to host the meeting in "a left-wing city", that's to say Genoa. Because if the leaders of the "Oak" (the symbol of the post-communist party), had won the elections on May 13, they would now be sitting in the very heart of the "red zone", close to Emperor Bush and the other vice-Emperors. Because now the post-communist bosses, on tow of people like Agnoletto and Casarini, are putting under siege their comrades of the European left, Blair, Jospin, Schroeder. What happened at the Botteghino of via Nazionale (the Roman headquarters of the post-communists) was explained by someone who knows very well the twisted post-communist physiology: Armando Cossutta. He said to the journalists: 'No wonder, my boys, the congress is at hand. The Left wing of the party does not want to be overtaken by the environmentalists. The rest of the party does not want to be overtaken by its Left wing'. Hence the slogan: *en masse* to Genoa! To pick up a few votes to the Left. And above all, if we wish to recall the curse of an old slogan, in order not to have any enemies on the Left." (Vespa 2001: 406-407).

On the special issue of *Limes* dedicated to the facts of Genoa, Antonio Pennacchi, an old revolutionary of "*Servire il popolo*", today a supporter of the post-communists, wrote: "The support of the former communists to "no global" protests cries revenge before God: it is simply a *pendant* of September 8 and the flight of the Savoia, is a breach of the social pact, is the dissolution of the sense of the State. We have organized G8, and have wanted it in Genoa to satisfy comrade Burlando. Had we won the elections, Rutelli would have gone there instead of Berlusconi. If Bertinotti had not broken the unity of the Left, D'Alema would have been there. And you dare to protest? The Head of the police and the commander of the Carabinieri had been appointed by us. They were our people. As – for instance – Zaccaria and Fabio Fazio. And you talk of Pinochet? But had there been the dictatorship of the proletariate I wanted, you would have been the first to be sent to Siberia ..." (Vespa 2001, p. 407).

The antagonist movements

In spite of their extreme diversification, all movements, from the more "pacifist" to the openly violent ones, concur to form a synergic self-rein-

forcing system. More or less "peaceful" protests have nevertheless a constantly radical character. Utterances are invariably in an incendiary language, providing a basis (or an ideological screen) to the activities of other less "peaceful" groups. Moreover, the very presence of more "quiet" antagonists in the streets creates the *material condidition* (mobs, confusion, slogans, noise, emotional tension) for the action of the violent. The general term whereby "antagonists" are known, "people of Seattle", hides a multiplicity of groups, associations and so-called *centri sociali* (communes of youngsters often given over to drug consumption and various illegal activities, and most probably recruiting ground of terrorists, but nevertheless studiously protected and financed by Left-wing municipalities). All these groupings are united to form blocks (Tab. 1), whose ideology is always confused but constantly loudly screamed. Every demonstration is invariably an occasion for destruction, both before and after the Genoa intifada. The graffiti left on the walls after the horde has withdrawn make instructive reading: "Ten, hundred, thousand Nassiryas", was more than once scribbled by the "pacifists" after the sacrifice of our soldiers in Irak. A raw threatening sketch of a fire extinguisher has entered the limited range of iconographic imagination of these vandals after the death of Carlo Giuliani during Genoa's intifada.

The Genoa Social Forum (GSF) adopted the Porto Alegre statement: "We are men and women: farmers and workers, professionals, students, unemployed, indigenous and black peoples, we come from the South and the North, we are engaged to fight for the right of the peoples, for freedom, security, work and education. We are against the hegemony of capital, the destruction of our cultures, the devastation of nature and the decay of the quality of life by transnational enterprises and by undemocratic policies. The experience of participative democracy, as in Porto Alegre, shows that realistic alternatives are possible. We reaffirm the supremacy of human, environmental and social rights over the exigencies of capital and investiments". These are evidently stereotyped formulas overfilled with words of assured demagogic impact, exceedingly vague as to possibly practicable programmes of action, but filled of echoes of two different ideological strains: a vague but violent anticapitalism which mirrors a distinct revanchist will after the dismal failure of communist regimes, and a likewise vague but extremely determined and violent environmentalist ideology.

Shortly before the Genoa meeting, the GSF sent a letter to the President of the Republic denouncing "the serious situation which has arisen concerning the unfolding of the G8 meeting of next July, with confidence in your intervention to re-establish a climate of free and serene confrontation between institutions and civil society". What kind of situation is meant is far from clear, but it is perhaps legitimate to presume that the claimed "right" may be that to agitate without limitations or controls, and that by "civil society" the GSF leaders wish to indicate themselves, invested (by whom?) of the mission to speak for "society". In another letter, to the Presidents of the Chamber of Representatives and of the Senate, the GSF calls for "a defense of the basic and intangible rights of the citizens of the world of work, to health, to the protection of the environment, to freedom of expression and a correct information" and a "definition of the common non disposable goods of mankind (such as biodiversity, the gene pool, the water resources ...)" (cit. in Acciari 2001).

Beyond resounding words, a simple scrutiny of these expressions makes their emptiness plain. Few remarks suffice in this regard. The "right to

Tab. 1. Anti-G8 movements and groups.

Movements	Acronyms & components	Of which foreigners	Programme platform
Genoa Social Forum (GSF)	ca. 300	64	Porto Alegre Appeal
"White overalls"	35	56	Letter to the President of the Republic
"Black overalls"	-	-	Anarcho-Insurrectionalism, in practice destruction
"Pink-black"	"Anti-G8 network", "Lilliput"	-	Presumably similar to the GSF
"Yellow-black"	Mainly "Social centres" (youth Communes)	-	Presumabli similar to the "white overrals"
"Blue black"	"Social centres" from Central and Southern Italy	-	Presumably similar to the "white overalls"
Various	Soccer teams' supporters, "Punk beasts", etc.	-	None, merely destruction lust

health" seems more than anything else a warning to the Father above: who can guarantee to anyone a "right" to escape sickness and death? And what does it mean to regard the gene pool (of whom? of what?) as a "common unavailable good"? And should water resources become "unavailable"? Should it be prohibited to draw water? Above all, it is highly problematic to apply the expression "citizen of the world" indifferently to the Christian inhabitants of southern Sudan (whose chief problem is to escape the massacres, tortures and slavery imposed by the Islamic government of that country) and the computer programmer of Bangalore (who has, plausibly, quite different aspirations and problems). But the tragedy of persecuted Christians is of no interest whatsoever to the nomenklature of the GSF or to its ill-advised supporters belonging to the Catholic hierarchy.

The manifesto of the "white overalls" utterly ignores the problem to explain and even less to justify its behaviour. Holding fast the axyom that all those holding different opinions are, by definition, delegitimized, the worrying document declares: "Our opposition to G8 is radical: we do not acknowledged to the leaders of the eight industrialized powers the right to come to agreements having consequences for the whole of mankind; in fact, although G8 has no decisional and executive power, but merely a consultative one, the strategic agreements taken there soon become effective, through supranational organizations such as International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the World Commerce Organization, which are all integral parts of the same mechanism ...". And it reiterates: "... we will not obey the prohibition imposed by the authorities which, through the plenipotentiary minister for G8, have assured that already in the week prior to the meeting no demonstration will be allowed. We will not obey the prohibition to overstep the border of what has been defined 'red zone', ...". The upshot is to deny heads of State and government leaders democratically elected and representing many hundred million electors, the right to gather and deliberate upon topics of common interest. And upon whom does, then, legitimation depend? From the pleasure of a hundred thousand demonstrators, making up roughly the 0.0016% of mankind, many of whom have shown their love to mankind smashing anything on their way?

As to the ideology of the "black overalls", it is defined "anarcho-insurrectionalist", but has little to do with the historical anarchic movement, which certainly has a long tradition of violent and bloody actions, but since at least twenty years, in Italy, has ceased to operate in illegal fashion. No one actually knows how many the "black overalls" are: they are certainly neither a party nor an organized movement. Their rough ideological utterances ("The police is the violent face of capitalism, policemen are the watchdogs of the rich ... they hinder our march and want to interfere with our class struggle against the rich", cit. in Morelli 2001) express openly their longing for violence, a longing satisfied with a ruthlessness supported by a paramilitary training obtained, it seems, from the ETA terrorists (Morelli 2001).

The movement, born in the Seventies in Germany, developed mainly in the USA, especially in sleepy Oregon, during the Eighties, had its baptism of fire in the unrest against the Gulf War, held violent demonstrations in Philadelphia for the liberation of Mumia Abu-Jamal, a Muslim anarchic criminal, and a few months later devastated Seattle to "give expression to their rejection of globalization". Since those days of the 1998, the Black Bloc have not missed a single occasion of anti-global protest, from Sydney to Praha, from Ottawa to Nice, from Göteborg to Genoa, moving from one end to the other of the planet with the utmost ease. Evidently, these idle and brutal sons of an affluent society have plenty of money to travel, or else they are financially supported by some interested pressure group.

In the booklet *Il popolo di Seattle: chi siamo, cosa vogliamo?*, ie "The people of Seattle: who are we, what do we want?" (Velena 2001), "black overalls" and "white overalls" appear to be faces of one medal: "The Black overalls are mostly anarchists, so-called "self-standing groups" ("*autonomi*"), i.e. the oldest rebels of the strongest stock of anti-system radicals, resistant to uprooting. Theirs is the *trait d'union* with the archaic Sixty-eight, with the mythical Seventy-seven (...). Their tactics and strategies have deep roots. They are based upon the swiftness, the elusivity, the boldness of the small group of cronies well acquainted with each other, because they live day by day their own anti-system choice" (Velena 2001, p. 139). "The White overalls descend directly from "Autonomia Operaia" and the "Social centres". In Milan they attended evening courses on resistance, on smashing of police lines, on *hiding into crowds of demonstrators*, and more besides, at the 'Leoncavallo' social centre" (Velena 2001, p. 133, italics added). "The clash, the street guerrilla, the distruptive act, even plundering, if it happens, we certainly will not repent of it, neither will we attempt to moralize and to awaken guilt complexes in the other components of this multifarious People.

May they decide to use this form of struggle and of destructuring of passive and indifferent quiet. It is our, your, their right" (Velena 2001, p. 130).

A few days before the G8, Luca Casarini threatened: "We will be the multitude of Genoa. The Empire is weak. A public mass illegality will flourish, a deeply rooted craving for rebellion" (*La Repubblica*, 16/7/2001), and further: "We will be there, and will be wicked". José Bovè, the leader of peasant ecologism sang the same tune: "We are going to make a quality leap". Open and repeated "war declarations" by Casarini took away any doubt as to the real intentions of the antiglobal mob to anyone who did not wish keep his eyes shut. The assault on Genoa was planned and organized in headquarters close to Lugano, using Internet a great deal. Internet messages by protesters warned their girlfriends suggesting them to stay at home, since they knew that violence was expected: there was therefore clear premeditation.

The spirit of devastation, accompanied by drug taking (documented by an amaterial video made during the unrest), which has characterized the unprovoked violence against the G8 in Genoa is the same which primed the Sixty-eight and its terror outcomes such as the Red Brigades and the Baader-Meinhof gang. Toni Negri, leader of "Autonomia operaia", condemned for armed insurrection against the powers of the State, "true engine of revolutionary plots" according to the final sentence of 1988, has publicly praised the Seattle movement and Porto Alegre as a "volcanic eruption, a kermesse of liberty, perhaps a new Sixty-eight" (*Corriere della Sera*, 10/7/2001). If Toni Negri is exiled in Paris to escape jail, many of the leaders of Sixty-eight sit today in the European Parliament, like Josef Fischer, Foreign minister of the German Left-wing government: in the early Seventies this individual was head of a "cleaning group" (*Putzgruppe*), specialized in attacks against the police. Daniel Cohn-Bendit, also an European MP, was ringleader of the Sixty-eight in Paris, and in 1976 wrote a book, *Le Grand Bazar*, in which he described acts of pedophily he perpetrated on children of the Frankfurt kindergarten where he "worked" as a "teacher".

Neither are these isolated phenomena: the subversion of morals is a fundamental element of revolution to destroy society. We should not forget that the age of the French Revolution, produced not only Danton, Robespierre and Marat, but also Lanclos (author of *Les Liasons dangereuses*, one of the most tragic manuals for the corruption of youth) and the infamous De Sade. Identical prop-

aganda techniques were also used, in the Sixty-eight and anti G8 unrest events, in attempting to criminalize the police, systematically accused of being responsible of any violence.

The "intifada" of Genoa (July 20-22, 2001)

It was obvious to anyone that a serious hazards for law and order existed in Genoa, on account of violence and devastations that had occurred elsewhere and the often repeated threats by antagonist groups. In order to keep the difficult territory of Genoa under control, it had been decided to surround entirely with heavy barriers a central zone including the whole historical port and the streets surrounding it, the areas of the "Palazzo Ducale" (Doges' Palace), De Ferrari Square, Venticinque Aprile Street, Fontane Marose Square, Corvetto Square and the whole Venti Settembre Street: this was the "red zone", surrounded by a broader "yellow zone" (Fig. 1). While it was possible to enter the red zone only through narrow openings rigorously controlled, the yellow zone was to all purposes merely on paper, where police forces intervened only when called by the citizens. The Security Department of the Department of the Interior ordered the deployment of thousands of men (Tab. 2).

A serious mistake of the government has been attempting to open a dialogue, which has yielded counterproductive results. As remarked by Angelo Panebianco in un editorial entitled "Western world disease among the Catholics. The G8 and the mistake of a part of the Church" on the *Corriere della Sera* July 30, 2001, "The Italian government has been induced to fall into the mistake of seeking an impossible dialogue with the 'Genoa Social Forum'. Probably, the government would have never attempted anything of the kind if the Catholic world had not been so heavily biased in favour of the antagonists. However, a dialogue is possible only with pragmatic movements, interested to the solution of practical problems, not with ideological movements aiming at fighting the enemy. What kind of dialogue is possible with someone who denies legitimacy to your very existence?" (cit. by Vespa 2001, 397).

In fact, the heads of State and government leaders were branded by *all* antiglobal ringleaders as "representing only themselves", while the antagonists styled themselves as defenders and saviours of mankind and the planet. Among the Catholic groups more gravely responsible for this mindless demonization are the activists of the *Lilliput Net-*

Fig. 1. The space of the unrest in Genoa.

Tab. 2. Strength of Law and Order forces employed.

Law and order forces	Nos. men
Territorial Police forces	5000
Land army forces	1300
Navy and air forces	1450
Prison wardens	250
Forestry Police	40
Police reinforcements	4500
Military Police (Carabinieri) reinforcements	4500
Revenue officers	1000
Total	18040

work, including such politically correct organizations as *Beati i costruttori di pace, Mani tese, Nigrizia, Pax Christi, Gruppo Abele* and WWF, with the open support of the local Catholic hierarchies, at the very highest level, a support expressed by means of words and facts. No disciplinary action has been taken against many priests mongers of class hatred, and demonstrators have found a friendly haven for their guerrilla training exercises prior to the wrecking of Genoa in the square facing St. Lawrence Cathedral.

Former cardinal archbishop of Genoa Dionigi Tettamanzi by no means aided a serious analysis when he wrote that globalization "not governed by ethical principles of justice and solidarity leads to a worsening of the gap between rich and poor peoples, between the concentration of wealth in the hands of few debauchee and the marginalization of the many Lazarus of the Earth" (Tettamanzi & Musso 2001). Some days before the devastation of Genoa, in a speech held on July 7, the same archbishop had stressed "the decisive role of voluntary organizations and political engagement of the youth, which recalls the cultural season of Sixty-eight, fruitful of vehemence and passion" (sic!), and had gone so far as to claim the existence of a "red thread" between the anti-global movement and the prayer vigil of the two million Catholic youngsters at Tor Vergata during the Jubilee of the


Fig. 2. Choreme of the relations among the different actors of the conflict.

year 2000. The Pope, though directly called in question, has obviously avoided to provide any support to utterances of this kind. A quite different interpretation is that of a high prelate steeped into Third World realities, the cardinal archbischop of Ciudad de Mexico, Rivera Carrera (2001). He widely acknowledges the advantages of globalization: the broadened spaces of freedom, the liberalization of exchanges which has greatly favoured economic growth (the 15 commercially more dynamic countries between 1980 and 1994 are all developing countries, the share of emerging countries in the export of manufactured goods has grown from a twentieth to one fourth of the total since 1973, to which must be added the progresses in uprooting illiteracy, diffusion of schooling, eradication of poliomyelitis), and the far from negligible fact that the introduction of the market economy in China has halved poverty. Disadvantages, according to Rivera Carrera, are caused rather by the fact that not all countries have made it to negotiate the entrance into globalization: to be left out is the true problem, it is what prevents a redress of economic and social imbalances.

The Catholic electorate is an important, perhaps dominating part of the popular support to the Centre-Right coalition, the *Casa delle Libertà* (House of Liberty), and therefore the irresponsible utterances by meaningful segments of the Catholic world, up to the top of the Genoese *Curia*, caused a useless and counterproductive dialogue to be sought, not only by the government, as stressed above, but also, secretly, by the police authorities responsible of law and order. A high police official, who requested not to be quoted by name, revealed to the author of these pages the existence of an agreement with the Genoa Social Forum, whereby demonstrators would be allowed to break through at the margin of the red zone "thus obtaining some visibility". All those responsible of law and order seemed to have been in the know, but the demonstrators did not keep their word: between Gastaldi Avenue and Tolemaide Street they attacked with extreme violence and determination, throwing Molotov cocktails and stones. "The truth is that Luca Casarini, the head of the White Overalls, did not admit to anyone that he was losing control" (Vespa 2001, p. 414). A choreme, i.e. a model of a single process (Fig. 2), can be used to show the relationships among the different actors of the conflict. Simplifying, the antagonist forces can be conceptualized in three main categories: (i) *rioters bent on destruction* (not only the Black Blocs but also the "white overalls"

and many other individuals from the local "social centres", punk-animals, and even the "ultras", fans of the two local soccer teams, Genoa and Sampdoria, usually bitter enemies but united for the occasion); (ii) *demonstrators* officially "peaceful" (among whom were left-wing politicians and some judges of the Attorney Office of Genoa); (iii) *supporters* who, though abstaining to take part to the processions, aided the demonstrators in various ways. Such help took various forms, providing logistic support and information, and upholding a vicious propaganda against the police forces.

The rest of the population was largely passive, though not entirely, at first largely indifferent or frightened, then angered by the wanton devastation of propriety and productive structures. Many citizens had taken early holidays before the usual "August exodus" to avoid to be in town, as everybody, beginning from the authorities, foresaw unrest and had advised the citizens to leave the city before the G8. The terror threat against the "red zone" was by no means a joke, and this justifies the order to shoot in case of a break of the barriers (besides a plan for a harmless "stage effect" by the "pacifists" which, as we shall see, did not take place), an order which did not concern the demonstrators, but only attacks by terrorists. There were warnings from the German secret services on the possibility of infected blood being thrown into the "red zone". Serious warnings were issued also by the Israeli Mossad and by the Egyptian president Mubarak about plans for terror attacks by Islamic cells of Al Qaeda. During the G8, a brother of the infamous Osama Bin Laden is known to have been in Genoa: it seems utterly unlikely that he was there for mere tourism. All this points to a high probability that, without the strict security measures to protect the "red zone", the catastrophe of the Twin Towers, which occurred only one month and a half later, would have hit the international leaders present in Genoa.

An Islamic terror cell must have been in place: it remained dormant thanks to the providential closure of the air space and the deployment of a battery of anti-aircraft missiles in the port area. The battery attracted a shower of sarcastic comments from the Left, of course. Had the Left been in power, it is highly unlikely that such "ridiculous" measure would be adopted: its leaders might have been seen in television strutting beside the major world leaders, up to an instant before the crash of the "martyrs" of Al Qaeda turning them into ashes, together with Bush (who was in all probability the target of the fourth plane of September 11,

fallen in Pennsylvania, destined to the White House by the "warriors of Allah"), as well as with Blair, Schröder, Jospin, Aznar and Putin (a hated target of the Tchechenyan Islamic terrorists).

The whole central city, along with thousands of innocents, would have been turned into ashes. Luckily, the "red zone", isolated as it was by heavy iron barriers up to 5 metres high, with a concrete base, in spite of being the focus of the hot days from 20 to 22 July 2001, impenetrable from land and sky, remained totally aloof from the conflict. This allowed the unfolding of the meeting and sheltered the 36,000 people living there and also the decorative improvements recently made there. The rest of the city, instead, suffered a great deal. In the aftermath of the devastations, a significant drop in birthrate took place, precisely nine months after the unrest, worsening the already serious demographic crisis even further. This has been attributed by Prof. Aldo De Rose to a decline in sexual activity linked to the psychological stress (*Il Giornale Nuovo*, May 13, 2004).

After such a havoc, one would have expected the Left to be defeated at the following elections in Genoa. Surprisingly, that was not the case. The 2002 local elections saw a stunning local success of the Left, which has subsequently turned the city into a sort of capital of noglobal movements. This can be explained bearing in mind the historical left-wing extremism of the city, widespread in all social layers, within an ageing population inclined to reject change. Not surprisingly, this is linked to a growing loss of dynamism and a disintegration of a once flourishing entrepreneurial culture: the scions of traditional entrepreneurial families have turned into high profile bureaucrats well connected with the post-communist establishment. It must also be borne in mind that Genoa was the nest of the "Red brigades" which caused so much bloodshed in Liguria and the rest of Italy during the Seventies.

Guerrilla techniques and responses by law and order forces

An analys of the guerrilla techniques employed reveals the high level of preparedness of the destroyers and the complicities they enjoyed. Guerrilla (from the Spanish *small war*) is the fighting method of those devoid of sufficient force to face the enemy in open war. It is confined to local terror actions aimed at spreading panic and forcing the government to come to terms, or else to control sufficient slices of territory to be able to move

on to open war. Guerrilla can be total, or exclusively urban. Ordinary guerrilla is fought with firearms and other highly destructive weapons, with the objective to replace the ruling élite, or it may also aim at the defense or restoration of a previous order against a revolutionary intrusion (eg the Vandée insurrection, and the heroic Spanish and Italian "Insorgenze" against the Napoleonic occupation).

The Vietnam war and the Afghan struggle against the Soviets have shown that guerrilla forces can even beat a superpower, if political factors prevent the same superpower from using all available force. If guerrilla is victorious, the conflict tipically unfolds in three stages: (i) the formation of war zones, operation theatres of insurgent bands; (ii) organization of "sanctuaries" controlled by the insurgents; (iii) overthrow of the government (Barnard 1982). War zones can only be formed with the support, either spontaneous or obtained by intimidation, of at least a part of the population providing logistic support and shelter to the insurgents. The physical environment is important: wooded mountains are highly favourable to guerrilla, a flat desert is most unfavourable. In an urban territory, the guerrilla can enjoy good prospects thanks to the opportunity to find hideouts, especially if the centre has narrow streets, while cities dominated by broad avenues are less favourable. The drastic restructuring of the urban layout of Paris planned by Baron Haussman under Napoleon III, was an application of this principle by the State actor for defensive purposes.

Ordinary guerrilla is widespread in poor countries having a fragile or non-existent democratic tradition. Not surprisingly, the continent *par excellence* of guerrilla movements is the poorest, Africa, where tribal or family struggles are the rule. In a not too remore past, from the end of the Second World War to the fall of the Berlin Wall, Asia and Latin America were theatres of serious guerrilla movements. On the contrary, comparatively wealthy countries with a well established democracy, where prospects to overthrow the government by force of arms are practically nil, urban guerrilla has become important. Though this is a quite different kind of conflict, it can preserve some of the features in common with the former, for example in the size of fighting groups. The weapons employed are quite different. Urban guerrilla fighters use weapons such as stones, Molotov cocktails, crowbars, etc., hoping to lure the forces of Law and Order to shoot, causing victims which the supporting propaganda will be able to exploit. The unrest of 30 June 1960 in Genoa, the demon-

strations against the Vietnam war, as well as the so-called "Sixty-eight" started in France, in Germany and Italy, were the early attempts of such a kind of guerrilla.

A mass of noglobals which gathers everywhere a G8 meeting takes place, implies the movement of whole armies from one continent to another. Although costs may be partially covered by local authorities anxious to show themselves "open to dialogue", by the hospitality offered by the so-called "social centres", notorious breeding and recruiting ground for urban guerrilla fighters and terrorists, the cost to move around tens or hundreds of people must be huge. For travel expenses only, moving 50,000 persons (a far lower number than that present in Genoa, but there were thousands of locals whose travel costs were non existent) an average of € 50 for a round trip, at an approximate average between bus and air trips, yields a total of € 25,000: an extremely conservative estimate, whiche does not include countless other items of expense of long range travel and support in the field. Neither is it to be forgotten the acquisition of microvideocameras, far more expensive than common videocameras, and the equipment to edit the recorded material (such as that used to manipulate the video showing the incident of Carlo Giuliani, of which the antagonists offered the Attorney Office a "modified" version, from which the brick which deviated the fatal bullet, originally aimed upwards, had disappeared). Even if it is impossible to obtain exact figures, one can assume that the mobilization of the antiglobals in Genova must have cost several tens of million euros. There must be therefore some kind of financial support by interest groups hoping to obtain economic and/or political advantages.

Another feature of the unrest is premeditation. It is hardly necessary to stress that truly peaceful demonstrations, such as the processions against the sliding scale or against the disastrous economic monopoly of the *Compagnia Unica Merci Varie* (the organization of port hands) in the port of Genoa have been held without any of the marchers carrying weapons of any kind and with no thought given to medical assistance. Neither any attention had been paid to whether there was much or little police. The irresponsible statement that a strong presence of the police is a "provocation", is just an excuse for violence. Police aggressions (ad Army attacks) to peaceful gatherings take place under dictatorships: we have seen them in the Tienanmen Square, or in Ceausescu's Rumenia. Evidence of the fact that clashes with the police and devastations were by no means chance

occurrences, but on the contrary were actively pursued, is brought forth by: (i) the repeated and serious threats made through the mass media; (ii) the repeated warning of foreign intelligence services on the forthcoming violence; (iii) the infiltration of a considerable number of street fighters many weeks before the G8 event in order to reconnoitre the topography of the city and establish links with local supporters, especially with those of the so-called "social centres"; (iv) the really enlightening fact that noglobals brought along whole medical teams (who paid for them?), evidently foreseeing the high probability of police counter-attack and a number of injured among their own fighters; (v) the use of micro video cameras for recording clashes in a partisan way in order to throw a negative light on the police; (vi) the systematic use of true uniforms and of a vast array of weapons of various kind (iron bars, crow bars, sling throwers, Molotov cocktails, etc.) to which must be added the use of other material found on the spot (stones wrenched from pavements and garbage containers used for building barricades after setting fire to them).

In spite of the repeated statements proclaiming pacifism and "non-violence", the so-called "white overalls" never actually took distance from the Black Bloc hooligans, neither have they isolated, and least of all, denounced them. It was on the contrary extremely difficult to distinguish the "peaceful" from the violent ones. Changes from white to black overall, or undressing the overalls altogether in order to pass for common onlookers, have been widely observed by many observers, including the present writer. Sometimes the rioters, to avoid being seen, went to change their overalls in the solitary peripheral streets of upper Genoa, above "Circonvallazione a Monte" (the upper "corniche" artery), but sometimes they changed openly in the central city. A typical guerrilla tactics is to avoid strongly held strongholds, such as the "red zone", but hitting the "enemy" where he is not entrenched, in this case in the "yellow zone". This was precisely the behaviour of the Black Blocs, who have entirely avoided the "red zone" and a direct clash with the police. However, they managed to create such a confusion that, in the streets clogged both by violent and "peaceful" demonstrators, the police have ended up throwing tear gas on the "pacifists" too. This has been particularly useful to anti-global propaganda, which thus could accuse the agents of attacks to the "pacifists". The "white overalls", not the black ones attacked the police.

Particularly subtle has been the technique of

scattered attacks at different points, which shows that every group operated in coordination with the others. The obvious objective was to compel the police to disperse in their turn to contain the hooligans. The latter could therefore concentrate all of a sudden, with pincer attacks, on isolated police cars, destroying them and attempting to lynch the agents. By shear luck there have been no casualties among the police. A statement by Carlo Casarini, the leader of the "white overalls" is extremely significant: in the tragic event of Alimonda Square which ended up in the death of Carlo Giuliani (hit when he was about to throw a fire extinguisher at the Land Rover Defender, with no small danger of an explosion, which would have caused a massacre involving not only the Carabinieri, but also himself and other attackers as well), the attackers of the Defender (not armoured), isolated and blocked, with three wounded Carabinieri on board, "were our comrades" (Vespa 2001, 416). The head of Digos (anti terrorist unit) in Genoa, Spartaco Mortola describes their warfare technique thus: the head of the procession of 20 July formed a wall of plexiglass shields, the men in the second line carried water buckets for protection against tear gas, the third line was formed by throwers of porphiry cubes wrenched from the street pavement and of stones picked up on the beach (Vespa 2001, 414). These mass attacks were quite different from the vandalic incursions of the Black Blocs.

The latter formed true guerrilla units, made up by 15 to 30 youths masked and equipped with helmets, cudgels, crowbars, Molotov cocktails, and cellular phones to coordinate their action. Though bearing in mind the vastly different conditions of the conflict in Ireland, there is a certain similarity, in size, of Black Bloc units with IRA "flying columns". This may not be due to mere chance, since such an order of magnitude allows wholesale visual control over the small unit, which can therefore operate in a highly coherent fashion, in spite of the turmoil. As a result, many streets in Genoa were devastated and soiled with graffiti. Banks and cars were typical targets of envy and class hatred, but the hooligans raged against targets with a low ideological profile, such as hire-purchase agencies, shops, even bus stops. For instance, in "Circonvallazione a Monte" (the upper residential artery perched on a Pleistocene glaciomarine terrace), far from the "red zone", a gang in black overalls smashed the glasses of the Ponte Caffaro bus stop, and tried to wreck the scaffolding erected for maintenance purposes around a high rise appartment building, evidently to pro-

vide themselves with an additional supply of iron bars; they also tried to open a locked gate leading to a garden, probably to destroy a car parked there. No police was to be seen in the area. These activities, however, were abruptly interrupted when the news spread about the first and only fatality of the unrest. Informed by cell phone, the gang hurried away, speeding towards the city centre.

The earlier information on vandalic activities so decentralised in various parts of the city were given by private television stations which were broadcasting the unrest live and received telephone calls from the public. The action of the police against such activities was quite ineffective. One explanation given for this was that operations were directed by officials who had shortly been sent to Genoa for the occasion and had little knowledge of the territory. On the other hand, both the commanders and the men engaged on the ground had to operate in extremely difficult conditions, due to the determination of the attackers, their sheer numbers, their efficient organisation and weaponry, and also on account of the encumbrance of the streets by the "pacifists" (Tab. 3), so it is hard to say whether a more local force might have done better. Also, the clumsy attack to the headquarters of the Genoa Social Forum in the school "Armando Diaz" was carried out in such a way as just to fuel noglobal propaganda, as some of the Molotov cocktails "found" in the school seem to have been seized earlier outside the school itself. The professional level of at least some of the police forces employed for the occasion was evidently not as high as might have been wished. It should be borne in mind that the police normally operates in Italy under heavy disadvantages, practically under orders to react as "softly" as possible, and constantly under danger of been charged by the magistrates, often openly politicised to the Left, for "excessive" use of force. It is therefore not surprising if recruitment in the police forces is by no means attractive to anyone who has better prospects of employment.

"If the Genoese had remained to 'garrison' their own city, perhaps all that happened might not have occurred", was the opinion of the mayor of Genoa, Giuseppe Pericu. This is a highly debatable statement, since it is evident that the winning card of the hooligans has been precisely the extreme overcrowding. If they had had to face the Black Blocs only, even a police force of no particular ability would doubtless have been able to control the situation. A more massive presence of citizens might only given rise to worse law and

Tab. 3. Main episodes of the anti-G8 guerrilla in Genoa.

DATE	HOUR	THE INTIFADA OF GENOA: ESSENTIAL EVENTS
21-7	10.54	Failed attempt of Greenpeace ecoguerrillas to invade red zone from above
	12.20	Demonstrators' procession; early damages in Torino Avenue
	13.17	Stoning and Molotov cocktail attacks against Law and Order forces
	13.36	Casarini disowns the perpetrators of damages
	14.13	Black Blocs surround GSF headquarters in the "Diaz" and attack jail of Marassi
	15.34	"White overalls" put red zone under siege in Dante Square; riots go on unabated
	15.43	Violent attack against Law and Order forces in Tolemaide Street
	17.04	Agnoletto announces GSF will abandon red zone; Tommaseo Square devastated
	17.36	Guerrilla in Tolemaide Street; Police armoured car set ablaze
	17.37	Carlo Giuliani killed by a bullet deviated by a flying brick, while about to hit a wounded Carabiniere with a fire extinguisher
	18.16	Another Carabiniere hit by home made bomb (smashed eye socket, serious cranic trauma)
	19.17	Casarini accused the agents and demands the calling off of G8 meeting
	20.30	Unabated devastations of cars, banks and shops
	20.30	Agnoletto, Casarini e Bertinotti confirm demonstration of next day
22-7	11.30	Attempted breaking through barrier of Palazzo Ducale, cries of "murderers"
	12.17	Shops damaged by in Marassi and Quarto; agents called in
	12.28	Thousands of rioters in Sturla supplied whit iron cudgels by a wagon
	12.30	Sonia Fede, Tv operator of "Studio Aperto", attacked (fractured knee)
	13.12	Devastations in the Albaro area
	13.37	Wagon full of knives and crow bars found in midst of "pacifist" demonstration
	13.54	Attack by "pacifist" demonstrators on Carabinieri barracks in Italia Avenue
	14.25	Barricades and Molotov cocktails in areas of Torino Ave. and Sardegna Avenue
	16.00	Harsh battle in Torino Avenue; Post Office devastated
	16.30	Citizens beginning to lose patience: improvised meeting in Torino Avenue
	17.00	Flower pots hurled at rioters by exasperated citizens in Casoni Street
	17.30	Rioters set on several fires
	17.38	Incidents in the "tail" of the "pacifist" procession in eastern Genoa
	17.46	Renewed clashes in Torino Avenue
	18.03	Cars ablaze close to the railway line in Torino Avenue; firemen action impeded
	18.09	More car fires in Sardegna Avenue
	18.13	Fire close petrol station; firemen obliged to operate under Police protection
	18.37	Fires extinguished, agents attack
	18.45	Rioters withdraw from central Genoa, devastations in Marassi area
	19.52	Wagon containing 5 iron cudgels in a camp "white overalls"

order problems. The rising resentment of people for the senseless vandalism, in fact, would have engaged the agents on a new front in the attempt to stem the violent reactions of the citizens. People was initially conditioned by a widespread left-wing ideological orientation, and perhaps also by the wishful thinking that the demontrations would be peaceful, but rapidly changed their mind from the second day. Spontaneous reactions against the demonstrators arose: flower pots were hurled at them from windows, and many noglobal youths, caught isolated or in small groups after the demostrations, were attacked and soundly beaten.

The inflow of noglobals grew constantly, until, on July 21, it soared to such a size as to make it increasingly hard to contain them, and this in spite of attempts to block potentially violent demonstrators at the frontiers (Tab. 4). The frontiers, however, could not be closed altogether, and, besides those who had infiltrated the future theatre of operation many days before, there were many local individuals ready to support the vandals coming from many other parts of the opulent and bored Western world. Even the "ultras" supporters of the two local football teams, Genoa and Sampdoria, were quite eager to "join in the feast". In comparison with the large number of "pacifists" engaged in acts of violence, the number of arrests has been extremely small; in particular have escaped arrest all Greek hooligans, who, from infor-

Tab. 4. Numbers of demonstrators and arrests made.

Demonstrators	Nos.	NOTES
Demonstrators July 19	30.000	
Demonstrators July 20	70.000	
Demonstrators July 21	100.000	
Blac Blocks	2.000	
Infiltered before G8	not available	
Turned down at the frontiers	2093	of which 298 on the basis of information by foreign police intelligence concerning individuals belonging to known violent fringes
Italians arrested	134	
Foreigners arrested	168	40% Germans, 10% Austrians and Spaniards, 5% Frenchmen, Swiss, Americans, British and Swedish
Total arrested	302	all immediately released by the judges bent especially on investigating alleged misbehaviour of the Law and Order forces

mation gathered by the present writer at the "Direzione Centrale della Polizia di Prevenzione" in Rome, seem to have been the most numerous, but evidently also the most difficult to catch, while is has proved comparatively far easier to catch the Germans. Very low has also been the number of injured rioters, far below that of the police, except in the last day, when some agents have perhaps begun to "lose patience" (Tab. 5, Fig. 3).

On August 12, 2001, applications for refund of damages received by the *Sportello indennizzi* (Refund counter) of the municipality of Genoa peaked at 13.6 billion liras (€ 26.3 million), corresponding to the following properties damaged or destroyed: 249 cars, 27 high rise apartments, 120 shops, 11 gas pumps and 8 banks. One must also add the damages to proprieties of the municipality and the provincial administration put at the disposal of the "pacifists" and left in conditions of total wreckage. Reliable estimates of damages run to over 40 billion liras (€ 77.5 million) (Tab. 6).

Summing up, the elements to evaluate the unrest against against the G8 in Genoa appear to be the following: (i) it was utterly impossible to distinguish the different, "peaceful" and not so peaceful, components in the crowd during the unrest; (ii) violence was preordained and absolutely not limited to the Black Blocs; (iii) the numbers of youths was huge and their violence systematic and unrelenting; (iv) law and order was upheld in no particularly efficient way (except the excellent decision by the then minister of the Interior Scajola to close the air space, which almost certainly averted a massacre); (v) after losing the elections, the Left was seeking, abetted by a sizeable part of the "Catholic" world, a revanche by extraparliamentary means.

Regarding the first point, as already pointed out, the violent ones hid among the "non violent",

the "non violent" suddenly started to throw porphiry cubes and to wield iron bars. A survey by the journal *Il Mulino* (2001), entitled *Protesta e globalizzazione* (Protest and globalization) shoots wildly an estimate of "a few thousand hooligans (perhaps no more than two thousand)". But, on the contrary, the utter impossibility to distinguish hooligans from "pacifists" is confirmed by all who witnessed the unrest, and this disallows any attempt to estimate the actual numbers of those responsible of violent actions. It is worth stressing once more that even the demonstrators who were not directly responsible of aggressions and damages, did favour them by clogging the streets, thereby posing the police the dilemma of laying themselves open to criticism in any case: if they restrained themselves from acting they would be charged for leaving "the hooligans do whatever they liked", if they acted because they lay themselves open to the charge of attacking "peaceful demostrators". The fact that "pacifists" did not raise one finger against the alleged "few" hooligans, and that they did not denounce even one of them, and finally that they took occasion, through their spokesmen, to criticise the police in the harshest possible terms, legitimises the suspicion of a far from occasional convergence of goals and interests between "peaceful"

Tab. 5. People injured during the unrest.

|	Injured	
	Demonstrators	Law & order forces
20 july	64	73
21 july	88	298
22 july	62	17
Aggregate	214	388

Fig. 3. People injured during the unrest.

and "not-so-peaceful" opponents of globalization. As to the "estrangement from the traditional methods of political action" by the noglobals, hinted at by the cit. report of *Il Mulino*, this only shows a surprising lack of historical perspective. Violent demonstrations have often been practised by the extreme Left which is a minority in the country. These are the well known "extraparliamentary methods", frequently adopted when the democratic elections have failed to give access to power. We have seen that to cause the hated Berlusconi government to cut a poor figure in front of the international guests, by compelling it to dismiss the G8 meeting, was precisely the outcome hoped for by the partities defeated in the elections a few months earlier.

A publication of the Young Communists (Ferretti, Bruschi & Chiarlo, s.d.) confirms the close ideological links between the oppostion parties and the incendiary utterances of the noglobal leaders (and the attendant violent behavoiur), including the attempt to accuse the other side for any mishap. The Young Communists support the demostrators with the usual slogans and with an

Tab. 6. Estimates of material damages to the city of Genoa.

Damages	Liras
To structures of the Municipality put at the disposal of the GSF	1.935.000.000
To structures of the Provincial administration at the disposal of the GFS	760.639.320
Compensation for damages demanded by private citizens	40.000.000.000
Total	42.695.639.320

incendiary language closely akin to that of the Red Brigades: "the immorality (...) the barbarity of capitalism"; "the certitude that on the road of liberism one can only find misery and wars". Worthy of note is the flattering definition of Genoa: "that spit of land locked between Sampierdarena, the river Bisagno and the sea". Noticeable also the bombast for "the cultural hegemony conquered on the newspapers and in television", obviously the result of many years of infiltration in the vital nodes of mass media power, especially if allegedly "independent".

As to the Black Blocs, the communist pamphlet does not openly take any position, but talks by innuendos of a phantomatic "right-wing" matrix of theirs, naming them "black nazis", or hinting at a suspicion they might have been "agents provocateurs of the police". In fact, it is impossible to deny that the unrest did have the government as its main target and that it was painstakingly organised. In this regard, one must bear in mind the testimony of the President of the Genoa Chamber of Commerce, Paolo Odone (cit. by Vespa 2001, p. 413): "It is impossible that outsiders might have caused this disaster without local leadership". The antiglobals, as we have seen, attacked with iron bars, with sling throwers, with Molotov cocktails which broke on the pavement or against a wall causing the burning liquid to shower the agents, with the frequent risk of burning them alive (a part of the cops had to work full time with fire extinguishers to save their colleagues, instead of fighting back the attackers). There was an evident attempt to wound, to lynch, possibly to kill, policemen.

Disquieting questions

A member of the police, who has obviously withdrawn his name, has voiced a number of rather disquieting questions: (i) why 80% of the police forces were positioned inside the "red zone" where the demonstrators had no chance to penetrate? (ii) why were the policemen so scantily equipped? (iii) why the local police superintendent Colucci and the provincial commander of the Carabinieri were repeatedly overruled by the central command in Rome? (iv) why did the government, after a phony punishment (the only man actually dismissed was superintedent Colucci, who was at the end of his career anyhow) give back their posts, and even promote the officials (especially those who did not belong to the Genoese police forces), since they were men of the previous

Centre-Left government? (v) why the "idiocy in the Diaz school"? The present writer does not claim to know the answers to these different and important questions, but they are not all equally difficult. As to the concentration of the four fifths of the forces inside the "red zone" it is not hard to find an explanation. It doubtless had adverse effects on law and order outside, but there is at least one good reason: it was imperative to protect the important guests although they were seemingly "safe" inside the "red zone". There was in fact no guarantee that some terror group had not infiltrated earlier the area, among the 36,000 local inhabitants, and the strong police concentration insured that any criminal act could be timely uncovered and effectively prevented.

Regarding the equipment, the answer is not as easy. The State Police and the Carabinieri do have some good equipment, but they were not supplied with rubber bullets and with weapons capable of stopping an attacker without blodshed, the gas masks were inefficient, and the Land Rover Defenders, being devoid of armour, were true traps (but the demonstrators, by means of Molotov cocktails, were even able to destroy at least one armoured vehicle). No doubt it was possible to provide the forces with far better equipment. Why this was not done is unclear, although the political transition, with the previous government aware of the high probability to lose the elections, and therefore inclined to leave the problem to the opposing political side, probably points to at least one of the possible explanations.

The problem of the relationships between national and local police headquarters and of the attendant pretended "punishments" after the G8 meeting (points 3 and 4) is a harder nut to crack. According to the anonimous informer, the local police had a deeper knowledge of the problem and the territory, but internal rivalries at the top of the chains of command might have made themselves felt. The search of a scapegoat is a common occurrence under any government, while a wish to restrain from dismissing officers promoted by the previous government in order to avoid abrupt changes could be a further significant factor. Anyway, beyond these general and rather obvious comments it does not seems possible to go.

As to the raid to the school "Diaz", general headquarters of the Genoa Social Forum, Police commander De Gennaro (2001) has stressed the extreme violence of the noglobals even in that occasion: in that operation only there were seventeen injured among the police officers. However, the anonymous informer judges the operation "an

extremely clumsy police action", and moreover that "it was a politically self-defeating action, but perhaps it was precisely what was sought (...)". What goal, then, was being sought? Is it possible that such an operation might have been ordered by someone who owed his post to the Centre-Left government, and has acted on the (correct) assumption that all blaim would have fallen upon the ruling Centre-Right government? To Centre-Left parties it was doubtless important to show that the Centre-Right was uncapable of managing an international meeting and thereby ruin the image of the new government, abroad as well as on the domestic front, by sending a clear message to the main industrial entrepreneurs, who are accustomed to make lavish use of the so-called "cassa integrazione guadagni" (whereby redundant workers are not fired but dismissed for long periods at public expenses). These tycoons, long accustomed to pocket profits and have their losses made up by the taxpayers, have long been in close touch with the Left, which they regard as being better able to keep extraparliamentary groups and the trade unions under control.

Two main concluding remarks are in order, bearing in mind both the dismal experience of Genoa and the Twin Towers tragedy. First of all, it must be stressed once more the *excellent decision to close and control the air space*, which almost certainly prevented Genoa to be hit by a catastrophe such as that of New York and Washington a few weeks lat-er. Secondly, *to hold top level meetings in large cities means courting trouble*. Out of the way localities whose access is particularly easy to control, or, better still, warships, do not offer mass media visibility to hooligans self-styled saviours of the world, and can be more easily defended both against hooligans and terrorists. It is no matter of fear, but merely of prudence and common sense.

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Emilio Biagini

The alleged saviours of planet Earth

Riassunto. - I pretesi salvatori del pianeta Terra

Le confuse basi ideologiche della contestazione antiglobal si fondano sul neopaganesimo gnostico. Gli slogan sono quelli ben noti, che evadono dai veri problemi del "terzo mondo", appellandosi ad un vago terzomondismo. Altra radice ideologica è quella della nevrosi ecologista. Al contrario di quanto sostenuto dai noglobal, le diseguaglianze sono sempre esistite e la globalizzazione, fenomeno di graduale inclusione nei circuiti commerciali ed informativi, tende piuttosto ad attenuarle. I paesi che realmente rimangono indietro sono quelli che, presi nella morsa di società statiche, di governi autoritari e spesso corrotti, di burocrazie invadenti e non meno corrotte, nella globalizzazione non riescono ad inserirsi, e questo spiega perché l'antiglobalismo è presente solo nei paesi sviluppati, in quanto si tratta di un movimento di retroguardia postmarxista.

Introduction

The ideological justification underpinning the violence unleashed through the streets of Genoa during the G8 meeting is obviously rooted in "third world" rethoric (the very expression "third world" has been invented by estreme left-wing propaganda) and environmentalism, besides having links with neopaganism, in the form of nature-worship, in line with neognostic philosophies. Its spokesmen are the "peaceful" demonstrators and their abettors: people who have taken on themselves the task, perhaps slightly ambitious, to save the world. Self-styled "interpreters and legitimate representatives of mankind", they maintain that the world is threatened by an iniquitous and polluting globalization: a perverse process engineered by the "masters of the planet", a process producing wealth for a few, poverty for all others (a muddled "third world" ideology) and environmental degradation (environmentalism). These are exceedingly old contentions, which must now undergo a rational examination.

The miracles of Saint Percentage

Saint Percentage is not on the calendar but performs miracles. To the imagination it lends reality to something which is far from real. The secret lies in that aggregate 100% (20% of mankind owning 80% of the riches, while the remainder 80% of people owns only 20% of all riches, therefore injustice and an urgent call for "redistribution"). All this yields a decided impression of a closed number, of a given amount which cannot be increased, a cake that has mysteriously appeared from somewhere, and that some malignant wizards have cut into unequal parts. But the economy is not a cake, it is a great number of confectioners appointed to bake different cakes. Some are good confectioners who make good cakes, others are not so good, some waste or steal the flour, the sugar and the other ingredients. Some even sell the ingredients to buy a Kalashnikov for themselves.

According to the current propaganda, the wealthy, under the deforming lens of envy and hatred, become automatically the parasytes of the poor. Since many people rely on emotions caused

Fig. 1. Innovations generated in different ages by area of origin of innovators (not place where they were active).

by statements whose strength lies in screams, repetition and intimidation, the imposture (up to a point) works. But the thesis of a rich world which lives by sucking the blood of the poor would be questionable in any case, even if the economy really were a "zero sum game", that's to say based on a fixed amount of riches that cannot be increased (with no such things as innovation, value added to goods through applied skills, inventiveness, personal ability), an economy whereby gain by someone would become automatically a loss for someone else. Even if the zero sum model held, it would still be necessary to show that, redistributing everything to everybody in equal parts, dise-

qualities would not arise anew.

Human beings, in fact, although they have (or ought to have) equal dignity and equal rights in the eye of the law, are by no means equal in foresight and ability. A short time after the levelling redistribution, some would have prospered, others would have squandered what they had. Among nations, some would have used the same amount of resources to invest them in productive activities, others to purchase weapons and smart cars for their rulers, while the mass media showed a distorted picture by showing poverty, but not its true causes (Glucksmann & Wolton 1987). A trivial reasoning, no doubt, but suited to the intellectual

level of the many *maîtres à penser* who rely on the even rougher slogans of Saint Percentage. And what about entrusting to the State the task to rule everything, so that the clever and sparing might not prevail against the squanderer? We would have a world scale Big Brother, an all-seeing police State, in which the satraps at the top would in any case be highly privileged, with all the others forcibly levelled downwards. Such solutions have been tried many times in history, with the results we all know.

On the other hand, it cannot be overemphasised that *the modern economy is by no means a "zero sum game"*. In order just to *begin* to speak of the highly complex working of today's economic world, it is imperative, first of all, to understand what development is, by studying the way whereby the developed world has come into being (Dugan 2000, Rosenberg & Birdzell 1986, Wilson 1979). It goes without saying that we cannot simply apply elsewhere the methods that have been effective in the West. The Westerners themselves have followed development paths which were somewhat different from one another. To bear in mind the different experiences, however, can doubtless aid us in approaching the problem in truly scientific fashion, thereby shunning any ideological and demagogic *cul-de-sac*, and also avoiding the fancies of a preindustrial eden, which, as Ricossa (1974) teaches us, was the reign of fatigue.

Far from a rational examination of the facts, many *laudatores temporis acti* (worshippers of the past) regard development and urban centres, which are the main engines of development, as the roots of all social evils. Others, like the celebrated Lacoste (1965, 1983) and many other besides, dream to be able to speak of underdevelopment without having first made clear to themselves what development really is. Others still, like the talkative *lobby* gravitating around the masonic "Club di Roma" (Gabor & Colombo 1976; Mann Borgese 1986, 1988; Meadows *et al.* 1972; Mesarovic & Pestel 1974; Moll 1991; Neurath 1994; Peccei 1974; Pestel 1989; Tinbergen, Dolman & Van Ettinger 1976) or the theoreticians of neocolonialism (Baran 1957), locked into barren malthusian schemes (Malthus 1999), are unable to realize the basic conceptual difference between *growth, development* and *progress.*

The most effective approach to the problem of development appears to be that by Friedmann (1972), who defines it as *innovative structural change of the society and the space it occupies and uses.* It is no mere economic concept: innovations in the political, social and cultural fields also fuel change, and therefore development. Moreover, it is nowhere prescribed that innovations must invariably be good: there may be some very nasty ones (e.g. the introduction of a dictatorship, or anti-Christian persecutions), and many have both positive and negative effects (a new factory may provide jobs but pollute the environment), and some others may be difficult to assess, since no man is able to see all ends of good and evil. This definition of development is therefore far from being unduly optimistic, and even less is it tainted with triumphalism.

Needless to say, development must be clearly distinguished from *growth*, which is a merely quantitative change without structural modification of the social and spatial system, and we should also avoid carefully any confusion with the vague term "progress". If by progress we mean improvements in some limited features of human activity, for instance if we say that computers ten years ago were less advanced than those of today, and therefore that there has been "progress" in their construction, we are certainly stating an obvious and undeniable truth. But anyone who tries to make us believe that there such thing as "Progress" with the capital letter, in the rough and arrogant fashion of the so-called "Enlightenment", perhaps adding the pretence to "make the new man" and to "save mankind", just falls into a tragically misleading myth of neognostic make, as all historical experience has abundantly shown. The amount and diversification of resources absorbed (and often, unfortunately, pollution too) both grow with development (we are now talking merely of *economic* development), the latter unfolds thanks to innovations, and innovations flourish thanks to an entrepreneurial culture unhindered by envy and parasytical bureacratic interference.

Entrepreneurs are often singled out as people pushing hard for self-interest (or the mytical "maximisation of profit"), but often they are just human beings aiming at a certain level of satisfaction in their work and no more; some of them are really sharks, undoubtedly. We should clearly distinguish between a healthy entrepreneurships that generates jobs and does not lean heavily on the support of the taxpayer, from the action of speculators who do not accept entrepreneurial risk but rely on public money to cover their debts: such speculators are usually a hindrance, often a severe one, to the adoption of useful innovations. We must also be aware that self-interest takes many shapes, and is by no means merely economic: a politician, a trade union leader or a bureaucrat seek power, an academic or a judge seek power

and prestige, and the methods to achieve such desirable ends and satisfy personal ambition may sometimes be as morally unjustifiable as any of a dishonest entrepreneur. In any case we cannot overemphasise the basic fact that the causes of development and underdevelopment are intrinsically internal, *no intervention from outside can replace the efficiency* (or lack of it) of the economy of a given country, nor can it create efficiency where there is none.

And how does economic efficiency arise? It is directly proportional to the level of entrepreneurial culture, and therefore to the greater or lesser propensity to generate innovations and adopt them, accepting the attendant entrepreneurial risks. It can never be overemphasized that the true engine of an economic system is innovation. Let us consider the innovations generated in different historic ages, distinguishing them according to the country of birth of innovators (Fig. 1). A veritable explosion of British economic dominance took place during the First Industrial Revolution (1701-1900), while the United States slowly emerged, to achieve wholesale domination in the following industrial and postindustrial stages (from 1901 onwards). The primacy of English-speaking countries is unchallenged, while western Europe lags behind, though staying far stronger than non-European, non-English-speaking countries. The comparative collapse of the rest of the world in terms of innovations generated is quite evident: in the last stage it is almost exclusively represented by Japan, an excellent imitator of the West. Eastern Europe, up to the year 1000 was brightly represented by the Greek world, but later fell into a decidedly subordinate role.

The march of innovations had a recognisable impact on the relation between income and population growth. Between the year 1000 AD and 1500 the world population grew by 0.09% a year and income per capita by 0.05%: these five century were therefore marked by stagnation and slow regression. The protoindustrial and early industrial age, from 1500 to 1820 saw a marked acceleration of population dynamics (0.28%), while income lagged (0.07%) and this was an age of worsening social conditions, typical of the early stages of accelerated development. But from 1820 to 1995 income rocketed by 1.27% a year, easily passing a population growth of 0.96% (Maddison 2000). As a "general law", we can say that economic isolationism is tantamount to undervevelopment (Fraser Institute 2002): even in Europe, the success stories of Spain and Ireland are obviously linked to the opening of the economy. Globaliza-

tion is advantageous for those involved in it: in the "third world", low income globalisers (such as China, India, and several Latin American countries) have improved a great deal, with growth rates of the gross national product at 5% from 1990, against a mere 2% of industrialised countries (whose more dynamic nodal regions are active globalizers): these harbour together about half of mankind, ie three billion people, who have improved, in general, their social conditions (almost entirely passive globalizers, but globalizers nevertheless). Other developing countries (such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, a large part of the Arab world and Africa), with two billion people, instead, have experienced, in the Nineties, an annual decline of 1% of their per capita income: these have been left at the margin of globalization (non globalizers), and are the real problem. The most isolationistic countries such as North Corea, Cambodia, Burma, and many African countries, are those which fare worst of all.

Between 1990 and 1998 the number of people living in conditions of dire poverty, with an income below $ 1 daily, have dropped from 21% to 19% (Cecchi Paone 2002): there is no reason to be particularly happy about a situation in which nearly one fifth of mankind is still in such desperate straits, but this shows that poverty at least is not growing, but rather slowly receding. Nevertheless, average expectation of life has improved everywhere: in 1900, in what is now the "third world" people could expect to live 26 years, in the West 46 years; today Westerners live in average 78 years, people of the "third world" 46 years, and the increase has been in a century, 77% in the West, and a staggering 146% in the "third world". Evidently, innovation, especially in the field of preventive medicine and reduction of infant mortality, has by no means bypassed even the poor countries, which have benefitted from medical research taking place in Europe and North America. Yet, many imbalances are still there, but they are not hard to account for. Any innovation in a favourable entrepreneurial environment – to be found in the West, while it is usually hard to find in the "third world" – produces money, often huge amounts of money, as it generates input-output links and gives rise to innumerable adaptations and improvements. It is no chance if the most innovative and entrepreneurial contries are also the richest. What does it mean, then, to state that the developed countries are rich because they have plundered the rest of the world? If 20% of the people hold 80% of the wealth, is it not perhaps because they have invented and adopted 95% of the innovations?

The whole matter hangs upon the level of *dynamism of the society*. If the opposing contention were true, and the wealthy were rich only at the expense of the poor, how could we possibly explain that countries which never possessed any colonial empire, such as Sweden or Switzerland, have an income per caput higher then Great Britain, which has ruled for centuries over the largest colonial empire in history? Spain and Portugal also had giant colonial empires and certainly did not restrain themselves in exploiting them. But to what use did they put the riches thus accumulated? Instead of investing them in productive activities, they built lavish palaces and purchased works of art. As a consequence, the economies of the two Iberian countries have lagged far behind the rest of Western Europe. Their living standard began to rise only when they undertook industrialisation, in the second half of the 20th century, when colonialism was long gone.

On the contrary, England and Holland in the 16th century, *before* undertaking the conquest of their colonial empires, and even before entering the great circuits of world commerce, which was being formed on the wake of great geographic discoveries, were the two wealthiest countries in the world. Why? The answer is straightforward, perhaps too straightforward for those who like complications, allowing a broader range of propaganda maneuvre: *local* innovations, *local* entrepreneurship, exploitment of *local* resources with *local* manpower. An efficient agriculture (compared with contemporary standards), coal mining, metallurgy, wool cloth making, in England. High quality agriculture, linen cloth, fishing of North Sea herrings and their export after smoking them, in Holland. These were the economic recipes of the two countries which are sill among the most meaningful among those having a high development level. The riches of India and Indonesia, forthcoming great colonial objectives of these two European powers, were still to come to the fore. Colonial conquest was a consequence, and not the cause, of their strength, which took the form of military and political power, in comparison with the weakness of the future colonies. Weakness has always invited aggression. *Exploitment took place, no one denies it, but it was by no means the cause of the imbalance in riches and power.*

And after all, how did India and Indonesia fare, before being colonised, respectively by the British and the Dutch? "Third worldism" has emphasized their wealth, Golconda diamonds, for example, to compare them with their present widespread poverty which is alleged to be due to colonial (and neocolonial) dependency. But, the fabulous wealth of precolonial India was held by the maharajas, while poverty had always been the common lot of the mass of the population long before the Indians heard of such thing as the British Empire. Moreover, Indian poverty is receding. And what about the vast modern sector of the Indian economy, including the great computer pole of Bangalore, largely responsible for solving the problem of the dreaded "millennium bug"?

Severely depressed conditions existed in the Precolumbian empires: yes, the Inca swam in (unproductive) gold, but what of his subjects, systematically held in humiliating subjection? If they, trembling, had to visit the Inca, were obliged to carry a weight tied on their back, in order to stress their abysmal inferiority, and the fact that perhaps this was not felt as something humiliating, "because it was part of their own culture", as the relativist anthropologist would say, just makes things worse. And when they were sacrificed to ferocious and cannibal gods? These gods, in the diabolical mythologies prior to evangelisation, were deemed to "need" drinking human blood to live. Our relativist friend would object, again, that "so was their culture", and it was not felt as a negative thing. And again, the answer is that this just makes the case even blacker. Asia, Precolombian America, Africa (at least the better organised tribal kingdoms) lived in the tradition of oriental despotism, in which the ruler was master of everything, including the life and the death of all his subjects. In Russia, oriental despotism was introduced by the Mongolic invasion in the early 13th century, and this heavy heritage accounts for a great many things, in terms of non existent democratic traditions, of economic backwardness, of elephant-like bureaucracy, of political "justice" used to destroy any opposition to the regime and not to protect the common people against common criminals: this was, and to some extent still, the condition of the desperate Eurasian lands where communism has found an easy ground and has taken roots.

Leaving aside the exceptional case of Indian weavers (prevented by caste barriers from changing occupation to escape the competition of British cloth, during the colonial age), on which Lenin (1916) insisted so much, taking it to be the general rule of all European imperialism, it is impossible to sustain that colonialism invariably worsened the economic conditions of colonial peoples, first of all because it would be hard to find something to worsen the situation even more, and moreover because in the colonies something has been built (the Indian railways have been the

largest investment made in Asia in the 19th century), some notion of modern economy has been introduced, after all, and if today Bangalore, mentioned above, and the city-state of Singapore are among the major centres for computer production, and enjoy a comparatively high living standard, this is due to contacts started under colonialism and to entrepreneurship, both foreign and local.

Neither does the marxist thesis viewing neocolonialism as the main source of prosperity for the developed world, bear scrutiny. If colonialism, with its paraphernalia of political and social control, has not been a significant factor to make the colonisers richer and the colonised poor, why should neocolonialism do so, with its network of relationships less rigid and constrictive, and which is rather linked, or tries to be linked, to attempts to stimulate development? The utter inability of marxist theory to generate valid predictions is well known. The marxian "prophecy" of an imminent revolution in mid 19th century has failed, the further "prophecy" on the fall of the more advanced "capitalist" countries first, has gone the same way. Revolution (or rather a military putsch) occured only in backward countries, beginning with Russia. The "prophecy" on the end of all religions has been ridiculed. The leninist thesis of imperialism as the "supreme stage of capitalism" has gone utterly wrong too (Aron 1951). Valid scientific theories are singled out by a high predictive ability. To stay within the field of the social sciences, let us recall the formidable intuitions by Tocqueville (1992), who depicted a future dominated by the rivalry between Russia and America and forecast that racial conflicts were going to be the greatest difficulty for the United States, and this hundred and seventy years ago, when prospects of that kind were extremely remote. Marxism, on the contrary, as pointed out by Pera (1979), had constantly to "run after facts, in order to explain why things had not gone according to its predictions".

In line with the marxist tradition, "third world" ideology and noglobalism are essentially destructive criticism. Strange bedfellows are, in this regard, (post)communists, Le Pen and other extreme right-wingers, nostalgic protectionists, multi-coloured pauperists including many priests. Often the unequal terms of exchange are singled out as responsible for "third world" poverty. It is true that raw materials coming from the "third world" fetch low prises, while industrial goods produced in "rich" countries are expensive, but industrial production brings forth a value added (through work and technology) which a raw material can-

not possibly have. It is true that economic aid often turns into a support to firms of developed countries setting up branch firms in developing countries. It is also true that a greater liberalisation of exchanges could help developing economies a great deal. On the other hand, the multinational firms in average pay salaries twice or three times as high as those current in the developing countries in which they set up their branches. And in any case the causes of development and underdevelopment run deeper, they are still and in any case internal to the different countries. It is worth stressing once more that without a social and entrepreneurial dynamism, without an ability and propensity to generate innovations, to accept them, to put them to good use (resources all of intellectual and cultural nature, neither material nor financial), any economic opportunity, either based upon internal physical resources or upon resources coming from outside, will inevitably be lost.

Neither is underdevelopment something unmoving and unchanging. Not a few countries formerly backward have been able to rise, treading in their turn the path to industrialisation. The club of developed countries tends to grow. During the late 19th century just a few countries of western Europe and the USA could be regarded as affluent. In the following century, there have been several success stories, and not only in countries mainly settled by Europeans, such as Canada and Australia. Any country achieving an entrepreneurial culture can put resouces to a good use and increase its share of production (and pollutants too). Also, economic liberty goes hand in hand with political freedom (Fraser Institute 2002). The diffusion of the habits of the open societies boosts the self-esteem and strength of entrepreneurial and professional classes, which become better able to counteract the perverse power of political and military cliques (Novak 1996). Globalization is a process of inclusion, and the countries with better prospects of catching out with the richer ones are precisely those having more open societies and therefore more open policies (Bonaglia & Goldstein 2003). Saint Percentage is by no means the unchanging total suggested by an emotional propaganda, neither can it be easily altered by the magic word "redistribution". It is an easy task to redistribute money, especially if it does not belong to us, but to taxpayers. It is not as easy to "redistribute" innovative and entrepreneurial abilities. Those who call loudly for "redistribution" of wealth evidently do not know, or do not want to know, that wealth has first to be produced.

Even worse, *by accusing colonialism, dependency and globalization for every problem besetting the less developed countries, the noglobals only manage to offer ideological support to dictators and warlords who are largely responsible for the poverty of their peoples.* It was easy, for Saddam Hussein, to claim that the embargo was causing untold suffering to the people of Iraq, he was constantly supported by sizeable Western lobbies evidently accustomed to consider countries as brutal totalitarian blocks, being unable to distinguish between the rulers (who may be oppressive and corrupt) and the common people (who may be their victims). But when the Americans troops entered the lavish palaces of the *rais*, they not only found a luxury worthy of Harun al Rashid, but also huge sums of money. It is permissible to surmise that perhaps the plight of the Iraqi population might have been lessened if Saddam's wealth had been used differently? And there are some more questions the opponents of globalization should answer. How comes that countries never colonised are exceedingly poor, such as Afghanistan, whereas former colonies, such as Malaysia, are far richer? Why is no global unrest strictly localised in developed countries, while developing ones (with the marginal exception of a few fast food outlets wrecked in India, but more for reasons of culture shock than for real opposition to globalization) tend to regard globalization as beneficial? Although these questions have been asked before, no answer has been forthcoming, yet. In view of the emotional, unscientfic character of noglobal ideology, it is highly unlikely that an answer will ever come.

Unsolved problems and unanswered questions

The straightforward problem of maintenance reveals a great deal on the static nature of some societies, suffering from lack of entrepreneurship, perhaps with governments which are not as competent and honest as might be wished. It does not take to be particularly bright or to posses plentiful financial resouces to keep what we already have in passable order, yet things are not that simple. We said already that many "third world" governments prefer purchasing military hardware instead of feeding their peoples, but, if the weapons are not swiftly used to wage war against a neighbour, what happens to them? These are, of course, complex machines, which cannot simply stored in a shed. Yet, in the hands of some "third world" regimes, not all, but most of them, fighter planes and tanks,

dearly bought with resources that might have been far better used, become quite soon unusable, and new ones must be purchased. "Third world" metropolitan cities tend to vie with New York pushing their skyscapers higher and higher, and build large prestigious avenues, but not infrequently basic infrastructures are rather substandard. Under the skyscrapers and the lavishly broad avenues there are often sewers with a disturbing tendency to become clogged, with all the consequences that can easily be imagined.

Static societies have further disadvantages of their own making. Let us consider the problem of land ownership. The "third world" is hiding huge capitals which do not enter the production circuits because they are locked into buildings and fields held in common, into areas under tribal tenures and given in use to people according to traditional oral legal agreements, without any legal property title. Therefore they can neither be accepted by the banks as guarantees against loans, nor developed within the modern sector of the economy. This huge immobilised capital is worth over $ 9000 billion, twenty times the value of all investments in developing countries between 1989 and 1999 (De Soto 2001). This huge submerged economy could turn the scales towards a positive development in most countries now struggling with poverty. The emergence of this wealth is highly desirable for all concerned, because it would be chepear to pay taxes rather than bribes and having to hide from the authorities, thereby foregoing opportunities for expansion of business. But such a healthy solution is hindered by gigantic bureaucratic obstacles: regular registration of a small business enterprise requires hundred of bureaucratic passages, an inordinate time spent filling up legal forms and the completion of the procedure may take sometimes five to ten years or more. The opening of a new enterprise in Canada costs $ 280, requires 2 bureaucratic procedures and is completed in 2 days. The same figures for Bolivia are: $ 2696, 20 bureaucratic procedures and 82 days; in Hungary (where the bureaucratic tradition of communism still lingers in spite of the demise of the regime) the cost is $ 3647,10 bureaucratic procedures and 53 days (Cecchi Paone 2002).

The ideological opposition to the industrial world often takes the form of an extreme catastrophism. Business cycle slumps are interpreted every time as the result of irreconcilable "contradictions of the system", deemed to pave the way to endless depression, social unrest and (hopefully, for someone) revolution. The Seventies and Eighties were years of complex and highly sophisticated marxi-

an "analyses" on the "transition from capitalism to socialism" (whatever the meaning of these words may be). The "analysts" were so busy with their beautiful "explanations" of non existent changes that they were taken unawares by the changes that eventually did take place. Now, many of those same "scholars" maintain that the fall of the communist regimes is "their" victory, because "that was not socialism", or "not communism". It would be interesting to know what it was, then. It is worth stressing that the crisis of all marxian applications has involved not only the communist regimes, but democratic socialism as well, from the Unired Kingdom to Sweden, where the socialist parties have been obliged to largely to abandon dirigism, to avoid serious electoral consequences. Can we expect the opponents, the catastrophists of development and of the attendant unavoidable globalization, to realise that their catastrophism is largely wishful thinking?

There are more serious reasons to be worried, reasons that noglobal catastrophists seem unable to recognise. Abortion and attendant birthrate decline are the causes of a mounting population suicide of developed countries (Dumont 1991, Dumont, Sauvy *et al.*, 1984). An egoistic attitude generates the "Kronos syndrome": individuals do not wish to accept that their time is limited and that they will have to pass away and leave the stage to future generations; like Kronos, they prefer to devour their offspring. This edonistic/materialistic attitude, utterly contrary to the Christian roots of the Western world, leads straight into disaster, moral, social, economic. Of course, the alleged "saviours of the Earth", while strutting and fretting for this and that, do ignore this very real problem, this race towards collective suicide, or rather hail it as a great benefit. One of the consequences of the "Kronos syndrome" is that an aging population becomes less and less apt to accept new ideas: we are therefore running headlong, in Western Europe especially, into a serious decrease of social dynamism, into a renewed static society, ready to decay and be conquered by cultures (such as the Islamic one) which laugh at feminism, birth control and abortion. Demographic victories are the only stable and final ones.

Those who really try to aid the people of poor countries by working there as unpaid volunteers, when they bring clothing or medicines, are often obliged to declare that these articles are for their personal use, lest the goods be seized at the frontier, as accepting aid in that form is not "dignified for the country". This is the official excuse. The true reason is that the ruling clique, often the president and members of his family, only want aid in cash, which remains in their pockets. And the seized clothing and medicines? Sold for good money, pocketed by the same clique. The media almost invariably show a conventional image of underdevelopment. Two characters: the wealthy Westerner filling his belly, the famished "third world" poor. However, they leave out of the picture a third character: the soldier wielding a Kalashnikov, pushing the poor towards deportation and starvation.

The seminal case, extensively discussed by Glucksmann & Wolton (1987), is that of Etiopia with its artificial famines caused by the deportations under the marxist regime of Menghistu, who had forbidden the reading of the Bible and filled the country with giant pictures of Marx and Lenin. The communist Cambodia of the broken skulls is another highly meaningful example. The genocide of the Montagnards in Vietnam is a further case in point: "guilty" of supporting the Americans during the war, the people of this ethnic group are rapidly disappearing through sterilisation and countless atrocities; they were more than two million, they are now reduced to six hundred thousand and in a fews years they will be no more. In Sudan the northern Islamic regime is mercilessly destroying, by massacres, tortures and forced conversions, the southern Christians and animists. In the whole of Africa south of the Sahara, tribal conflicts and feuds within ruling families are playing havoc. *Silence, on tue* (Silence, we are killing), the title of the book by Glucksmann & Wolton cited above, is highly significant: no media coverage, no peace marches, no multicoloured flags for millions of victims.

If we speak of a "first world" (or developed world) and of a "third world" (or world of underdevelopment), it is fit to remember the "second world" too, that's to say that world variously called "communist", "real socialist", or "ruled by a marxist nomenklatura". In the third edition of the even too celebrated *Géographie du sous-développement*, Lacoste (1976) finally realised the importance of the entrepreneurial culture, and acknowledged, in his marxist jargon, that "in the underdeveloped countries what lacked was the burgeoisie" (what would be more properly called an entepreneurial élite), but he proposed the singular thesis that real socialism in the "third world" had at least the merit of to "do away with unemployment, and rather creating a scarcity of manpower". But Lacoste forgets that it is an easy task to eliminate unemployment wielding totalitarian power: it suffices to introduce forced labour, precisely what has

been done in the communist countries.

In this regard, and interesting fact accurately suppressed by the marxian historical vulgate is that pre-revolutionary Russia, during the half century prior to 1917, was effectively developing, thanks to foreign investiments, coming especially from Great Britain, Belgium and France (Von Laue 1963). Not only, but on the wake of foreign example, some Russian entrepreneurship was also developing, according to an imitative process which later worked exeptionally well in Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, that's to say in all that fringe of eastern Asia which escaped communism. Between 1865 and the outbreak of the first world war, milk and cheese production developed in Siberia, textiles in St. Petersburg and Moscow, steel in eastern Ucraine. In the leninist gulag, perfected by Stalin, which lasted until Gorbacev's time included, with centralised planning geared especially to arms production, this entrepreneurial development was crushed. The "leading country" became the seat of gigantic armed forces built upon an economic and social void. There was no production of the most basic consumer goods. Prices were low because they were forced downwards, empty shop windows exhibited propaganda posters instead of goods.

All other communist countries fell in line with the "leading country", no matter whether they were satellites or rebels to the leadership of the Kremlin. Secrecy and spies everywhere (we have witnessed the obsession with secrecy even in the recent case of Sars pneumonia in China, which allowed the epidemics to spread). The whole was masked by a noisy propaganda campaign and by statistical imposture: for example the ratio of doctors to patients seemed higher in the USSR than in the West because paramedics were counted as doctors. The imposture was heavily supported by Western mass media personalities, intellectuals, politicians, as a few documents (such as the Mitrokhin dossier), escaped from the secrecy of Kgb archives, exhaustively prove. The collapse of such a system was unavoidable. The "second world", plunged in the nefarious cultural heritage of oriental despotism (and still sunk in it, since the old story continues in China, Vietnam, North Korea, and elsewhere), begs the question: did the "second world" ever exist as such, or was it just deeply underdeveloped and therefore a mere part of the "third world"?

But who really helps the poorer countries? In practice mainly, or rather only, the missionaries of the Catholic Church. According to marxists, missionaries exercise a negative role (at most they just provide some perfunctory relief), because they prevent the achievement of "political consciousness" by the poor, which, traslated from propaganda jargon into human speech, means that, by spreading charity, i.e. love, they prevent the spread of class hatred and the seizure of power by professional revolutionaries. Here, therefore, comes to the fore the marxian concept on religion viewed as "the opium of the people", which has been the catchword of uncounted bloody persecutions against the Church. In fact, missionary aid is by no means and opiate and a perfunctory relief. It provides the basics of development (medical care, excavation of wells, new crops, handicraft training). This is the true path to effective aid: *to help people to do things by themselves*. The farmer who has learnt to use capillary tubes for drop irrigation can feed his own family and have surplus to sell; the artisan who has learnt to use properly hammer, pincers, saw and planer (a skill far from easy), is the potential small entrepreneur of tomorrow, and we can say likewise of him who has learnt the trade of electrician, plumber or farmer.

But what do the noglobals propose to do? Beyond vague slogans, such as "another world is possible", it is utterly unclear what viable proposals are contained in their utterances, in Porto Alegre and elsewhere. Certainly they have not taken any stand on the need to improve the level of societal dynamism. The myth of "redistribution" forcefully put forward does not take any account of the intellectual inputs necessary to a modern economy. The proposal of abolishing the patents for inventions, if implemented, would bring about the end of any incentive for research and development, with an attendant dramatic standstill of innovation in the developed world and no advantage accruing to developing countries. What "redistribution" practically means, is that production and income in the whole world would be crushed everywhere to the same level. It seems more than probable that all this is but an ideological screen for a totalitarian design, exactly like the multifarious ecologist mythology, which makes up the other horn of the muddled noglobal ideology.

The ecologistic neurosis

In its "reckless quest for profit", "capitalist" development, together with the "population explosion", is bent of "destroying the planet" – this is the wisdom pouring from the mass media. The villain of the situation, the Great Intruder, is, of course, man. It is therefore declared imperative to

contain the number of obnoxious human beings. What an excellent thing, abortion. The unborn child is sacrificed to the comfort of adults, and in this way more room can be found for the animal species threatened by human encroachment. The sweet moralists so deeply moved by the cruel destiny of seals have apparently no qualms for the children murdered before their birth. Extremist ecologism, by disowning the Western open society, is also responsible of throwing discredit upon the only effective controls on environmental problems, exercised thanks to transparency of information.

Precisely the democratic control exercised in the West by the people upon economic initiatives has prevented the dreadful environmental havoc brought forth by communist industrialisation in Eastern Europe and in the Eurasian plains. In Ucraine, oil pollution is such that a lighted cigarette stump thrown into the Dnjeper has set fire on a river stretch several kilometers long. The burning of coal in the open air has poisoned the people from East Germany to the Urals and beyond. The Kara peninsula has become a dangerously radioactive area. The hydrology of the Russian great plains are in disastrous disarray, large parts of the taiga are dying due to the lowering of the water table, the Kara Bogaz has been dried up and steppe winds are scattering many million tons of salt over the fields in Central Asia, lakes and rivers are dead all over Russia and Siberia. The highly hazardous Three Gorges project (involving, among other things the dislocation of more than one million people) in the strongly diastrophic area of Central China poses a serious threat: in the event of major earthquake, the consequences will be too ghastly to contemplate. More of this in a further contribution, by Corona, in the present volume.

Environmental protection is a serious matter: in the Western countries evaluations of environmental impact for every major project are justly mandatory. What is not acceptable, instead, is extreme ecologism, which is not science, but a fashionable ideology, a form of mystique clothed in scientific terms culled from truly scientific ecology. It is a kind of pantheism, evidently rooted in the neognosis, in awe in front of "mysterious forces of nature", which fires gullible spirits wishing to feel themselves part of a "grand project to save the planet". After rejecting Christianity, with its obnoxious Ten Commandments ("Do as you please", was the motto of diabolical initiation of the Hell-Fire Club, a highly significant product of the 18th century English Enlightment), the human soul is

thirsty of purpose and meaning, and tries to find it in gnosis. The gnostic ideology rejects the limited human perfection, it is the frenzy of those who "do not tolerate not to be God" (Samek Lodovici 1991), and thanks to "a magic jump beyond the mirror of reality", hope to find the edenic world.

It is an extremely old heresy: harking back to the dawn of Christianity, with clearly pre-Christian forerunners. It reappeared in thousand different shapes and versions. The myths of the "good savage", of "mother nature", of the "living planet ", are some of its most recent idols. The ideology of "Gaia", the living planet, is but a reissue of the heathen Gea or Mother Earth. Of course, any planet is but a big stone revolving around a star, which can or cannot offer physical and chemical conditions favourable to life. The idea of "Gaia" is mystic, not scientific. Confronted by these forms of irrationality, it matters little that ecology, the truly scientific one, has shown the high resilience of ecosistems (Holling 1978), or the fact that the very concept od sustainable development is utterly vague and needs, at the very least, a careful reinterpretation and redefinition.

It matters little that the Club of Rome has already been obliged to reasses many times its catastrophich predictions that had been proved utterly wrong, thereby causing the Club to become the target of devestating criticism (Clark 1973, Larouche 1983). In the meantime, misguided fanatics are prepared to make use of highly unconventional methods to prevent the broadening of a road necessary to ease traffic and prevent accidents: they dig tunnels and bar them with steel doors to forestall their pursuers. Their presence underground prevents bulldozers from coming into action for fear to cause a collapse of the tunnels on the human moles. They chain themselves to trunks, or even nail themselves to them; in short they seek sacrifices they probably would not even dream of undertaking to save a human being or their very soul.

In accordance with the newly rising heathenism, one finds in ecologism all the moral features of the old pagan world: infanticide by exposure under the cloak of legalised "therapeutic" abortion to prevent the spread of human life, the denial of a special place in nature to man (degraded to an animal among animals), the cult of the Mother Earth, tree worship, and worship of water sources and animals, a rampant superstition which enriches without measure such individuals as "magicians", seers and quacks (he who does not believe in God is by no means a "free" thinker, but a conceited being ready to believe anything), the

conscious idealised reappraisal of ancient heathenism so respectful of nature (and also slave-driver, persecutor of Christians, and a veritable world of terror ruled by an inexorable Fate to which the gods themselves were subject; however these less pleasant features of paganism are conveniently passed over).

The irrational nature of ecologism gives rise to true psychoses (Ciusa & Spirito 1971). Some examples among many may help to clarify this point. The Yugoslav ship Cavtat sunk in the Otranto canal on July 14, 1974, after a collision with another ship. Immediately after the accident, some scientists expressed serious worries about a possible catastrophe for the whole Adriatic or even for the Mediterranean. The mass media immediately echoed with alarm, not without hot polemics on the alleged inefficiency of the recovery operations to free the Italian seas from the "terrible" threat represented by the 200 tons of tetraethyl lead contained in the wreck. Only three years after the shipwreck, a quantitative analysis (D'Arrigo 1977) showed the real size of the problem: even if all drums containing $Pb(C_2H_5)_4$ had been smashed and their content had homogenously mixed with sea water in the Canal of Otranto, the concentration of $Pb(C_2H_5)_4$ would have grown by 0.05 parts per billion: a concentration comparable to that already naturally present, whereas with a diffusion in the whole Adriatic the tetraethyl lead from the wreck would have totalled just 0.006 parts per billion. Anyway, given the high specific weight of the chemical and high water pressure, the $Pb(C_2H_5)_4$ gushing out of the drums could not have possibly become dispersed, but it would have spread at the bottom up to a few hundred metres around to wreck, destroying benthonic life on such a puny area as to cause no serious problems at a regional scale.

Like the case of Cavtat, that of the oil tanker Haven, which caught fire and sunk by Arenzano, Liguria, in 1992, was widely reported in the media, obviously presented as a catastrophe for the whole Mediterranean. Quite soon, the wreck which was expected to poison the see became a true "haven" for benthonic, nectonic and planktonic fauna, and a few years later it swarmed with healthy fishes, mollusks and crustaceans. As usual, while the disaster was glaringly reported, the recovery of the ecosystem (which in the end was vastly improved, as the big submerged structure provided for the fauna a refuge area which otherwise would have never existed) went almost unnoticed. This mass media noise on disasters, and the scanty attention paid to the later solutions of the problems has two

quite obvious reasons: one intrinsic to the nature of the media themselves, sensationalism to attract the attention of the public and widen the audience, the other is that the communities involved have a vested interest in magnifying the problem in view of the forthcoming litigation for damages.

But is it true that nature is unpolluted, and that man is an alien source of pollution? Nature, "provident" and "intelligent", does feed everybody as a mother? He who harbours idillic fancies of this kind evidently has never thought of the cholera vibrio and the bacillus vector of the bubonic plague. Neither has he ever seen a lion in action against the cubs of his own pack, to whom he systematically breaks the neck to protect his position as the dominant male. Neither does he imagine what a weasel does if it manages to penetrate a henroost: it does not kill one hen which would be amply sufficient to fill its belly (and that of many more weasels), on the contrary it slaughters as many of them as it finds. The meek turtledoves fight each other to the death, each trying to wrench the tongue from the other's mouth: at the end of the struggle the loser is literally torn to pieces. And what of the millions of species extinguished before man appeared on earth? Whole ecosystems of past geological eras have been erased by nature, sometimes in sudden catastrophies.

A very heavy responsibility in the formation of a watered-down and distorted image of the natural world falls on the cartoons and the documentary films by Disney, where everything is splendid and ordered, and where you never see animals eating, except a few herbivores. The result: an increase of serious accidents because more and more youngsters, especially Anglosaxon, bewildered by nature worship, behave recklessly in dangerous ares. Among the many examples, it is very significant that of the eleven years old Mark Garratshea from Baltimore who, in the summer of 2000, with his mother, went to the national park of the Okavango delta in Botswana. The child, who had seen many times the Walt Disney film *King Lion,* was convinced of the "goodness" of animals and, with permission from his mother, had wished to sleep in an open tent on his own to feel close to these "dear friends" of his. Next morning the following pieces of him were found: the head, an arm, a pool of blood, the whole mixed with urine of hyenas.

Edenic ideology thus plays havoc among the people who only know nature through the Disney Corporation and the WWF. Truly, nature is the most powerful polluter (Ciusa 1976, Hammond

1975, Johnston 1974). During his great expedition in Latin America (1799-1804), the founder of modern geography, Alexander von Humboldt discovered natural sources of oil in the Maracaibo lagoon: the impact of these, which had been pouring at the scale of geological times, must have been far more serious than the shipwreck of a supertanker; evidently, the oil becomes naturally decomposed and ceases to be a problem. The huge amounts of sulphur anhydride let out by volcanoes must necessarily be a major cause of acid rains. Three large eruptions alone, which took place in the space of a century: Tambora (1815), Krakatoa (1883) and Katmai (1912) have ejected in the atmosphere such a huge amount of matter (carbonic anhydride, sulfur anhydride and dust) as to surpass all pollution produced by human civilisation from the beginning. No doubt, mining and metallurgical activities are sources of dangerous metal particles, but plants let out in the atmosphere organic particles containing lead and zinc (Beauford *et al.* 1977). At the same time, the extremely homogenous chemical makeup of the metal content in the atmosphere cause their presence very hard to account for with anthropogenic pollution only.

It seems that alarm mongers often lag behind reality. In the Thirties of last century, British planners and politicians began to voice the deepest worries about the "excessive growth" of cities. After the second world war the Labour Party set up a drastic politicy of urban containment and foundation of New Towns in order to "lighten" the demographic pressure of metropolitan cities and provide more "natural" living conditions. Young families moving to the New Towns had serious problems: the expression "New Town Blues" entered the dictionary, meaning the boredom and bad mood of young wives left alone the whole day long in a monotone and dreary urban environment of these dormitory towns while their husbands were out at work. It was not long before it was realised that the problem of "excessive urban growth" had entirely changed face, independently from any politicy consciously followed. The demographic crisis and spontaneous emigration from large cities began in fact to cause worries, exactly opposite to the previous ones: mounting depopulation, loss of jobs. In short, the economic health of the cities began to cause widespread alarm. Likewise, "excessive" energy consumption and the attendant pollution are causing fears and igniting polemics, and meanwhile the problem is radically changing: the leading economic sectors, such as electronic and computers have low energy intensi-

ty, whereas they are strongly information intensive, so that ecological problems of high energy consumption and pollution are being solved, thanks to innovations and market trends, in the developed world. The strongest polluters, nowadays, are the developing countries, and this points to the need of more, not less development, in order to heal not only poverty, but the environment too. It has been demonstrated that environmental protection undergoes considerable improvement in a country when per capita income passes the $ 5000 threshold (Krueger & Helpmann 1991).

Great attention is being paid in the media to the destruction of the Amazon rainforest, dubbed in ecologistic propaganda the "green lung of the earth", because the plants of the region are deemed to be essential for the production of the oxygen we breath. It is not commonly known, however, that over 90% of this oxygen is produced by sea algae, especially myriads of microscopic ones which are not even remotely in danger of extinction. Likewise it is not generally known that during the repeated ice ages from Late Pliocene onwards, practically the last three million years, forests were repeatedly destroyed by the dramatic climatic chages, and later recovered starting from small ecological niches where the various tree species had managed to survive: yet it does not seem that the disappearence of the forests caused anoxya at all. Moreover, the extent of Amazon rainforest deforestation has been exaggerated, and most of the damage has not been caused by the large corporations, which have adopted conservation policies involving partial and selective logging, but to the landless poor who destroy the trees in wholesale fashion to settle in the land thus laid bare, and then go happily to Porto Alegre to protest alongside the noglobals (Cecchi Paone 2002).

What is more disastrous, pollution or ecologism? The answer to this question is not easy, but the case of Love Canal, in Upper New York State can offer interesting food for thought (Holden 1980, Kolata 1980). In 1978, the town, which was built on a chemical disposal site, harboured a thousand families. A study commissioned by the Environmental Protection Agency found in the local population some chromosome aberrations, president Carter declared a state of emergency and the residents were evacuated. Two years later the Department of Health and Human Services performed a new investigation and uncovered a great many methodological blunders in the previous research: the percentages of cancers, spontaneous abortions and chromosome aberrations

found among Love Canal residents fell statistically within national averages. Much ado about nothing, but in the meantime the demoralising effects on the people had been devastating and in many cases beyond repair. Many families had broken up: husbands wanted to stay to avert losing the profits of years spent toiling, wives insisted to go away to protect the health of their children; quarrels had arisen, leading to separations and divorces. Those who had not left lived in terror of irreversible genetic damages.

Environmentalists in Italy are few and not particularly popular, but for mysterious reasons they wield a huge influence. In 1992, an eruption of Etna threatened Zafferana Etnea closely, but the "greens" raged against the embankments, the motor scrapers and the artificial gullies which, according to them, would have "spoilt" Etna: evidently a nice stream of lava covering the houses of unlucky families should be regarded, according to them, as an environmental improvement. For years, in the municipality of Rocchetta Tanaro, Piedmont, the "greens" thwarted any attempt to dredge a large bar in the bed of the Tanaro, in spite of repeated requests from the mayor. The reason given was the need to protect a nesting area of a precious flock of grey herons. Eventually, during the flood of 1994 – as the mayor and any other person with a modicum of common sense in the town had foreseen – the bar, which in the meantime had kept growing, formed such an impediment to the flow as to cause a disaster in the builtup area. And the herons? They did by no means suffer, but merely flew to the river bank nearby and built new nests there. In the province of Novara, in 1996, while the damages of the 1994 flood were still being mended, it was forbidden to clean a number of pits to avoid disturbing the habitat of a certain freshwater shrimp. Any comment is unnecessary. *Usque tandem, Catilina, abuteris patientia nostra?*

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Emilio Biagini

The global environmentalist imposture

Riassunto. - L'impostura dell'ambientalismo globale

È innegabile che esista una seria esigenza di tutela dell'ambiente, come dimostrato dai disastri ambientali causati dalla mancanza di critica libera nei paesi già afflitti dalla tirannide comunista. Vi sono tuttavia anche estremismi allarmistici ed antiumani che configurano una vera e propria nevrosi ecologica. Dietro di essa si nascondono ben precisi interessi costituiti, economici ed accademici, che mirano ad impedire una potenziale grande ondata di sviluppo basata sulle nuove tecnologie (nucleare intrinsecamente sicuro, trasporti a levitazione magnetica, biotecnologie basate su organismi geneticamente modificati). Le multinazionali petrolifere e chimiche e l'industria automobilistica, appartenenti ad un'ondata di industrializzazione ormai obsoleta, si oppongono con furiose campagne propagandistiche alla diffusione delle nuove tecnologie che ridimensionerebbe il loro potere. La diffusione degli organismi geneticamente modificati mediante biotecnologie avanzate, invece, danneggia chiusi interessi egoistici degli agricoltori del paesi sviluppati. Se si vuole ridare slancio allo sviluppo e all'occupazione, è indispensabile sconfiggere tali interessi reazionari con una ben mirata campagna di informazione.

Introduction

It is undeniable that there is a serious need for the protection of the environment, and an environmentally responsible policy must be an essential part of any modern political platform. This must be clearly stated at the outset, since the public has been so thoroughly brainwashed about the environment that expressions such "environment", "Mother Nature", "Gaia", and "overpopulation" have become irresistible catchwords capable of swaying rational reflection on the matter. This said, it must be acknowledged that there are, in the developed world, movements pushing far beyond advocating a sane environmental policy, and leading to extremes of hysteria and catastrophism. It is also necessary to draw a clear line between the respectable science of ecology, and the furious ideology of ecologism, or environmentalism. In fact, after the innumerable disasters brought about by ideologies, any word ending in "*-ism*" ought to be regarded with the strongest suspicion.

The pounding terrorist propaganda by ecologists aims not only at de-humanizing human beings, reduced to a merely animal or sub-animal level (a logical, unavoidable outcome of atheism and materialism; ancient pagan thinkers also thought, not surprisingly, that man is just an animal), but also to destroy national sovereignties to replace them with a supranational control which, under the excuse of protecting the environment, will be able to decide what technologies to adopt, which firms will be allowed to survive and which instead will close down, where we will be permitted to live and where it will be prohibited, who must be sterilized and who will be have permission to have children, and how many. These projected policies are the inevitable expression of an ideology which regards man as "a cancer", on the line of materialist pessimism of malthusian make (Malthus 1999). It is understood that the tacticians of ecologistic terror hope to rise to the top of the forthcoming totalitarianism, thus achieving

even higher positions than those they already enjoy, compared with a rest of the world made more and more poor by a stifled economic development. However, some sharper and more honest members of the ecologistic movement, are beginning to voice serious doubts (Lomborg 2001).

Above all, environmentalism is far from being disinterested. On the contrary, there is an ecological catastrophism massively fed by vested interests, and some industries may come so far as to support campaigns against themselves, if self-interest so dictates, as we shall see, for example, in the case of the so-called freons.

"Greens" (with fear of the new technologies)

It is said that one may become green with fear, and the fear in this case is that of new technologies. The movement of the "greens" can be said to be born officially as a mass movement on April 22, 1970, when in the United States was celebrated for the first time the *Earth Day*, in line with a neognostic rediscovery of heathen-like "values", cloaked as worries for health and the environment, and aiming from the very beginning against the Judeo-Christian tradition, "guilty" of upholding the dominance of man upon nature. At the same time, that tradition was accused of being responsible for the onset of racialism, having talked of Good as light and Evil as darkness. In an evolutionary perspective, they supported compulsory sterilization, because – they maintained – a merely voluntary birth control would have "deprived the gene pool of responsible people", leaving the others to breed like rabbits.

High-flown academics like Marcuse blew on the fire. There awoke, in immature and easily influenced minds, a spirit of wholesale rebellion, yearning to unsettle everything and make everything new, which has always been the fuel of revolutions for the unaware followers. For others, the movement was a good excuse to vent their violent instincts. So, on the one hand, "pacifist" and willingly co-operative, politically correct groups were born, given to sweet campaigns to "save the trees", on the other hand violent gangs of ecoterrorists, Black Blocs, and the like, emerged. Great was (and is) the ideological confusion, but the sponsors of such movements, on the contrary, knew (and know) very well what their goal was (and is), and the way to achieve it, not by logic, but by mastering all available communication channels, screaming, repeating, and insulting ("reactionary", "enemy of mankind", and the like) anyone who holds different views, and shows to be aware of the true nature of their endeavours.

The main sponsor of the "Earth Day", to the tune of $ 200.000, was Robert O. Anderson, then president one of the leading oil companies, the *Atlantic Richfield Oil Corporation* (ARCO), active in the exploitment of North Sea oilfields. He also owned the newspaper *London Observer* and chaired the *Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies* (an organization for "humanistic studies" founded in Aspen, Colorado, in 1948). He contributed further $ 200,000 to the ecologist association *Friends of the Earth*. Among the founders of the Aspen Institute it is worth mentioning the chancellor of the University of Chicago, Robert M. Hutchins, a friend of Bertrand Russell and a dedicated malthusian. Hutchins was planning director of the *Ford Foundation* which it advised to finance, in the early Fifties, a research project on hallucinogenic chemicals such as LSD and mescaline. This study contributed to bring forth the counter-culture movement of the following ten years (Gaspari, Rossi & Fiocchi 1991). Of course, it would be hard to say whether this result was intentional. Nevertheless it is certain that such a counter-culture, deeply hostile to Christianity, and narcotics diffusion which went (and still goes) with it, were instrumeental in creating, among school and university students, a subversive climate, which became massively channelled into environmentalism. It is also worth stressing that the spread of narcotics is functional in its own right, given its destructive character, just to the containment of the "cancer" of the Earth, the human population.

The massive support of world financial and oil lobbies to the ecologistic movement gave quick results. What was still a little known opinion trend, became all of sudden a protest movement with violent fringes of anarchoid hue. The unrest, begun in Sixty-eight. still lingered, so that heterogenous and confused protest movements merged and strengthened one another: the illusion arose in many a youth to be instruments of a global and beneficial change. The Vietnam war provided additional fuel the the fire of protest. The lobby fanning the fire, however, never lost sight of the initial goals. The perfume of oil given off by the dollars and the pounds, accounts perfectly for the fact that nuclear energy was the chief target from the very beginning.

The "Friends of the Earth" established their headquarters in London. There they organized, in 1971, an international demonstration against nuclear power stations, the first of a long sequel,

some of them exceedingly violent. Under the new president of the Aspen Institute, Joseph Slater, another big boss of world finance (he was director of the Ford Foundation), the ends of the ecologist movement were put into focus: a ban against nuclear power stations, a reduction of economic activities, especially of intensive agriculture, and of building programmes of large transport lines, and, above all, zero growth of the population of the world to be achieved in all possible ways, from mass sterilization to abortion, forcing a halt to demographic growth as a precondition to obtain aid, i.e. blackmailing the underdeveloped countries. This has prompted many of them to counterfeit birthrate data in order to qualify for aid. The latter went often not to the populations but to local satraps.

After the first oil crisis of 1973, several countries had put forward plans for nuclear development, but the worldwide massive propaganda campaign set up by ecologist movements succeeded in forestalling such projects alternative to oil. If we need to put an exact birthdate to the oil lobby we can take September 17, 1928, when Sir John Deterding of Shell invited to his castle of Achnacarry, in north Scotland, Walter C. Teagle of Esso and Sir John Cadman of British Petroleum to reach an agreement for the formation of an oligopoly: like Chicago gangsters, but on a global scale. The fact that they all were top members of the Freemasonry helped no doubt to achieve a satisfactory (for them) understanding. These individuals divided among themselves the planet into spheres of influence, decided to crush any kind of external competition, to fix by common consent the prices of oil products, to exploit Soviet oil together.

The plan of the oil tycoons was applied to the letter and without the slightest scruple. The trade in Soviet oil by the Western oil companies was linked to the support by great Western capitalism to the USSR, a support that was for many years a decisive factor of the Communist regime and its gulags, where tens of millions of people died or were brought down to a subhuman level. The long and complex story of the unswerving support of Free Masons to the Soviet regime is still to be written. As to crushing the competition, Italy was hit particularly hard, with the murder, in 1962, of Enrico Mattei, the founder of the national oil company ENI (*Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi*).

Another result of this kind of pressure was the transformation of ENEA: this organization went off with the tail between its legs, after a covered but highly persuasive hostile campaign by foreign oil magnates and their ecologists, and its acronym was transformed from *Ente Nazionale per l'Energia Atomica* (National Authority for Atomic Energy) first to *Ente Nazionale per le Energie Alternative* (National Authority for Alternative Energies), and then to *Ente Nazionale per l'Energia e l'Ambiente* (National Authority for Energy and Environment). Exxon, strongly present in Italy under the name Esso, first supported with donations the ruling parties of the Centre, later on it was extremely generous with those of the Centre-Left from 1962, the year of the murder of Mattei: these parties evidently were more pliable and gave a better guarantee of controlling protest movements.

In this way was born the sinister empire of the "seven sisters" (ready to defend their interests with nail and teeth): the *Royal Dutch Shell* (an Anglo-Dutch giant floated in 1907 from the merger of two pre-existing societies), the *British Petroleum* (BP, floated in 1909 as Anglo Persian Gulf Company), plus five more American ones. Initially, all oil sold in the United States was controlled by the family Rockefeller, which had floated in 1870 the Standard Oil. Convicted as a monopoly in 1911, the society was broken up, and a number of societies were born: *Exxon, Mobil, Chevron, Texaco, Gulf Oil* (an exceptional one, being the only large American oil company not controlled in some some way or other by the Rockefeller). The management boards of all seven "sisters" have always been filled with people engaged at the same time in leading positions in the various ecologistic movements.

The command structure of the ecologistic movement is practically made up entirely by financial magnates (a veritable flood of dollars has come from the family Rockefeller through the banks and the foundationis it controls), by the leaders of the great oil companies and by the most highly selected character of the European aristocracy, among whom the Prince Consort of Elisabeth II, His Royal Highness Philip, Duke of Edinburgh. The high-ranking nobleman was initiated into the free-masonry by the Grand Master of the "Marina" lodge, with the number 2612. He would have liked to become Gran Master of the Great Mother Lodge of England, but that office went instead to Edward Duke of Kent, due to the opposition of the uncle Lord Mountbatten, probably worried about the bad figures that the eccentric Prince Consort (relentless ecologist, but supporter of the fox hunt), would have done, causing the austere British Freemasonry to blush. On the blunders of Philip of Edinburgh a huge literature exists. In an interview to an American television

network, he complained that the royal annuity was "only" £ 700 million a year, and when the interviewer hinted at the increase of unemployment in Britain, he replied that he failed to understand what reason did the Britons had to complain, since earlier they had complained about having not enough leisure time. On August 8, 1988, Philip outdid himself when, in a statement released to the Deutsche Presse Agentur, declared himself to be exceedingly happy about the death caused by AIDS: "Were I born again, – he said – I would like to be a letal virus like that of AIDS, to contribute solving the problem of overpopulation" (Engdhal *et al.* 1991).

The *World Wildlife Fund* (WWF), which has an annual budget to the tune of tens of million dollars, was founded in 1961 by the Duke of Edinburgh and Prince Bernhard of Holland: the defence of nature has become a pretext to force poor countries into sterilization, abortion projects with low technological level. The inspectors of WWF, instructed by the World Bank, visit the areas involved in infrastructural projects (dams, railways, roads, canals, nuclear power stations, steel plants, projects for intensive agriculture and animal husbandry), and advise to finance only the low technology ones (dubbed "appropriate technology projects" or "with a low environmental impact"): these just worsen underdevelopment (Engdhal *et al.* 1991). The *Guardian* (September 4, 1990) reported that, from February 1987 the WWF entered into an agreement with the government of Zimbabwe for the protection of the black rhino: sophisticated equipment for trasport and surveillance were put at the disposal of the Zimabweans, as well as weapons. The rhino was "protected" by hunting the poachers: many tens of them were killed. Poachers are men and the rhino is only an animal, but for the ecologists, and the materialists in general, man is worth less than animals.

Similar goals has *Greenpeace*, founded in 1970 under an essentially antinuclear brief: among its main supporters the usual Duke of Edinburgh, the Swedish royal family, the royal family of the Low Countries, and a number of private foundations; similar are also the huge budgets which have enabled the association to open 35 headquarters in 22 countries, and to possess a true fleet and a highly sophisticated equipment for communication, intelligence and propaganda. A huge scandal was the documentary film "Survival in the Great North", produced in 1989, in which Greenpeace tried to point an accusing finger against the seal hunters. Later it was shown that tortures had been inflicted to the animals by members of the same Greenpeace; and the reason of that will be immediately evident bearing in mind that the annihilation of the fur trade would leave the monopoly of this lucrative economic activity in the hands of the synthetic fur makers. And what raw material is used for such products? But oil, of course.

The mass media are staunch supporters of ecologistic campaigns, following transversal alliances ignoring political divides. Highly instructive in this regard if the story of the founder of the CNN, the most influential television network in the United States (Gaspari, Rossi & Fiocchi 1991): Dallas born Ted Turner. He began to rise by signing a contract for the utilization of a Tv satellite, in order to set up a world-wide network. After a classical puritanical education of a calvinistic hue, he openly rejected it, declaring: "I have grown under the terror of eternal damnation, and have been saved seven or eight times. But every time I get farther from salvation I feel better (...). Christianity is the religion of losers". He has been the major supporter of the "Big Green" referendum, sponsored (and lost) by Californian environmentalists, and has suggested to replace the Ten Commandments with a grotesque environmentalist parody.

Quite often, the champions of ecologism are the worse polluters. For example, none of the environmentalist organizations which dubbed "a criminal action" the dyoxin accident in Seveso (July 10, 1970), apparently "remembered" that Dr. Luc Hoffman, owner of Icmesa, a branch of the multinational Hoffman-Laroche, was honoray vice president of the WWF. Russell Train, cofounder of WWF, director of the department "Environment, Health and Safety" of the chemical multinational Union Carbide, was elected president of the WWF in 1978. The Union Carbide is the owner of the Bophal factory, in India, which, on December 2, 1984, ejcted a toxic cloud that poisoned 170,000 people, of whom 2,600 died. Train, who had previously expressed his high approval of plans to force a decrease of the world population, has defined "excellent" the environmental programme of the Union Carbide. Evidently, toxic clouds improve the environment by reducing the population. On March 24, 1989, the oil tanker "Exxon Valdez" went aground in Prince William Bay, Alaska, polluting the sea with 40,000 tons of crude oil, which contaminated the coast on a length of 1,600 kilometres, killing 36,000 migrant birds and utterly destroying the salmon fisheries. The owner of the tanker was Exxon, one of the "seven sisters", and the president of Exxon, and at the same time of the American WWF, was Eugene McBrayer,

which accounts for the fact that WWF, instead of loudly denouncing the incident as one more piece of evidence on the environmental hazards, has kept singularly quiet about the whole business.

It is not necessary to examine in detail the various environmentalist groups, more or less alike in terms of aims, philosophy and (double) standars of behaviour, neither would it be any use to consider the further developments of ecologism, which has tediously continued to harp constantly on the same tune. What would be the outcome, were this kind of environmentalism to be entirely successful? Probably nothing different than a worsening of what is already taking place: (i) a huge increase in wealth of the financial and oil lobbies sponsoring the movement; (ii) stagnation in the poorer countries and a halt to the positive effects of globalization; (iii) continued dominance of the Anglo-Saxon north Atlantic economic bloc, which controls huge oil reserves, upon Germany, France, Italy, and the rest of Europe, countries far less well provided with oil, whose interest would be rather to rely on nuclear power. However, in view of the strength deriving to terrorist organizations, such as Al Quaeda, precisely from oil, it is quite possible that the USA and the UK may decide to lessen the dependence on oil for political considerations overriding the interests of oil tycoons, and this will give a boost to the adoption of other energy production methods, including nuclear power.

It seems that the nuclear industry tries to influence the environmental movement too, and the campaign against carbon dioxide increase in the atmosphere began, having as a major target all fossil fuels. This attempt by opposing lobbies to have the environmentalists side with them, leads the ecologist movement to attack any kind of development (though some lip service is paid to "sustainable development", whatever this may mean, or "alternative paths to development", just another expression of quite uncertain meaning). This is exactly what a definite section of the industrial world wants: i.e. all those who have invested huge amounts of capital in long mature technologies: oil, cars, rubber, and all linked activities.

Ecological totalitarianism

Many of the founder members of the Friends of the Earth came from the associations Planetary Citizens and World Federalists, closely linked with the Free Masons. The cream of the financial aristocracy of the Anglo-Saxon world belongs to these two associations, whose goal is the union of the world under a single government. The world government idea is not new. It was one of the strong pieces of the Enlightenment, such as in the pamphlet *Zum ewigen Frieden* of 1795, by Immanuel Kant, who suggests that a government of that kind could guarantee "eternal peace". It may well be asked how could this be reconciled with reality and with Christian doctrine, which promises peace only on an eschatological perspective and prophesizes that war (Armagheddon) will be with us to the end of time, which will be time of the Antichrist. The Enlightenment, it is well known, rejects the Christian Revelation and, being a form of neognosis, maintains that mankind can achieve peace by its own efforts, becoming united in brotherly embrace which can only be that of the masonic brotherhood. It must also be borne in mind that most Free Masons have no idea of what their sect is all about: there is a great numer of initiation steps, and only the puny clique at the top, is in the know; the others are just led by the nose and most probably they have joined merely in the hope to gain advantage for their careers in the first place.

It is far from difficult to grasp what kind of world government would arise from extreme environmentalism: a dictatorship swayed by the élite financial world, to the serious detriment of true entrepreneurship and of mankind in general. Who these paladins of such "new order" are, is clear from the offices held by them and the kinds of projects they like to foster. Norman Cousins, founder of the World Federalists, belonged to the board of Directors of the Friends of the Earth, member of the Aspen Institute and manager of the Saturday Review. Douglas Dillon, a powerful Wall Street banker, founded in 1961, upon advice of Bertrand Russell, the Institute for World Order (IWO), aiming at bringing about a world government and sponsor of the project Mobilization for Survival, with the declared purpose of phasing out nuclear power and bring about a decrease of the population. In 1980 President Jimmy Carter sponsored the study Global 2000, which called for draconian measures for the reduction of the population of developing countries. In 1989, the then Soviet foreign minister Eduard A. Sheverdnadze proposed at the United Nations to turn the UN environmental programme into and Environmental Council with mandatory powers, with attendant severe curtailing of national sovereignties. It is fitting that such a proposal should come from the Soviets, who have been the inventors of "limited sov-

ereignty", as all their former satellites well know.

One episode, reported by the news in 1992 is highly significant of the level reached by the ecologistic paranoia. A buzzard (*Buteo buteo*) had been attacking the inhabitants of a small French village, Mezière-sur-Issoire, by Limoges. After fifteen aggressions and some serious injuries, under the frowning eyes of the "greens" and the Forestry Service, the villagers had to resort to the law courts. On account of an Act of 1976, the buzzard is a protected species, and cannot be killed, under threat of heavy fines and even jail. It is an absurdly rigid law, that leaves no room for exceptions, even for species far from threatened with extinction (in France only there are about 60,000 buzzards). Some ornithologists, policemen and foresters were eventually sent. Their first occupation was to inform, by registered mail with return receipt, the ministry of the Environment, the only one concerned in similar matters. Thereafter, the "experts" vainly tried to catch the dangerous bird. The aim, they explained, was to understand whether the buzzard suffered of physical or psychological ailments, in order to tend it and educate it. It is unclear how this could have been achieved: perhaps by psychanalysis, in order to check whether it had suffered some trauma when still in the egg?

"Silent spring"?

The celebrated "Silent spring" by Rachel Carson, published in 1962, has become, from the very date of its publication, one of the sacred texts of the incipient environmentalist movement, Like all fables, it begins with "Once upon a time ... ", and ventures into an idyllic description of an America "where all creatures seemed to live in harmony with the environment", a place enlivened by the songs of many little birds. And goes on transfixing with fiery words the use of pesticides and of DDT in particular, singled out as the chief culprit for the disappearance of the little birds and for making the spring "silent" The romantic swetness of the descriptions and the tender regret for a world which never more, helas, will return, makes a stark contrast with the harsh psychological warfare which it wages, filled as it is of "subliminal messages, childish fears, guilt complexes, terrifying images which become suggestive literary devices to manipulate the reader and lead him to believe acritically the content of the message" (Gaspari, Rossi & Fiocchi 1991). The book opens with a quotation from Albert Schweitzer: "Man has lost the ability to

look at the future and act in advance. In the end he will destroy the Earth", but without informing the reader that Schweitzer was talking of the atomic warfare, and certainly not of pesticides, and that just concerning DDT he had espressed himself in a highly positive way, in the hope it could help to destroy insect pests.

Actually, DDT, whose properties as an insect killer were discovered by the Swiss chemist Paul Müller (who was awarded the Nobel Prize for this discovery), did exactly what Schweizer hoped it would do. On the wake of the emotion caused by "Silent spring", and of "researches" which demonized it in every possible way, DDT was banned. It was "useless", they said (because of new varieties of resistant insects), and "dangerous" (because it tended to become concentrated at the top of the food pyramid) The disappearance of DDT has caused an immediate revival of malarial fever and of parasytes attacking the plants. The harvests of cotton, peanuts and potatoes, where DDT had been employed, had doubled. Before DDT, in 1961, in Pakistan there had been 7 million cases of malaria; after a sustained campaign of DDT spraying they had declined, in 1967, to 9,500 only; but in 1975, three years after the ban, they had risen to 10 million. The same things happened in India and Sri Lanka. At present, malaria cases in the world are hundreds of million, and half the world population is at risk.

And birds? Between 1941 and 1961, at the climax of DDT spraying, they increased in the whole North America. After these data of the Audubon Society were published, the strategy changed: DDT is no longer a bird killer, but an egg weakener. Carson's book reported reasearch according to which it seemed that Japanese quails fed with a diet containing DDT did not sit on their eggs: a perusal of the original study by Dr. J.B. De Witt has shown that this was far from true: there was a minimal difference on the percencentage of normal clutches between quails which had been fed DDT (80%) and the control that had not received it (83.9%). Moreover, Mrs. Carson omitted to mention a similar study of the same author on pheasants: normal clutches were 80% for the group which had taken DDT and only 57% in the control group. A further hoax was the theory of DDT accumulation "forever" in the oceans. On the contrary, it is degraded quite rapidly: in a month about the 90% vanishes, and the rest follows. Attempts to show that DDT causes cancer in man were unsuccessful.

Why such a rage, then? For political reasons. A too swift population increase would bring about a

threat to extant political and economic balances. An official of the Officie for population control of the American State Department, declared in the early Seventies: "Using DDT we made a serious mistake. Malaria, one of the most widespread sicknesses in the world, has been practically eliminated. In this way we have upset the natural balance. Too many human beings have remained alive. We would be lucky if a more deadly virus appeared" (cit. in Gaspari, Rossi & Fiocchi 1991).

The return of the marshes and the devastation of agriculture

Once upon a time there was reclamation. Marshes were drained to save men from malaria, today there is a dominant tendency to re-establish them, evidently because the anopheles, being "natural", deserves more respect than human beings. Whereas the conservation of extant humid areas can be meaningful for fishing and tourism, and also for preserving ecosystems, within a proper balance between economic activities and ecology, aimed at the paramount needs of mankind above all, it is utterly unacceptable to flood again ponds already drained, that would at once become breeding grounds for countless mosquitoes. By yearning an impossible "primigenial purity" of "unpolluted nature" we tend to forget that nature has wiped out millions of species and whole ecosystems, sometimes gradually, sometimes by means of dreadful catastrophes. Backwards in time, we might attempt to recreate Precambrian conditions, before the "pollution" by oxygen caused by the chemical activities of bacteria produced an oxydizing atmosphere which damages rocks and allows aerobic organisms to live, including the obnoxious human species. Is this unpolluted nature idyllic enough? Are you satisfied, environmentalists?

Machines defeated fatigue and increased productivity in agriculture. To harvest wheat in a hectare of land with a scythe took a hundred hours work, with a sickle about seventy-five hours, with a mowing machine little more that three hours, with a combine harvester one hour. Chemistry contributed to the defeat of fatigue too: to weed a field with a hoe is a back-breaking effort which evidently neither eurobureaucrats nor executives of multinationals have ever experienced; after the introduction of herbicides this work has become accessible even to people with white hands as they are, if only they condescended to soil them with some real work.

In 1950 a farmer could feed fifteen people.

Thanks to herbicides and pesticides, he can feed today nearly fifty. But, under the ecologistic imposture, the age of the reversal of reclamation has dawned. Eurobureaucrats are doing their worst to restrain agricultural production: quotas, set aside, joint liability taxes for actual or alleged pollution caused by fertilizers, budget cuts for agriculture, incentives for the slaughter of cattle and the uprooting of vines, cuts to financial support to agricultural export, price rises of fertilizers and pesticides. At the sane time we have a proliferation of farms producing according the so-called "biological agriculture" (what does it mean?), as if using pesticides and fertilizers meant "mineralogical" agriculture.

Indictments to fertilizers as causes of algal blooms at sea are utterly groundless. Fertilizers are largely made up of nitrates and/or phosphates, it is true, and if these chemicals fertilize the land, they, washed away by rainfall, can also "fertilize" rivers and the sea. At least in theory. In practice it should be explained why algal blooms (which involve essentially microscopic algae belonging to the Flagellata or the Diatomeans) are taking place since the preindustrial age, when fertilizers (and phosphorated detergents, also accused of being responsible for blooms) did not exist. Moreover, nutrients capable of supporting a bloom are present in the waters in quantities more that sufficient to support a bloom at any time, as reserves are accumulated by river discharges at the geological time scale, before man appeared. Finally, how do we account for the fact that these blooms involve *one species only at a time*? This is compatible only with the action of *specific biostimulants* as the vitamins, contained in large amounts in rivers and "clean" effluent from water treatment plants. Biostimulants do not favour indiscriminate proliferation, but each acts on a given species only (Biagini 1990). Algal blooms can cause serious *anoxia*, due to the huge algal biomass which cannot produce oxygen during the night but keeps consuming oxygen. Anoxia plays havoc among organisms, damaging the fisheries and forming huge amounts of putrefying organic matter. Man is by no means responsible for anoxia: this event occurs in a high pressure regime, under good and stable weather conditions, which cause no mixing of the water column, so that the deep anoxic layers receive no oxygen from surface waters. It is a paradox: we are confronted by totally natural events, perhaps even worsened by depollution measures, and yet accusing fingers are pointed against man, the "great polluter".

And pesticides? We pointed out already to the

catastrophic results (and the true motives) of the ban on DDT. But there are many more pesticides. Shall we to give up them? What for? They are already present in huge amounts in the food we eat (sometimes up to 5-10% of dry weight). Plants have developed natural defenses against parasytes. They produce natural pesticids, usually alcaloids, often as poisonous as those produced by man. Anise, apple, banana, basil, carrot, cauliflower, celery, fennel, grapefruit, melon, pineapple, potato, raspberry, are just some of the species producing pesticides. Unlike man-made pesticides, which are sprinkled on the produce and are then washed away by rain and/or by washing in the kitchen prior to consumption, natural pesticides are a part of the fruit, leaf or tuber, and are swallowed with it. The only way to avoid them is to stop eating. After a long enough fast, the environmentalist dream of a world finally healed from the "cancer" which is mankind would come true.

The hysteria about transgenic foods and the SRI paradigm

Another, and more recent, environmentalist bogey is that of transgenic foods. The first transgenic tomato was obtained in the USA in 1987, and the sale of this kind of food was authorized in 1992. Transgenic foods are those derived from plants or animals which are genetically modified. Thanks to the intimate knowledge of DNA, the technologies aimed at changing the gene pool are by now highly advanced. It is possible to use them on man as well, and this should not be allowed, for self-evident reasons, at least self-evident for anyone who does not regard man as an animal like all others (or worse than all others). But if genetic engineering is used to obtain plants and animals with useful characters such as high productivity and resistance to parasytes, why should we oppose it?

Incredibly, on the contrary, a furious campaign of environmetalistic terrorism was unleashed against these new products, but *only in the West, where agricultural protectionistic lobbies are evidently worried by the possible competition of new crops.* Genetically modified plants and animals are pictured as monsters ready to devour mankind, in graphic and verbal caricatures so rough as to warrant the conclusion that environmentalism mongers think they have to deal with a mass of mentally disabled, or hope to have so heavily conditioned public opinion by now that it is no longer necessary to mount a propaganda campaign having a modicum of likeness to reality. Not surprisingly, producers and sellers of food advertised as "biological", ie "not manipulated", prosper. "Biological" agriculture is big business, and sells its produce at a high price, whereas transgenic foods could be marketed in huge amounts at low price. But this is probably the true goal: keep prices up, screaming at the same time against world-wide hunger. The public opinion must be lead to believe that transgenic agriculture is not the solution, and that the only ones who worry about the "third world" poor are the environmentalists themselves.

The absurdity of this propaganda appears not so much from the fact that there is absolutely no evidence that any transgenic food ever caused any health problem, but rather from another undeniable circumstance: *nearly all* food comes from genetically modified organisms. If we did not possess such organisms we would simply starve. Leaving aside venison, berries occasionally gathered during some outing and, in part, mushrooms, and some wild greenery, we subsist on organisms whose gene pool has been altered by controlled breeding and artificial selection. This has been going on since the "agrarian revolution" of the Neolithic Age, and the modified species, if left to themselves, would be rapidly overcome and destroyed by wild species, far better equipped to compete and fight: a corn field would swiftly become covered by weeds, and it takes little imagination to picture the destiny of a sheep flock left to itself in the wild. What difference is there between gene manipulations of the past and the present ones? None, except that today they are now performed more effectively and with a more accurate view of what achievement is intended, being the result of a more advanced science and not of empiricism.

Would transgenic food solve the problem of world hunger? We will never know without putting them to the test, and it is unlikely we will ever come to that, in view of the demonization they are being subject to. Like for the CFC, DDT and other products which came under environmentalist fire, the problem is remote from rational examination and the results of scientific research, and rather subject to the SRI paradigm (Scream, Repetition, Intimidation). After the screams and the squawking of environmentalists, come excommunications in the form of bans, through laws accompanied by civil and penal sanctions, cutting out all argument. It is not difficult to understand why it is so. If the ruling circles mentioned earlier regard mankind as a cancer, evidently everything that could help to feed it must be destroyed. Absurdly,

the very same circles deem it perfectly moral and logical to apply transgenic technology to man, in order to get "spare parts" and the "perfect" human being, with a revolting disregard of human dignity as an image of the Creator and a brutal materialism that would have been highly pleasing to Hitler.

The violence of animalists

The concern about pain inflicted to animals is fully justified, bearing in mind, among other things, that the physiological differences from one species to another are such that a medical experiment carried out on animals is often meaningless if referred to man. It is therefore fully understandable the student protest unleashed after a practical demonstration of vivisection at the University of Norwich in 1876, which led to the passing of the Cruelty to Animals Act. However, the so-called "animalists" go much further. The "father" of animalists and feminism (see Campos Boralevi 1980) is the English philosopher Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832), founder of utilitarianism, the theory according to which man is moved essentially by the search of pleasure and the rejection of pain. Starting from this assumption, Bentham maintained that the State has four goals: to provide citizens with means of subsistence, to favour abundance, to guarantee security, to strive for equality. Materialistically, he rejects any distinction between man endowed of an immortal soul and the animals, bestiality in man should not be repressed, but allowed every opportunity to vent itself. "Do as you please", was his motto: the initiation to satanism of the infamous Hell-Fire Clubs of 18th century England. He defended usury and homosexuality.

The degradation of man to the level of animals brings as a consequence the rejection of every human claim to control and use nature for his own ends. This is the basic contention of the Animal Liberation Front (ALF) and the Earth Liberation Front (ELF). ALF was born in Great Britain in 1982 and swiftly spread in Europe and North America. Animalists have performed attacks to research and breeding centres to free the animals (usually left loose in a non congenial environment, where they quickly meet their death), damaging research and fur producing firms (to the adavantage of artificial fur garment makers, and the oil industry, as pointed out above). Further exploits of theirs include sabotage and bombing attacks to firms and universities, destruction of vehicles and earth moving equipment. This kind of action is widespread in the United States, where it is known as monkey-wrenching. In Britain, instead, animalists dig tunnels under trees destined to be cut down and hide in them, defying the firm to carry the cutting and risk the collapse of their tunnels; in order to avoid being captured by the agents who pursue them; they go as far as to block the tunnels by installing steel doors; alternatively, they climb on the trees and nail themselves to them. All this results in loss of time, money and jobs. From 1980, animalist attacks have intensified, with uprooting of genetically modified vegetables and (in the United States) fires of houses located in places judged "ecologically wrong".

Edward Skidelsky (*New Statesman*, June 5, 2000), has published an updated review and a pressing critique of the animalist ideology. He writes: "To put a stray dog on the same footing as your brother, only because both are sensitive to pain, would not only be odd, but also wicked (...). To talk of 'animal liberation' is even more absurd than to speak of 'animal rights'. The notion of collective liberation is of a vaguely marxist origin (...). Sentimentalism inevitably hurts those it wishes to protect. The minks 'freed' last year from a stock farm by protesters will have to be killed, because they have no space in the environment we have created. We should accept the fact that animals can only be our dependents, and treat them as lovingly as possible within this kind of relationship. This paternalism belongs to the tradition of all three monotheistic religions. God grants Adam the 'dominion' over animals. Our power over nature is constitutional, non autocratic. Animals are entrusted to us, but we cannot do whatever we please to them. The erosion of religious faith (...) is partly responsible for the present disorder in our relation with animals". This is the very point: lost the centre everything is lost. The centre of man is God. If man gives up his natural centre, he ends up revolving on himself with no compass to guide him, a prey to his own conceit which, paradoxically, degrades him to the level of an animal. Also, we must never forget the solid vested interests cynically exploiting the crooked idealism of gullible youths to turn them into askaris of the environmentalist movement, into antiglobals and Black Blocs.

The demise of tropical forests

Environmentalist propaganda concerning tropical forests has found a slogan often pounded into our eyes and ears from countless television

screens: we are destroying the "green lung" (sic) of the planet. The contention is based on the simplistic line of reasoning that forests produce oxygen, therefore fewer trees mean less oxygen. Brazil is particularly under attack. It is alleged that it is destroying "a heritage belonging to the whole of mankind". The activities of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, tend to "internationalize" the Amazon forest, meddling with Brazil's agricultural development, to cut its potential competition. An obviously neocolonialist policy which, though in highly different conditions, recalls the destruction of vines in the provinces of the Roman Empire, seemingly ordered by Diocletian about 92 AD to protect Italy's production of wine (Lo Cascio 1991). The Brazilian government attempts to react to the international impositions. The minister of Foreign Affairs Francisco Rezek went on record for saying that "the government will not allow environmental problems and the native question to be politically exploited in Europe and the United States (...). These countries forget principles such as territorial sovereignty. They act like an independent authority engaged in building up an international environmental government" (*Italia Oggi* 20/4/1990).

But unfortunately, international pressures weigh heavily, due to the imbalance in financial power. Brazil needs international support to start a nuclear power programme, but its appeals for having it financed were checked by the granitic opposition of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. So, Brazilians must use a traditional energy source: charcoal. Similar conditions occur in many other tropical countries, obliged to fell forests to get energy. The very same financial potentates attempt to prevent sovereign countries from exploiting their own forests. No nuclear energy, no coal because it pollutes, no charcoal because it destroys forests, no other option is left than run after wind (when it's there) or the sun (when the sky is clear), or purchase oil from the masters of the universe. As compensation, thanks to shameful refereeing, the world soccer championships often see the triumph of "third world" countries, for the sake of entertainment and pride satisfaction of the impoverished populations. If Roman emperors offered *panem et circenses* to the mob, the new financial emperors grant *circenses* only. It is true, then, that the world order is deeply wrong, but for exactly opposite reasons from the contentions of the noisy protesters, who do not realize to be misled by the very lobbies they think to be opposing. Lobbies have the strongest vested interest to paralyse develop-

ment, preserving at all cost things as they are: non transgenic agriculture, oil, cars.

Is the cutting of tropical forests such a serious environmental hazard? Locally it is, because on the surface thus laid bare, due to eluviation, a reddish clay rich in iron oxydes, called laterite, forms a hard crust which makes agriculture and the regrowth of vegetation extremely hard. On the contrary, if no sufficient time is left for laterite to form, the environmental impact may be lessened.

The greenhouse effect

A furious environmentalist campaign has been unleashed on the greenhouse effect, though this is actually absolutely natural, and necessary to the survival of life on Earth, otherwise the planet would be in the grip of a permanent glaciation. The average surface temperature is 15 °C, without that effect it would be –18 °C. Greenhouse gases have the same concentration both in the moist equatorial forests and in tropical deserts: but temperatures inside the former stay constantly above 30-35 °C, while in the latter violent excursions occur from 70 °C to below 0 °C. As the two areas have an equal concentration of carbon dioxide, and the only difference concerns the concentration of water vapour, the latter, therefore, appears to be a far more important greenhouse gas. Even the consequences of greenhouse gas changes are far from clear. A considerable heating could increase evaporation, producing a thick cloud cover which would reflect solar radiation and, after an initial temperature raise, the main trend would be towards cooling. Environmentalists weave tales of a dreadful rise of the sea level due to a fabled melting of polar ice. Catastrophic cartoons and maps, showing highly hypothetical effects of sea level rises of many tens of metres effectively contribute to ecologistic terrorism. The whole is based on totally theoretical computer models of climate change, loaded with utterly arbitrary average temperature increases of one, two or more degrees. Computers just produce results based on the data fed into them, neither are they able to make out whether the algorithms used to develop the model are realistic or not.

Geomorfologists eventually supplied solid data, showing that the huge eastern Anctarctic ice sheet, which contains by far the largest amount of ice of the planet, has undergone no change at least in the last 14 million years (Sugden 1996). Even the western Antarctic ice sheet shows no hint of melting. Moreover, a temperature increase over

Antarctica, even of 5 or 10 degrees, would bring about a rise from –40 °C to –35 °C or –30 °C, with the sole result to ease evaporation and therefore the formation of clouds and snowfall, which would make ice grow rather than melt.

The only data on which there is some agreement are those on carbon dioxide concentration increase in the atmosphere, from the preindustrial age to the present time, from 270 to 330 parts per million, and a limited swelling of surficial ocean layers of about 1 mm a year. Average temperature trends, however, when allowance is made for distorsions due to dislocation of meteo stations and urban growth (with attendant expansion of the urban heat island), do not show a definite increase, or rather they show increase in some regions and decrease in others. No certitudes exist on climate change. Catastrophists who, so they say, are so frantic about "saving the planet", in order to persuade us that we are truly facing an "ecological catastrophe" due to our own fault, should do three things: show that there are *strong* short term climate alterations (not mere normal oscillations), that these alterations are necessarily negative for mankind (heating in Canada and Siberia could only be welcome), and that they are caused by man (the extreme complexity of climatic factors makes it rather problematic).

At the present time, it is not possible to satisfy any of these conditions. But all this means nothing, as any serious scientific debate has been literally censored by the media, which report only the rages of catastrophists. They are the only ones interwewed by television networks, and every time climate is mentioned, images of disintegrating glaciers appear on video, accompanied by a voice expressing the sharpest fears on the "changing climate ", the "sick planet", the greenhouse effect "threatening life on Earth". The audience is under neither obligation of possessing degrees in physics, geology or natural science, nor of being expert on a subject far from simple, in which even "experts" are likely to lose the way. The upshot is that people start to be worried. Just what environmentalists wish.

The ozone "hole"

The Antarctic ozone anomaly is a natural phenomenon discovered in 1956 by Gordon Dobson during the International Geophysical Year, when the chlorofluorocarbons or "freons" (the CFCs, used in spray cylinders and fridges) were still rare. It was "rediscovered" in 1982 by Shigeru Chubachi

of the Japanese Polar Research Institute. It was again "rediscovered" for the third time in 1985 by Farman, Gardiner & Shanklin (1985), of the British Antarctic Survey, who claimed the merit ignoring the previous discoveries (see Engdhal *et al.* 1991). This "discovery" was the starting point of a furious television and press campaign against the CFCs. It was necessary to outlaw them, in order to launch new products protected against competition, and freons became a deadly threat to mankind. Weak brains used to weak thinking swallowed unquestioningly the whole story. The maneuvre was reported by Haroun Tazieff (1991), the leading volcanologist, so an expert in atmospheric gases. The present writer obtained a direct, though confidential, confirmation by the manager of a chemical multinational.

The multinational of chemistry DuPont and ICI produced new propellers, in which chlorine is replaced by hydrogen, giving rise to a new family of gases called hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs). Unlike the CFCs, these substances, which cost five times more, are more corrosive and more poisonous, they blow off at the slightest contact even with the puniest embers, such as those of a lighted cigarette, disfiguring horribly the unlucky smoker, as it happened more than once. "Edgar Bronfman, owner of the chemical giant DuPont (...) more than anyone else has advocated the Montreal agreement and, in general, the initiative to ban the CFCs. Members of the DuPont family, whom Bronfman has reduced to minority associates in the management of the Group, have made known that, by the speculation on the 'ozone hole' and the CFCs, he was going to profit to the tune of 10 billion dollars" (Engdhal *et al.* 1991).

Basic researches running counter these disturbing rumours were simply ignored. Kanzawa & Kawaguchi (1990) have shown that the dynamics of the atmosphere, the temperature in particular, plays a decisive role in the appearance and disappearance of the "hole". A group of Italian scientists of the Institute of Physics of the Atmosphere in Rome has demonstrated the dependency of the phenomenon from sunspot changes. Dean Hegg, of the University of Washington has shown that at least a part of the CFCs (perhaps all), held responsible of the ozone depletion in the stratosphere, are actually far heavier than air, so that they tend to settle on the ground. Meaningful amounts of CFCs are destroyed there (Khalil & Rasmussen 1989). Thus the CFCs ecocatastrophe is but a myth. The production of these chemicals, has reached a peak of 1.1 million tons a year, containing 750,000 tons of chlorine. A part of this may

reach the stratosphere, carried by rising air currents, especially during storms and hurricanes, contributing to turning ozone into oxygen. However, each year 300 million tons of chlorine evaporate from the oceans, of which a certain amount also reaches the stratosphere, carried by the same vertical motion.

One more giant natural source of chlorine is given by volcanic eruptions: one historic event, that of Tambora, in the Indonesian island Sumbawa, in 1815, gave out 210 million tons of chlorine, largely thrown directly into the stratosphere by the violence of the volcano. Volcanoes on the planet are over 10,000, 96% under the sea, and a given percentage of all these volcanoes is erupting at any given time. Some, especially those formed by basaltic oceanic crust, are erupting continually. In the years in which no great eruptions take place, volcanoes let out from 11 to 36 million tons of chlorine. Is it conceivable that only man-made chlorine reaches the stratosphere, while the natural one, emitted in amounts hundreds of times greater, does not get there? Only in the tropics 44,000 storms a day take place, generating very strong convective currents which carry upwards huge amounts of gas (Gaspari, Rossi & Fiocchi 1991). Bearing in mind that most of sea evaporation takes place in the tropics, we can have a hint as to the order of magnitude of natural chlorine in comparison with the puny anthropogenic production.

But F.S. Woolard, called by Bronfman to chair the DuPont, has clearly expressed, in a speech to the Chamber of Commerce of London, a clear-cut refusal of the facts: "Too often we give importance to technical and scientific data rather than to what people want. We must learn to act differently" (cit. in Engdhal *et al.* 1991). Of course "what people want" is nothing else than what has been pounded into millions of heads by the ever present video controlled by the multinationals like the DuPont, and by "scientists" made suddenly sensitive to the threats of the CFCs by papery means which can be easily imagined. DuPont controlled the 25% of the world market of the CFCs and alogenated liquids, but until the patents that allowed the multinational to make big money had not yet expired, it defended them with all its might. In 1986, when the patents expired, the chemical giant suddenly "realized" their "hazard". All of a sudden the very convenient "discovery" by Farman and his coworkers popped up: the previous ones had strangely been passed over, there being no vested interest to turn them into a media "case".

Market competition for CFCs was on the increase, especially by medium and small firms, which have always been the lifeblood of the economy, in terms of diffused development and job generation, and hoped to defy the multinationals. The environmentalist initiative of the "rescuers of the Earth" crowded out all these obnoxious competitors. The DuPont, the ICI, and a few other giants, can again control the market of the new HFCs of which they possess the patents and exclusive rights. But those who suffer more from these chicanery are just the poorer countries, where vast amounts of food are being lost every year for lack of refrigeration. Hundreds of millions of fridges might have been built in such countries using the cheap CFCs, whereas nowadays the programmes for the diffusion of refrigeration, which might have saved hundreds of millions of people from hunger and dangerous food intoxications, have been stopped on account of the exorbitant cost of the HFCs. In this, as in many other cases, the extreme danger of environmentalist campaigns, which go to the exclusive advantage of some financial sharks is quite plain. There is no danger of an unwarranted conspiracy theory: the names are well known.

A perspective of development for Europe

Contrary to the vested interest of environmentalists, the interests of Europe are totally opposed to the continuing dominion of the oil sheiks and the "seven sisters". A bold innovative choice is needed, including, as we have seen, besides the development of intrinsically secure nuclear energy, of the Transrapid magnetic levitation transport method. The latter was defined by Tietze, not without some justifiable enthusiasm, "the most significant innovation in land traffic from the invention of the wheel" (Tietze 1998, Tietze & Steinmann-Tietze 2001). The early experiments in the field of magnetic levitation go back to 1912, but the pionieer, the French Emile Bachelet, had to give up his attempts due to the exceedingly high energy consumption. The feasibility of a railway with no wheels and using magnetic fields along the rails to move the trains was demonstrated in 1935 by the German Hermann Kemper, who took a regular patent for it. The early working vehicles (Transrapid) were built between 1969 and 1972 in Germany. In 1989 the Transrapid 07 reached, on the experimental Emsland track, the speed of 435 kmh. Also the Japanese have entered the race, and have already built a few short working lines. In 1997 a magnetic levitation train established in Ja-

pan the world speed record on rails at 530 kmh.

The installation of 235 million Gigawatt of electronuclear power and the doubling of transport capacity of transport systems thanks to a high speed maagnetic levitation rail lines make up the core of a development programme, outlined by Engdahl *et al.* (1991). This would benefit Europe greatly, turning its central part into an economic megalopolitan core of world signficance, easily overcoming, among other things, the problem of high energy consumption by magnetic levitation rail lines: a classical case of linked innovations increasing the sinergy of the economic system, as was the case of the relation between steam engines and textile machines in the First Industrial Revolution. The intrinsically secure nuclear power reactors might be a solution to the energy problem, if governments sufficiently determined could be found to oppose a strong political will and a suitable information campaign to the hysterical raving of most environmentalists, which explodes as soon as nuclear energy is mentioned. It is certainly true that traditional reactors are at risk of leaking radioactive gases, although it must be borne in mind that the only truly serious accident, that of Cernobyl, was caused by the obsolete structure of the station, devoid of a suitable cover, and by the idiotic management of the technicians, who were testing the cooling system to see up to what point the core would melt, till the core really melted.

Traditional nuclear reactors in the Western countries, are far better built than the Soviet ones, they have sturdy covers and sophisticated multiple control systems which have more than once prevented disasters. Even the Three Mile Island accident in Pennsylvania, the most serious ever to take place in the West, has had practically no consequences. The environmentalists' frenzies which put the nuclear reactor on the same footing as the atomic bomb are therefore utterly groundless, also because the nuclear fuel is quite different from the radioactive material used for warheads. Moreover a nuclear reactor can be supplied by a single cargo plane and needs no further fuel for ten years. On the contrary, a power station using coal, oil or gas, needs a steady inflow of supplies: the resupply of such a station allows therefore frequent bribes, while for a nuclear one the bribe can be got only once. This accounts quite well for the suspicious interest of politicians and high State official to demonize nuclear power and to favour other kinds of power production, more expensive for the tax-payers, but more lucrative for themselves. Besides, it is far from difficult to figure out what reactions are being stirred up by

the idea of a network of nuclear power stations such as to cut the use of oil down to size, at the archaic courts of sheiks and in the air-conditioned offices of the great oil companies, and what legal and illegal methods such power groups may put into the field to annihilate the nuclear option. There is therefore an extremely sturdy network of vested interests and superstitious hysteria seeking to bar the way to a rational solution of the energy problem.

Nevertheless, the hazard of traditional nuclear power stations, though remote, is a real one. It is therefore justified to do away, gradually, the extant nuclear reactors, but not to replace them with "clean" sources such as solar energy, wind or biomasses, which can be useful for integrative purposes but cannot replace fuels entirely. To supply a city with solar energy it would take a station as large as a city itself, without considering cloudy spells. Wind and biomasses are unreliable too if a steady energy production is sought. The solution, instead, can come from intrinsically secure nuclear reactors, sheltered from core melting hazards by the laws of physics. A new industrial revolution, based on intrinsically secure nuclear power, magnetic levitation, transgenic agriculture and the computer industry is possible, but against such an economic leap objections and obstacles of any kind are unleashed by powerful pressure groups linked to the oil and car industries. By producing cars upon cars, a crisis in the long run is inevitable. Mature technology and a largely stagnant market (at least in the developed world) are the two handicaps of the car industry, to which we could add urban air pollution and traffic congestion. New solutions must be found, so that a new constellation of highly innovative industries with wide market prospects may arise. But will environmentalist furies in the pay of oil tycoons allow it?

The need to defeat the reactionary interests of the enemies of innovation is therefore paramount, if we are to foster development and generate much needed jobs. This can only be achieved by means of a well organized information campaign. It must be made clear, once again, that while a rational protection of the environment is a healthy policy worth of support, people must be aware of the fact that the interested screams of extreme environmentalists are robbing them of their future prosperity.

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Luisa Corona

Water and globalization: environmental risks and hydro-political conflicts

Riassunto. - Acqua e globalizzazione: rischi ambientali e conflitti idro-politici

Con l'avanzare della globalizzazione, la popolazione mondiale è aumentata, particolarmente nei paesi sottosviluppati, grazie anche al progresso della medicina moderna, dando luogo ad una crescente pressione sulle risorse idriche. Ciò ha reso inevitabile l'intervento umano, così che il corso naturale dei fiumi è stato deviato (Volga) e imponenti dighe sono state costruite (The Three Gorges Dam), per sfruttare al meglio le risorse disponibili. Spesso si tratta di opere colossali, risultanti da progetti di ingegneria civile di elevatissimo standard tecnologico. Tuttavia, talvolta questi progetti non sono stati realizzati col necessario approccio multidisciplinare (diga del Vajont), base essenziale per una valida pianificazione territoriale in cui il rischio ambientale è una variabile essenziale. In India e Israele, solo per menzionare pochi esempi, l'acqua è una fonte di conflitti che sorgono non solo dalla scarsità idrica, ma, soprattutto, dal fatto che il medesimo bacino idrografico (Gange, Giordano) appartiene a paesi diversi. In tali casi, il conflitto diviene inevitabile, soprattutto perché i paesi localizzati a monte fanno "abilmente" leva sull'acqua. Ciò è particolarmente vero se tali paesi controllano anche le sorgenti. Il processo di globalizzazione, che ha contribuito a creare questa situazione, non appare capace di risolvere i conflitti idro-politici. Ne deriva che, il conseguimento di soluzioni pacifiche e definitive appare ancora lontano.

Globalization, demographic growth and water resources

About 71% of the world surface is covered by water: 97% of this huge amount is salt water contained in the oceans, 2% is stored in the polar caps and glaciers, and about 1% is underground; lakes, soil humidity, rivers and the biological systems account for only a minimal proportion. Consequently, the amount of water, available for human consumption, is small and unevenly distributed on the surface of the Earth. In fact, about 80% of it is concentrated in few lake basins (the Great Lakes of North America, Tanganyka Lake, etc.) and in very few major river systems (the Amazon River, the Gange, the Yangtze, etc). Moreover, the rising globalization, thanks also to the progress in modern medicine and to a better quality of life (at least in the more developed countries), has produced a significant demographic growth. In the last twenty years, world population has increased by 60%, with an attendant rising demand for water (for drinking, agriculture, industry, etc.). The most developed countries (English-speaking world, Western Europe, Japan), which represent the global centre with prevailing active globalization, have approximately one billion inhabitants and a very low demographic growth rate, hardly 1% per year. Other countries (China, India, Mexico, Brazil, just to mention the most important amongst them) make up the global inner periphery, characterized by predominant passive globalization, gaining growing benefits from the most developed ones, and accounting together for approximately three billion people. The remaining areas coincide with the least developed world (Africa, part of Latin America, Asian countries such as Cambodia) because of lack of a sufficiently dynamic society, and they represent the external non-globalized periphery (Biagini, 2004). The population of these

countries, which sums up to approximately two billion, grows annually by 3%. In 25 years time there will be two billion people more on the Earth. The greater part of it will go to increase the population in Asia, Latin America, Africa and the Middle East. Such growth will involve several consequences: one of these, surely not a negligible one, is represented by the growing pressure on water resources. Water is a primary and collective good, which prevides a basic element for human survival, for the birth and maintenance of every form of life. In order for this good not to become an extremely rare, precious and of exclusive property of a few people, careful planning is mandatory.

Already in the past, great civil engineering plans have been realized, such as those for integrated management of river basins. The first example of it was achieved in the USA, with the institution of the Tennessee Valley Authority in 1933. Dams, and therefore water and energy, occupy pride of place on the world stage. Today, as in the past, dams are built in order to channel river water into reservoirs, to render rivers navigable, to exploit waterfalls to generate electric power. In the world there are more than 800 thousand dams, 45,000 of which exceed 15 m in height, creating river basins with storage volume of more than 3 million m^3. The course of nearly half of the greatest rivers on Earth has been modified by building barrages. These works are not always realized taking in the just consideration possible environmental risks present in the area.

This is the case of the Vajont: it is a magnificent dam from a technical standpoint, but the geologic information about the area in which the reservoir was going to be located, which should have been an important alarm-bell, was not correctly evaluated. Construction works were therefore carried out disgregarding the writing on the wall of an "announced catastrophe".

Other works, of important technical value but linked to high environmental risk, are represented by the Three Gorges Dam, on the Yangtze River in China and by the management of the Russian water system. In the first case, risk is due to the strong regional diastrophism: if an earthquake was to strike, the dam could collapse causing a catastrophic flood. In Russia, the numerous interventions realized on the course of the Volga River have produced undesired and unexpected effects.

Water control, use and management have to take into account not only environmental hazards: water is often the direct cause of real conflicts or it creates conflict conditions. In fact, in some regions of the world (e.g. Israel), water constitutes an important source of economic and political instability. Nearly 40% of the world population depend on fluvial systems shared amongst two or more countries.

India and Bangladesh dispute over the waters of the Gange River but it is in the Middle East that disagreements about water are modelling the political scenario and the economic future. The increasing value of water, worries concerning its quality and amount of supply, and access granted at first and then denied, are making water a strategic resource of the same importance as oil or some minerals. And it is exactly because of its strategic quality that water is going to become a more and more contentious resource.

The Tennessee Valley Authority

On the 18 May 1933, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt proposed to the Congress of the United States the creation of the Tennessee Valley Authority: an independent agency with government powers but endowed with characteristics of flexibility and adaptation, typical of the privately owned companies. This represented one of the first government actions that was part of a wide-ranging complex of economic and social reforms. It became known as the New Deal and had in the TVA one of its more complete expressions. With the institution of this body, Roosevelt meant to react to the 1929 crisis (the Wall Street Crash, October) that had hard-hit the economic, political and social structure of the United States. To the TVA were not only entrusted competence on planning and economic programming, but also the task of managing the water resource as well: navigability improvement, flood prevention and exploitation of the hydroelectric resources. The main objective of the TVA, in order to guarantee a general economic and social well being to the nation, was the use, conservation and development of the natural resources of the Tennessee river basin and the nearby territories.

The Tennessee, a tributary of the Ohio River, and therefore pertaining to the Mississippi river basin, has its source on the Appalachian with two spring basin catchments (Holston from southwestern Virginia to French Broad from northwestern Carolina); nearly all its course lays between the outermost western spurs of the Appalachian system. The Tennessee River is 1050 km long from the Holston-French Broad confluence to the inflow into the Ohio River. Its river basin

occupies a surface of 105,900 km². The area concerned with TVA services was at first limited to 105,900 km² of the river basin only, included, for the greatest part, in the state of Tennessee (55%), the rest being divided between Alabama (17%), North Carolina (13%), Virginia (8%), Georgia (4%), Kentucky (2%) and Mississippi (1%). Such territory included 125 counties. Subsequently, when the electric power stations were built, the area supplied with energy gradually widened to nearby counties, until it included a total of 201. No provision for further enlargements was then forthcoming, as the area became delimited by law (Biagini, 1974).

Notwithstanding numerous but sectorial attempts to control the course of the river, the Tennessee Valley, before the institution of the TVA, was regarded as an extremely depressed zone, because of frequent floods preventing the development of agriculture, of industries and of all connected activities. In particular, as it was a valley where the economic activity was mainly related to woodworking, the intense deforestation had started a devastating mechanism of continuous flooding and landslides. At the beginning of the 20th century, in order to find a way out of the recurrent floods a dam had been built at Muscle Shoals, as well as an industrial plant that, taking advantage of the electric power, produced synthetic nitrate (a primary component of explosives and fertilizers).

At the end of the First World War the strong demand of explosive materials waned and the costs to operate the dam resulted too high for the fertilizer production only, consequently it was shut down and the plant closed. Then, it was thought to privatize the dam, but negotiations with the government went on for the entire course of the 1920s. During such period, the dam with the annexed factory did not resume production and that just worsened the pre-existing underdevelopment and depression of the area. The region began to change face when the TVA started to build the dams: for 20 years one every year was completed. Every structure had been localized, planned and constructed in order to carry out a precise task. On the whole they formed a unique system for the control and the productivity of a great part of the river. Amongst the various dams on other rivers, the Hoover Dam, on the Colorado River at the border between Arizona and Nevada, must be singled out for its impressiveness (Tab. 1). When it was constructed, in 1935, it was the highest dam in the world, made up of a vast reservoir used by a large hydroelectric power station.

Tab. 1. Characters of the Hoover Dam.

materials	concrete
maximum height	222 m
storage	35 Kmc

The TVA considered the possibility to implant electronuclear generators. In 1967, in fact, began the construction of the largest nuclear power station in the world: the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (power 3,5 million kw), in northern Alabama. The activity of the TVA impressed deep changes in the landscape due to the realization of dams and reservoirs, hydro- and thermo-electric power stations, large port infrastructure and industrial plants. The area was interested by an intense agriculture development, by a rational exploitation of forests, by the creation of natural parks equipped for tourist receptivity and the study of nature and, moreover, urban structure became denser and more articulated. Flood damages were avoided thanks to the control system made up of a number of dams (33 large and 9 smaller in 1971, plus other 8 dams more on the Cumberland River).

The Tennesseee river, unsuitable to navigation in its natural conditions, had been transformed in an important waterway open all the year round, with 9 dams with sluice, plus another 10 on the Clinch River. This river, therefore, became part of an immense integrated system of inland navigable waterways (16,000 km) that connects the Great Lakes and the ports of the north-eastern Atlantic coast to the Gulf of Mexico, via the Mississippi River (Biagini 1974). The TVA represented, therefore, the most important success of the New Deal in the field of land planning. Not even the most tenacious opponents of the enterprise can argue about some objective results such as the 200,000 jobs in direct employment, the pioneering initiatives in several fields, the increase of incomes and consumptions as compared to the other regions of the country and the positive financial budget. Such elements, indeed, highlight the importance of the action carried out by the TVA devoted to the utilization, the conservation and the development of an area that was previously deeply depressed. Today the federal TVA is a corporation and the largest public energy producer in the United States.

The Vajont case

The Vajont Valley, that lies on the border be-

tween Veneto and Friuli Venezia Giulia, rises between two mountains: Mount Salta, on the right-hand side of the Vajont Torrent, and Mount Toc (1821 m), located on the opposite side. The Vajont Torrent, a left-hand tributary of the Piave River, into which it flows after a distance of approximately 13 km, has its source in the northern side of Mount Col Nudo, in the western Carnic Prealps. The valley is of glacial origin: ice melting, in the Pleistocene, caused such an intense torrential erosive action to exhume Cretaceous soils first, and eventually the Lower Jurassic ones. When Würmian ice melted, a relaxation of the rocks with consequent inner stress imbalance and several landslides took place (the old landslide of Mount Borgà happened in the 18th century). The Vajont waters have always been considered for exploitation: the first official application for this purpose was submitted in 1900.

Subsequently (1929), Doctor of Engineering Semenza drew up the first coherent plan to exploit the Vajont waters and to build a large arch dam, 190 m high, able to store 46 million m³, located near the Colomber Bridge. Construction began only in 1957, asccording to a new plan called "The Great Vajont", in which, for geologic reasons, it was decided to move slightly the location of the dam and to improve its technical characteristics (Tab. 2).

The first building phase, entrusted to the SADE group (Società Adriatica di Elettricità di Venezia, *Adriatic Power Company of Venice*) was characterized by some technical problems, nearly exclusively due to the nature of the ground. The company, then, decided to intensify geologic surveying, to which, initially, it had devoted only a puny percentage of the budget.

From such surveys emerged that the land as subject to landslides. Doubts were cast by the experts about the safety of the plan. Notwithstanding this, construction went ahead and the dam was completed in the first months of 1959. It was the

highest arch dam in the world, described as extremely beautiful for its double curvature. The danger of landslides, however, was always present, in fact some alarming events happened. In March 1959 by the dam of Pontesei, located just 10 km away from the Vajont, a landslide came off the foot of Mount Castellin and the Saint Peter Spiz, having a front approximately 500 m long and a volume of 3 million m³: it produced a 20 m high wave, causing the death of a man and the collapse of a 70 tons bridge.

To this event no particular prominence was given, in order not to stir alarm that could compromise the Vajont Dam, that had still to be tested. The SADE, in relation to that event, decided of appoint some experts (prof. Leopoldo Müller, a Doctor of Engineering expert in geo-mechanics, Semenza, son of the planner, and Giudici, geologists) so as to investigate the problem of the stability of the slopes around the future lake. From these studies emerged the existence of a palaeo-landslide that could move further. In fact, later on, after the beginning of the first of the three storage tests, at the height of 590 m, a landslide (4 November 1960) took place: a rocky mass of approximately 800.000 m³ fell down into the Vajont basin, generating a wave that, at the impact with the surface of the reservoir, rose up to 10 m. Damages were not recorded but the fact was an all too evident warning. Moreover, at the same time as the landslide, a long crack appeared, on the northern slopes of Mount Toc, like a huge 'M', more than 2500 m long.

After this event, measures were taken to empty the reservoir, as it was acknowledged the inelastic behaviour of the rock that, instead of repelling the water of the basin, "drank" it like a sponge. In order to avoid flooding the towns of Erto and Casso (main centres that faced the valley), in case other landslides blocked the valley itself, the SADE decided to drill a bypass gallery (4.5 m in diameter). Such gallery should have had to connect the two basins, in case of a fall of the landslide. This work was completed in January 1961 with the water surface level at 600 m of altitude. In addition to these measures, in March of the same year, the SADE, prompted by Prof. Ghetti from the University of Padua, made its technicians build a model of the Vajont reservoir in order to carry out tests so as to forecast the consequences of the fall of a landslide from the Toc.

This experiment was made with unrealistic data supplied from the same SADE. Therefore the model turned out to be somewhat approximate in design. That was denounced by the same Prof.

Tab. 2. Characters of the Vajont Dam.

typology	double curvature arch
material	concrete
level of foundation	463,90 m
level of crown	725,50 m
level of maximum storage	722,50 m
maximum height	261,60 m
lengthof crown	190,50 m
usable storage	150,000 million mc

Ghetti in his final report. However, that report was never forwarded to the Testing Commission and the supervisory bodies. In spite of that, Prof. Ghetti established that, up to a water level of 700 m, no substantial danger existed. On the basis of such results, the SADE continued, throughout the 1962, to fill up to the 700 m level, without finding any failure. In March 1963, the dam passed from the SADE to the ENEL, that was entrusted with the Vajont system. The ENEL (*Ente Nazionale per l'Energia Elettrica*, National Authority for Electric Energy) demanded immediately (April 1963) the elevation of the water level to 710 m, few metres under the maximum capacity of the basin. In the following months (August, September), after the third infilling was carried out, increasing failures started to show up and moreover the landslide mass started to move again. Doctor of Engineering Biadene, succeeded to the late Semenza, established to proceed to a partial emptying of the basin taking the water level down to 695 m (a level that everybody thought to be well within the safety mark against any unexpected event). That was the last discharge, an extreme attempt that did not succeed to avoid the worst. At 10.39 p.m. of 29 October 1963, a landslide of remarkable size came off the northern slopes of Mount Toc (Tab. 3), and plunged into the lake below.

The violent impact brought about two waves. The first was approximately of 50 million m³, rich of solid material in suspension, with a front 150 m long at the dam and 70 m long at the outlet into the Piave, reached an height of 930 m; the second one, of smaller size, reached a height of 70 m at the outlet into the valley. The first one was particularly destructive: after having licked the population of Erto, Casso and S. Martino, places that were upriver, struck the dam removing the upper part; then it flowed in the deep gorge of the Vajont reaching the underlying valley of the Piave and wiping away in a few minutes the large town of Longarone and other smaller settlements. It was a dramatic event that caused the death of approximately 2000 people.

The morphological effects of the two waves were impressive. The water removed the vegetation and part of the morainic and detrital deposits, laying bare the rock underneath. All manmade works went completely destroyed except for the dam that lost its top dam road, while no sign was left of the building site. The basin of the Vajont remained divided in three parts: a reservoir of considerable dimensions upriver from the landslide, known today as the Lake; a smaller one downstream, besides the dam, and a third one on

Tab. 3. Characters of the Vajont landslide mass.

surface	2 Kmq
volume	260 milioni di mc
front length	2000 m
average height	150 m
speed	72-90 Km/h
upward front reach	160 m

the same body of the landslide, which disappeared in short time. In the years following the catastrophe, many scholars tried to find an explanation to the phenomenon. The most interesting study, and the one that has gone nearest the solution, is that carried out by Hendron and Patton (1985). First of all, they confirmed: the existence of a palaeolandslide; the discovery, in several places along the surface of detachment, and also outside the landslide zone, of montmorillonitic clay, up to 5 cm thick; the existence, on the slope, of two aquifers separated by the aforesaid clayey level. These confirmations led the two authors to re-examine the hydro-geological structure of the whole area. They found out then, by using piezometers, different values between the upper aquifer and the lower one. This is because the level of the upper water bearing layer, that matches the mass of the strongly fractured and permeable palaeo-landslide, was influenced by the level of the lake. The lower water bearing layer, instead, was contained within the insufficiently fractured limestone of the Vajont, but was made permeable by karst phenomena, and was fed both by the lake and by rainfall. Its level, therefore, depended on rains but also from the rather long time needed for the water-bearing layer to be re-charged. Moreover, the permeability values, the shape of the two water-bearing layers, and their recharging times were very different. Extremely different were also the piezometric levels, thereby bringing about neutral pressures that favoured instability of the mass. Hendron and Patton assumed, thanks to these results, a correlation law between level of the lake, rainfall accumulated in the lower water bearing layer and displacement. According to these considerations, it became obvious that the hydro-geological structure of the area was the main cause of the catastrophe.

Some other causes, defined preparatory or predisposing and determining, or triggering, of natural and anthropic origin, must be added to this one. Among the preparatory causes, particularly significant have been the geological structure of Mount Toc, deforestation, the cuttings and exca-

vation resulting from the construction of roads and drains in the area in which the dam rises. One of the determining causes was the exceptional intensity of the rainfall recorded in the two months before the landslide occurred. This rainfall made the weight of the rocky stratum increase, produced the imbibition of its bed and consequently a lubricating action of the gliding surface of the future landslide. In the highest part of Mount Toc, subject to karst erosion, water penetrated underground, undermining the solidity of the rocky mass; the sudden filling and draining, carried out during the months during which the dam was tested, produced cracks in the rocks and this, because of the infiltrating water, had washing and removal effect (in solution and suspension) of the cementing components.

Moreover, water exercised a tension between interstitial grains within the rocks up to the point of causing their "floatation". This would explain why the collapsing mass fell in a single block and in a very short time. Rushing towards the realization of gain, the SADE's technicians and the same Test Commission, forgot the necessary precautions. In fact, limiting the capacity of the basin of a few metres would have meant to recoup construction costs in a longer time. Such costs, moreover, had increased because of the unexpected works (reinforcement of the dam's shoulders and, above all, the bypass canal) deemed necessary to enhance the safety of the project. The pride of being able to boast the higher dam in the world, created by specialized Italian technicians, together with an unfortunate rush towards profit, caused them to fail to estimate correctly the geological data and the significant signals warning of what was to happen. All these concomitant causes were sufficient to cause the uprooting of the landslide stratums and the sliding, extremely fast, of the immense mass that stroke into the valley of the Vajont basin, all in a single block without any break up.

The Three Gorges Dam on the Yangtze

The project for the Three Gorges Dam of the Yangze River is the most impressive engineering achievement of all times. It will give the opportunity to take advantage of its hydroelectric potential, it will facilitate navigation and control the turbulent nature of its waters. The Yangtze, the longest river of China (6300 Km, the third longest in the world), whose source is a tributary of the Tuotuo River on the Qinghai-Tibet plateau, flows through the Qinghai province, the Autonomous Region of Tibet, the Sichuang, the Yunnan, the Hubei, the Hunan, the Jiagxi, the Anhui and the Jiagsu and eventually flows into the East China Sea, at Shanghai.

Along its course, from the town of Fengjie to that of Yichang, in the Hubei, for approximately 200 Km, the magnificent gorges of Qutang, Wuxia and Xiling, known with the name of "The Three Gorges", extend. In the medium section of the ravine of Xiling, that extends for 76 Km, the Three Gorges dam is being built; it will be located in the city of Sandouping (in the Hubei province). The real father of this plan was Sun Yatsen, the nationalist leader, first president of post-imperial China. In 1919, he wrote "a plan for industrial development", in which he introduced an impressive scheme for a system of irrigation and flood control aimed at generating electric power through the construction of a series of large dams. Sun supported this idea for the remaining six years of his life and in his last documents he expressed a stronger and stronger belief in the fact that a dam of such grandeur would have generated 30 million horsepower, producing, therefore, an unimaginable wealth for the people living in central China.

The idea was subsequently resumed in 1930-1932, years in which an attempt was made to work out a plan, in order to begin construction, but the turbulent political situation did not allow to carry such programs out. The USA, in 1944, promised the Chinese government aid in order to realize their plan but the civil war stultified all efforts. In 1949, the People's Republic of China was born and Mao Zedong together with Zhou Enlai entertained again the idea of the dam. It was not before 1980 that studies of preparation of the work started. Just in 1991 the plan was ready to be presented for approval, the following year, by the Congress of the People. Such approval, like the following works, were accompanied by a mounting wave of controversies and boycotting campaigns by international environmentalist organizations.

The Chinese government, under the pressure of such criticism, found itself alone to meet the expenses for this work, since all the great international agencies, including the World Bank, withdrew any support. No foreign enterprise is, therefore, directly involved in the works even if Europe (Great Britain, Switzerland, Germany and France) supplies generators and turbines. This plan of multifunctional development schedules the construction of a dam 185 m high and 2309 m long, that it will create a basin of 1045 km², with a stor-

age capacity of 39,3 billions of m³ enough to produce 18,2 million kW/year. This work will be finished in 17 years (1993-2009) and the generating station will enter in full activity once works will be completed. The cost of this work, interests and devaluations included, varies from 24 to 35 billion dollars.

The plan is divided in three phases: during the first (1993-1997) the main course of the Yangtze river has been blocked; in the second (1998-2003) filling of the basin has officially begun (July 2003) and during the third phase (2004-2009) four turbines every year will be installed. By the end of the construction works the largest and most impressive hydroelectric generating station in the world will have been created with its 26 turbines that will produce 700,000 kW each, for a total capacity of 84,7 billion kilowatt-hour of electricity per year. Moreover, such a system (with a distance that varies from 500 to 1000 km from the load control centres in eastern Sichuan and in northern, southern, eastern and central China) will convey alternating current, on 500-kilovolt cables, towards eastern China and eastern Sichuan, and direct current, still on 500-kilovolt cables, to eastern China, and will be connected to electrical networks in the north and the south of China.

The Three Gorges Dam will not only play a fundamental role in electric power generation but also in the control of the turbulent waters of the Yangtze, which have caused in the course of the centuries, disastrous repeated flooding and have been a source of traumas for the local populations. Some historical documents report that in a span of 2000 years, between the Han Dynasty (206 B.C. - 220 A.D.) and the Tsing Dynasty (1644-1912), the river caused 214 severe floods. In the course of the 20th century three relevant floods took place, causing the death of 317,000 people. Moreover, it has to be borne in mind that, the last the flood so far, in 1998, hit 100 million people, destroyed approximately 5 million houses and submerged more than 200 million hectares of land. The national economy was also heavily hit, in fact, a tenth of the harvest of grain was lost. Improvement of navigation represents the third fundamental objective of the plan: it is expected that barge tonnage, from Chongqing to Yichang (in the Hubei province) will increase up to 10,000 tons and the annual cargo volume will reach 50 million tons in each direction.

Moreover a system of sluices and lifts for boats will make navigation easier. The completion of this plan will involve the creation of a reservoir that will submerge 27,280 hectares of tillable land,

inundating 116 towns, 1711 villages, 1599 factories and at least one million and three hundred thousand people will be forced to leave their homes and to move elsewhere. This "forced" relocation is a particularly bad experience, especially for old people, for whom changing house means to see a system of relations of solidarity so ancient as their existence come to an end. On the other hand, the attitude of the young people is completely different: they regard the fact of moving to the new cities (these have been built, with their 20-30 storey towers, upstream of those that will be soon submerged) like an opportunity making it possible for them to enjoy a better quality of life. Moreover, with the creation of such basin, more than one thousand archaeological sites will be completely submerged: an immense historical and cultural heritage that has formed thanks to the influence that the Yangtze River along its course, above all in the area of the Three Gorges, has exercised on culture and development of the ancient civilizations.

Action in order to safeguard and protect this heritage has begun together with the plan for the dam. For this purpose, the Chinese government has invested a considerable amount of money: to the tune of figures equalling the annual funds that the same government allocates for the protection of all the archaeological assets in the rest of the Chinese territory. Among the protected monuments, the White Crane's Crest deserves special mention: it is known as the most ancient hydrometrical station in the world. From 1993, many specialists have made great efforts in order to find a solution to safeguard it. After several failures, they have worked out a method called "the container without pressure". With this method the crest will be covered with a transparent non-pressurized container, so that it will be possible to admire it even when it will be submerged.

The local fauna (the dolphin "baiji", the sturgeon of the old river, the river porpoise and the Siberian crane) also resent the construction of this reservoir. In fact these are animals whose survival is closely related to the life and the good water quality of the Yangtze River. Such work will drive these species, already severely threatened by navigation that has drastically reduced their populations, towards extinction. The Three Gorges Dam, the greatest creation of hydraulic engineering of our times, already renamed "the Chinese Wall of the XXI century", is rising in a region in which there is a remarkably dangerous environmental risk: diastrophism. In fact, not far away from the dam there are six active faults, one of

which is ten kilometres only upstream of the reservoir and other two have been classified as potentially dangerous for the area of the dam. In the past, China has already experienced the effects of an earthquake on a dam: in 1962 the barrage of Xinfengjiang was seriously damaged by an earthquake of magnitude 6.1 on the Richter scale, after that a series of seismic swarms hit the area since filling of the basin begun.

On 1 July 2003, the enormous reservoir on the Yangtze has begun to be filled and approximately one thousand micro-earthquakes have taken place in less than one week. The director of the Centre of Seismologic Prevention and Monitoring of the Hubei, professor Xu Guangbin, has made clear that this seismic activity was expected, since it is related to the beginning of the filling of the basin, as well as possible earthquake tremors (up to 4 degrees on the Richter scale) that might occur with the elevation of the water level (135 m) in the basin. When the dam will be finished in 2009, the expected telluric movements could reach even 6,5 degrees on the Richter scale. According to the experts, the structure has been planned to stand a magnitude 7 earthquake. Moreover, in the area where the dam will rise, there is also a risk of landslides. The area is made of limestone with scattered cavities containing clay. In 1992, the group of geologists and seismologists involved in the feasibility study of the dam, identified 260 potential landslides, 140 of which were beyond one million m^3 of earth and rock; some were classified as unstable, others in motion and 14 at activation risk as a result of filling the reservoir up. The basin of the Three Gorges presents, therefore, similarities with the sadly famous dam of the Vajont.

The Russian hydrographic system

The Russian region is characterized by vast hydrologic catchment basins: the Ob River and its affluent, the Irkush, that run for 5410 Km from north-western China through the Siberian lowland to flow into the Glacial Arctic Sea; the Amur River that marks, for great part of its course, the border between China and Siberia; the Volga River that flows through European Russia. Such hydrographical system discharges 4,400 km^3 of fresh water every year into the sea. Notwithstanding that, vast territories suffer from recurrent droughts that limit land productivity: in fact, approximately 85% of the capacity of the Russian rivers flow through cold lands in which agriculture cannot be practiced, and then reach the Arctic

Ocean or the Pacific. In the western Siberian lowland, a humid area (2 million Km^2) that, in some periods, becomes a real marsh because of water from the Ob and the Jenisei. From such hydrographical situation derive the two historical objectives of Russia: irrigation, of fundamental importance for agriculture, and the strategic improvement of water resources, through technical intervention (Biancotti, 1995).

To such purpose, Russian rivers have undergone modifications of such magnitude that they form today the least natural hydrographical system in the world, because of the almost integral artificial regulation imposed on them in the last fifty years (Biancotti, 1995). The Volga River (3531 Km), together with its tributaries (Kama and Oka) is the most important fluvial system in European Russia: it has its source in the Valdaj Mountains and then flows into the Caspian Sea, near Astrahan, with a vast delta. With a river basin of 1360 thousand Km^2, it is a waterway of fundamental importance because it connects the inner zones to the ports of the Caspian Sea and from there, through a system of canals, to those of the Black Sea.

The first great works on the Volga go back to the Thirties, when Stalin tried to launch the country in the industrial era by means of the "Unified Hydraulic Economy System" plan. The final aim of such plan was the modification of the course of the great rivers in order to convey southwards (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan) the water from the north, so as to make agriculture possible exploiting the modest gradient of the vast Russian-Siberian plateaus, the immense lowlands with a minimal slope. Electric power generation was another important objective of these first interventions: the realization of artificial barrages (the first one in 1937 and the last one in 1983) was aimed at the creation of hydroelectric reservoirs. Today, the energy annually generated is 39,5 milliard kilowatt-hours, hardly 3% of Russia's energy production, a somewhat disappointing result.

Another important plan, called " The Five Seas System", aimed, through intervention on the Volga River, at reorganizing the waterway system of European Russia: a system of canals, dug in the steppe, and sluices built along the watercourse interrupted by the dams, would have connected the Caspian Sea, the Black Sea, the Azov Sea, the Baltic Sea and the Arctic ocean.

In this way the Volga was transformed into an important electric power source (50 million kwh/year), in an economical system of water transport (60% of the traffic), and a water resource able to

provide irrigation for huge areas. Upsetting the hydraulic regime of the Volga River, during the Soviet period (1917-1991), has produced benefits but also real ecological disasters. In fact, the Volga's catchment is a vast plain, so that, in order to create an artificial lake able to store a significant water volume, it was necessary to submerge extensive areas: for every cube kilometre stored, an average 200 km^2 of territory had to be covered. That involved the submersion of previously cultivated areas and the forced resettlement of the population. Moreover, water, collected in those reservoirs, is subject to intense evaporation because of the continental climate that characterizes the semi-arid environment of the Russian steppe. Such physiological loss, together with the use of the water of the Volga River for irrigation, have determined a substantial modification of the water supply which has decreased of approximately 35 km^3 while previously it totalled up to 300 km^3.

As a consequence, the balance between inflows and outflows into the Caspian Sea has been severely altered, with an attendant lowering of its level of 25 m, as compared to the beginning of the past century. Extensive areas which once were submerged are today unhealthy swamps. In order to increase the flow into the Caspian, every summer, the bulkheads of the reservoirs are heaved up in order to raise the capacity of the Volga. To re-establish the hydrological balance of the Caspian is very difficult. However, action has been taken to reduce at least the strong evaporation to which the basin is subject. Therefore, it was decided to close the gulf of Kara Bougaz, a large bay surrounded by arid lands, by means of the construction of a dam. Draining this bay would have reduced the total surface of the sea, thereby reducing losses by evaporation. Moreover, because of the water evaporation, that was thought to provide an opencast mine of mineral salts at the bottom of the bay. However, it had not been considered that the salt deposits, undergoing the erosive action of the strong winds of the steppe, would have spread sodium chloride on vast agricultural surfaces making them sterile.

The transformation of the Volga fluvial system into a terrace of closed and isolated water systems, brought about a decrease in fishing stocks. Being no longer able to go upstream, fishes cannot complete their own biological and reproductive cycles. This resulted in a catastrophic fall of catches with attendant negative repercussions on the economy: between 1910 and 1935, 150,000 tons of Rutilus (*Rutilus rutilus caspia*) were caught every year, whereas today catches hardly total 10,000 tons

(Biancotti, 1995). Such a situation is further aggravated by water pollution because of the high industrial concentration along the river. Other rivers like the Peciora (1809 Km) and the Irtys (4248 Km), which flow through the vast Russian northern lowlands, have endured deep modifications. In the thawing season such rivers flood thousands of square kilometres of land feeding a complex system of watertables that allow the life of the taiga and of the virgin conifer forest of this area.

The attempt to divert southwards the course of their waters from the Arctic Ocean, in the direction of the Aral Lake, that is today silting up, has caused a decline of the inflow with consequent running dry of a once flourishing and well vegetated territory (Biancotti, 1995). The effects of such intervention were not less negative in the south where the lakes, excessively supplied of water, doubled (and, in some cases, tripled) their surface. The rise of the groundwater level favoured therefore occlusion of ground's pores, essential for air circulation, indispensable to the radical apparatus of cultivated plants (cotton, etc). Once again, on the Russian ground, human and technical intervention has managed to alter irreversibly a previously productive and profitable environment.

Water as a source of conflict: the Farakka Dam in India

In some countries, water for human uses is becoming more and more rare, and the probability of tensions and conflicts is high, particularly where catchment basins belong to more than one State. This is the case of the Gange fluvial system that flows in India for 2125 km and, for the remaining 298 km, in Bangladesh. With a watershed of approximately one million km^2, the Gange has its source in the glaciers of the Himalayan region beyond 4500 m a. s. l., on the northern face of the Gangotri Mountain. After crossing the plain, where it receives numerous tributaries (Jumna, Gumti, Gogra, etc), it flows into the Bengal region with a delta covering 44 thousand km^2.

In 1974, India decided to build, at 18 km from the border with Bangladesh, the huge dam of Farakka that diverts a large part of water of the Gange towards Calcutta. With the realization of this diversion, the river capacity, during the dry season, has decreased by 70%. This has turned out to be devastating for Bangladesh and particularly for its south-western region completely dependent

from this river. The lower water supply has brought about a rise of the salinization of soils, a consequent reduction of fertility and therefore a lower grain production per hectare.

The consequences on the population are disastrous: poverty and malnutrition for 40 million peasants particularly during the five months of winter drought; thousands of families have been forced to emigrate towards the shantytowns of the big cities (Calcutta and Dacca) in search of better living conditions. The traditional economy, hanging on a fragile balance, and lacking the necessary financial resources to invest in the purchase of hydraulic pumps and in the realization of more efficient wells, has been disrupted. Total annual economic damage endured by Bangladesh has been estimated at approximately 4 billion dollars. The construction of the Farakka dam has, therefore, produced a very complex situation of difficult solution.

After more than twenty years of growing tension and official protests, an international agreement has been drawn up whereby India engaged itself to leave Bangladesh half of the water stored in the reservoir. However, such agreement did not stop India from constructing several dams upstream of the first one, and from continuing to reduce the amount of water destined to the adjacent country. As far as future water supply is concerned, a heavy threat lie on India and Bangladesh: the Gange is, in fact, a highly polluted river. Survival and well-being of nearly 40% of the population depend on this great river, that, with its 2500 km long course, flows through more than one hundred large and small cities. Such urban settlements have grown in a such a massive way so as to determine, in a time span of approximately 50 years, a fourfold growth of the population.

The Ganges is, therefore, subject to an increasing anthropic pressure that brings about a constant worsening of its waters. Moreover, the river crosses the most fertile and productive territories of northern India, and therefore receives along its course an enormous amount of residues of fertilizers, pesticides, and of industrial and urban wastes. Therefore, in the immediate future the pollution rate is expected to increase; in fact, it is believed that, within the next twenty years, the river basin of the Gange will harbout more than a billion inhabitants on its territory. For Bangladesh, it will be more and more difficult to manage such explosive social and economic situation, and hydro-political conflicts are likely to intensify.

The hard-fought water: the Jordan river

The Middle East is, with north Africa, one of the most arid regions of the planet: it represents 10% of the world surface, is inhabited by 5% of the world population but has only 0.4% of the water resources. Currently, Israel, Jordan, Cis-Jordan and Gaza are below the threshold of absolute poverty, since every inhabitant consumes an average of 500 m³ of water per year; the remaining middle-eastern countries are placed below the threshold considered critical, 1000 m³ of water per person per year. The constant water shortage is due, in the first place, to some natural factors such as the presence of an arid climate with consequent rainfall scarcity, as well as the geological make-up, mostly mountainous, and a hydrographical system constituted mainly by smaller water courses of torrential character and by a small number of large rivers. To these factors, some others of anthropic nature have to be added: demographic growth, evolution of life styles and an increase of demand by emerging economic activities that make still more problematic the exploitation of already insufficient water resources.

Moreover, the situation is further aggravated by the fact that the largest part of the river basins cross or are located on the borders of more countries or are in regions involved in long-standing conflicts. Therefore, a sort of multi-ownership of the water resource arises in a country where water, in the course of history, has always carried out an essential role in defining development conditions. To control this resource means to be able to deal with the neighbouring countries from a force position, to have in hand a strategic weapon of exceptional value. Currently, Israel masters this weapon. Its control on water resources is a consequence of the military power exercised during the Six Days War (1967). Through this war it not only occupied some territories (West Bank, Gaza Strip and the Golan Heights) but managed to extend its control on the sources and the course of the Jordan River.

Moreover, it transferred the authority on the water resources, that it confiscated declaring them a state property, to the military command and prohibited water infrastructure construction without licence. Israel, therefore, enjoys, through the military power, the right of exploitation of primary resources in the occupied territories even if that has never been recognized at an international level. The Jordan River, that in addition to Israel, in the northern part runs along Lebanon, Syria, in the central area of Cis-Jordan, laps Jordan and the

Palestinian Authority, is one of the most important water resources under Israeli control.

Its catchment basin includes the Beqaa Valley in Lebanon, the Galilee Sea (the Tiberias Lake), the Jordan Valley and the Dead Sea. On an area of 18.300 Km², from Mount Hermon in the north to the Dead Sea in the south, it covers a distance of approximately 360 Km, with one annual average capacity of 150 million m³. Passed Lebanon, the river crosses the Golan Heights, where its waters are enriched, with a total capacity of 550-660 m³ per year, by three tributaries: the Dan, the Hasbani and the Banyas. The course of the Jordan continues and forms the Tiberias Lake, the only natural reservoir of the river basin, situated entirely inside the Israeli borders. After the inflow of further tributaries, such as the Zarqua, for a capacity equal to 300 m³ per year, and smaller streams, the river flows into the Dead Sea.

The Golan Heights, a region astride of Syria and Israel, are made of two different geographical areas, divided by the Sa'ar Stream: the Golan Heights in the strict sense, and, a little more northwards, the slopes of Mount Hermon. The heights are a plateau (1070 km² of basalt and other volcanic rocks) that, in the west, slopes down to the Syrian-African fault, where the Jordan River flows and the Tiberias Lake opens, and in the south it is interrupted by the gorge of the Yarmuk River. Nearly the whole Golan belongs to the catchment of the Kinneret: numerous seasonal streams (172) flow down from the Golan towards the lake, which in turn guarantees 30% (770 million m³ per year) of the water supply of Israel. The control of the Golan Heights is fundamental for two reasons: for their strategic position, since they grant the Israeli forces a good control of the area and therefore warrant them greater security; and because the heights are located at the confluence of a third of the Jewish country's water resources. In order to consolidate their position on the territory, the Israelis have built numerous farming settlements.

Another important water resource is the Tiberias Lake, under Israeli control as well, that supplies water to all the country through the National Water Carrier: the 130 km long Israeli national water system, capable of delivering up to 4,5 million m³ per day. It carries southwards the water from the north of the country, where it is more plentiful. It is the main artery to which the regional water schemes are connected and is used in order to take the winter water surplus to the sites of infiltration so as to recharge the water tables. Israel is also heavily dependent on groundwater:

the mountainous aquifer and the coastal one. The water-bearing mountainous layer, situated in the chains of central Giudea and Samaria, is made of limestone and dolomite. Its total production is approximately 632 m³ per year (452 m³ of fresh water and 180 m³ of brackish water). It is subdivided into three zones: the western one, (Yarkon-Taninim) the most profitable; the north-eastern one (Shem Gilboa) not very rich and the eastern one (125 m³) that flows down towards the Jordan river.

The first two sections are shared between the Palestinians and the Israelis, while the last one is entirely under Palestinian control. The coastal aquifer extends from Mount Carmel in the north up to the Gaza Strip in the south. It is made of sand and sandstone formations along the Mediterranean coast and is resupplied by surface rainfall. Annual production is estimated around 280 million m³, representing approximately 15% of the country's total resources. About 1700 wells are scattered along the coastal aquifer and pump water from depths between 50 to 150 m for a total amounts of approximately 450 million m³ per year. However, the excessive pumping, particularly in the last 25 years, has brought about a lowering of the water table and a seeping of brackish water. It will be necessary, therefore, to close down many wells because of the increasing salinity. Israel, although it has secured control of the most important water resources of the region, nonetheless suffers from a serious water deficit. The recharge rate of the water table is 15% lower than consumption.

Therefore, Israel cannot absolutely afford to yield to the Palestinians either the aquifers or even less any access to the Jordan river, whose waters have already, with difficulty, to be divided with the Hashemit e Kingdom. Currently the Palestinian residing in Cis-Jordan endure constant rationings and unexpected water supply interruptions, but a more dramatic situation is experienced in the Gaza Strip. This is an area with a high influx of refugees, particularly after the 1948 and 1967 wars, and it is one of the most populous regions in the world (2000 inhabitants per km²) whose water resources are extremely limited. The water table there, an extension of the coastal aquifer of Israel, should be exploited, in a sustainable way, for 60 million m³ per year, but its utilization is equal to exactly double that figure. This intense withdrawal has determined the infiltration of brackish water in the phreatic layer altering negatively the already low water quality, and destined to get worse with time.

The Palestinians, whose daily consumption per capita is 70 litres, against the 270 litres used by the Israelis, claim rights, historical by now, of exploitation on the water resources stored in the aquifer that have their source in Cis-Jordan, including those that, naturally, flow down in the territory of Israel and that mostly are taken advantage of by this country. Moreover the Palestinians think that the Israeli administration is responsible of an insufficient water resource allocation that heavily restricts their urban and industrial development. Serious problems derive from such ever-intensifying exploitation of the water resources: the water of the aquifer risks, as we have seen, a progressive impoverishment with consequent exhaustion of the water of the wells and an increase of salinity, particularly in the valley of the Jordan River and in Gaza.

The Jordan River is threatened by an increasing pollution rate because of chemical waste released in increasing amounts from agricultural, industrial and urban sectors. Existing sewage works are not many and not always efficient, and less than 40% of the families are connected to the disposal system. That is not all: the capacity of the Jordan is constantly decreasing due to excessive exploitation of its waters. The level of the Dead Sea has dropped from -395 m a.s.l. in the 1950s to -414 m a.s.l. nowadays, and continues to lower of approximately 8 cm per year, with a consequent contraction of its surface from 1000 km^2 to 770 km^2.

In order to check this drying up process, fostered by the strong evaporation to which the basin is subject because of the local climate, the hypothesis has been advanced of the construction of canals to take water, from the Mediterranean and the Red Sea to the Dead Sea (Med-Dead Canal). This measure was part of the Oasis Plan (first introduced by LaRouche in the 1970s) that involved mainly the construction of nuclear power plants to supply the desalinization systems located so as to create development corridors in the desert zones. To the 1940s date back the first attempts (Lowdermilk Plan, 1944; Hayes Plan, 1948, etc.) to reach an agreement so as to solve the problem of the chronic water shortage that affects mainly Israel and the Palestinian Authority but that, in reality, is of interest to the entire Middle East.

In 1953 it was drawn up, by Middle Eastern and American experts, the Johnston Plan, with the aim to carry out a development of the waters of the Jordan catchment. The construction of dams was considered, as well as of hydroelectric systems as, through this plan, it was hoped to set up a Jordan Valley Authority akin to the Tennessee Valley Authority. Jordan, Israel, Syria, Lebanon and the former Palestine would have taken advantage from this intervention. After two years of difficult negotiations the plan was dropped for political reasons: the Arabs absolutely did not intend to improve development perspectives for Israel. Negotiation stopped for good in 1955. Various attempts at mediation have been tried since (Oslo Agreement in 1993, temporary Second Oslo Agreement in 1995, etc.) but a final and peaceful solution of the disputes, between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, about the water supply was never reached. The future of water resource management appears, therefore, ever more complex and delicate, particularly so in an area where water, insufficient by nature and, what is more, shared out between various countries, is enduring increasing pressure because of continuous demographic growth and ongoing economic development.

Conclusions

Since the days of yore, water courses have attracted human settlements because of fresh water availability, favourable ground layout and land fertility. Even intervention on the rivers in order to regulate their course are carried out from time immemorial. Since the end of the 19th century rivers have started to be deeply modified. In a relatively short time (about a century) a huge work and a vast anthropic alteration of the river courses have been carried out, resulting in a superimposition of highly artificial regimes on natural hydrological and morphological systems.

At present, there are in the world 45,000 dams higher than 15 m (to which have to be included those between 5 and 15 m high) and with a reservoir larger than 3 million m^3. Most of them are in China, the USA, Japan and India. There are 20,000 dams higher than 30 m located in various parts of the world. There is then a fine dust of small reservoirs of little impact that single communities build to satisfy local needs. Without complex works on rivers, water accessibility would be enormously lower. Many barrages protect from potentially disastrous floods and supply drinking water. Moreover, dams provide 20% of the world electric power (without atmospheric pollution) and about a third of irrigation water. Some dams are works of great technical value, symbolize human ability to subdue nature through technology and progress, but nature and history have dramatically shown the frailty and limits of these "great works".

The case of the dam of the Vajont, where human imprudence together with ignorance have been fatal for more than two thousand people, has been emblematic. Instead of a multidisciplinary approach, that to the advanced engineering techniques joined geological and geographical knowledge, pride and conceit of being able to boast the highest (for those times) dam in the world, with the relative "benefits" that such construction involved, have prevailed. Today we are witnessing the construction of a colossal work, the Three Gorges dam, the largest in the world, on the Yangtze. The huge size of this work will be really justified? From an economic point of view, will the ratio between investment and return be positive? And what about the impacts on the natural (devastating repercussions on habitats) and social environments (uprooting of huge numbers of people)? Moreover, the earthquake risk, looming large on the Three Gorges dam, cannot be overlooked.

Water, an extremely precious good, is the focus not only of important works of elevated engineering value aimed at an optimal use of it, but it is also a cause, particularly where it is in short supply (Israel, etc), of real conflicts. Wars for water stem always from the clash of two opposing principles: territorial sovereignty, defended by those who think of being in the right to use at leisure water that has its source in the controlled territory, and territorial integrity, supported by those who believe that territories located downstream have the right to benefit of a constant and not diminished rate of the water courses that flow from other countries.

The clash, therefore, is always between different political actors, among which the one who is located upstream is obviously in an advantageous position, and even better if it controls the sources, and takes great care not to assume a conciliating attitude. In fact, water has always been used as a power and social inequality lever. To this purpose, it has to be reminded the-wolf-and-the-lamb philosophy: *Ad rivum eundem lupus et agnus venerat / siti compulsi: superior stabat lupus / longeque inferior agnus.* The etymology itself of the word "rival" is significant: the one who is on the other side of the river, that depends on the same source and from whom it is necessary to defend oneself. Globalization cannot eliminate water-related conflicts, cannot offer easy solutions in relation to a resource that, in the near future, could stir up more political conflicts than the black gold. In fact, in some regions of the world, water is, increasingly, an important source of economic and political instability.

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Globalization and static societies: the case of Sardinia

Riassunto. - Globalizzazione e società statiche: il caso della Sardegna

Il termine "globalizzazione" è uno dei concetti più controversi degli ultimi anni. Le idee sull'argomento si dispongono sui versanti contrapposti di due spartiacque che in parte si intersecano: da un lato gli 'scettici', dall'altro i 'globalisti'; le posizioni di questi ultimi generalmente si attestano lungo le trincee contrapposte dei 'no global' e dei 'sì global'. Il termine 'globalizzazione' viene quasi sempre caricato emotivamente di slogan, piuttosto che scientificamente analizzato. Il fenomeno va letto in chiave geografica, come un processo di integrazione dei diversi sistemi spaziali in un unico a scala globale appunto. Allo stato attuale il livello di integrazione è ben lungi dall'essere uniforme: variano i livelli di sviluppo, la dotazione di risorse, le capacità umane e infine le 'faglie' tra i diversi sistemi – culturali, religiose, etniche, ideologiche – piuttosto che riassorbirsi si approfondiscono e le occasioni di conflitto si moltiplicano. La globalizzazione è da interpretarsi in chiave di teoria conflittuale dello sviluppo. Dal momento che lo sviluppo è un concetto multidimensionale, così dovremmo parlare di globalizzazioni al plurale: finanziaria, tecnologica, economica, culturale, politica, ecologica, geografica e sociologica. Le società partecipano differentemente al processo di globalizzazione a seconda del livello di sviluppo raggiunto, dell'accessibilità degli spazi occupati, della dotazione di risorse. Come lo sviluppo può essere endogeno o esogeno, così la globalizzazione può essere esercitata o subìta. Per ciascuna società queste due forme si verificano contemporaneamente, con livelli più o meno elevati di asimmetria tra le due forme. Una variabile importante per spiegare tale asimmetria è rappresentata dal livello di dinamicità delle diverse società. La Sardegna rappresenta un caso di società tradizionalmente statica, che oggi da un lato manifesta segni di dinamizzazione, dall'altra permangono preoccupanti elementi di staticità, o anche di regresso. La partecipazione alla globalizzazione da parte della Sardegna è estremamente asimmetrica: la globalizzazione attiva, o 'internazionalizzazione' è quasi trascurabile, nonostante qualche significativa eccezione. Essendo la globalizzazione un processo di integrazione, un ruolo chiave è giocato dai trasporti e dalla logistica, ma la partecipazione della Sardegna in questo settore, per i propri bisogni è insufficiente. La rivoluzione informatica e telematica, che poteva rappresentare un settore più libero dai vincoli posti all'economia dall'insularità, che pure era partita bene, e stranamente in anticipo rispetto al 'continente', non ha avuto grande diffusione lungo la gerarchia territoriale. Lo scarso dinamismo demografico e la crescente pressione migratoria costituiscono una minaccia di globalizzazione subìta in grado di cambiare profondamente la struttura sociale e culturale dell'isola.

Globalization: a controversial concept

Globalization is perhaps one of the most popular catchwords of the last two decades, a word that has captured the attention of societies at a "global" scale. Hardly any socio-economic phenomenon happens that is not immediately related to globalization: the popularity of pop singers such as Madonna, the worldwide spreading of religious fundamentalism, the success of "Star Wars", the sourging wave of terrorism, the McDonald's empire, climate change phobia, the SARS pneumonia scare.

Although this concept has become widespread in the last two decades or so, its origin dates back at least to the studies of sociologists such as Saint-Simon and geopolitics scholars such as MacKinder during the 19th and the beginning of the 20th

centuries. The concept of globalization arises from the observation that modernization was leading towards increasing worldwide integration.

During the 1960s and '70s the term "globalization" acquired attention as the growing integration, particularly amongst Western countries, highlighted the blurring of sharp divisions between internal and foreign affairs and therefore the increasing difficulty of applying traditional solutions to new problems. After the collapse of the Iron Curtain in 1989, the liberal capitalist system was seen as the global winner of the ideological confrontation known as the Cold War. This system has thereafter been targeted by its critics as the origin of most problems in societies worldwide: pollution, poverty, war, overpopulation, immigration, unemployment, disappearance of aboriginal cultures, Third World's debt. Fighting against globalization (whatever it is) has become the new engagement of hundreds of thousands people around the world and "no-global" the flag around which have gathered all sorts of protesters: 'green' activists, anarchists, former communists, Buddhists, Catholics, Muslims. In what has become a global Babel the word stays but the meaning is gone.

The intensifying debate has finally involved the scientific community that is called upon to rationalize the ideas, but no simple and univocal structure has emerged but an heterogeneity similar to that found in society. It is at least possible to draw a divide between 'globalists', who consider globalization as a real new phenomenon, on the one side, and 'sceptics', who believe it to be a mere ideological and mythical construction of negligible explanatory power (Held & McGrew 2001).

A part of the globalists join some of the sceptics in the effort to highlight the positive results of a cost-benefit analysis of the globalization process, a position that has been termed 'yes-global', while the rest of the globalists embrace the 'no-global' flag of total condemnation of globalization. Of course this quadripartite structuring is a simplification of all the different positions that are highly complex and articulated, and it is possible to suggest that these are extremes of two scales along which those can be located. Often the meaning of "globalization" is left unexplained and/or is used as a box to be filled with whatever phenomena the writer has decided to blame or to praise. It is therefore necessary to review the concepts that have been classified under this tag.

Globalization is more often presented with emotively loaded words rather than seriously and scientifically analysed. In this process, that is more ideological and political than scientific and analytical, the meaning of the word "globalization" is bent to the needs of the moment. Some focus on very narrow fields of meaning: George Soros defines it as "the development of global financial markets, the growth of transnational enterprises and their growing dominance on national economies" (2002, 15). Other authors expand this field: Stiglitz describes globalization as "a closer integration amongst countries and populations of the world, determined by the enormous reduction of transport and communication costs and by the demolition of the artificial barriers to international circulation of goods, services, capital, knowledge and (more limited) of people" (2002, 9). The truth is that there is no universally accepted definition of globalization, even amongst academics, this probably being a result of a general trend towards narrower specializations, so that the globalization process is interpreted in different ways according to the point of view of the discipline (or sub-discipline) of the speaker.

Globalization has been conceptualized as an action from a distance, whereby local social actions influence distant subjects somewhere else; as space-time compression in socio-economic interaction, due to modern telecommunication technologies that erode the influence of space; as an acceleration of interdependence, i.e. intensifying levels of interconnection between national economies and societies; as a shrinking world due to the diminishing importance of confines because of socio-economic activities. Globalization has been described as global integration, restructuring of interregional power relationships, increasing awareness of a global condition of mankind, and of intensifying interconnections at the regional level (Held & McGrew 2001, 13). Globalization is able to coagulate a considerable volume of hostile feelings as it is seen to incarnate "this stage of hegemony of the Western culture, (...) because, for the first time, we are approaching a world market that is expanding 'globally', i.e. worldwide" (Abìnzano 1998, 2), the 'New World Order' to which all other countries must bend.

A classification of the different uses of the globalization concept has been attempted by Taylor and Flint, who consider of eight major dimensions:

i) *Financial globalization* describes the instantaneous world market in financial products traded in 'world cities' across the globe continuously twenty-four hours a day.

ii) *Technological globalization* describes the combination of computer and communication

technologies and their satellite linkages that have created 'time-space compression', the instantaneous transmission of information across the world.

iii) *Economic globalization* describes new integrated production systems that enable 'global firms' to utilize capital and labour across the whole world.

iv) *Cultural globalization* refers to the consumption of 'global products' across the world, often implying a homogenizing effect as with 'Cocacola-ization' and 'McWorld'.

v) *Political globalization* is the diffusion of a 'neo-liberal' agenda promoting State expenditure reductions, deregulation, privatization and generally 'open economies'.

vi) *Ecological globalization* is the concern that current social trends will outstrip the Earth's capacity to survive as a living planet; it aspires to be a 'green political globalization'.

vii) *Geographical globalization* is about the reordering of space replacing the 'international borders' by trans-state practices in an increasingly 'borderless world', often viewed as a network of 'world cities'.

viii) *Sociological globalization* is the new imagination that sees the emergence of a single 'world society', an interconnected social whole that transcends national societies' (2000, 3).

Even this classification if far from exhaustive: is economic globalization only concerned with 'global firms', and are they so free to move their business around wherever they like? Limiting consideration just to labour and capital as factors of production is the endless proposition of 19th century's misconceptions. Is political globalization limited to a 'neo-liberal' agenda? Why were not so stigmatize the internationalist attempt to uproot local cultures and substitute them with the Marxist verb during the 19th and 20th centuries? What about global terrorism and the countries sponsoring it? Don't they play a global game? Is ecological globalization, whatever it is, limited to so called 'green' points of view stated and enforced by organizations that are themselves globalized? Geographical globalization has to do just with a network of cities and the increasing transparency of international boundaries? How about global geopolitics, conflicts, transitional areas and periphery. What about development? What about linguistic and cultural boundaries in the cyberspace? How about physical and other non physical spaces? The concept of globalization for some authors is no longer able to account for the present situation: Deaglio describes the present historical phase as a postglobal era (Deaglio 2004).

A single perspective in approaching globalization will likely produce deformed views. According to Carvalho and Azevedo "the world can be regarded as an integrated set of specialized regions, where each one plays a different role, according to its specific abilities. For each global productive process, there is a distribution of roles among nations. Some countries concentrate their efforts in research and development (intellectual production), certain provide the raw material, some supply the inputs and parts, and others are responsible for the low cost assemblage." (2000, 7). These monofunctional areas, if they can be identified for a single product, as in the case of "the Madza Miata MX-5, a "Japanese" sport car [that] was designed in California and financed by Japan. The prototype was created in Worthing, England, and the assemblage is made in the USA and in Mexico with electronic components developed in New Jersey but produced in Japan (Ortiz 1992). A single product creates a relatively simple web of relationships, but taking into account all the goods and services which are produced daily in the world, the network becomes much more complicated so that it is not that easy to isolate roles. Add all the cultural and political relationships between different areas, all the reciprocal influences and let's have a look at the tangled skein that results.

Reality is much more complex than economist simplifications suggest. An holistic approach is needed and a true geographical (without adjectives) point of view on globalization is likely to produce a deeper understanding. As a science of synthesis on the edge of physical and human sciences, geography is better equipped to understand the whole picture than narrowly focused disciplines or sub-disciplines.

Central to the concept of globalization is the idea of integration, in itself a concept that is not univocal. Integration is in turn linked to interaction. "In a wide sense, the concept of spatial interaction can be related to any kind of relationship between places (connexity, similarity, flows, proximity) and one could assimilate the analysis of spatial interaction to spatial analysis in itself, or even to geography. In the practice of (mainly geographical) research, spatial interaction often takes a more limited and technical meaning and may refer to a phenomenon described as "decreasing of the intensity of flows with distance" (De Boe & Hanquet 1999, 16). As the distribution of population, resources and physical and technical accessibility is generally the aim of equalizing interaction is an utopia. "The idea of integration (so-

cial, economic and political) underpins the formation of the European Union. Integration tends to be regarded as a positive response to the disintegration of traditional structures caused by globalization. The EU is widely perceived as being on the right scale to counterbalance the influence of the other major integrated regions in the world" (De Boe & Hanquet 1999, 7). The model of European superstate that is being developed tends to be strongly centralized and integration is being based on interest just to receive aid. What will happen in countries such as Italy, and particularly in Sardinia once aid will be redirected to new EU members is still to be seen.

The Union tends to aim at social cohesion and policies aiming at this goal are based on "*reducing disparities between the levels of development of the various regions*" (Treaty on European Union, title I, article 130a). By analogy the European Union intends spatial and territorial cohesion as a situation where all parts of the territory would have equivalent opportunities in relation to territorial features. Of course, the role and deployment of territorial parameters such as location, altitude and climate (not to mention the distribution of land fertility, natural and cultural resources) indicates that complete compensation of such disparities is an unachievable aim, even if efforts can be made, at a cost, so as to alleviate the constraints of areas that are particularly disadvantaged.

Geoff Mulgan (1997) labels the current era one of 'connexity': cultures, economies, social worlds, politics and environments all become driven by logics of increasingly intense interconnections and flows, over larger and larger geographical scales. A growing range of economic, social, and cultural interactions are being supported by modern communications technologies. Of course, it is possible that connections may occur between specific sections of society only and between specific areas that such sections occupy. We may therefore witness different social geographies of spatial integration.

Spatial integration is a concept that is wider than simply transport linkages but includes all transactions (or flows) between areas. The growing importance of network-based connections means that economies are increasingly driven by "the logical or 'virtual' regularities of electronic communication, a new geography of nodes and hubs, processing and control centres. The nineteenth century's physical infrastructures of railways, canals and roads are now overshadowed by the networks of computers, cables and radio links that govern where things go, how they are paid for, and who has access to what. The physical manifestation of power, walls, boundaries, highways and cities, are overlaid with a 'virtual' world of information hubs, databases and networks" (Mulgan 1971, 3).

Perhaps, disagreements amongst globalists and sceptics are partially due to a lack of a stable focus on the geographical scale of analysis. Underlying many arguments there is an analysis founded on 'floating' geographical scales. This is to say that very often problems that are domestic in origin are attributed to the action of global firms or foreign national governments that operate globally. This attitude is very often supported by the 'good savage' myth: non-western people are fundamentally good, it is the Western culture that stains their original purity. This is the case with many conflicts in Africa where from time to time the blame is on gun traders, on mining companies, on multinational companies while it is usually the case that they are internal conflicts, sometimes even at the family scale, or are just a revival of old tribal rivalries began before the onset of colonialism. It must be said that the influence of rogue countries, particularly some Muslim ones, in stirring conflicts, persecutions and enforced conversion against Christians, is normally overlooked.

Present levels of integration are far from uniform: stages of development, resources endowment, human abilities in different regions are varied. To this it is necessary to add cultural, religious, ethnic, ideological 'faults' between different systems that are far from being absorbed, while conflict occasions multiply. In the proposition by Huntington faults are linear boundaries between different cultural systems, but this model does not take into account present day multicultural societies where more or less significant cultural 'islands' are frequent.

Globalization is a process towards an aim, perhaps an unachievable aim: complete integration in a system in which concepts of centre and periphery blur at advanced stages of development such as the industrial and post-industrial stages. It also happens that nothing is fixed but everything changes: in the process of "creative destruction" (Shumpeter 1936) areas that were successful and well integrated thanks to a certain technology may loose centrality, become areas in need of restructuring with a falling level of integration.

Central to the process of globalization is the concept of development, "understood as a process of innovative structural transformation of a society and of its pattern of interaction with the space it

occupies and uses" (Biagini 1981, 4). If we analyse development at the planetary scale, globalization can be interpreted as the process of progressive integration of the global periphery within a space organized by global centres. If we consider the whole world as a system, it can be conceptualized as a patchwork of subsystems, more or less strongly interconnected, at different stages of development. If we were to overlook the less interconnected spaces we would come up with a globe covered with empty holes. Spatial systems at the same scale are more or less interconnected amongst themselves. It is difficult to envisage a world completely and uniformly interconnected because there are spatial systems that are divided along various fault lines, particularly cultural and religious ones. Huntington identifies nine main spatial systems based on religion or other ethnic characters: the Western system, the Latin American, the African, the Chinese, the Hindu, the Orthodox, the Buddhist and the Japanese (Huntington 1997). Each of these areas is made up of a number of countries or regions. Relationships among them are more or less conflicting according to some inherent incompatibilities, different word vision, and geopolitical interests.

Globalization: a reversible process?

There is some debate about whether globalization is or is not reversible. Particularly during the 1990s the idea of globalization as being irreversible was widespread both amongst supporters (Bryan & Farrell, 1997) and opponents (Hardt & Negri, 2001). Globalization, instead, is a reversible process. This is theoretically true in the economic field: "when technological progress makes distance costs drop more rapidly than production costs, distance barriers can be overcome and markets integrate. A subsequent phase can be hypothesized whereby technological innovation proceeds more rapidly in the manufacturing sector than in the service sector, a necessary condition for the disintegration of markets" (Deaglio 2004, 26). Problems of cost are open to influences of political origin: labour and capital costs are related to the level of social protection and level of taxation and interest rates, import duties and technical specifications (e.g. environmental friendliness) or ethical requirements (e.g. forbidding of products made by children) may be introduced, so that cost distance is artificially increased. Distance between markets is also influenced by cultural distance between different civilizations (Huntington 1997)

a distance that sometimes, for some products, becomes very difficult to reduce. What is more, the advantages due to economies of scale, and therefore the base for the creation of larger markets, may diminish rapidly with size. Modern electronic and information technologies have put great effectiveness, flexibility, efficiency and visibility gains at close reach of small companies at a relatively low cost.

A more serious threat, possibly leading to disintegration, is the rise of new empires. If the USA represents a new "light" empire (Ignatieff 2003) there are a number of other empires that fight for global power and war might lead towards randomization of outcomes as far as integration is concerned or even a threat towards globalization. International organized crime, that includes organizations such as the Italian mafia, the Japanese Boryokudan (the new name of the Yakuza), the Chinese Triads and so on, owns the largest amount of liquid assets in the world, and produces goods and services equivalent to 8-10 per cent of the world GDP. The Eastern empire of terror has clashed with the Western empires and has questioned a development path that looked already given and acquired. Globalization is also threatened by anti-globalization, that pretends to moderate globalizing trends but it is likely to be on the books of other empires, not unlikely of the empire of terror. Anti-globalization may also be interpreted as an emerging empire in itself, acquiring power with the same unruly methods as other players and producing mega-business (Mini 2003). Probably the world is not globalized and never it will be completely. Globalization is a limit-concept whose validity is based on highly restrictive conditions and of very difficult achievement. It is probably better to talk about integration or different degrees of integration (Fratianni 2003).

There will always be areas where the economic structure is obsolete and in need of restructuring and where vested interests oppose to change. The creative destruction necessary for development to proceed is often rejected because of the introduction of innovation which puts established positions in danger. Globalization will probably always result in an archipelago of areas well integrated within themselves and with diminishing levels of integration with other areas (Deaglio 2004). All areas will then be localized along a continuum of integration in respect with all other areas, spanning from virtually nothing to the highest levels.

The World Bank, the IMF and other organization often have intervened with economic support accompanied to stringent budget restructuring

plans: austerity, privatization and liberalization of markets have been the three pillars of the Washington Consensus during the 1980s and 1990s (Stiglitz 2002). These policies have in the first place all resulted with severe pruning of welfare expenses. Or at least these are the accuses. For example, management of the passage from planned socialist economies to market systems in previous communist countries has been based on massive doses of deregulation and liberalism. Some authors accuse this approach as responsible of the cases, although not on a massive scale, of extreme poverty (Deaglio 2004). It would be interesting to understand on which data have comparisons with previous situations been drawn: in those countries, and in many others where dictatorships were in place, statistics have been and still are constantly manipulated, falsified and invented (Conquest 2001). What is more, the alarming ideas about the increase in the wealth gap between population living in the richest countries and those dwelling in the poorest countries have been demonstrated to be based on superficially constructed indexes (Lomborg 2003). Probably the idea that the creation of a private sector together with the opening of the market would have resulted in development, i.e. that development is simply a result of economic factors, is a sad result of specialization of organizations such as the IMF or the WB. It ignores cultural, political, environmental, educational factors, it also ignores history and the fact that change needs time. "The economist who is only an economist is likely to become a nuisance if not a positive danger" (von Hayek 1967, 123).

There are a number of misconceptions that feed the globalization discourse: the self-elected defenders of the world state that globalization leads to the triumph of the largest companies, despite proofs that the proportion of output from big companies has declined worldwide. In fact new technologies reduce the importance of economies of scale, make information access independent from firm size, and open boundaries free companies from ties with national governments. So as to scare people, these militants often quote statistics that compare firms' turnover to States' GDP. Since GDP measures value added, the correct corporate equivalent is profits, and this leads largest companies to be equivalent to countries below the 50th in the list. There is an underlying idea that States are better than companies. People in companies are bad, people in States are good, entrepreneurs are inherently profit seeking, whereas politicians and bureaucrats work for the good of their people. According to Freedom House, an independent NGO, in year 2000 in the world there were 85 free countries, 60 partly free and 47 not free.

"In Free countries citizens enjoy a high degree of political and civil freedom. Partly Free countries are characterized by some restrictions on political rights and civil liberties, often in a context of corruption, weak rule of law, ethnic strife or civil war. In Not Free countries, the political process is tightly controlled and basic freedoms are denied". In 2000, there were 2,324 billion people living in free societies, i.e. 38.90 percent of the world's population (http://www.freedomhouse.org). From this data different consequences stem: the idea of the death of distance is in many cases a nonsense, as political borders are real obstacles to the movement not just of people, but of goods and of ideas particularly in not so free countries where the control of people is the core of power control. In the free countries, the world economy is organizing itself around cluster of excellence (e.g. Hollywood, the City in London) often located in technopoles (Silicon Valley, Boston's Highway 128, Cambridge, UK) (Castells & Hall 1994). Another consequence is also related to globalization: the role of global institutions such as the UN, the FAO, the UNESCO deserves a more critical attention. These organizations have proved highly ineffective at achieving goals that are in their constitutions but very efficient at providing fat wages and privileges to countless members of the elites of authoritarian regimes (Giordano 2003), as well fattening their own vast buraeucracies.

There is also the myth that globalization is destroying the environment. In reality any industrial activity has an impact on the environment. The so called sustainability is a politically correct myth rather than a real possibility. Unless production is limited to what is purely renewable (solar energy, chemicals from grown products, building materials limited to stones and raw earth), we are going to affect the possibility of future generations to use those resources. This misconception is related to the idea that a resource is a given, while it is the product of human creativity and changes in technology. In the same way, as we would not know what to do with obsidian or flint-stone that our ancestors 'left' us, it is a real possibility that our descendants will not need at all many of the materials we are using today. Moreover, a clean environment is a luxury that only rich economies can afford: if all the world population returned suddenly to a stone-age living stile it would be a disaster for the environment, as that way of life, on the

contrary to what ideological environmentalists believe, was extremely "unsustainable". Unless we want to limit population density to that of some tribes of Amazonia or Borneo. The problem would be to get rid of the millions of dead bodies that would result. There are some organizations such as the Voluntary Human Extinction Movement (http://www.vhem.org) that preach the total and immediate human reproduction stop so as to allow the planet re-acquire its health. It is true, in the strict sense that globalization, by increasing trade flows stimulates production and therefore creates pollution, but in the long run it also creates the wealth to clean the environment up (Micklethwait & Wooldridge 2001). An index elaborated by the World Economic Forum that explored the degree of environmental sustainability in 122 countries showed a strong correlation between greenness and wealth.

A complex framework: active and passive globalization

Technological innovation has been one of the main factors shaping the evolving relationship between development and transport. The growth of world trade and the establishment of the global economy is deeply related to transport modal change. The latest stage in such evolution is the telecommunications revolution we are experiencing nowadays, a stage that stresses the information and growing expertise content in production and trade of goods and services. These "information super-highways", whose creation has been concentrated in developed countries, have initially increased regional and global development imbalances. As with most the other transport modes that have been developed in human history, with the resulting space-time and space-cost convergence, have always, at least initially, had polarization effects. Convergence has been more pronounced along the axes of communication between the most developed and the most populated cities and regions. To a certain level this is also true in the case of electronic communication instruments: carrying capacity of communication cables is greater along the lines interconnecting larger cities (Hoyle & Knowles 1994).

Societies take different part to the globalization process according to their level of development, accessibility of the space they occupy, natural resources endowment. In the same way as development may be exogenous or endogenous, so globalization may be exerted or endured. Space (both in physical and non-physical terms) is endowed with different levels of accessibility (physical, economic, cultural and psychological) and asymmetric accessibility in the in and out directions.

If globalization is a process of integration, this is related to accessibility which "can be defined as how easily a place can be reached from a given point" (Lowe & Moryadas 1975, 7). Factors that determine the level of accessibility of a place can be social, cultural, political, economic, technological or physical. Accessibility therefore varies in space and can be asymmetric, i.e. external societies can experience different accessibility to a place than societies that live in that place. Accessibility is also related not just with capability to access a certain space, it has also to do with will. More active and aggressive societies are keener to move and establish relationships with other spaces than static societies. Integration can be imposed or invited or even sought for. As development can be exogenous or endogenous, so globalization may be either active or passive, and therefore enforced or undergone. Sardinia is in the middle of the western Mediterranean Sea but historically Sardinians were not very keen in establishing relationships with the outside world. The island was often integrated (at a very basic level) by other societies of which became an exploited periphery. The surrounding sea was for the invaders an opportunity for enveloping Sardinia in their political and commercial nets, while it was an impassable barrier to Sardinians themselves. In historic times the Sardinian coast has been hostile to the settlement of the Sardinians themselves while it was not so for the Phoenicians, Romans, Byzantines, Genoese and so on (Cau 1999).

These two active and passive aspects of integration, and therefore of globalization, act normally at the same time in every society. The degree of integration in the world is nowadays such that most countries and even most regions within them, have occasional or established relationships with many others at the same time. The asymmetry is given by the prevalence of either of the two forms. The difference between the whole of acted relationships and the sum of endured relationships establishes a continuum between active globalizers, a positive result, and passive globalizers with a negative value. Not all the significant relationships are easily quantified: trade flows or tourism flows are less problematic than political or cultural influence. On the whole the full picture must be based on some quantitative data and more qualitative information. One such variable

that is not easily quantified is the level of dynamism of a society.

Central to the concept of development is the type of society that is the actor of the development process itself. Society is a system of interaction between and within cultural behavioural models, individuals, socio-economic and spatial structures. When we focus on the interactions between social systems and space they occupy and use, we are considering spatial systems. Societies can be more or less static or more or less dynamic when compared to each other. That is to say that 'the' static society or 'the' dynamic society do not exist as such. They are ideal-types, two ideal models against which to benchmark real societies. Innovations produce development waves within society and on space causing structural change in one or the other or both.

The main character that distinguishes a dynamic society is its degree of openness to innovations, i.e. the readiness to accept innovations as they emerge, and to favour the structural change such innovations need and produce. As development is a multidimensional concept, related to educational, cultural, political, social, economic and other paradigms it is possible to have different levels of dynamism in different sectors. Different geographical areas of the same spatial system may also show different levels of dynamism. A society can be dynamic in its economy, but politically static. Central areas tend to be more dynamic than peripheral ones. Dynamism may change in time as well, with societies being more innovative during parts of their history and more static in others.

The characters of an ideal static society are: a level of development usually at the pre-industrial stage, or experiencing the introduction of exogenous localized limited disharmonious industrialization; a rigid adherence to traditional behaviours and ideas; a tendency to locate individuals in society according to ascriptive criteria such as family descent; a sense of time mainly related to natural phenomena.

The characters of an ideal dynamic society will be the opposite of the previous one: a high level of industrialization; innovative behavioural and thinking modes; a tendency to locate individuals in society on the bases of personal success; linear and abstract sense of time (Biagini 2004). The study of development is based on statistical rather than deterministic reasoning, therefore probability and not certainty is the character of all the assertions. The young are usually more keen to explore new ways and accept new ideas. Consequently on the whole, the higher the percentage of young people in a society the higher the energies available for change. A "young" society will be more extroverted and even aggressive. According to Huntington, changed demographic balances and a percentage of the population between 15 and 20 years old higher than 20 per cent of the total population explain most of the conflict between civilizations at the end of the last century (2000).

The Sardinian static society

In January 2001, in Sardinia, young people as defined above represented 7.52 per cent of total population, while people of 60 plus years old counted for 21 per cent of the total population. This trend towards an aging population was marked by a change in the birth rate related to a secularization of social and cultural attitudes towards family and individual life. Such change of attitude is testified by the pass of divorce and abortion laws (in 1970 and 1978) and, even more, by the results of two referenda on the same issues (held respectively in 1974 and 1981) (Fig. 1).

There are a number of characters that are typical of static societies. Amongst them a variable that is often overlooked but that plays a considerable role is "envy". Envy can act as an obstacle to the creation of an entrepreneurial attitude and therefore to economic development. It sanctions wealth creation and inhibits the achievement of success which are the spur to entrepreneurial activities. Consequently innovative and non conventional behaviours that underpin entrepreneurship are discouraged. Envy is a feeling that may be felt with different degrees of strength: we have the envious that if he is unable to get something that someone else has got he prefers that none of them gets it (Nozick 1981) and this feeling has been termed weak envy (Elster 1991); there is also a more severe form of envy: "we may think of envy as the propensity to view with hostility the greater good of the others even though their being more fortunate than we are does not detract from our advantages. We envy persons whose situation is superior to ours (...) and we are willing to deprive them of their greater benefits even if it is necessary to give up something ourselves." (Rawls 1972).

Envy is related to self esteem, in the sense that comparing with others of higher status or wealth diminishes it. Envy is also independent of merit, on the contrary merit may give more result to strengthening of envy feelings: an individual's self-esteem is more put in question by someone else's

Fig. 1. Age pyramids for the Sardinian population. Key:
a. 1ˢᵗ December 1970, n. 898 (Divorce Act);
b. 12 May 1974, referendum on divorce;
c. 22 May 1978, n. 194 (Abortion Act);
d. 17 May 1981, referendum on abortion.

abilities than by his luck. Of course there is a need to discriminate between envy and emulation, which is a benign form of envy that encourages people to strive to reach what others have already got. It is also necessary to differentiate between envy and resentment, which is a feeling that, when genuine, arises from an endured injustice: wealth has been achieved because of corrupt institutions or because of unfair behaviour. Often, because resentment is more morally acceptable than envy, the latter is rationalized by individuals as the former.

Nozick (1981) suggests that envy, rationalized as resentment, is the main motivation of egalitarianism in societies, particularly so in traditional societies where economy is perceived as a zero sum game. Normally, envy plays an important role on a local scale and it needs closeness to trigger: spatial, temporal, of status or wealth. It arises amongst members of the same community, and, within it, amongst those that belong to the same or the closest social strata. Envy can develop to more severe levels in societies in upward transition where occur at the same time social mobility and privilege. The more closed a community, the more effectively envy works as a social check: people's action space is very limited and overlap consider-

ably. Isolation limits knowledge of other places and people that would put local privilege in perspective.

Envy works so as to discourage entrepreneurial behaviour that accepts innovations and put the accepted norm in question. In traditional societies the envious does not act directly and openly but in more subtle ways, even by witchcraft or evil eye.

People may feel gratified by perceiving to be the object of envy or threatened. The second case is the most frequent one, and it is probably this feeling the origin of redistributive practices in traditional societies, or attempts to hide wealth. Money is more easily hidden than harvests, and bank accounts are even more effective in this respect. In every time the bureaucratic caste has played an important role in putting into effect local and more general envy. In every time entrepreneurs have had to defend themselves both from the peers envy and from the institutional envy. Institutional envy thrives in the politicians' will to control every gram of power and in intellectuals' frustration of inability in acquiring the economic power that they believe they deserve. Envy against entrepreneurs arises because of their same nature: their ability to innovate and activate a process of "creative destruction" that inevitably

breaches tradition and threatens vested interests (Shumpeter 1936) and their ability to understand new market and profit opportunities arising from innovation, to envisage new uses of existing resources and goods (Kirzner 1973).

Entrepreneurs produce profits in ways that are not easily understood by non-entrepreneurs and are not proportional to identifiable and measurable effort or number of working hours. In some ways this is related to existing theories of value: if value of a good is believed to be given simply by the number of worked hours every "plus-value" is immoral. This wrong belief is behind medieval theories of just-price and underpins classic economic theory and especially Marxist theories.

In Sardinia wealth was traditionally considered an ascribed status. It could not be increased or obtained along ordinary ways but by luck. "It is symptomatic, for example, that it is still possible to meet elders that consider the origin of wealth of well off families in the community where they live, to the discovery of a hidden treasure (...), by the founder of the family (...). Finally, it is even more symptomatic that similar findings are, generally, strictly related to magic events or in any case of supernatural character (...). Wealth can be acquired only as an opportunity completely external to normal economic activities" (Pinna 1971, 88).

Attitudes and evaluations the Sardinian family does of social states, show that it tends to appreciate to the highest level ascribed status. (...). The family is correspondingly lead not to evaluate acquired status, or not to acknowledge them as such" Wealth as well is considered an ascribed status: it is owned, not acquired. (...) It must not and cannot be increased in normal ways, and it is not expected to follow, for example, the capitalist accumulation law. Consequently, everybody is content of asking the job done and the instruments available, to stay in the position one is in, not thinking, and not even supposing, it to be possible to expect anything else (Pinna 1971, 66, 86-87).

Social control in small village communities is stronger than in wider ones, and social mobility is minimal. Some authors state that criminal activities such as slashing cattle's hocks or sheep slaughtering, the destruction of vineyards, burning harvests would be the destructive expression of an "equalitarian tendency" in Sardinian society. However, if it is true that inheritance is equally parted amongst those that have a right to it (legally stated and stemming from ancient Roman law), or providing equally for all the children that intend to get married, it is equally true that social imbalances, even very strong, have always existed in Sardinian villages. These behaviours can be interpreted as an attempt to maintain relative positions in the social ladder enforced not by the "hegemonic classes" but by the "lower classes", particularly so by the members of these latter on peers or people of lower status.

These attitudes are not new to social researchers: in South Africa, for example, the strongest opponents to reform in favour of the Coloured communities were the *armblankes* (the white poor) (Biagini 1984); in Northern Ireland protestants of lowest status are the most vociferous opponents to opening society towards the Catholics so as to co-opt them in the power structure (Biagini 1992, 1996). Generally speaking, entrepreneurship can be hindered or made easier by culture. Such action by culture starts at an early stage in primary groups (family, school, peer group), carries on in secondary groups and through public agencies. The entrepreneur appears to family and friends as is he or she does not have a precise role, as if his or her activity was either adventurous or immoral. Instead of becoming lawyer, medical doctor, mayor, member of parliament, farmer he or she plunges into the fray, becomes a gambler, an adventurer. Not even decision makers are free from such an attitude" (Alberoni 1960, 134). Even if all this was more true a few decades ago, in most communities it is very much the same as it used to be.

If envy has a large component that is geographically influenced, localization, distance, scale and geographical knowledge are variables that may influence social checks related to envy and, indirectly, entrepreneurship diffusion. It is consequently possible to envisage a relation between different geographical scales in changing attitudes. Globalization might therefore be, for static societies, an opportunity to become more dynamic.

Sardinia: overcoming isolation

Sardinia, both historically and at present times, sums up many of the limiting factors of active integration and globalization: its insularity, its distance from important markets, its limited size and population, its rough morphology, its dry climate, its static and divided society. Historically Sardinia has been involved in a number of international economic circuits, political relationships and cultural influences. Where Sardinians are from is not known, although there are some elements to identify them with the Shardana, the people of the sea that fought as mercenaries in the Egyptian wars.

Although in those days they almost certainly knew how to sail, inexplicably this ability was lost with time. Sardinia was colonized by the Phoenicians, ruled by the Romans, under the Byzantines, allied with Pisa or Genoa, then taken by the Aragoneses, afterwards taken over by the Spanish, eventually ended up with the Piedmontese.

Each domination put Sardinia in the orbit of its own influence and internationalization was endured rather than acted. After all its location, size, scarce population and static society made the island very vulnerable to external attack. Notwithstanding considerable cultural borrowings Sardinia developed a civilization with a number of original characters. The island's morphology, very rough and fragmented, has worked towards cantonalization of the island, each canton with a cultural individuality. What developed is a society, or a group of different societies, characterized by a limited action space, a sense of time based on the natural cycles, a profound respect for tradition, all in all a static society as any. Since the 18th century the Piedmontese attempted to modernize the island's economy, but the attempt was carried out in complete disregard of local cultures. Sardinian resources were exploited ruthlessly by the Piedmontese government and by their foreign acquaintances. With the unification of the Italian country, Sardinia followed the destiny of the southern regions, left behind in the development process.

Generally speaking the existence of asymmetries in globalization is not as negative as it is often suggested. In a spatial system, even when imports largely exceed exports and the presence of international interests is much more intense than the role played by local firms on the international arena, there is still space for taking advantage of the situation. This has been the case for countries such as Ireland, Taiwan or Singapore where international investments have been smartly turned into intense internal development. Of course it has much to do with the way external enterprises approach the local market, whether the idea is that of deep exploitation with a sort of slush-and-burn approach or companies are available to build on local resources. On the other side, i.e. the local decision makers have to be really interested in favouring development to the benefit of the system rather than accept passively whatever foreign investors do or worse, exploiting the situation to their own benefit.

The population in Sardinia is aging. This favours the permanence of the society in a static condition. The problem is also that it is not generally acknowledged the idea that development is related to production, by every citizen. Everybody seeks rent positions. A considerable and exceeding proportion of the active population is employed in the public sector. (Fig. 2): about 44 per cent of population in working condition.

From the comparison with Lombardy, a region that is not known to be inefficient, highlights overabundance of the public sector in Sardinia. Another relevant proportion of the economy, one way or the other is dependent from the public sector: materials, public projects, consultancies. It is then necessary to add the number of professional politicians, mayors, province and region councillors. These people, when they reach the maximum number of service periods, are normally relocated at the head of consortia, areas with common problems stemming from a mountainous morphology called *comunità montane*, and other bodies. All in all, the share of the economy that is publicly controlled is probably very close to 70 per cent if not more, very far from the desired 30 per cent that some authors consider the maximum for a healthy economy (Conquest 2001). To this datum it is also necessary to add the number of pen-


Fig. 2. A comparison between the Lombardy and Sardinian provinces on the number of workers in the public sector per 1000 residents, Source: ISTAT.

Fig. 8.3. Number of invalidity pensions per 10,000 people per age: a comparison between Sardinia and Lombardy in 2001. Source: INPS 2002.

sion holders and particularly the so called baby-pensioners (Fig. 3).

An economic structure incompatible with globalization?

Today, the Sardinian economic structure is virtually completely based on small and medium size enterprises (SME), i.e. firms with a number of employees ranging between 1 and 15: even leaving out companies with less than 5 employees, SMEs represent 95 per cent of local economic structure that employ 60 per cent of the workforce.

Sardinia is divided into four provinces (this is still true at present but another four provinces will be created shortly, i.e. the previous four will be subdivided). These are quite unlike in size and socio-economic structure. Cagliari province counts about 59,000 enterprises (around 42 per cent of the regional total). The commercial sector is the most important in terms of number of firms (31.8 per cent compared to a national value of 28.0 per cent). Arts and crafts is the second important sector (25.3 per cent, Italy 28.6 per cent).

As far as size is concerned, companies in the micro-enterprise (1-2 people employed) range are over-represented as compared to the national average. In the province there are about 39,000 farms, 35.4 per cent of the regional total, 51 per cent of which operate on areas between 1 and 2 hectares. In total, however, entrepreneurship density, i.e. the rate between number of registered firms and residents in the area, is the lowest in the region (7.6). In Sassari province operate 41,300 firms, mostly commercial (27.7 per cent) and of the agricultural sector (25.2 per cent). Also important are the building sector (14.2 per cent as compared to the national value of 12.9 per cent) and the hospitality sector (6.3 per cent, national 4.8 per cent). Entrepreneurship density is 8.9 registered firms every 100 residents. Oristano province counts 14,600 enterprises, the last in Sardinia and the 94th amongst the Italian provinces for this index. Agriculture is represented with 40.9 per cent of the total (Italy, 20.9). Commercial and building sectors account for 24.5 and 10.5 per cent respectively. Entrepreneurship density reaches 9.4 per cent (Italy, 8.6). Nuoro province's productive structure is represented by 25,200 firms, a third of

which are active in the agricultural sector (36.4 per cent). 24.0 per cent of the registered firms operate in the commercial sector, while hotels, bars and catering in general represent 5.8 per cent, the highest value in the south of Italy, while severely under-represented are services to business (3.5 per cent) and credit and insurance (0.7 per cent). Entrepreneurship density equals 9.2.

With an economic structure as the one summarised above, it is not surprising if Sardinia's level of internationalization is far from impressive. In 2002, Cagliari province exported goods for € 1.65 billion, i.e. 78.1 per cent of the regional total, while exports from Oristano amounted to € 50 million and from Sassari € 0.3 billion. The export propensity, i.e. the percentage ratio between export and total added value produced by the area's economy in that year, equalled in 2002 15.8 for Cagliari province (23.9 for Italy as a whole), 4.7 for Sassari, Oristano 2.5 and Nuoro 2.8. Destination of Sardinian export characterized by a large presence of unusual or marginal markets: the first destination for export from Cagliari province is Spain, while among the first 10 destinations EU countries are under-represented whereas appear countries such as Croatia, Malta, Libya, Tunisia and Slovenia. Such an anomaly may be explained by the large prevalence in the exported goods (3/4 of the total) of refined oil products. In the classification of the 10 top destinations of export from Sassari province the first is the USA, then 7 EU countries and finally India and Canada. Even more unusual is the composition of destinations from the Nuoro province, lead by Congo, then the USA, Spain and France, finally Norway and Hungary. About 50 per cent of export from Oristano province are absorbed by Libya, then Germany, France, Spain, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Sweden, finally USA, Argentina and Peru.

The balance between import and export gives an idea of the asymmetry in economic globalization, or, more aptly in this case, internationalization, relationships. In the classification of the top ten countries of origin for import towards the Cagliari province we find that nearly 60 per cent of the total come from Libya and Iran, while there are three European countries plus Kazakhstan, Norway and Azerbaijan. The top ten countries from which Sassari province imports goods are lead by France, followed by Venezuela and Libya. France is the main partner as far as imports towards Oristano province are concerned, while the USA follow next. The third and the fourth positions are occupied by Argentina and Turkey: the

countries of America account for around 30 per cent of the total import value. Less surprising is the list of major partners for Nuoro province with France, Netherlands and Germany in the first three positions, while it is the only province to have import relationships with Uzbekistan.

The attitude towards establishing relationships to an international level can be gauged employing the openness rate, i.e. the percent rate between total value of external transactions (sum of import and export) and the total added value produced by the economy in that area and in that time unit. The openness rate for Cagliari province equals 44.7 (value for Sardinia 23.7, Italian average 47.0) and occupies therefore the 45th position in the national province league. Extremely low is the degree of outgoing attitude for Sassari, Nuoro and Oristano provinces, with openness rates respectively of 9.6, 4.0 and 9.6.

The local industries better able to survive are those having an exogenous origin, as it is the case with oil products constantly representing over 50 per cent of export, as well as traditional products such as cork, food and drinks. Artificial fibres, and therefore most of the industries located in inner Sardinia, are in a deep irreversible crisis. In any case the situation is not sustainable in the long run, as the value of export from Sardinia as a whole is only 55 per cent of imports. So far wealth has been provided by external public subsidies, but this source will be probably unavailable in the future because of the agreements, the EU policy on public national subsidies, and the need to redirect resources to the EU newly joined countries.

The "General Report" produced by a partnership between *CNA* (*Confederazione Nazionale dell'Artigianato*) and *API Sarda* (*Associazione delle Piccole Imprese*) reveals that SMEs would be very interested in trying to export their goods and services and to take advantage of foreign commercial and production cooperation opportunities and to acquire exogenous know-how and to reach international financial resources. However, difficulties are considerable: lack of knowledge about markets and financial systems in target countries is the most relevant one. Insufficient development of transport and communication infrastructure is also well acknowledged. Firms have also internal limits, the most relevant of which is the insufficient trade area and inadequate marketing effort (CNA & API Sarda 2003).

Generally speaking SMEs benefit from strategies that allow them to overcome initial disadvantages, namely smaller scale economies and market uncertainty. In Italy as a whole, SMEs have been

able to compete efficiently thanks to the creation of external networking economies. This is true in Sardinia as well. The most dynamic enterprises are those that cooperate most with other enterprises and institutions. Therefore, public decision makers are important because they determine the general environment within which enterprises operate, for example with management of education and justice systems, but also are able to influence birth and growth both by direct policies, such as subsidies and bonuses, and indirect, such as services and infrastructure. Public intervention, nonetheless has had negative effects as well, as has prevented the bank system to be sharpened by competition, its subsidies have usually gone to the advantage of capital intensive activities and general efficiency has lagged behind.

This distortion in the market may be perpetuated if the number of rent seekers is such that competitive activities are lead out of the market. Rent seekers are able to sell products and services at a lower price than the competitive companies, and if rent seekers are numerous the whole market will be distorted. The more the rent seekers, the less profits for competitive companies, the more the number of potential rent seekers. The rate of rent seekers in the market may be considered a symptom of a static society. The EU has imposed strict rules to which countries must adhere when applying measures to support SMEs: the *de minimis* subsidies. They try to preserve at the same time stability, efficiency and competitiveness within the market. This is why measures that impact on the administrative, tax and finance environments are encouraged, together with access to information, research and innovation.

In the study by OssInd (1993) the interviews were focused on three main themes: which regional policies were considered to be more effective, whether financial subsidies, education or infrastructure creation, and which of those were more in need of amelioration. Answers were generally critical and most opinions denied effectiveness and stated the need of serious amelioration. In most cases what is asked is more space for the market. However there is a failure of the market that afflicts SMEs as compared to larger companies: the latter are able to offer more reliable warranty and are more able to access credit. Sardinian banks tend to exclude high risk projects, taking no care of their profitability. This behaviour is typical of static societies. Respondents blame insufficient infrastructure, particularly as far as internal transport networks and energy distribution systems are concerned. However, roads are more than adequate to meet demand and, although there is not a gas distribution network, all these difficulties can easily be overcome through technology.

A more serious problem is that of accessibility to foreign markets. Of course the ability to sell in markets wider than the regional one is extremely important if a company's goal is growth. However, for local enterprises it is extremely difficult both to satisfy the qualitative and quantitative standards necessary to be competitive in those markets and to get sufficient information on demand in those markets. All such information can be seen as a legitimate part of the sense of space of a particular segment of society: the entrepreneurs.

In order to analyze the asymmetry between active and passive globalization it is necessary to look at the rate between import and export flows, both in volume and value. Detail can be added by analysing country of origin or destination of international trade flows. It should be also taken into account goods categories so as to highlight the technological level of the island.

The tendency to growth is significantly affected by the type of company. Capital companies are 50-60 per cent more likely to grow (in employment terms) than people companies. The regional government together with the Foreign Trade Ministry have joined in a project to facilitate export from Sardinian firms. Its role is to promote and coordinate the action of national institutions such as the ICE (Istituto per il Commercio con l'Estero, Foreign Trade Institute), the SIMES, the SACE, that manage national intervention supporting export. The regional government encourages internationalization of Sardinian firms, promotes a coordinate network able to fully exploit the instruments offered by national and regional legislation supporting export and internationalization of subjects involved in export activity in the Region: Chambers of Trade and their foreign subsidiaries, associations, bank system, exhibition bodies, local decision makers and regional agencies. The board is expected to provide information, help and consultancies regarding services towards company internationalization, promotional, financial and insurance backing up. The board involves, together with the political actor, the Regione Autonoma della Sardegna, and the ICE, the SACE and the SIMEST, the regional chambers of trade, Consorzio Ventuno, a public innovation body, some organizations of Sardinian industrialists (BIC, OssInd) and representatives from all economic sectors.

Transport: cause or result of integration?

As globalization is a process of integration, a key role is played by transport and logistic services. The distribution of accessibility, due to morphology and infrastructure provision, is such that even inner integration is not that easy and is far from being satisfactory. In a sense, the structural difficulties that have influenced Sardinian economic and political history are still at work, originating an intractable vicious circle. Geography (i.e. insularity, size, morphology, pedology, climate) has influenced population size and location, which in turn are such as not to make it a cheap task to serve them with transport infrastructure: in fact, in 2001, there were 51.47 km of roads per 10,000 inhabitants, compared to 29.91 for Italy as a whole, but only 0.35 km of roads per km^2 (Italy 0.57).

As far as external transport is concerned, insularity dictates the modes of transport: either by sea or by air. Sardinia is served by three main international airports – Cagliari-Elmas, in the south, Alghero-Fertilia, located in the north-western corner of the island, and Olbia, on the north-eastern coast – and by the following small and large ports: Arbatax, Porto Foxi, Cagliari, Portovesme, Carloforte, Sant'Antioco, Calasetta, Alghero, Porto Torres, Olbia, Golfo Aranci, Santa Teresa di Gallura, Palau, La Maddalena, Isola Santo Stefano, Porto Cervo. Globally, import and export to and from Sardinia is carried mainly by sea: 99.99 per cent in weight and 99.35 per in value (Tab. 1). The different modes of transport cater for goods of quite different value. It is also possible to highlight the general asymmetry of the Sardinia-rest-of-the-world relationship. Most of the volume of sea trade is made up by oil products to and from the Porto Foxi terminal, related to the SARAS refinery. Between 1991 and 1998, seaborne trade has grown by 8.6 per cent, compared to 18.2 per cent at the national level.

Passenger transport to and from the island is again channeled on the airports and ports. Passenger transport have soared in the last decades particularly in connection with the development of a increasingly significant tourist economy and with a general economic growth. The number of passengers transported through the Sardinian airports grew from a figure of 2,660,312 between arrivals and departures in 1991, to 5,433,121 (+72%). The three airports have been recently enlarged and refurbished: Cagliari has undergone an investment of € 66 million, taking the working surface to 35,000 m^2, more than doubling the covered area. Deep change have been brought in the air transport market by the so called 'low cost' companies: they sell no-frills journeys at a price that changes day by day, and sometimes at a symbolic price. Ryanair, an Irish company, has been a pioneer in this segment of the air transport market. It started in the year 2000 with the route Alghero-London Stansted (147,771 passengers in 2002), then, after the early success, other routes have been added since January 2004: Alghero-Girona and Alghero-Frankfurt. VolareWeb and Aerolloyd, two low-cost companies, fly respectively from Cagliari-Elmas to London-Luton, and from Olbia to Munich.

In Sardinia, the maritime passenger transport between 1991 and 1998 has grown by 15.6 per cent, from 9,880,000 to 11,417,821, but by 62.1 per cent at the national level. Direct sailings between Sardinia and foreign countries in 1998 accounted for 173,088 arrivals and 175,418 departures. From the 1990s there have been a number of improvements in a service that was traditionally very poor as far as quality and passenger well being was concerned. In general, transport statistics, both in the seaborne and airborne sectors, show an increase in the level of traffic between Sardinia and the rest of the world. It underlines an increase in the degree of integration between the Sardinian economic and spatial systems and the rest of the world.

Tab. 1. Import and export flows to and from Sardinia in 2003, by weight and value. Source: ISTAT 2004.

	By Sea			By Air		
	By weight (Tons)	By value (€)	Ratio value/weitht	By weight	By value	Ratio value/weight
Import	10,689,832.5	3,643,831,613	340.8	310.1	24,961,957	80,496.5
Export	4,223,606.3	2,149,760,361	509.0	388.2	12,904,257	33,241.3
Total	14,913,438.8	5,793,591.974	388.5	698.3	37,866,214	54,226.3

Telecommunications: the end of insularity?

Development is a process ruled by probability, not by determinism. It is more likely that innovation arises from the centres at the top of urban hierarchies. This, apparently, is not always the case, as it happened in Sardinia that has become land of pioneers of modern telecommunications. Tiscali, the name of an old village hidden in the centre of Sardinia, has become the name of a leading Internet and communication company. Tiscali was established in Sardinia the 1st of January 1998 following the liberalization of the Italian telecommunications market, when the first prepaid phone service for residential users in Italy was launched. In March 1999 Tiscali launched the first free Internet access service, giving a boost to the growth of the Internet market, and becoming one of the main European firms in the sector. Between 2000 and 2001, Tiscali took over more than twenty telecommunication companies in order to strengthen its position across Europe, Middle East and Africa. It operates now in fifteen countries.

The development of a proprietary optical-fibre network has enabled Tiscali to gain a competitive edge over its competitors. Today the group offers a 12,000-kilometre long optic fibre network that crosses all of Europe and a series of Metropolitan Area Networks, covering over 30 major European cities and reaching a total of 60 PoPs.

Tiscali has over 300 peering-partners throughout the world (http//www.tiscali.it, 2003), and has a turnover of € 750 million. This success might consolidate by moving to a more central location from its present headquarters, which are still in Cagliari. The man that made this enterprise a miraculous (for Sardinia) reality, Renato Soru, known in the island as Mr Tiscali, was borne and bred in Sanluri, a small town in the south of Sardinia. Sanluri is one of those rare towns in Sardinia where entrepreneurs are not seen with suspicion but rather find a competitive environment where activities arise and flourish. In Sanluri, for example, started her activity Francesca Lecca, a young shoes and fashion designer that operates shops in Sanluri, Prague and London. However, Sanluri is probably not enough: Renato Soru attended the Bocconi University in Milan. After taking his degree he worked in a merchant bank in the same city. This has not been an isolated case: the first Internet provider in Italy, VideOnLine also started up in Sardinia, established by an original character, Mr Nicola (better known as Niki) Grauso. Dr Soru, entered the telecommunication business in 1996 with 300 million lire to acquire Grauso's Czech On Line, Internet service provider of the Czech Republic.

Although Tiscali is still an important reality, it has shared many of the vicissitudes that the New Economy has endured: Tiscali shares are continuing to slump from the peak reached in the late 1990s. In a sense, the Tiscali company is a victim of the same speculative bubble that affected the so called New Economy at the end of the 1990s. At the start up, the share value grew from € 6.6 reached its peak on March 3, 2000, i.e. € 115,70 (+1650%). After that peak it crashed and on October 5, 2004 it was quoted at € 2.93. The decision taken by Mr Soru to run in the regional elections in 2004 has produced opposing interpretations that have not been taken lightly by the market. However, the board of directors has appointed a new CEO, the Dutch Ruud Huisman. Tiscali has also changed its strategy: it has become a provider of telephone accesses, by taking control of the so called 'last mile'; it has also entered with decision the broad-band Internet access business (Anzani & Caffaratti 2004).

In order to recover from the crisis, Tiscali has decided to give up its interests in Switzerland, Norway, Sweden and South Africa, concentrating the business in the largest European markets: Italy, France, United Kingdom, Germany and Benelux. The good news is that the major problems by which Tiscali is troubled do not spring from insularity.

Such an early development of Internet in Sardinia has not been followed by a more widespread and capillary diffusion of Internet as compared to mainland Italy. The situation is quite uniform and at the regional scale, Internet diffusion amongst firms varies between 72 and 77 per cent. By the end of 2002 there were 64,303 companies with an Internet access and the number should top to 77,363 by 2006, i.e. the percentage of connected Sardinian firms is at present 73.5, while it should grow to the 88 per cent within the next four years. Although data are encouraging, the reality is that most companies use Internet for e-mail post-boxes and catalogues browsing and general information search, but very few of them use it as an integrated marketing tool to project firms' activities on the international arena. This is in accord with the structure of the Sardinian space economy.

As we have seen, globalization in Sardinia is generally endured. This feeds the autonomist and even separatist political propaganda, that exploits the easy parallel: globalization equals domination. However, it has to be stressed that exogenous inputs are helpful in pushing a certain social and

economic system in general, and Sardinia in particular, toward increasing dynamism. It is particularly so when the innovation coming from outside is a complex product inclusive of marketing techniques, merchandising, and business data analysis strategies. It is the case of franchising.

Franchising: exogenous innovation and dynamization

The term 'franchising' has been used to describe many different forms of business relationships, including licensing, distributor and agency arrangements. The most popular use of the term has been originated from the development of what is called 'business format franchising', i.e. the granting of a license by a person (the franchisor) to another (the franchisee), which entitles the franchisee to trade under the franchisor's trade mark and name and to make use of an entire package, all inclusive of the elements needed to unable a previously untrained person to run a business and of a continual assistance on a prearranged basis. The franchisor will get a fee at the beginning from the franchisee, plus on-going management service fees. In return, the franchisor has an obligation to support the franchise network, mainly with training, product development, advertising, promotional activities and different management services. (British Franchise Association, http://www.british-franchise.org/whatis.asp).

Franchising is an example of organisational network: it provides a way of overcoming distance 'friction' that makes interaction difficult, activating the internationalisation of elements between economic systems. Franchising can warrant self-employed and small firm owners access to a wider organisational know-how, as they have to comply with the production and management systems set by the franchisor (OECD 2000). Franchising is a kind of complex round out of exogenous innovation, which is able to induce change in a number of factors of development and, if sufficiently spread, to budge the static nature of a society.

In Italy the franchising formula is characterized by intense growth of the franchisors and affiliates numbers. At the beginning of 2003 there were 709 brands, with a growth of 3,2% as compared to 2002. The total number of franchisees was 36,547 in 2001, and reached 39,315 selling points in 2002, a growth rate of 7,6 per cent. Italian franchisors operating on foreign markets are about 120, i.e. 17 per cent. This form of business employs about

96,000 units (+2,6 per cent as compared to 2002), while turnover amounts to € 14 million (13,2 million in 2001). As far as country of origin of the franchisors is concerned, it is as follows: Italy 91.7%, USA 3.0 per cent, France 2.5 per cent, Spain 0.6 per cent, Great Britain 0.3 per cent, Austria 0.3 per cent.

Sardinia represents 0,7% of the Italian franchisors and 0,3% of the franchisees. "of particular interest are the provisions recently laid out in the 2002 financial act (Article 52, part 77 of the 488/2001 Act), which, in the area of business incentives for the commercial sector, provides for financial incentives for "investment by firms which are part of business chains, even in the case of franchising". In this context we can set the incentives provided by the public company 'Sviluppo Italia', an agency the government has set up to promote development, in favour of franchising projects by residents in southern Italy and in the economically depressed areas of the country. The aim of this policy is to favour the spread of franchising in areas where, as we shall see below, this practice is still not widespread. The data for the individual regional outlets show a marked concentration of franchisees in several regions. In particular, 36.4% of the total sales outlets are concentrated in Lombardy, followed by Veneto with over 11%, Piedmont with around 10%, and Emilia Romagna with 9.3%.

Data show that in Lombardy four franchisors (Il Fornaio, Tecnocasa, InSip and Buffetti) run 56% of the franchisee chains. These statistics reveal the prevalent regional and/or interregional context of many franchising networks, as well as their marked territorial localism. (Sardinia 5 franchisors, equal 0.9 per cent of the number of franchisors at the national level) (Majocchi & Pavione 2002). Despite the positive performance of franchising in Italy, there are still some critical problems.

In this regard the data on franchising reveal a high turnover of brands: dozens of franchisors abandon the market each year. Moreover, less than 5% of the chains exceed the threshold of 100 franchisees, which represents the optimal minimum level of national diffusion for most businesses. There are even fewer franchisors that stand out for their ability to consolidate their business and systematically utilize widespread communication networks. Finally, an additional critical factor is connected to the quality of the relationship between franchisor and franchisee, especially in terms of continual assistance and communication. In fact, in many cases the efforts of the franchisor

are focused on the growth of the network and the start-up of franchisees, neglecting or underestimating the need for systematic dialogue and interaction between the two sides (Michel 2002, Majocchi & Pavione 2002). "If we consider the franchise agreement as a co-operative agreement among entrepreneurs (Baucus & Human 1996), the role of the franchisee becomes more important and the final success of the agreement can depend both on the management ability of the franchisor and on the co-operative behaviour of the franchisee. This point has been mainly neglected in research theory concerning franchising networks. However, recent studies (Cifalinò 2001, Shane & Hoy 1996) have shown the significance of this entrepreneurial perspective on the part of the franchisor as well as the franchisee. In this sense the probability of success of a franchising network depends on the effectiveness of the co-operative behaviour of both sides. From this perspective the long and well-established tradition of cooperative network management in Italy (Lorenzoni & Baden-Fuller 1995, Lorenzoni & Lipparini 1999) seems one of the reasons that could explain the large success of the franchising formula in the country" (Majocchi & Pavione 2002).

Against this generally positive scenario for franchising, Italy shows some contrasting results when international franchising is taken into account. This is true both for the development of the Italian franchising network abroad and even to some extent for the development of the foreign network in the country. With regard to internationalization a characteristic of the Italian system – in part also a consequence of the average small size of the Italian production and distribution units – is the low level of international expansion. The low propensity to expand abroad is mirrored in the scarce weight the Italian franchising network has abroad. The number of franchisors with a significant international network is around 80 – roughly 13% of the total number of Italian franchisors – managing a network of 2,665 units. Most of this international network is made up of brands operating in the fashion business, a traditional sector where Italian firms in the world market are generally well placed. As it has been shown (Petersen & Welch 2000), international franchising can be a useful instrument in order to start an international expansion process. In this respect international franchising can be seen as a first step through which Italian firms can gain international experience which can lead to a more effective international development. The future of international expansion through franchising will therefore mainly depend on the ability of Italian firms to develop international capabilities (Fladmoe-Linquist 1996), a capacity that seems critical for Italian firms in the future.

Concerning the presence of foreign networks in Italy similar observations can be made. The number of foreign franchisors is still limited, with a total of 69 brands operating mainly in the service sector: i.e., in those businesses where the competitive strengths of Italian firms are less developed but the market is growing faster. The conditions that assure a good expansion of this kind of arrangement in Italy – with the exception of the scarce resource motivation – still holds for potential new foreign entrants. Moreover, the strong specialization of Italian firms in traditional sectors like mechanics, fashion and furniture leaves a lot of room for new entrants in new fast-growing businesses like Internet services, new technologies and the like. The foreign franchisors that entered the market, initially American, French and English, have in part already taken advantage of this opportunity. For example, US firms, which are the main foreign investors in franchising (comprising 42% of all the foreign franchisors), operate primarily in the service sector. Around 50% of the American franchisors in Italy are in this sector, thereby taking advantage of the weak competitive position of Italian firms in the market.

The difficulty with the Sardinian market stems from its small size and the geographical polarization of its population. As far as locational aspects are concerned, the optimal position for the business success is in the city centres although in service franchising a central location is less necessary, whereas for goods such as clothing it is more important. In Italy, the catchment area required is usually an average of 56 thousand inhabitants. More in detail, 64 per cent of the franchisors require a catchment area with a population less than 50 thousand. 31 per cent of them require an area with people between 50 and 100 thousand people and 5 per cent require more than 100 thousand inhabitants, a condition not frequently found in Sardinia.

Globalization and identity: the challenge of immigration

Unitil the 1970s, Sardinia has been a place from which people used to leave. Although relatively depopulated and with low population density, insular and more isolated than the rest of Italy, and therefore with emigration less intense than

other regions still between the second half of the 19th century and the last decades of the 20th a considerable part of the Sardinians left their homeland. This flow of population although had deprived the island of many of its more entrepreneurial sons and daughters (an average 0.3 per cent of total population between 1876 and 1930) also had established relationships with numerous other regions in the world and made enter geography in many people's minds. People was forced to change their sense of space as their action space, theirs or their families', widened. Destinations changed with time: between the Italian unification and the end of the 19th century 64.9 percent of Sardinian emigrants went to Brazil; before World War I, France, the United States and Argentina received 25.7, 13.2, and 20.7 per cent of the flow; between World War I and the 1930s it was France that received the highest proportion of Sardinian emigrants (Rudas, 1974). During the Fascist period emigration was actively discouraged with the exception of the flows towards the colonies, Libya, Eritrea and Ethiopia. After World War II emigration flows are directed nearly exclusively towards the EEC countries reaching the peak in 1962 with nearly 10,000 people leaving Sardinia. By the end of the 1950s another phenomenon was appearing: repatriation was becoming more and more significant with a peak in 1962 with 4500 people returning home (Leone, Loi & Gentileschi, 1979).

During the 1970s and early 1980s another change was under way: Sardinia was ceasing to be a source of emigration to become a destination for extra-European immigrants: 'coloured' pedlars started to appear on the beaches in summer, miners from Poland were employed in Silius, seasonal workers from the Maghreb picked tomatoes and grapes, women from the Philippines and South America were increasingly employed in domestic work, black girls from Africa and blond ones from the Eastern Europe replaced local prostitutes. Sardinia is now becoming a so called 'multicultural' society, and Sardinians are experiencing advantages and problems that such a condition entails. At the end of 2000 the registered foreigners in Sardinia were 12,918, scattered in 325 out of the 377 towns and cities of the island, although with some significant concentration in the main cities. These immigrants come from 130 different countries, i.e. about 70 per cent of the countries of the world are represented. This is the result of the great improving of international mobility, as it is much easier and cheaper to move around the world, and consequently highlighting a growing integration,

or globalization (Zurru 2002). The degree of difference and the aggressive nature of many immigrant communitiess are the potential source of major problems. We will examine the two groups that have cultures that show the lowest propensity to integrate: the Chinese and the Muslim. The Chinese came to Sardinia to run businesses: the first Chinese restaurant opened in 1987. In Cagliari there are now 15 Chinese restaurants, 20 in the Sassari province: although ethnic restaurants are a niche market, nonetheless they are in direct competition with all the other restaurants. The number of 'Chinese' shops in Sardinia has grown rapidly, creating problems to the local economy, particularly traditional clothing shops that are already under pressure because of the expansion of large out of town commercial centres. In Cagliari there are about 300 regular Chinese immigrants and a guessed 600 clandestine. Most of the Chinese immigrants in Sardinia come from Wenzhou, a port-city in the Zhejiang province.

Although it is well known the relative ease with which the Chinese community in Europe is able to put together considerable financial resources and lend them informally to newcomers, there is also widespread concern about the involvement of criminal elements. It is however very difficulty to find probative elements about it: there is a "wall of silence" which is almost impossible to break and obstacles stemming from the presence of different interests, regional cultures, and dialects which can easily mislead local police and international investigators. From a political point of view it is important to consider that the flow of immigrants from China is actively encouraged by the government of the People's Republic of China that has reached full awareness of the usefulness of the *huaqiao* (emigrants) for the national economy both as a source of remittances (the second in the world by volume after the Philippines) and an opportunity for trade of Chinese goods (Onnis 2002).

The immigration of people practising the Muslim religion stirs up even more concern. Sardinia is the last region but three in Italy (immediately before Valle d'Aosta, Molise and Basilicata) as far as the number of immigrants is concerned. In the island, the percentage of immigrants on the total population is 0.8 per cent as compared to a national average value of 2.9 per cent. Between 1999 and 2000 the number of immigrants has increased by 4.3 per cent in Sardinia and by 10.9 per cent at the national level. There are no precise statistics on the religious affiliation of the immigrants and only some informed guesses can be made. If we

classify as Muslim every immigrant from the countries where the majority of the population practise that religion, results that they are 5547 out of the 12,918 foreigners registered in Sardinia the 1 January 2001 (43 per cent compared to a national 36.8 per cent) (Manduchi, 2002). The largest groups are from Morocco (2416 immigrants) and Senegal (1685 immigrants), followed, at a distance, by Tunisia (344), Albania (274) and Bosnia-Herzegovina (256) and other less significant nationalities. Notwithstanding the relatively small number of immigrants and the male predominance that would suggest a temporary character of their permanence, it is necessary to consider that, while in the rest of Europe it has taken twenty years to reach, through different phases, the stage of 'mature' immigration, i.e. with immigrants that become citizens and stay, in Italy, where immigration started, virtually unnoticed, at the end of the 1970s, it has needed ten years only. What is more, these are data on regular migrants. The number of illegal immigrants is utterly unknown.

Conclusions

The world is becoming more and more integrated, although this process is far from being uniform and unquestioned. Sardinia is an example of a traditionally static society that has enjoyed a certain level of dynamism, translated in higher standards of living and a richer economy. However, demographic and cultural factors put such dynamism at risk. Globalization, i.e. the process of international integration in its double, active and passive, face offers many opportunities but challenges and difficulties as well.

Sardinians have a tendency to be inward looking, and have a culture were private and public envy, exacerbated by a small demographic size tending to discourage the entrepreneurial spirit. None the less, economic, social and cultural improvements, thanks to relationships and circuits in which the Sardinians may or may not be protagonists, have been experienced. A different attitude, particularly a different sense of space, or even of geography, is emerging. Internet, satellite communications, better and cheaper transport are giving Sardinia an historical opportunity. The challenge is to enter the globalization conscious of the own cultural and ethnical peculiarities, and to consider them as a strength rather than a liability. However, established identities follow the tough laws of demography, and the future, in this respect, is far from encouraging.

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Carlo Pelanda

The geoeconomics of globalization

Riassunto. - La geoeconomia della globalizzazione

Esiste l'esigenza fondamentale di bilanciare le sovranità nazionali con gli standard globalizzanti. La globalizzazione è un modello di relazioni con al centro il mercato americano combinato con varie economie "regionali", ma è in mezzo al guado tra disordine ed un tipo di ordine forse inapplicabile. La convergenza di ogni singola nazione verso uno standard comune planetario va costruita in base ad un'opportuna strategia di convergenza. Non si deve limitare la libertà del mercato, ma dargli un'organizzazione vantaggiosa per la maggioranza degli attori che vi partecipano. La modernizzazione economica senza quella sociale, come avviene nei Paesi emergenti, non genera un capitalismo di massa, ma uno selettivo molto instabile, ciò che porta ad un rischio sociale crescente. Si richiede perciò di applicare uno standard flessibile, ma questo tipo di flessibilità non è un buon segno. Per partecipare ad un mercato aperto globale e sopravvivere, un paese deve conseguire un ordine interno evoluto, ossia una società liberalizzata con una classe media ben istruita, moneta solida, infrastrutture funzionanti, in generale una forte competitività. I Paesi emergenti hanno enormi vantaggi nell'aprirsi al mercato perché così riescono a trasformare in ricchezza la loro povertà esportando il basso costo del lavoro e ricevendone in cambio denaro. Ma tale processo di capitalizzazione ha dei momenti di sbilanciamento all'interno di una società nazionale: alcuni diventano ricchi subito e altri restano poveri creando le premesse per una crisi politico-sociale. Inoltre l'arricchimento dei poveri impoverisce temporaneamente i Paesi ricchi per crisi di competitività settoriale. Nella ricerca della formula per un'architettura politica del mercato globale si devono evitare limitazioni oltre misura della sovranità economica nazionale con vincoli esterni e definire per ciascuna nazione uno standard globale combinato con misure di sostegno, mentre la nazione interessata accetta dei controlli ma non in modo indiscriminato. Si tratta di applicare una teoria delle sovranità bilanciate che richiede la capacità di valutare il grado di convergenza di una nazione con lo standard globale e cosa manchi per restare sulla giusta rotta. Ciò può farsi con la cartografia tematica. Rappresentare un territorio è anche un atto politico che serve a evidenziare lo stato di un territorio sul piano economico, sociale e tecnico-infrastrutturale così da poter valutarne la situazione di forza riferita alla traiettoria di convergenza verso l'apertura di mercato del territorio stesso, mediante simulazioni dinamiche per poter inquadrare i negoziati politici tra una nazione e la comunità internazionale, quindi modulare i modi della convergenza e definire i fabbisogni.

The rediscovery of maps

The encounter between geography and economics is grounded on the fact that the latter studies economic phenomena without due consideration to their territorial dimension, whereas for the former economic, political and anthropological data are raw material for a meaningful representation of a territory, by means of symbols defining territorial specificities. The geoeconomic approach, in other words, ought to be better developed. The chief upshot of this is that economic models are beset with a basic ambiguity: the difficulty to clear up which is their main unit of analysis, so that analyses tend to be deterritorialized. Moreover, economics also tends to exclude political and anthropological dimensions from its models with a sort of proud reductionism which often makes it

more incomplete than warranted by the incompleteness unavoidable in every sciencce. This is particularly noticeable in the attempts to understand globalization, trace it and build scenarios of it. It should be clear, in fact, that the "bricks" of the global structure, and therefore its territorial specificities, are the nation-states. From this follows that any model of globalization ought to be able to answer the question: how do nation-states and globalization standards become combined? The answers, as provided by the literature, are not as clear as they should. This implies a rather urgent problem: without an efficent representation of the globalization of the economy, how can we plan the governance of that new phenomenon?

The same problem is evident also in the case of the "small globalization" ongoing in the European area: neither in the current political language nor in research is there a clear idea as to how to order the nations within a supranational system.

In fact we do not know enough about ways to reconcile national specificities with a global architecture. The reason for this is a faulty approach: the tendency to underestimate the national dimension and, in general, territorial specificity – a fault quite often due to "philosophizing" attitudes of many geographers hostile to map making and quantitative methods, and lost in "discourse". We do not ask ourselves enough: how could that given territory converge towards a global standard and be comfortable in it? And, on the other hand, how can we adapt a global or supranational standard so that it may become adapted to national specific characters? In fact, many scholars study this topic and even more, at a political operative level, try to manage it. The problem is far from unknown. Nevertheless it is evident that we do not yet have ideas sufficiently advanced, a fact that must be imputed to an underestimate or underepresentation of the relevance of the territorial dimension in macrosystems theories.

Along this line of thought unfolds the research expounded in the volume *Sovranità e ricchezza* ("Sovreingty and wealth", Pelanda & Savona 2001), whose the chief object is to find ways to balance national sovereignties with globalizing or supranational standards. In that research it is hypotesized that precisely the absence of such balance was a most dangerous circumstance, which could lead to block or upset the process of economic mondialization. This hypotesis is strengthened by the evidence of such shortcoming in the institutional languages of the European "small globalization". They reveal serious difficulties in the attempt to standardize and integrate in harmonic fashion the various national specificities. The prime object of the research is therefore the building of concepts and institutions to achieve a balance between place and logos, between territory and universalizing politicy. According to the geopolitical and geoeconomic approaches, the topics cannot be dealt with properly if good maps are not available. But what is a good map?

Globalization in a quandary

Before trying to answer, however, it is fit to take the bearings on the globalization process. In the field of studies and political statements, language simplifications have brought about a wrong image: that globalization has already taken place. It is not so. For example, an in-depth analysis of commercial flows shows, in fact, that these tend to unfold within rather than between regional blocks. Moreover flows of goods and capital moving outside blocks go for the most part to the United States. The so-called "globalization" appears rather as a model of relations having at its centre the American market combined with many "regional" economies. The growing economic interdependence among the various territories of the planet does not imply the existence of a single world market. The global circulation of financial capital is doubtless a piece of globalization, but it is insufficient to conclude that the whole process has been completed. The same can be said of the international mobility of goods and people, as well as for the planetary diffusion of information. The planetary single market is still a far off objective.

This might seem trivial, but in fact it is of the utmost importance for designing the future institutions of global governance, because it defines the goal starting from reality: the problem is not to build institutions to fill up the political void of a potential market, but to aid the evolution of international and national institutions capable of building such a market. But the problem could appear less trivial bearing in mind that it implies building a convergence of every single nation towards a common planetary standard, giving pride of place to the dynamics from below (place) upwards (logos), whereas so far the chief thrust of research and political applications have moved in the opposite direction. Two points must be borne in mind: (i) globalization is fragmented in regional areas; (ii) the globalizing thrust is triggered by the peculiar world centrality of the United States, which allows us to call it, for the time being, "Americanization". The second point is such as to

cause shivers. If the standard of globalization is American, there are only two possibilities: either the whole world becomes americanized, or else it is necessary to find other convergence standards. In the first case, the problem is that the standard is certainly consistent with economics, but the possibility, or willingness of other nations to conform to it is doubtful. While, in the latter case, a non-American standard, more adequate to other nations, could lead to economic disorder for lack of effectiveness. Thus the globalization process is in quandary between disorder and a kind of order that may prove unworkable.

The quest for a more flexible global standard

A market is an institution. Economic exchanges can take place through processes ruled merely by the law of demand and contingent offer, such as: "I need food and you deem my pearl to be of value, so we barter." However, exchanges producing greater value require a system of standardizable rules all actors are liable to uphold, so that a single set of rules may allow to operate with greater security and therefore invest capital on the basis of verifiable hazard calculations. It must be borne in mind that an advanced market requires standards of high quality, safety and controls. In brief: structuring and, as far as possible, certitude. This does not mean to limit market freedom, but give it an organization advantageous to the majority of participating actors.

There must be a very effective global standard to prevent the globalizing market from falling a prey to disorders which might destroy it. However, complying with an advanced standard is far from easy for countries that are poor, emerging, or have cultural and political systems widely at variance with Western models. Actually this is a quite common situation. As the standard we name "American" appears to be by far the most effective under the viewpoint of economic performance, the first research option is to evaluate whether it can be adapted to other cultures without losing its efficiency. But let us define this standard better and see why it has become globalizing.

The American economic model is based upon the principle of the open market ruled by a political system which trasfers to citizens the highest level of responsibility to make provision for themselves, though within a framework of basic social security. The attendant standard is based upon a "strong" society that can weather the "highs" and "lows" of economic liberalism since the majority,

in the end, gains an advantage. The big problem is that applying a standard derived from that model to weaker societies implies a strong hazard of producing more liabilities than advantages, or at any rate it is too advanced for backward nations.

There is a further complication. The americanization of the planet has historically developed in an unbalanced form which it is fit to consider. The market of the United States attracts exports from the whole rest of the world. The latter has been obliged to learn how to produce in "American" fashion to be able to sell in the States. In this it has been aided by the fact that firms of the rich country have delocalized their productions to catch the advantages of cheaper labour and less stringent legislation, and this has spread information where previously there was none. But the American standard has beccome inserted into various local systems without modifying their socio-economic systems. For instance, Japan can sell cars in America without having the same rules of bank transparency. China sells all that can be sold in the USA without being a democracy and with no strong financial system. Europe exports a great deal to the dollar area without being a comparably open market: the European market is open only as far as it is necessary to sell in America, but little or no further.

This increases economic interdependence between national systems, but does not bring about a homogenous market. For example, capitals go around the world, but standards remain different. The American standard has become globalized without producing meaningful changes in the different societies as they became linked to the American market. This has doubtless brought modernization and capitalization to poorer countries, but has also raised two problems. The international market stands upon national pillars unable to support it as they lack a sufficient level of order, since national models are not modified a great deal by mondialization, with an attendant instability hazard as internationalization grows. Moreover, economic modernization without parallel social modernization, as it takes place in emerging countries, does not lead to mass capitalism, but to a selective and highly unstable one. And this brings about a likewise growing social hazard.

To solve the first problem, the International Monetary Fund was set up with the task to uphold (American) standards for the good management of economic institutions of world nations, with World Bank support to capitalize them. A third element, the United Nations, should have acted as a container to internationalize the American pres-

sure to build globally democracies and States balanced under the viewpoint of social security, in order to solve the second problem. This is the system outlined in 1944 at Bretton Woods. The USA sought to extend their model to the world by means of international institutions: this ruling core worked well enough to frame a preliminary set up of the global market. However, it failed to stabilize the system, because the standards applied are not suitable to the diversity of the planet.

This problem is well known and the object of a great many theoretical and practical efforts to modify the institutions of Bretton Woods. But the literature and political action show that, though it is possible to make the globalizing standard based on the American model more adaptive, this will not suffice to improve things a great deal, since a standard posseses intrinsic flexibility limits. For example, a government can be allowed for a limited time to protect by anomalous measures its currency in a situation of deep crisis – it was granted to Malaysia and Chile in the late Nineties –, but it will not be possible to allow this to continue indefinitely. Or, one can avoid, in future, to make mistakes such as that to impose to Argentina a rigid parity with a strong currency, but it will always be impossible to force a viable requirement of stability from outside if inner conditions are not sufficiently ordered in themselves. Standard flexibility has an inexorable limit. For example, one must force Japan to bank transparency because a crisis there would upset the whole system, it is possible to leave the country time to reach that object, but it is unthinkable to give up the final goal. And what if Japan, or China or any other country cannot make it? The globalized system blows up.

To speak plainer, making the standard more flexible causes its application to be suboptimal. In other words, its rigour has to be tempered in cases of emergency. But a flexibility of this kind, though understandable, is no good thing. It means that the integrative model is less varied than necessary. And this gap does not seem to be nearing a solution.

It is plain, therefore, that the effectiveness of the standard is to be achieved only in part by means of greater elasticity of application, whereas for the greater part it depends upon the will and possibility by each single nation to converge towards the standard. And this kind of analysis puts the construction of a truly global market under the viewpoint of individual territories. The task of the researcher and the politician is to find ways to make them convergent. Jocularly, one could say

that globalization is "rediscovering" national States, or that maps discarded in the assumption they were no longer of any use because the whole planet was being "universalized", must be urgently fished out from basements.

The configuration of a converging nation

It is not so much a matter of political will by a nation-state to become globally convergent, but its realistic ability to do so. That is because, to partecipate in a global open market and to survive, a nation-state must achieve a rather well developed internal order. This may be a difficult object. For example, in a liberalized society there must be a well educated middle class, a solid currency, infrastructures in good working order, and in general a strongly competitive system. In such conditions, openness to a broader market yields far more advantages than liabilities. But, for example, nation-states accustomed to models of social protectionism, when called to reduce them, evidently experience a great difficolty to become transformed in order to be able to confrom to a standard of global free market. This is quite evident in the European dimension.

Emerging countries enjoy huge advantages in becoming open to the world marked, because in that way they can turn their poverty into affluence, by exporting the low cost of labour and getting money in exchange. But the process of capitalization ushers unavoidably into phases of imbalance within a national society: some people become rapidly rich, while others remain poor, thereby giving birth to the preconditions for a crisis in social and political cohesion. Moreover the enrichment process of poor countries leads temporarily to a decrease of wealth in rich countries due to a sectorial competitivity crisis. Both theory and facts show that in the end the overall balance will be positive for all concerned, but this does not help to relax those who lose their jobs in advanced countries due to increasing competitivity of emerging ones. And this brings about a huge problem of consensus for the open market policy.

Many other critical points are evident in the process of globalization, but those outlined above admit one solution only: a nation must be aided from outside in order to succeed to partecipate with advantage to the global market system. It must also be sanctioned when its divergence is not justifiable by objective internal difficulties. But here the chief question is: by what criterion are we going to define the "framework" a nation-state

needs to receive from outside – let us call it, for the time being, international community – instalments of "stick and carrot" to keep on the right track?

So far, the image of a converging nation was defined by means of criteria of "good behaviour" established by the International Monetary Fund, which by the way are very good. However, they may be of little use in cases in which a country is utterly unable to comply. In such cases the globalizing standard is softened, and this destabilizes the system up to a point, or is applied just the same causing trouble of another sort, for example sanctions which worsen the condition of the sick. Evidently there is a lack of tools for "positive convergence" which could help a nation to become "convergent", i.e. to conform to the international standard.

The problem is not unknown, and remarkable solutions can be found in Europe. A temporal horizon is established for countries which are going to enter the Union, and a framework of aid so that they may be unable to converge towards the required standards. The system of European convergence, in this regard, is an excellent example of the correct method to balance national specificities with general standards, leaving respite time for adjustment and granting incentives. But the "stick and carrot" method, with emphasis on the latter, is possible because there is at least a core of European government, and therefore distributable resources. The process can therefore be managed within a political consensus which helps a particular nation to achieve convergence. At the global level there is no planetary government to carry out such a work. Neither is it likely that a government of this kind will come into being in the foreseeable future. It is therefore necessary to find a political recipe for the same integrative job, though there cannot be a central governmental function. Is it possible? In theory yes, provided countries can receive incentives aiding them to change their internal models to make them better conforming to globalizing standards.

Balancing national sovereignty with global wealth

A viable organization of the political structure of the global market may be best achieved by means of the following guidelines:

i) national economic sovereignty must be left to nations-states in full and must not be excessively limited by external restrictions;

ii) the definition of a global standard to which a given nation is to conform must be strengthened by a suitable support in order to enable the nation to comply with the requirements;

iii) the interested nation accepts controls aiming at evaluate its poltical will to conform to the required standard.

We must seek therefore to achieve harmonization between national sovereignties and world standards in a cooperative game. Paolo Savona and I have defined this game as: "sovereignty there and back again". In the sense that a nation-state does not yield sovereignty to the standard indiscriminately, but preserves it within the constraint to use its internal freedom of maneuvre in order achieve the configuration of a converging nation-state within a deadline accepted by the people on the one hand and the international community, or the international institution concerned, on the other. It is a sort of "trip" of sovereignty: the nation-state yields it to have it limited by a plan aiming at a convergence towards a globalizing standard, but it is then given back as freedom to choose the practical ways to achieve the desired convergence and to be aided from outside to fulfil the planned change.

To stress the difference with what is taking place nowadays in reality, it is fit to call to mind that nations are to all effects forced to yield economic sovereignty to an external system without getting in exchange either aid or workable agendas. In this sense a political void exists in globalization: the stick and the carrot are not correctly balanced, whereas a good carrot would be both just and necessary to help each nation-state to find its way, highlighting opportunities and advantages at every step. And the reason for such void is that the correct conclusions have not been drawn from economic theory, though robust in itself: it is true that the more a nation-state becomes open to the global market the more rich it becomes. And this is regarded as a compensation and a prize for the yielding of economic sovereignty to global market standards. That is true and has never been gainsaid as a basic underlying fact. But there is a little problem: before the prize is achieved, nation-states experience severe problems of transition. In other words, the procedure so far established underestimates the transition problems in the process of convergence. What is called for is a new procedure to treat such problems in more realistic fashion. Together with Paolo Savona I have proposed a model of balanced sovereignties which should hopefully serve as a spur to think more and better in this direction in the persuasion that,

even should our proposal prove unworkable in detail, the basic concept would still be relevant in any case.

The requirements for a good map

On the other hand it cannot be overestimated the need to measure in full detail the conditions of each nation-state if the theory of balanced sovereignties is to be properly applied. It is mandatory to estimate as precisely as possible the human resources and abilities of nation-states to come to a convergence with the global standard in order to become aware of what do they need to keep on the right track. This knowledge can be gained by a suitable thematic mapping methodology.

To map a territory is also a political action. In this particular case it is political more than anything else. Each government should map the spatial system of its own territory in such way as to give a description comparable to the overall map of the global system, so that the present conditions, the trends and the needs may be clearly understood. Nowadays we have no such maps. This might come as a surprise to our colleagues statisticians, who deem to possess powerful tools to track the evolution of the system. These are excellent tools, no doubt, but they did not appear suitably geared to the solution of our problem: maps having in direct object the balancing of sovereignty.

To achieve this object the new maps should be based on a method of "statistical cartography" conforming to an agreed world standard, showing economic, social and infrastructural variables in such a way as to gauge strengths and weaknesses of each national actor in relation to the path of convergence towards market opening of its nation-state. A point that cannot be overemphasized is that the new thematic mapping methodology must be digitized in such a way as to be geared to the performance of dynamic simulations. This will help to frame political negotiations between the government of a nation-state and the international community to find the optimal path towards convergence and the definition of what is needed to aid that government to achieve the desired object.

What we need is a system of representation allowing the government of a nation-state to know its own situation, advantages and liabilities of the participation to the global system, and to share such knowledge with its partners, be they other nation-states, or some international actors such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Some colleagues could regard such a technical solution as irrelevant, especially in view of fashionable "philosophical doubts" regarding cartography as "static" endeavour which "deadens" – they say – the "true image" of the three-dimensional globe. Others may be of the opinion that geographical concepts such as space, territory, and similar, are no longer viable, as distances have been – so they think – more or less cancelled. Others still may say that this proposal means to uphold economic imperialism: a subversive position which will be examined in other chapters of the present volume dealing with the enemies of globalization (see in particular the chapters by Da Pozzo, De Leonardis and Biagini).

But if we are be rid of idle talk and behave responsibly towards the problems at hand, we must understand that building such maps is a necessary step towards a well-founded new theory of globalization: nation-states, not their annihilation, are the chief units of the game. And therefore new technical instruments of geoeconomy are needed which might help to appreciate this basic truth. They also must provide a common scientific basis to balance specific interests with the global one.

In conclusion, the economic theory of globalization must be supported by a suitable mapping system. Nowadays the theory is ambiguous and thematic mapping uncertain. It is to be wished that this chapter may contribute to point to the challenge of new applied research in map making and attendant understanding of the multifarious conditions of nation-states which must be aided to enter fully the globalized scene. It is plainly necessary to fill a political void which is both cognitive and methodological.

References

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Brian Slack

Maritime transport and globalization: evolving relationships

Riassunto. - L'evolversi dei rapporti fra trasporto marittimo e globalizzazione

I rapporti fra globalizzazione e trasporti sono al tempo stesso intensi ed ineguali. In quanto domanda derivata, i servizi di trasporto ricevono un impatto, sotto molti fondamentali punti di vista, in seguito a processi che divengono sempre più globali. I trasporti containerizzati si conformano alle attese generate dalla globalizzazione, e in particolare all'allungamento e all'intensificazione dei collegamenti, nonché alla crescente omogeneizzazione, mediante dimensioni spaziali ineguali e differenziate da regione a regione. È viceversa possibile che la globalizzazione venga a sua volta plasmata dal trasporto containerizzato. Per comprendere l'effettivo svolgimento dei processi generali occorre in conclusione tener presenti le diversità locali, che su questi processi esercitano un indubbio impatto.

Introduction

Globalization is a term that is so widely used today that its meaning is hard to define with any degree of clarity. For example, a recent book provided 35 different definitions of the term (Streeten 2001, 173). Despite it being a word so overused that it is meaning has become obscure, it is evident that the process of globalization has drawn the academic interest of a very wide range of disciplines. Globalization is recognised in the economics and business literature as promoting the financial and commercial expansion of a world economy that has become increasingly integrated. From manufacturers whose raw materials come from all around the world and who produce and sell their products in an international marketplace, to the banks and financial institutions that move capital between continents, the contemporary economy seemingly knows no boundaries. This process is also recognised in the fields of politics, where global issues shape the relationships between states (Dunn 1995), in the environment, where many forces of change are seen to be at a planetary scale, and in culture, where the influence of TV, cinema and the Internet are diffused across the globe (Friedman 1994, Scott 1997). Even terrorism has gone global, thanks to Al Qaeda, and the recent outbreak of SARS is a further clear signal of globalization!

From a wide set of disciplinary studies, several key features of globalization emerge. First there is a spatial expansion of linkages. Industrialists assemble components from around the world (Dicken 2002), and political relationships between States have been stretched (McGraw & Lewis 1992). Second, there has been a growing intensity or deepening of linkages of all kinds, from the commercial to political and cultural. Third, there is a growing homogeneity of relationships. In cultural and communication studies, for example, globalization is seen by some as a force for standardisation and homogeneity. The threat of American cultural hegemony is seen to arise out of such global communications technologies as television, movies and the Internet. In commercial and industrial relationships similar consequences arise. Companies serving global markets adopt standardised operational and marketing procedures that allow them to carry on business in disparate regions (Dicken 2002).

It should come as no surprise that the transport industry too has been shaped by globalization. As a derived demand, transportation must inevitably reflect changing patterns of commercial and industrial relationships. Container shipping has been particularly affected by the forces of commercial globalization. In this paper the adjustments made by container shipping in response to globalization pressures are explored. It examines the extent to which the three broader effects of globalization are evident. The paper goes on to analyse the limits to globalization in container shipping and to suggest that the relationship is much more complex than considered at first sight.

The restructuring of container shipping

The globalization of the economy has resulted in a great expansion of international trade. During the last twenty years international trade has been growing at a rate significantly higher than production. At the same time, new markets have been opened up, most noticeably in East Asia but also in South America and South Asia. Container shipping, which is the mode that best serves these new trade opportunities, has had to respond by increasing capacity on existing trade routes and extending services into new market areas. Fifteen years ago the large majority of the world's container trade was between Japan, North-West Europe and North America. Today, the pattern is global.

While representing significant opportunities, the need to expand capacity and provide global services has placed enormous pressures on the shipping lines. Most of the established lines were in no position to respond to the changes by the 1990s. Some failed commercially, others withdrew from mainline container operations, but those that have remained found it advantageous to join with erstwhile competitors to invest in new and larger vessels in order to add capacity and to extend services in new market areas (Brooks 2000).

Two main forms of association between the lines became evident. Many of the carriers seeking to provide global services came together to form strategic alliances. Four major groupings emerged in the 1990s: Grand Alliance, made up of Hapag-Lloyd, P&O-Nedlloyd, NYK, OOCL and MISC; New World, comprising APL, MOL, and Hyundai; United, with Hanjin, DSR and Cho Yang; and, SeaLand with Maersk. A looser alliance emerged in the late 1990s between K-Line, Yangming and COSCO. These alliances were made up, therefore,

of most of the major container shipping companies. By pooling vessels members could offer a broader set of services than would be possible by acting independently (Midoro and Pitto 2000).

At the same time, and sometimes overlapping the formation of the alliances, there took place a number of mergers and take-overs. Maersk eventually took over its alliance partner, SeaLand to create the world's biggest carrier; NOL purchased the assets of APL and re-named the new firm, APL; P&O merged with Nedlloyd; Hanjin acquired DSR; CMA bought CGM; and, CPShips bought CAST, Lykes, Contship, TMM and ANZDL. In all cases the new enlarged firms could deploy extra capacity (ships) and serve new markets. The result has been a growing concentration of ownership in container shipping. Between 1990 and 2000 the top twenty carriers have seen their share of container capacity increase from 25% to nearly 60%. In addition, most of these top carriers are also members of alliances that provide joint services around the world.

Impacts on container shipping

The impacts of these structural changes in the container shipping industry are considered in the context of three expected outcomes: the degree of spatial expansion, the intensity of linkages, and the trend towards homogeneity. These outcomes are examined by considering in turn three dimensions of container shipping: (i) the network of shipping services, (ii) the vessels deployed, and (iii) the ports served.

(i) *Shipping services*
Research by Slack *et al.* (2002) compared the services of the alliance members prior and subsequent to the formation of the alliances. This research shows that the number of services increased from 422 to 545 between 1989 and 1999 (see Fig. 1). More remarkable is the growth in weekly services, which expanded from 210 to 400 over the same period. These results suggest that while the alliances enabled carriers to offer more services, the major impetus was to enhance service frequencies to at least one sailing per week on a greater range of routes. This result confirms the hypothesis that globalization produces an intensification of linkages.

The increase in the number of services took place in conjunction with a spatial restructuring of the networks. Analysis of the connections reveals striking contrasts between pre-and post alliance-

Fig. 1. Growth in container services, 1989-1999.

formation periods. Prior to the alliances shipping lines tended to focus their networks from their home range, with services that were end-to-end, that is to say went to other ports on another maritime range across one ocean. Furthermore the routings were largely East-West, linking the major markets of Japan, Europe and North America (Fig. 2). Each line had a different profile.

By 1999, however, the market coverage had become global. This is reflected in the number of different major market areas served. If the world is divided into 13 maritime ranges, in 1989 the lines that were to join together in one of the alliances served an average of 7.3 ranges. By 1999 an average of 10.3 ranges were being served (Slack et al. 2002). The service networks too evolved in a more complex fashion. Instead of end-to-end services, by 1999 the networks were multi-range, linking several continents with interdependent services (Fig. 3). Network elaboration and a lengthening of routes appears to have been the dominant feature. The observed increase in the scope and scale of container shipping linkages confirms another of the expected outcomes of globalization.

(ii) *Vessels*

It has long been recognised that container shipping benefits from scale economies. The history of container shipping has been one of a gradual increase in vessel capacity. However, there existed two main constraints. The dimensions of the Panama Canal exerted a specific limit on vessel beam and draught, resulting in the so-called Panamax vessels of approximately 4,000 Teus, the largest ships that were able to pass through the canal. This size limit was reached in the 1980s. The sec-

ond constraint was that in order to achieve maximum scale economies, the larger vessels had to be filled to capacity, and in the competitive world of container shipping, individual lines could rarely meet this requirement, and hence were reluctant to invest in ever larger ships.

The log jam was broken in the 1990s. After being held to Panamax dimensions, more and more lines sought to invest in the more economic post-Panamax ships, and since the early 1990s there has been a significant increase in vessel size (Fig. 4). This was greatly facilitated by the emergence of alliances, whereby the largest vessels could be allocated to alliance services, so that a pooling of cargoes could ensure higher load factors per sailing. At the beginning of the Twenty-first Century a major question is how big will ships become? It is a question that is resulting in a lot of academic debate (Gilman 1999, Cullinane & Khanna 2000). While there are differences of opinion on how big ships will become, there is a general consensus that the limits of size have not yet been reached.

The growth in the size of ships is not the only facet of increased capacity in container shipping. Between 1989 and 1999 the number of container ships operated by the alliance members increased from 728 to 1100 (Fig. 5) (Slack et al. 2002). While many of the new ships brought into service were of post-Panamax dimensions, and were deployed on the main East-West trade routes, their deployments allowed many of the *existing* sub-Panamax ships to be re-positioned to serve newer and smaller markets. Consequently there has been a great deal of upscaling in container shipping on a global basis. All markets and all trades have been impacted by the growth in vessel size.

Fig. 2. Networks in 1989: regionally concentrated and end-to-end.

10 ports. A similar pattern is repeated by OOCL. Conversely alliance co-member, MOL ceased service to 57 ports, while adding only 47. Companies that underwent equity mergers during the period as well as alliance membership experienced some of the largest adjustments. P&O added 106 ports to its network and APL added 71, both increases being greater than the number of ports retained between 1994 and 1999. This leads to the question as to whether the mergers led to the increases. In the case of P&O, it appears that the merger with Nedlloyd was an important factor in the addition of ports, because Nedlloyd had served 60 of the 106 new additions previously. On the other hand, for APL only 8 of its new ports had been served by previously by NOL (Slac, *et al.,* 2002).

There appear to be two elements regarding the effects of the alliances on port selection. First, in

Fig. 3. Networks in 1999: global and multi-range.

(iii) *Ports*

The choice of ports of call is directly related to how the carriers seek to exploit markets. The changes made to container shipping networks over the last decade of the Twentieth Century have inevitably impacted on port selection. Expansion into new markets has added new ports, and on ranges where service is maintained, new joint services have brought about a rationalisation of port selection. The late 1990s were a period of significant change and adjustment for the carriers' services. Table 1 summarises the changes for a sample of carriers. The most impressive feature is the scale and magnitude of the shifts in ports of call that took place in a very short time. In a five year period, HMM added 43 new ports to its schedule, while maintaining service to 24 and dropping only

Fig. 4. Growth in the size of container ships, 1980-2000.

every case the majority of the ports included in alliance networks were previously served by the individual members. For the Japanese carriers, that were already offering services to a wide spectrum of ranges, the alliance ports were overwhelmingly part in their existing networks. For HMM, APL, MISC, DSR, Cho Yang, OOCL and Hanjin the alliance ports represented at least half the ports for which service was maintained between 1994-9, and in the case of Hanjin and HMM nearly all the retained ports were those that were part of alliance services (Slack *et al.*, 2002).

The second aspect of the alliances is that they helped open up new markets and ports. They provided every member with additional market coverage, and all the carriers added ports of call that were components of alliance networks. Examples are numerous, including MISC accessing the East Coast of North America, DSR the West Coast of North America, APL Europe, Hapag Lloyd the Far East, P&O the Pacific North-West. Of particular interest is the way the alliance services enabled carriers to tap directly into the Chinese market, replacing earlier networks based entirely on transhipments via Hong Kong (Wang & Slack 2000). A further way the alliances helped members open up new markets was that because the joint services linked the major markets, freed capacity could be allocated to establish individual services in other ranges. Thus, during the latter half of the 1990s MOL restructured its services in Japan, and MISC extended new services to the lesser markets, such as Australia.

Globalization has had a major impact on container port operations (Evangelista *et al.*, 2001). Up until the 1990s, cargo handling in most ports was managed by local interests, either directly by the port authority itself or under contract to a local terminal operator. In the last decade a significant change has occurred. Terminal operations have become increasingly under the control of a number of globally-based firms such as Hutchison, PSA, Eurogate, SSA and CSXWT that manage or own berths in ports around the world. In other cases berths are being managed by the shipping lines themselves, such as Hanjin, K-Line and Evergreen, or by firms that may have a corporate link with shipping lines, such as APM and P&O Ports. The disappearance of locally-based firms from ship handling and berth operations has become one of the most striking developments in container shipping (Notteboom & Winkelmans 2002).

With port operations being controlled by an ever smaller number of firms, and with alliances selecting the same ports of call homogeneity appears to be becoming a well-established feature of the port industry. This homogeneity is being reinforced by the standardisation of equipment being used: the ubiquitous dock gantry cranes, the standard yard vehicles and lifting devices. This also extends to include the conformity of port landscapes. Container ports from one part of the world to another display little diversity of appearance and morphology. Chinese container ports landscapes display many similarities with others half a world away. When we add that the individual identity of each member of an alliance service is diminished, with for example APL containers being moved on New World alliance services on MOL ships and calling at Hyundai berths, and that the firms are applying standardised information and documentation processing systems, the container shipping industry as a whole can be said to be more homogeneous.

Tab. 1. Ports served by the major Alliances, 2001. Source: Containerisation International Yearbook 2002.

New World Alliance	Grand Alliance	United Alliance
NORTHERN EUROPE: Bremerhaven, Felixstowe, Hamburg Le Havre, Rotterdam, Southampton	Antwerp, Bremerhaven, Hamburg, Le Havre, Rotterdam, Southampton, Thamesport	Antwerp, Felixstowe, Homburg, Le Havre, Rotterdam, Thamesport
MEDITERRANEAN: Genoa, Marseilles, Barcelona	Barcelona, Damietta, La Spezia, Marsaxlokk, Marseilles	Gioia Tauro, La Spezia, Marseilles, Valencia
MIDDLE EAST: Aden, Jeddah, Port Said	Jeddah, Dubai	Jeddah, Khor Fakkan
SOUTH ASIA: Colombo, Laem Chabang, Port Kelang, Singapore	Tanjung Priok, Colombo, Laem Chabang, Port-Kelang, Singapore	Colombo, Port Kelang, Singapore
EAST ASIA: Chiwan, Hong Kong, Kaohsiung, Keelung, Kwangyang, Ningbo, Quingdao, Shanghai, Yantian	Hong Kong, Kaohsiung, Ningbo, Quingdao, Shanghai, Shekou, Xiamen, Yantian	Chiwan, Hong Kong, Kaohsiung, Kwangyang, Quingdao, Shanghai, Xingang, Yantian
NORTH ASIA: Busan, Hakata, Kobe, Nagoya, Shimzu, Tokyo, Yokohama	Busan, Hakata, Kobe Nagoya, Sendai, Shimzu, Tokyo	Busan, Hakata, Osaka, Tokyo
WEST COAST NORTH AMERICA: Dutch Harbor, Los Angeles, Oakland, Portland, Tacoma, Seattle, Vancouver	Long Beach, Los Angeles, Oakland, Seattle, Vancouver	Long Beach, Oakland, Portland, Seattle, Vancouver
EAST COAST NORTH AMERICA: Charleston, New York, Miami, Norfolk, Savannah	Charleston, Halifax, Miami, New York, Norfolk, Savannah	Norfolk, New York, Savannah
CENTRAL AMERICA: Balboa, Puerto Manzanillo	Balboa, Cristobal, Puerto Manzanillo	Balboa, Cristobal, Manazanillo, Puerto Manzanillo

Limits to globalization

As much as globalization is recognised by many disciplinary researchers as a process that is helping transform the world, there are many others who argue that it has limits. Evidence has been assembled to suggest that proportionately, the world economy was more open at the start of the 20th century than at the end (Irwin 1996). A great deal of social science research has concluded that the global processes impact differentially at the local or regional level. Cultural distinctiveness shapes issues or processes as varied as advertising (Hannerz 1996) and production technologies (Gertler 1997). In the environmental field we are urged to 'act locally', even if we 'think globally'. Global political and economic processes have been shown to play out differently in different States and regions.

It is widely recognised that there exists a spectrum of causes and effects that range at a multitude of scales between the global and the local. Many researchers from non-spatial disciplines now accept this geographical metric of globalization (Scholte 2000). In geography and urban and regional planning recognition of the regional and local dimensions of globalization has given rise to a greater critical awareness of the importance of space and scale in broad-based processes (Dunning 2000, Yussef et al., 2001).

Container shipping is no exception. Each port inevitably possesses a unique site that helps enforce the particularities of the locality. Site has a profound impact on operations and performance as exemplified by the case of Hong Kong, where lack of space has given rise to particular operating conditions with high stacking densities and midstream transfers. In other ports, where space is less of a constraint, ground positioning of containers and even total yard automation is possible in ports

such as Rotterdam. In addition, there are many factors, such as markets and governance that combine to establish regional differentiation. Thus, in East Asia where markets are essentially coastal, boxes move very short distances by land to the ports. On the other side of the Pacific, however, a large proportion of containers move great distances to inland markets in the US from West Coast ports. These differences have a big effect in determining the role of logistics intermediaries in inland distribution systems. McCalla *et al.*, (2001) have demonstrated that logistics providers offer different kinds of services from one market to another. In terms of governance there are growing divergences in administrative structures, from the State-controlled enterprises of France to the privately operated facilities in the UK or Hong Kong. In France, despite belonging to a common economic bloc, the EU, and despite providing some of the most extensive port infrastructures in Europe, French ports languish. French port authorities, the local terminal operators and the unions have worked in the past to prevent liberalisation, and in particular the opening of French ports to international terminal management companies.

Local and regional differences in shipping networks are apparent, despite the globalised uniformities discussed earlier. Robinson (1998) has postulated a hierarchy of services in Asia, in which the locally based services operate in parallel with the mainline operations of the mega-carriers, a situation that is repeated in the Caribbean basin. As in other fields of human endeavour locational distinctiveness is still strong, and there are powerful countervailing forces that weaken global conformity.

Globalization and container shipping relationships revisited

While not disputing the position of international transport as a derived demand, a service that responds to market opportunities, a careful assessment of the situation leads to the conclusion that container shipping is helping shape globalization. There is interdependence between transportation and globalization. How could the world economy function without an efficient transportation system? Container shipping, in particular, sustains and shapes globalization. The extension of container shipping into the north-south trades has been a feature of contemporary containerisation, and while it is true that the lines are seeking to penetrate new markets, i.e. they are acting in re-

sponse to globalization, it is also clear that their entry into these areas is a fundamental precondition for global integration.

These new services, therefore, may shape the economic conditions of globalization. Yet we know very little except that many new services have been added, capacity has increased, frequency of sailings has improved, and rates have fallen. Each one of these developments has the power to produce significant changes. Local industries in these newly linked regions have greater opportunities to sell their products in regional and global markets. At the same time, however, multi-national producers gain access to formerly inaccessible markets. Which trend is dominant and why? Who benefits? Do the local shipping companies help sustain local economic vitality? Does the welfare of areas that are not included in the new global shipping networks suffer a disadvantage, or is the reverse true?

A further indication of the role of containerisation shaping globalization is in the emergence of transhipment hubs. The reconfiguration of networks has produced a new class of container ports. In order to link the separate services into a global network certain ports have been established as central links. These 'pivot' or transhipment ports have emerged over the last decade at critical points at greenfield sites. In the Mediterranean several such ports have been established, such as Algeciras, Gioia Tauro and Taranto that are among the biggest ports in the basin (Zophil & Prijon 2000). Similar hubs have been developed in the Caribbean: Kingston, Rio Haina, and Freeport. It is significant that these new traffic centres are larger and/or growing faster than the traditional port complexes in these areas.

Conclusion

It is evident that globalization has had a considerable impact on the container shipping industry. In the span of less than a decade it has been transformed from one made up of a large number of carriers, to one characterised by a growing concentration of capacity. Its services have been reconfigured and extended into all the market areas of the world, and service frequencies have been enhanced. There has been a growth in the numbers of vessels in fleet and there has been a major increase in ship size. Port selection has undergone a transformation, and the organisation of the terminal handling operations too have been internationalised.

These changes seem to conform with expected outcomes of globalization. There has been a stretching and an intensification of linkages. Ship services and port operations have become more alike. There is a growing degree of homogeneity in the industry.

Despite this strong evidence for the impact of globalization on container shipping, the paper has provided two caveats. First, it is clear that there are significant local and regional distinctions. Many of these still have to be documented and explained more fully, but it is clear that there are limits to globalization. In this respect container shipping is mirroring the trends already well documented in other fields. It suggests that caution should be employed in considering the importance of global forces. Even in an industry as global in scope as container shipping, local factors persist and exert a continued influence.

The second caveat is that the relationships between globalization and container shipping are not entirely uni-directional. Container shipping is helping shape emerging spatial patterns and relationships. It is certainly a facilitator of globalization, providing the means by which international trade can flow around the world with greater ease and lower costs. It is worth examining, therefore, how the shipping lines are giving rise to new market opportunities and helping shape the configuration of the global economy.

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Luciano Cau

Globalization of charity: the Carmelite Missions from Liguria to the Central African Republic

Riassunto. - Globalizzazione della carità: le missioni carmelitane dalla Liguria alla Repubblica Centrafricana

L'obiettivo del presente capitolo è quello di porre in evidenza il contributo dato dai Missionari della Chiesa Cattolica, e in particolare dalla grande Famiglia Carmelitana, alla promozione umana, oltre che all'evangelizzazione, delle popolazioni nel cosiddetto "terzo mondo". Si tratta di un argomento costantemente trascurato dalle scienze umane secolarizzate, che, nelle rare volte in cui accennano all'attività dei Missionari, è solo per rimproverare loro l'"indebita interferenza" con le culture indigene. Un argomento di tale vastità, quale l'Opera Missionaria a livello globale, richiederebbe molti volumi, e in questa sede può essere trattato solo presentando un singolo esempio, ma assai significativo, della vita missionaria: quello della Provincia Ligure dei Carmelitani nella Repubblica Centrafricana. In quel paese i missionari hanno portato a termine un gran numero di progetti: le scuole di villaggio a Bozoum e Baoro, il sillabario della lingua sango, il centro di promozione femminile a Baoro, la scuola del seminario e le scuole professionali (ceramica, falegnameria, meccanica), i pozzi a Bozoum, il dispensario medico e dentistico a La Yolé, il nuovo ponte sul torrente Koyali a Bozoum, la ristrutturazione delle prigioni di Bozoum, il Centro di formazione e sviluppo agropastorale a Bouar-La Yolé, la cooperativa di allevamento a Boyele-Bozoum, il centro pilota per la formazione agropastorale a Bangui-Bimbo. Come spesso avviene, le opere dei Missionari sono state largamente saccheggiate e distrutte durante la guerra civile originatasi da una faida familiare all'interno del ristretto circolo dominante, con larga partecipazione di miliziani islamici. I Missionari carmelitani, inizialmente costretti alla fuga, sono tuttavia tornati sul posto per ricostruire ciò che è stato distrutto e proseguire la loro opera di evangelizzazione e promozione umana.

Introduction

The purpose of the present paper is to provide an example of the actions for the promotion of human development performed daily throughout the world by the Missionaries of the Roman Catholic Church. This is a subject usually overlooked by the literature on development, produced by geographers, sociologists and economists. The current secularization trends bring about a style of development studies totally silent on the initiatives (and the martyrs) of the Catholic Missionaries. If the Missions are mentioned at all, it is only to stress an alleged "undue interference" of the Church with "native" cultures.

It is plainly impossible to deal in any detail with all missionary activities by the many Orders of the Church, as they build a true globalization of charity. One significant example only will be provided: the operations of the Ligurian Province of the Carmelite Order in the Central African Republic.

The Central African Republic

As the name implies, the country is at the very centre of Africa (Fig. 1). It has an area of about 623.000 sqkm. The relief is dominated by the Central African Ridge, with massifs rising over 1000 metres, which divide the land into two main river catchments, that of the Ubangui, a tributary to the Congo, and the Chari-Logone which flows northwards. The climate is tropical, with two seasons, a wet one (roughly from April to October) and a dry one, the latter being longer in the north.

Fig. 1. The Central African Republic and the main settlements of the Ligurian Carmelites.

In the country there are about 3 million people, and therefore a population density of only 5 inhabitants to the square kilometer: the country can therefore be regarded as underpeopled. An artificial creation of the colonial age, the Central African Republic is far from being ethnically homogenous, being located in a contact area between two major language groups: the Congo-Kordofan and the Nilo-Saharan. Most speakers belong to the Oubanguian branch of the Adamawa-Ouganguian family. The main languages of the group are the Gbaya, the Banda and the Gbanziri-sere, although there are many others. Two peculiar groups are the Pigmies and the Peuls, the latter being mostly herdsmen of the north, in contrast with the peasant populations of the south. One fourth of the population is protestant, one fourth animist, while the Catholics are 17%, the Muslims 15%, and "others" 18%.

The country has been a French colony, under the name of Oubanghi-Shari, until 1960. Between 1966 and 1976 it was the "empire" of Jean-Bedel Bokassa. The ensuing political history is one of military coups d'ètat, civil strife and international pressure to get a democratisation process under way. The official language is French, as it would be hard, among the great number of local speeches,

to find one which would be accepted by the whole population as a national language.

The currency is the Central African Franc (CAF), lately linked to the French Franc, and nowadays to the euro (1€ = 655,9 CAFs). The gross national product per capita is US$ 330: The rate of economic growth per capita –0.3% per annum, *i.e.* it is *decreasing*. The illiteracy rate for people over 15 is 66% (but 96% for females). With the exception of a small number of youngsters attending senior schools, the majority has practically no option except agriculture. No attempts are made either by the State or by private agencies to favour a search for alternative occupational outlets. A part of the young people try to survive by starting small trading activities, favoured by the closeness of the border with Cameroun. However, any trade of a significant importance is in the hands of Muslim Arabs who possess the necessary means of transportation on the local roads, which tend to damage lorries, because of their condition of utter disrepair, the only exceptions being some main arteries which although are not tarmacked, have been improved by a recent aid project of the German government.

Local entrepreneurial traditions are virtually non-existent, the introduction of useful innova-

tions is hindered by local resistance so that it can be described as a typical static society, according to a pattern theoretically outlined by Biagini (1981). Not surprisingly, the country is beset with social pathologies. Extreme corruption is widespread within the officialdom, and abuse of power is extensively practiced by public authorities, both civil and military. Crime is rife, with murder, robberies and thefts sharply on the increase. In spite of widespread poverty, money to buy firearms seems not to be in shortage. Outlaw bands roam the countryside, often attacking the Missions.

These features identify the country as a markedly underdeveloped one, and utterly unable, at present, to jump into the bandwagon of globalization. From the viewpoint of customs and the way of thinking, the country is experiencing a period of deep crisis. The family, still tied to solidarity within the patriarchal clan, is subject to strong social forces leading it into isolation and even disgregation. Marriage, up to recently rigorously established and controlled by the families involved, is nowadays often reduced to a very unstable relationship between two youngsters. This phenomenon is but an aspect of the social disgregation typical of young people migrant to the towns, where the difficult economic and social conditions generate a "do-it-yourself" behaviour, precariously dragged on from day to day. One of the most negative consequences is the very high number of unmarried mothers, whose children are often taken away from them to be included in the clan of the man who claims to be their father. Divorce and poligamy are increasing. Elderly people, due to their improductivity, are often abandoned in a state of utter poverty.

About 91% of the inhabitants lives under the poverty threshold. The life expectation at birth is 44 years for males and 46 for females. Infant mortality (deaths within the first year) is 12.9%. Defective preventive measures, polluted drinkwater and insufficient food cause a number of illnesses, including endemic malarial fever, oncocercosis, bilharzia and leprosy, as well as epidemics of hepatites and meningitis. Only a 3% of the national budget is allocated to healthcare, so not surprisingly structures are in complete disrepair, in spite of some effort to intensify basic care. There are only 150 medical doctors, 108 of which, however, operate in the capital Bangui, whose district (*préfecture*) concentrates only less than 20 per cent of the total population. Urban hospitals are staffed by Central African doctors, aided by some specialized and some unspecialized nurses. Patients, however, are obliged to pay even the slightest services,

and seldom can afford surgical operations or extended care in case of prolonged illness. Medicines are very hard to find and so expensive that very few people have a chance to follow a suitable cure when needed.

The frequent occurrence of sickness and death often induce people to turn to traditional "healers", and also to black magic, whereby they seek to single out the responsible for the "evil spell" which suppposedly caused the sickness and death. The alleged "sorcerer" is then persecuted by the aggrieved family, often with fatal results. In this scenario, the only viable alternative, both for medical treatment and as a supply of medicines, is the medical support provided by the Missions, through their dispensaries and village "pharmacies", or crate-pharmacies (of which more below).

The Carmelite order from Liguria to Central Africa

The Ligurian Carmelites entered the Central African Republic on December 1971. They were entrusted with the Bozoum parish (Bartolomei 2003), and later with that of Baoro and Bossèntélé. Bozoum, the administrative centre of the prefecture Ouham-Pende, within the diocese of Bouar, is a *brousse* (woody savanna) town, located in a highland at a height of 700 metres, with a population of 17,000 inhabitants, of which 5,000 Catholic. Over the years, missionary work developed. The seminar of Bouar-La Yolé was established, soon followed by the house for the human formation of candidates to religious and priestly life. All these missionary settlements are located in the *préfectures* of Bouar and Bozoum, in the diocese of Bouar, in north-western Central Africa, not far away from Cameroun and Tchad.

The area is in the north-west of the Republic, where sango is the dominant language. French is used in schools and administration. The prevailing activity is agriculture which, however, is far from optimal efficiency in exploiting the available resources. Land is tilled only during the rainy season, using traditional methods aimed at a production geared to mere local consumption, or little more. Produce includes manioc, maize, peanuts, sweet potato, French beans, sesame, millet and rice. The meagre fare is supplemented by some venison, fish and stock farming (goats, pigs, hens and sheep). Cattle raising is mostly practised by seminomadic mbororo herdsmen.

The plough has been introduced by the early Missionaries and it has spread thanks also to the

agency of the ACADOP, a German-Central African aid organization. The latter has also carried out development projects such as the drilling of wells up to 70-90 metres deep. As elsewhere, the Missions have linked the work of evangelization to projects of human advancement, to support development and face the various needs arising over time. The Carmelite Missionaries have carried out a considerable number of projects, involving education, irrigation, health, transport, services, agricultural development. Each project is under the special responsibility and management of one or more of the missionary Fathers.

Development projects by the Ligurian Carmelite Missions

Village schools at Bozoum and Baoro

State education in the Central African Republic is wholly wanting. The number of schools in relation to the number of inhabitants and villages is totally insufficient. The percentage of children starting attendance at school is 56%, of which only 17% reaches the end of the primary cycle. Women are nearly all illiterate. The average teacher to learner rate is one to sixty or seventy. Often, especially in the first classes, a schoolmaster must teach more than hundred pupils. At the Bozoum secondary school, in school year 1998-1999 there were five teachers to 900 pupils.

This is the situation in terms of numbers. In reality the state of affairs is much worse as these schools fail to work at all. After three years of interruption due to unpaid salaries (the so-called *années blanches*) and the consequent nullification of all courses, in 1996 the government started to make some advance payments to teachers, and teaching started again, though without much enthusiasm. Then, in the course of 1997, such handouts were discontinued at first, then resumed, with the result that school year 1997-1998 began late and ended late too (in September 1998 no final results were yet known). School year 1998-1999 began in December and in a way or other came to a close; in Bangui, many parents supported the self-assessment by themselves to the tune of 300 CAFs a month in order to pay the teachers.

Financial problems are the basic reason for the lack of teaching personnel: the State cannot hire more teachers having no money to pay them. Sometimes teachers leave their post for weeks on end to seek alternative earnings. Overcrowded classes and a very low level of teaching are the inevitable outcomes. After one year at school, children cannot yet read and write; at the end of the primary course they know almost nothing of history, geography, sciences, very little arithmetics and absolutely nothing as to music or drawing skills. This situation is made more serious by the lack of books: they are difficult to find and, when they are available (in the capital Bangui only), their cost is exhorbitant for the average purse: 3000 to 4000 CAFs, equivalent to a week salary of a manual worker. The courses in all subjects, including those at secondary level, are written on the blackboard and transcribed on copy-books.

School equipment is virtually non existent. School desks are rare, and pupils go to school carrying a stool from home to sit on. Maps, libraries, gymnic equipment are unknown. If the Centre of the space economy, *i.e.* the national capital, has little, the Periphery, *i.e.* the surrounding *brousse*, has nothing at all: school buildings are straw huts, tree trunks are used as school desks, no books are to be had, and it is difficult even to get copy-books and pens. A small blackboard is the only teaching equipment. In view of the general poverty, no improvement is foreseeable in the short term.

Attendance is a major problem in itself. In this area the concept of school was introduced by the Missionaries (one century ago for the first time in Central Africa, 65 years ago in Bozoum). Most adults do not understand the value of formal education and do not see positive results stemming from it. On the contrary, they perceive all too well what, under their viewpoints, are the negative outcomes, such as lack of interest in work in the fields and disobedience, because children would feel a kind of superiority on their illiterate parents. As to the girls, instead of beginning from their early years to work at home and in the fields, they are seeing as wasting their time, doing things of no practical value, and, above all, no longer accepting to behave submissively.

This mentality is quite evident when kids are enrolled at school. Many parents state they have no money to register their children, although the school tax is minimal (4,500 CAFs per year). Others enrol the males but not the females. Most parents, after enrolment, pay no further attention to the school necessities of their children, and do not care to provide them with clothing and even food. Few of them purchase copy-books and pens, almost no one keeps in touch with the schoolmaster on the progress of their children. At the season of mushrooms, of hunting, of caterpillars, the kids play truant for weeks on end.

Faced with a collapse of the educational system, the government, in January 1997, entered into an

agreement with the Bishops' Conference of the country in order to improve the quality of teaching and the diffusion of education.

The Carmelite Missions at Bozoum and Baoro started, in 1982-83, a teaching project in cooperation with the village chieftains and with the State school authority for fundamental education. This work is taking place in the *brousse, i.e.* in the most disadvantaged area. In these years thousands of children have been able to get some education, which the State would have been unable to provide, for lack of funds, there being no State schools in the villages at all. The Missions provided the basic wherewithal for the functioning of a school, that's to say a teacher every 30 kids in each class, with a complete set of basic didactic material: a book for every pupil and a writing desk. Teaching is taken very seriously and schoolmasters undergo an inspection every fortnight, thanks to the cooperation of a Central African inspector, a retired teacher who has been provided with a motorbike to travel from one school to another. In 1998-99, twelve schools were kept in as many villages of Bozoum, plus a private school in the Mission itself, with 144 children and 7 schoolmasters, while at Baoro three villages are served, with 47 children.

In each village the Mission organizes classes and teaching syllabuses only after contracting a "cooperation protocol" with the Parents' and Pupils' Association of the village. Such protocol provides for the finding and managing of a hut for the Association, and undertakes to give the teacher food and lodging, to send the children to classes and to enter into an agreement of cooperation with the schoolmaster sent by the Mission. The salary of the latter varies from 23,000 to 30,000 CAFs a month, according to professional seniority. During the three summer months, half salary is paid. The Association collects an enrolment tax of 1000 CAFs a year for children in the nursery school and 1500 CAFs in the primary school. The Mission pays for the stationery, the books and all teaching aids. Moreover, it refunds to the Association the schoolmaster's salary, and receives from it the enrolment taxes.

Books remain the property of the Mission. They are not to be taken home, but left in class, in order to protect them from being spoiled or destroyed. In this way, they will be available next year for the incoming pupils. The school year runs from end September/October to July; the school week from Monday to Friday. Timetable and subject matters are rationally organized. The primary cycle includes six years, with the following sub-jects: 1st year, notions of Sango and French, arithmetic, acting, catechism, reading; 2nd, Sango, French, reading, arithmetic, catechism; 3rd, grammar and syntax, writing skills, use of the dictionary, arithmetic and geometry, elements of literature, natural science, catechism; 4th, like the previous year, plus history and geography of Central Africa; 5th, like the previous year, plus health education, civic education and notions of agronomy; 6th, like the previous year, at a more advanced level. The cycle ends with an external examination, after which the successful candidate is awarded the Primary Elementary Certificate, opening access to the secondary school.

The teaching staff in 1999-2000 included 56 teachers, all of Central African nationality and provided with a secondary school diploma (*Licée* or *Institut technique*), having a teaching experience ranging from 2 to 25 years. Some of them formerly taught in State schools, but have opted to teach in the missionary schools. Before the opening of the school year, a stage lasting three full weeks is organized for the teachers at the central Mission in Bozoum, aiming at pedagogical education and the updating of teaching techniques. Shorter stages lasting one weekend are held during the school year at two month intervals. Textbooks are discussed, as well as teaching methods, complementary practical activities, relationships with pupils and parents. These sessions are held by the pedagogic counsellor of the State schools, often in the presence of an inspector of the Public Education Department of Bangui. Teachers have a library of about 2000 volumes at their disposal, for consultation, constantly updated by the missionary Fathers, besides audiovisual material.

The Sango language primer

To ease reading to the pupils of the first class, the Missionaries have developed, in the early half of the 1990s, a primer for the local language, the Sango. Nothing of the kind had existed before. Earlier, teaching had been in French from the first year. The State has followed suite, opting too for the teaching of Sango at the beginning of the primary cycle. As in many other cases, the Missionaries are being the agency for the preservation of local languages and cultures threatened by dominant European languages. The pedagogic advantages are also quite evident: country pupils who initially only know the local speech may thus be more gradually introduced to the learning of the European language, French in this case.

The Centre for the advancement of women at Baoro

The human and Christian promotion of a Mission needs, among other things, the development of material structures. To fulfil these ends, the Carmelite Missionaries opened in 2001 a Centre for the advancement of women at Baoro. This is a continuation of a previous cooperative activity, which received government acknowledgement in 1998.

In 2001-2002, 27 girls, divided into two classes, attended the Centre; in 2002-2003 attending girls had risen to 53, divided into three classes. Primary school licence is a requisite for admission. Pupils are required to pay an enrolment fee of 1500 CAFs. The Mission provides all necessaries to run the Centre, *i.e.* teachers (all Central Africans except two Italian Carmelite nuns) and equipment (textbooks, sewing machines, fabrics, wool skeins, material for cutting and sewing, stationery, physical exercise equipment).

Taught subjects include: pediatric nursing, knitting, embroidering, cutting and sewing, pastoral theology, moral theology, French, history, geography, mathematics, natural science, physical education. The school year begins early in October and closes at the end of June. Classes are held both in the morning and in the afternoon, shunning the hottest hours around midday. At the end of the school year, pupils display and sell many of the textiles, clothing and embroideries they have made: proceeds are largely used to purchase new materials.

Updating stages for continuing education are held for the teachers of the Centre, as for those of the Primary school. They also have free access to the library and the audiovisual equipment. The Centre has proved extremely effective and, as the advancement of women and their social freeing from the weight of traditional powerlessness are important aims in themselves and for the promotion of development, the most effort is spent to introduce similar initiatives in all major villages of the area. For this purpose, it is foreesen to employ as teachers the girls educated at this early Centre.

The seminary school at La Yolé

Several hundred pupils attend the seminary school, due to the always uncertain situation of the State schools. The school offers two classes of the *Cours Moyen* (the last two classes of the primary cycle), then the Middle School (4 years) and finally the *Licée* (three years). Teachers are mostly Central African, though some are Italian, both Carmelite sisters and lay people. It is not easy to find well prepared native teachers, but the Mission is working by continuing education to promote their human formation and update their teaching skills.

Only a small part of the pupils actually enter holy Orders, but the others are well prepared to perform their future duties as citizens, employees and fathers of a family. The students of this school achieve excellent results in the State (external) examinations, with a rate of failure of 0% (zero per cent), against an average rate of 80 to 85% in the country as a whole.

Such results are only achieved by means of care and dedication to the tasks at hand, offering pupils an education as complete as possible, helping them in their human and Christian choices. State programmes are followed accurately, adding something more which the State does not contemplate: art education, necessary to educate the young to an appreciation of beauty.

The vocational schools at La Yolé

Therefore, at the seminary school at La Yolé, a ceramics school has been added, thanks to the efforts of some lay cooperators of the Missionaries. Clay deposits have been discovered nearby, and an oven has been provided, largely thanks to the contributions of the association "Talità Kum" of Desio (which supports also the dispensary and the dental clinic). The kids are enthusiastic about the opening thus offered them; and the school can be regarded as an early educational initiative granting an opportunity to develop native decorative skills.

Targeted educational projects are essential for human promotion of the poverty stricken populations of large parts of Africa. These have to start at grassroot level, providing the basic skills without which any further technical education could not be built. For this reason, at Baoro, a school of carpentry has been opened in 1986, and in 1994 another school for training in mechanical skills. The teaching staff is formed by a director and two technicians, one Italian, another from Ruanda, as the general policy is to employ African workers wherever possible, replacing it with non-Africans only when suitable local, or anyway African, technicians are not available.

Also, a basic mechanical workshop was established. It is run by an Italian technician, and it is the only school of its kind in the whole of Central Africa. Courses last an entire school year: the first six months are devoted to theoretical and practical teaching of general mechanics, electrome-

chanics and the basics of physics, with tests and simulations applying the notions being taught; and four months of practical activities on Toyota, Nissan and Suzuki engines. At the end of the year, the students who have passed the final examination can stay further at the school for training to get the driving license. Each student must be married, as a guarantee of his morality and stability. A Carmelite nun holds bi-weekly meetings with the students' wives to teach them personal health practices, children nursing, cutting and sewing.

All students licensed by the mechanics school have found a job, so this enterprise has become exceedingly popular, and has soon obtained official recognition by the government in 1995, so that the licenses it releases have full legal value. Since 1999-2000 the number of accepted students grew from 12 to 40, the school became biennial, adding the teaching of basic chemistry, electrochemistry, properties of materials, and practical teaching on car-body repair. An upgrading of motoring skills is exceedingly necessary in Central Africa, where vehicles, both private cars and lorries, as well as public buses, are very dangerous due difficult roads, lack of maintenance and shortage of suitable spare parts.

Health problems and the wells project at Bozoum

Water is as a severe problem in Central Africa, especially from February to April, in the latter part of the dry season, when streams, and many of the wells, even to the depth of 10 metres, run dry. People use to drink water from polluted pools, while the need of precautions such as water filtering and boiling has not impressed the common mentality, so that infective diseases are rife. In 1983 the municipality of Bozoum has repaired a water supply line from a point of the river Ouham three kilometres away: the line, however, serves mostly public buildings and those of senior public officials, plus some merchants or private citizens of means and good connections. Nearly all people have to walk far in quest of water. There are no more public fountains. Private citizens provided with water exploit their privilege by selling the precious fluid to less fortunate fellow countrymen. Water has become one of the rarest commodities.

The Bozoum Mission had initially being linked to the supply lines of the National Water Society, but the latter went out of business, and the Mission had to pump water from the Koyali stream: a reddish water which had to be filtered a great many times. In 1983, the Mission obtained from the team "Sangha Forage", linked to the Swedish Baptist Mission of Berberati (exclusively engaged

in drilling wells) the support for drilling a well and equipping it with an electric pump. The water thus found at a depth of 32 metres was finally clear and drinkable. Town water had to be used only in case of emergency, such as if the pump blows out because of lightning. In 1988 the Mission installed a new hand-driven pump in Bozoum town, in the Karré Betara neighbourhood, close to St. Anthony's chapel, so that most of the town can now enjoy this service.

The pure water thus obtained has considerably improved the health of people living in the area. Such is the importance of water supply that a project for drilling about sixty wells, to be equipped with hand-driven pumps, in the Bouar diocese has been proposed by the Capuchin friars of Genoa, also deeply involved in Missions in Central Africa. The Carmelite Mission at Bozoum took charge of ten of these wells, and started promoting the initiative between 1990 and 1991, at Bozoum and eight neighbouring villages, to make people aware of the need and usefulness of the project.

This preliminary work was carried out by two Central African rural extension officers, usually involved in health projects. Village committees headed by the local chieftain were set up, with the task to provide for maintenance, by choosing a man in charge for the purpose, as well as to collect money to create a maintenance fund. This had to be planned in advance, as most people in less developed countries have little inclination to maintenance work (May 1981). Drilling was entrusted to the Sangha Forage group. The wells have become focal points in the lives of the communities: from morning to late in the night, long queues of people gather around them carrying vessels of any kind.

The medical and dental dispensary at Bouar-La Yolé and the provision of medicines

This is an initiative born out of the heroic spirit of sacrifice of an Indian Carmelite nun, sister Payton, who for years has been treating the sick in a mud hut. Eventually, in 1995, the parish of Immaculate Heart of Mary in Cuneo, North-West Italy, collected the necessary sum for building a dispensary. At a short distance from the seminary at La Yolé there were the ruins of a colonial building, a house of about 100 square metres, lacking the roof, doors and windows, but with the walls still standing and in comparatively good conditions.

What was left of the building was thus restructured, adapted and "fortified" to prevent robberies and plundering of the installations. It has a

large entrance hall, used by sister Payton for medical examinations, two rooms making up the dental surgery (equipped with an electric generator, and a hydraulic installation with specific components for a dentistry apparatus), a toilet and a verandah used as a waiting room. The new dispensary was ready on January 26, 1996, and was immediately filled with patients, especially young mothers with their children. While sister Payton catered for general medicine, the dental surgery was staffed by two Italian voluntaries, Doctor Angelo Sala and his wife Stefania Figini, a licensed orthodontist, both from Desio (Lombardy), aided by a Central African male nurse undergoing training.

Many patients of the dental surgery come from distances of 70 or 80 kilometres. There were no dentists in Bouar, prior to this initiative, although this is the second town of the Central African Republic. The nearest dental surgery was in the capital Bangui, 400 kilometres away. Patients at the Bouar-La Yolé are required a fee in accordance with the national list of rates. The fee does not by any means cover all expenses, but provides an opportunity for some assumption of responsibility by the population.

In addition to these initiatives, crate-pharmacies are being provided for use in the villages. This is a customary arrangement used by Missionaries in Africa: true pharmacies in the European sense being too expensive, a simple crate is divided into compartments by means of shelves and filled with medicines for the native population. It is the best solution allowed by circumstances for countries in which the alternative is to be left with no medicines at all.

A new bridge on the Koyali stream at Bozoum

The town of Bozoum is cut in two by the Koyali stream, which forms a marsh just below the Mission. In this very area, during the years 1970-75, rice cultivation was attempted by the Chinese of Taiwan, as a demonstration to the inhabitants: for this purpose, the stream bed was lowered to lay down the paddy field. Later a new paddy field was laid 7 kilometres from the town, and the old abandoned field in the centre of town has become a marsh. To worsen the situation, the stream bed has been invaded by heaps of rubbish thrown down by the inhabitants. The upshot is that, during the rainy season, the stream floods the town, easily destroying the mud huts. The area, called GPN, formerly the seat of a pioneer Israeli association for agricultural development, is sparsely populated and has largely become a transit place for people going to work from the centre of town

to the plantations bordering the road to Bouar.

The passage over the stream was therefore of crucial importance, there being no bridge, but a simple covering of tree trunks. The Mission took therefore upon itself the task to build a bridge. After obtaining the necessary permits from the authorities, and gathering funds, construction began in February 1990. The bridge is 35 metres long, in massive brickwork and iron, with three bays. Usually the water level is so high as to overflow the bridge only during one or two weeks a year, at the peak of the rainy season. This is a considerable result towards making the crossing of the Koyali secure.

The restructuring of the Bozoum jail

The old jail of the sub-prefecture of Bozoum dated back to colonial times, and was a dilapidated building, devoid of sanitary services and of water supply. For several years the administration of the sub-prefecture had asked the Mission for help, as the finances of the Central African State were unable to shoulder the task of restructuring the jail. The inmates, usually ranging from twenty to forty, are seldom fed by the State, and are obliged to support themselves by casual work.

Fund raising for restructuring the old jail has been no easy task but, thanks to the contribution of an anonymous donor, it has been possible, eventually, to entrust the job to a local enterprise, headed by a Bouar merchant, Abbo Bello. Thanks to a donation by another friend of the Carmelites, a well has been drilled alongside the jail, in order to provide water to the inmates and the warders, and also to the surrounding population. The whole was completed in 2001. It was solemnly opened in 2002 at the presence of the highest administrative and judicial authorities, who thanked the Mission for their excellent work. Father Marcello Bartolomei, the Superior of the Mission, then answered, expressing the continuing readiness of the Mission to serve the poor, and also calling attention on the respect due to the prisoners in application of the Charter of Human Rights.

Unfortunately, 40% of the people locked in jail in the Central African Republic are accused of witchcraft, in the sense of evil eye deemed responsible for sicknesses or death. These absurd beliefs, rooted in envy, superstition or conscious revenge against an enemy, sometimes lead to persecutions or even to summary executions, once the alleged author of the spell is named. As a consequence, the jail is often used as a refuge to prevent a lynching.

The Centre for agro-pastoral education and development at Bouar-La Yolé

In the continuing attempt to promote human development, the Mission of La Yolé started in 1986 the building of a Centre for agro-pastoral education and development. After a long growth, the Centre reached a considerable size, with a total area of 250 hectares, entirely owned by the Mission, of which 10% used for cultivation and the rest for grazing. The built up area covers 20,000 square metres, of which 8,000 covered. These are occupied by classrooms, the dining hall, two dormitories, services, a common hall, the church, stores and warehouses (about 1000 square metres) for processing and storage of produce and equipment, barns for the animals (about 500 square metres).

The Centre is attended by 70 students ranging in age from 10 to 21 years, mostly from Bouar and surrounding villages. They live in the Centre and a wholesale formation is guaranteed to them, including education up to secondary school diploma (*Licée*), completed by theoretical and practical training in agriculture and stock raising. Moreover, whole families are hosted at the Centre to give them an opportunity to learn new skills and for general instruction.

The practical objectives of the Centre are the following: (i) to offer a kind of technical education that may enhance the professional skills and the agricultural vocation of the rural population, linking study with practical agricultural work in order to help the students to achieve self-sufficiency in food production; (ii) to spread the growing of new products having a high nutritional value (citrus, vegetables, fruit trees, maize, rice) in order to enrich and diversify the local diet, based exclusively on manioc or cassava; (iii) to spread stock raising; (iv) to improve agricultural techniques, introducing new and more suitable tools, including the yoke for use with cattle at work, and aiming anyway at the optimization of available resources; (v) to oversee the marketing of produce; (vi) to promote communal work among the students, in view of the organization of small agricultural cooperatives.

As it is evident from the summary elements of climatology sketched above, agricultural work in the Central African Republic must inevitably be conditioned by the two seasons, dry and wet. In order to obtain, during the dry season, the necessary water for the production of vegetables and for the survival of fruit trees, a dam has been built by the Mission on the Boboro stream. It is about 50 metres long, with a canalization of about 700 metres. Two wells have also been drilled to obtain drinking water for people and cattle.

At present, the effort of the Centre is mainly aimed at the improvement of the local diet, through plantations of maize, sorghum, rice, soy and other pulses; such plantations are in the process of being enlarged, while the cultivation of manioc, whose nutritional value is very low, is going to be reduced. The production of other local food, plants such as peanuts, sweet potatoes, gombo and other pulses, is worth preserving. A part of the land is allotted to the production of European vegetables, such as green salad, French beans, tomatoes, aubergines, courgettes. It is also planned to extend the orchard, up to 4 hectares, especially with tropical plants, such as mangoes, avocados, papayas, bananas, guavas (*Psidium guajava*) and citrus (lemon trees, orange trees, grapefruit trees). In order to achieve better quality fruits, new crossbreeds and grafts are being tested, with the technical assistance of *Cooperation Française* of Bouar, an organization that has been carrying out agricultural experimentation since colonial times. Thanks to the assistance of this organization, by crossing three species of herbaceous plants (*Braccaria, Xiloxantes, Panicum*), a new type of fodder particularly drought resistant has been obtained.

The Centre has two tractors and a considerable array of other equipment, supported by a mechanical carpentry workshop for the necessary maintenance. It is completed by a system of stock raising (milk cows, sheep, goats, pigs, hens), developed in order to achieve food self-sufficiency for the complex, as well as to stimulate and improve livestock raising outside, as this is usually very limited and neglected. The Centre gets technical and veterinary assistance from the neighbouring veterinary clinic at Bouar. Responsible of the Centre is Father Aurelio Gazzera, aided by two Carmelite missionaries, ten local teachers from Bouar and seven workers that provide unskilled labour and guardianship.

The stock farming cooperative at Boyele-Bozoum

A stock farming cooperative has been established since 1997, thanks to the financial support of the Association "Aid to the Third World", which has enabled the 22 members of the cooperative to fence a large area, sufficient as a pasture for 50 cows. The cooperative is staffed by Central African herdsmen, and is has been provided with veterinary equipment and the necessary medicines.

Jubilee Project 2000: the pilot centre for agro-pastoral formation at Bangui-Bimbo

A new important Centre for the human promotion of Central Africa has been started in 1999 under the direct supervision of Father Anastasio Roggero (Roggero 2002), after consultation with an agronomist from Cameroun, Dr. Maturin Tchatat. The Centre is located in the south-western periphery of the national capital Bangui, with an estate of 40 hectares. Its main activity is the production and marketing of palm oil for human consumption. Palms grow easily in the local environmental conditions, but they are not cultivated, except in very few plantations owned by the State. The very little oil available on the market is imported from Congo and is therefore very expensive.

The pilot centre is spiritually linked to the Year 2000 Jubilee: it aims to provide an example to be followed for the upgrading of the conditions of the many poor farmers of Central Africa. It includes three blocks of buildings: Block 'A' for classrooms, equipped with audiovisual aids and library, meeting room, dining room, two dormitories and services; Block 'B' with stores and sheds for processing and storage of produce and equipment; and Block 'C' with barns for the animals.

Through Dr. Tchatat, pre-germinated seeds of oil palms were imported from Cameroun, where their cultivation is well established. In 2002 the Centre was fully operational, with 4000 oil palms, plus 3000 palms in the nursery. A plantation of this kind can produce 3 tons of oil per hectare after only 3 to 4 years, and up to 14 tons after 10 years, and with good fertilizing production can soar up to 40 tons per hectare. In a small section of the estate (about 3.5 hectares) an orchard has been planted, and a further small section is used for the production of European vegetables. A well 60 metres deep has been drilled. Stock raising is also carried out, to ensure self sufficiency to the cooperative managing the Centre.

To be admitted to the cooperative, the partners must be introduced by a priest or nun, have to be married (as a guarantee of maturity and stability), and it is expected they buy at least one share of the cooperative (the cost of a share is 30,000 CAFs). They undergo intensive professional training, including courses on the use and marketing of palm oil, on water and natural resources management, on mechanics and vehicle maintenance, on administration and accounting.

The educational objectives to be achieved are the following: (i) to offer a level of theoretical and practical formation for the farming profession, through the study of agricultural and manual activity, in order to let students achieve self-managing abilities; (ii) to spread the cultivation of new produce having a high nutritional value (oil, citrus, vegetables, fruit trees) in order to enrich and vary the local diet, hitherto unhappily based, as noted above, on the nutritionally poor manioc; (iii) to spread stock raising (making use also of the excellent fodder obtained from the scrap of palm oil production); (iv) improve agricultural techniques introducing new and more suitable equipment; (v) look after the management of produce (from storage to marketing and sale); (vi) to boost the communal cooperation among the partners.

Conflict problems

In spite of all the efforts of the Missionaries, the projects described above have been severely impaired by local political mismanagement and conflict problems. In that area, as in the rest of the country, the absence of the State and the curtailment of international aid have brought about widespread decline in every sector of production. For some years now, State finances have been unable to cope with the necessary expenses to pay the salaries of public officials and to make the various services work properly. Impoverishment and stagnation have been the inescapable outcomes. Notwithstanding promises of reforms by politicians, distrust towards the institutions has grown year after year, with frequent uprisings and attempted coups d'état under President Ange-Félix Patassé. The French Army withdrew, after dismantling its own bases, and peace-keeping was entrusted to UN troops, mostly made up by Africans and deployed only in the capital Bangui. After that, any hope of law and order has vanished.

On the 25th of October 2002, civil war broke out between the supporters of former Army Chief of Staff François Bozizé and the troops loyal to President Patassé, supported by the Libyans and the Congolese rebels led by Jean-Pierre Bemba. After the abortive coup d'état in the capital Bangui, the rebels, strongly supported by Muslim mercenaries from Tchad, slowly gained control of most of the northern and western areas of the country. They destroyed the missions and murdered several priests wherever they had the mastery. When they reached Bozoum on January 18, 2003, they plundered it utterly, then sounded the bells to summon the Christians and beat them savagely. A few youths who were trying to put some order in the mission were beaten nearly to death. The rebels took the liturgical vestments and

church plate making them objects of public mockery (Bartolomei 2003).

Thirty years of labour have thus been destroyed in a single month. Damage is huge and all activities, both pastoral and social, have brutally come to a halt. Eventually, on March 15, 2003, general Bozizé took Bangui and seized power, proclaiming himself new President and obliging Patassé, who was out of the country at the time, to give up his return. Bangui was plundered for two days. When the turmoil began to abate, the new President has started to lay down the foundations of a political agreement, while the country is exhausted both by the previous misgovernment and by the civil war. The Missionaries, after having had to flee to avoid being murdered by the Muslim rebels, have now returned to their appointed posts to reconstruct what has been destroyed, even if that will entail severe sacrifices. It was hoped that the change of government will ensure law and order, enabling a fresh start in the development of the country. However, the new ruling clique has made known that it was unable to control the armed bands and suggested that the Missionaries should pay the outlaws for protection.

Besides the all-important work of evangelization, the Missions have an essential role to play, by promoting development in close touch with the population, starting at the grass-root level, and thus preparing a set of basic skills upon which the people themselves may, at a later date, build up their own original path of development, in harmony with their culture and inclinations. A scandalous silence reigns in the materialistic West on these activities and their all too frequent sufferings, and of course no protection is to be expected from secularized societies. But the Missionaries do not stand alone, since, through their world-wide labours, they expect a reward that the material world cannot give.

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Massimo Arcangeli

Global hands on the planet: semantics of a "liquid" power

Riassunto. - Mani globali sul pianeta: la semantica di un potere "liquido"

Omogeneizzazione e standardizzazione sono i caratteri più evidenti dell'attuale processo di globalizzazione, vista peraltro da una certa prospettiva politica come un processo neocoloniale di appiattimento culturale sugli standard di MacDonald e di una comunicazione per via elettronica e televisiva eccessivamente a senso unico, nella quale la lingua inglese minaccerebbe di causare l'estinzione delle altre lingue, anche europee. Secondo un altro punto di vista, invece, il flusso "liquido" veicolato da Internet potrebbe finire per "coagularsi" e la dominanza dell'inglese potrebbe implodere, analogamente al latino, gradualmente sostituito dalle lingue romanze. In Europa potrebbe affermarsi così una lingua artificiale. Come in passato si era provato con l'esperanto, oggi si prospetterebbe la possibilità di un ipersemplificato "europanto". Tali ipotesi appaiono quanto meno utopistiche.

This contribution intends to examine separately the concepts that, more than others, express the sense of what is, at the present time, universally known as globalization, i.e. the economic-cultural dominion on a world-wide scale that seems more and more unstoppable, and, of course, of its linguistic implications; also in the perspective of a diagnosis, and a reasonable prognosis, of the Italian language and the othersones between the major languages of culture. Along the way that I have decided to undertake it will happen here and there to accompany the discourse with images of works of art, created in the century just passed. The reason for this choice, from my point of view, is not the gratuitous taste to satisfy an aesthetic fancy but the attempt to summarize in the immediacy of the artistic synthesis the value of a reasoning followed in its analytical and more or less articulate developments.

Homogenization and standardization

According to the American sociologist Theodor Levitt, director of the "Harvard Business Review", the globalization of markets, thanks also to the employment of the new technologies, would have by now produced the homogenization of needs. From this derives Levitt's exhortation to the enterprises not to differentiate the offer and to introduce instead one single product at a single price, the lowest possible, in the world-wide market, promoting that product in the same way wherever it is commercialized, and taking advantage everywhere of the same distribution channels. It is the adapted and extreme version of brand serialization, transferred from the consumer-advertising imagination to the production economy, reproduced as it is by who has used it for years without seeing it (neither wanting to see it) ever changing; the supermarket-type serialization (but today we would rather say the shopping-center-type) that Andy Warhol has photo-mechanically fixed in the linear multiplication of the tinned Campbell's Soup (Fig. 1).

On a linguistic level, Levitt's appeal to the market immediately recalls the repeated exhortations to use, in the field of international exchanges, one single language: English. And, of course, it recalls

Fig. 1. Andy Warhol, Campbell Soup cans, New York, Museum of Modern Art.

the consequent actions aimed at favouring a wider spread of this single language. The most advanced forefront of the coalition in favour of homologation is represented precisely by the economic-financial sector, that, if we take for good Levitt's remarks, we should expect more and more unwilling to employ languages other than English in the promotion and sale of the different goods. If those remarks hit the target, the choice of a single language to which entrust the fate of a determined product would fall perfectly, from a market point of view, in with the logic of a standardizing strategy that has simply acknowledged the fact that languages are not so different from goods. Surely this is not a new idea, like not new, and indeed of very old origin, is the idea itself of the convertibility into cash of the linguistic object; an idea that, however, has never appeared before socially and culturally relevant as much as in these recent years and that obviously stems precisely from a more general perspective of a market (cfr. Calvet 2002), in which every single language, like any other consumption goods, is more or less marketable or buyable.

Colonization

"Colonization" is the second word that crosses my mind, called unavoidably into play by all the scholars on the subject. The sociologist Domenico De Masi has constructed on it an entire table structured in ten points, everyone of which delegate to represent a particular type of globalization. The nine following aspects would have to be considered in this idea of "widened" globalization (De Masi 1999, 163 and following):

i) the human exploration of our planet, and, subsequently, of other planets of the solar system, for knowledge purposes and for exploitation of the resources available each time; in this case, precisely the great explorers would be the ones (from Ulysses to Magellan, from Columbus to Gagarin) to incarnate the movement of progressive extension of the territorial areas subject to human control or dominion;

ii) the progressive widening, up to covering completely the earth surface, of the areas of the planet destined to the exchange of goods; it would be possible to provide, as the representatives of this point, both "pernicious" examples (like the slave trade) and "noble" examples (like the exchange of scientific information between research laboratories all over the world);

iii) the aspiration of certain nations to militarily prevail on adjacent peoples and, therefore, gradually on peoples farther and farther away, until extending their will of conquest to the entire planet's surface; some great emperors and similar figures, more or less far back into the past, would

represent examples of this will of dominion on the world (from Cyrus the Great to Charlemagne, from Napoleon to Hitler) and the United States today;

iv) the attempt, carried out by the multinational companies (Coca Cola, Microsoft, Sony, etc.) and by some large professional lobbies (from the American oil tycoons to the Italian designers), to distribute their goods in the markets all over the world;

v) the progressive widening of the reach, or the range of the influence capacity, of the capital of a great enterprise, of the currency of a country or a confederation of States, etc.;

vi) the relocation of industrial production towards areas more and more distant from the countries of origin, with the consequence of going beyond not only the territorial borders, but also the power of single countries each time involved in the operation;

vii) the attempt to spread own ideas (religious, philosophical, political, etc.) everywhere in the world; the Catholic Church with its missionaries, the Enlightenment with the *Encyclopédie*, the present United States with their customs and their cultural models are some possible examples that, according to De Masi, could be given in relation to this;

viii) the institution of authorities, at international level, able to regulate trade between countries, to cope with conflicts and controversies within a logic of a world-wide peaceful coexistence, to promote or to take common initiatives in defense of peace, atmosphere, infancy, human rights, etc.;

ix) the organization, by the great industry, "of multinational machinery aimed at mitigating, through international agreements and exchanges, the dangerous fluidity of global competition" (De Masi 1999, 166).

The tenth aspect contained in the list prepared by De Masi would summarize the meaning of global dominion in its strict sense, i.e. of that particular and very topical globalization by which we commonly indicate a model of colonization that, involving the responsibilities of the world, proceeds according to terms substantially different from what happened in the recent and less recent past. It would be the concurrence of six various factors, still according to De Masi, to make the phenomenon absolutely original to the eyes of those that carefully examine it (see Held *et al.* 1999):

i) the simultaneous presence of all the nine indicators just brought in support of a more generic hypothesis of global colonization;

ii) the *de facto* rule exercised on the world by the United States, that do not conceal the aspiration after continuing their colonial travel beyond the earth boundaries (towards the Moon or Mars);

iii) the real perspectives, after two world wars and forty years of Cold War, of a future political unification on a world-wide scale;

iv) the ever increasing easiness with which goods, people and, thanks to the Internet, data are moved from a place to another in the world;

v) the "lubrication", carried out by the media and the computer science technology, of the "processes of social and cultural unification" (De Masi 1999, 167);

vi) the sharing, by all mankind, of the same fundamental fears (from the nuclear war to atmospheric pollution, from environmental catastrophes to the AIDS; and we could also add the terrorist actions of Islamic origin, the atypical pneumonia, the bird flu, etc.).

Consumption, according to De Masi, takes on the role of "detector and collector of this new, showy form of globalization, that on the one hand transforms the globe into a huge airport, standardized in smells, noises, colours, rituals of its duty-free stores, on the other hand feeds a deep subjectivity, refuses standardization, consumerism and fashion so as to favour more and more discreet and elegant ways of life" (De Masi 1999, 168): elsewhere, even drawing consequences partly different from those that De Masi has reached, and although analyzing the issue from a strictly linguistic point of view, I have substantially embraced this last proposition, noticing that the strong impulse exercised by the global civilization towards a linguistic homologation that sees the English language prevailing at world-wide level is de facto counterbalanced by many more or less strong pressures that move instead (and, presumably, will continue to move still for a long time) towards various directions of a subjectivity nourished by centrifugal forces of varied nature. Those that, for example, seem set upon defending the single dialect varieties those that, in recent years, have been engaged on different fronts to protect national languages, in some ways at war between themselves too in order to gain a place in the sun (see Bollman 2001, De Swaan 2001, and also Calvet 1987), from the threat of that only vehicular model that it would be destined to replace them everywhere.

George Ritzer's analysis gets as well into the perspective of an American supremacy considered under the consumerism and fashion profiles; he has gained support for his theories about the ex-

ponential increase, at planetary level, of fast-food, shopping centres, holiday-clubs, amusement parks and so on. Ritzer (1996) speaks in this regard of mcdonaldization (see also Ariès, 1997/2000, and Barber 1995/1998), that in this way represents a general formula applicable to the field of the catering industry as well as to any other social field (from education to the family, from politics to the food culture) and symptomatic of a standardization that cancels differences and, doing so, acts towards a basic depersonalization. Umberto Bossi has referred to it as well with a recent and well known statement with which he has vividly represented the challenge between the cause of our national language and the cause of the international communication like a clash between the "polenta", civilization and, precisely, the McDonalds civilization.

Not much different from Ritzer's mcdonaldization is the californization of what has talked about, referring to tastes and fashions of the new generations, another expert on globalization such as Kenichi Ohmae, according to whom the values system transmitted by the globalized world would keep by now only a simple trace of the dominant geo-model (California and, therefore, still the United States) and would have instead all the characters of a universal system.

Division

This term as well has not had a great difficulty to find a favourable acceptance by the scholars on globalization issues. Division in the first place, as a result of frictions and conflicts fed by various forces that oppose the phenomenon (as it has been pointed out in the previous section), has been accepted naturally by the same analysts who notice in the globalization process the effects of colonization. "According to this concept, the network of institutions that defines the structure of the new global economic system is not seen in structural terms, but as intentional and contingent, subject to the control of individuals that represent and try to carry on the interests of a new international capitalistic class (...). Considered from an alternative perspective, the 'globalization' is neither unavoidable nor necessary. Like the plans of capitalistic development that have preceded it – modernization, industrialization, colonialism and development – the new imperialism is full of contradictions in the position of generating contrast and resistance forces that are able, and at certain conditions they want, to undermine the process of ac-

cumulation of capital as well as the system from which this depends" (Petras/Veltmeyer 2001/2002, 17).

However, for other scholars, that have put themselves in a different perspective, globalization itself would be the result of a complex interlacement of multi-causal logic, of various impulses, various forces in competition amongst them (to be guided and controlled in order to subordinate them to the development of humanity: compare Griffin/Kahn 1992) and not the fruit of a system of power guided by a dominant logic, that one, for example, of a precise plan of class. A considerable part of them, indeed, thinks that the idea of a division is included in the nature itself of the global civilization. The same alleged American aspirations to colonize the world have found in this way in many cases, within this vision, a partial reappraisal. Jasper Johns, a neo-dada artist, has become the protagonist of an analogous partial restructuring in a famous painting. The perimeter of the American flag, in the mentioned painting (Fig. 2), coincides exactly with the perimeter of the canvas, that, therefore, is not able to oppose to the rule of the represented object any space, however small, able to contain it. However, the "resistances" to that dominion are perceived and come from the inside: from the encaustic technique, that renders the picture (painted on newspaper sheets glued to the canvas with the colour-fields technique) similar to a fresco.

The sharpest and most penetrating reflections on globalization are due, as everybody knows, to the work of one of the gratest contemporary sociologists, Zygmunt Bauman. According to Bauman, "globalization divides as much as it unifies; it divides while it unifies, and the causes of division are the same ones that, on the other side, promote the uniformity of the globe. At the same time as the emerging process of a planetary scale for the economy, finance, trade and information, another process is set in motion, that imposes spatial constraints on them, what we call 'localization'. The complex and close interconnection of the two processes imply that the standards in which entire populations, and different segments within single populations, live, grow different in a drastic way. What looks like an achievement of globalization for some, represents a reduction to the local dimension for others; whereas for some people globalization marks new freedoms, upon many others it falls as an undesired and cruel destiny" (Bauman 1998/2002[6], 4).

Division is also a central element of thought within the frame of the world-system devised by

Fig. 2. Jasper Johns, Flag, New York, Museum of Modern Art.

Immanuel Wallerstein. The world-system, according to the American historian, would represent the logical consequence of capitalist development, that would embrace, in a completely natural way, a global vision and would be composed of a single market subdivided into three different levels corresponding to as many geographic areas: central, semi-peripheral (or semi-central) and peripheral (see Wallerstein 1974-1980/1982, and Wallerstein 1995/1999). In these areas, that cover the entire planetary system, the trans-national mankind moves beyond the borders established by the single States and contributes to giving shape to a life experience in which the concept of distance itself is practically cancelled.

The division of the world into three different spaces (central, semi-peripheral and peripheral) can evidently offer a breach on the possible future scenarios towards which the destiny of the various languages, in relation to their distribution on the globe surface and to the sheer possibility of their survival in the face of English, is projected. A survival that according to someone would be in serious danger and that, precisely because of this, would demand some kind of answer in terms of downright opposition, or at least of a reasonable alternative to the overwhelming domination exercised at the world-wide level by the English language. At the present time, for example, by now it is possible to count more and more numerous side-takings in favour of a *language of guarantee* able to replace English at least in international communication. A *language-bridge* able to oppose

English, in particular, on the two fronts that appear the most exposed to the risks stemming from that supremacy:

i) the political one, that watches the excessive power of the English language as a dangerous offshoot of American imperialism;

ii) the typically linguistic one, that perceives English as a serious threat to the survival of the single national languages.

In recent times, several hypotheses of creation of an appropriate artificial language have been put forward once more, so as to guarantee the establishment of an authentic democracy of communication. It could be the same old Esperanto, of course, set up by Ludovico Lazzaro Zamenhof at the end of the 1800's, like many other artificial languages (mainly based on Latin, supported by French and German, the most widely spoken languages in Europe at the time). Or, within the narrow but decisive Eurocentric perspective, the more recent Europanto invented by Diego Marani, a translator at the General Secretariat of the Council of Ministers of the European Union as well as, for some years now, a novel writer (see the *Nuova grammatica finlandese*, Milano, Bompiani, 2000, that was awarded the Guinzane Cavour Prize, and *L'ultimo dei vostiachia*, Milano, Bompiani, 2002).

Devised almost for fun by its creator, who after having launched it in a column of "brico-politics" on the Belgian weekly magazine "Le Soir Illustré" (on which he has had as well to answer questions expressed in that language by the most zealous

readers), has run a second successful column on the Genevan "Le Temps", Europanto has been in more occasions been picked on precisely by the Esperantists. Compared to the 16 rules of Esperanto, that it is therefore a language that has to be studied, however elementary it may be, Europanto, in the intentions of Marani, should be learned with no need for rules: it would be enough to have a smattering of English and to mix it with the most common international words coming from other languages. People intending to write in this language, asserts its inventor, need only to construct sentences in which there are at least three languages: the rest comes by itself.

Marani himself, that has published a collection of stories in Europanto in France (*Las adventures des inspector Cahillot*, Paris, Mazarine, 1999), explains, in a synthetic and effective piece of writing put on the Internet (EUROPANTO. *From productive process to language. Or how to cause international English to implode*, http://www.europanto.contagions.com/gram.en.html), his model of a new language that, he makes it clear, can however be considered artificial only in part. "Europanto is a mixture of words and grammatical structures borrowed from a number of different languages which anyone of average culture with a basic knowledge of English can understand. But it is not a language, nor is it intended to become one. At least not yet. Europanto is a linguistic code of conduct, a series of guidelines or 'precautions' to be taken if we want to communicate with someone who does not speak the same language as ourselves without using a specific lingua franca". In the same article Marani explains also the reasons that could lead to prefer Europanto to English; whose dominance, at any account, "cannot be challenged. With the exception of a few small areas that have been cut off from the processes of industrialization and globalization, English has become the universal language of our time. Europanto has a different goal. Rather than an artificial language, it is a system for the creation of a new language of the future. It is intended to give voice to the frustrations of the vast majority of people who are forced to use English even though their command of the language is not very good.

This can be achieved by speeding up the process of the internationalization of the English language and by its isolation from the Anglo-American culture. Instead of trying to compete with English, the aim is to cause the language to implode, to destroy it from within. The mechanism is very simple. Nowadays, virtually everyone knows a few words of English and is capable of putting together very simple sentences, but most people are unable to speak the language properly because they do not know all the nuances, the subtle differences in meaning that only a mother-tongue speaker knows. In a conversation in English between two non-native speakers with just a smattering of the language, the register is naturally very low and only the basic message is communicated – often little more than could have been achieved by gesticulating. But what would happen if the two speakers could enrich their vocabulary with words from their own languages or from other important European languages? The worst that would happen is that the level of understanding would remain the same. If, however, the words used were similar to ones in the other persons language or were somehow recognized, then their mutual understanding would be enhanced. This is the mechanism on which Europanto is based.

The structure is essentially English, but the words are borrowed from other languages and, if necessary, transformed to make them easier to understand. Imagine, for example, a French speaker and an Italian speaker who have to communicate in English even though their two languages are very similar. If the two of them were to add words from their own languages, they would almost certainly find it easier to understand one another. The result would be a kind of English contaminated with words and forms borrowed from other languages, i.e. Europanto – or rather one of the many possible Europantos".

Surely, it could not lack, at this point, an example of Europanto. Marani gives it in the version of a text written up by Belgian readers and example of "a Dutch-German-French variant of Europanto"; a version, however, not devoid of others (besides the French) Romance linguistic elements:

Aquello augusto postmeridio, Cabillot was in seine officio un crossverba in europanto solvente. Out del window, under eine unhabitual sun splendente, la city suffoqued van calor. Zweideca vertical: "Esse greco, esse blanco und se mange", quatro litteras. Cabillot was nicht zo bravo in crossverbas. Seine boss le obliged crossverbas te make ut el cervello in exercizio te keep, aber quello postmeridio inspector Cabillot was mucho somnolento. Wat esse greco, esse blanco und se mange? tinqued. May esse el glace-cream? No, dat esse italiano aber greco nicht. Cabillot slowemente closed los eyos und sich endormed op seine buro. Der telefono ringante presto lo rewakened.

"Hallo-cocco! Cabillot parlante!".
"Aqui Capitan What! Come subito in meine officio!".

"Yesvohl, mein capitan!" responded Cabillot out van der door sich envolante.

Capitan What was muchissimo nervoso der map des Europas op el muro regardante und seine computero excitatissimo allumante.

"Cabillot! Nos habe esto messagio on el computero gefinden! Regarde alstubitte!".

As it can be easily noticed the present participle form (*ringante, envolante, allumante, solvente, splendente*) and the modality of formation of the superlative (*muchissimo, excitatissimo*) derive from the relative models taken on by Latin and, therefore, inherited by Romance varieties (to which the formative model for adverbs of manner refers too: *slowemente*); the auxiliary verbs "to be" and "to have" "have been turned into the clearly Latin-based forms 'esse' and 'habe' for the present tense while for the past tense the English form 'was' is used"; the possessive adjectives (*mein, meine, seine*) and most of the prepositions (*aber, on, op, out, und, under, van*) have been borrowed from Germanic languages, whereas for the definite article Marani has mostly made use of the Romance domain (*el cervello, el glace-cream, la city, los eyos* and, in composition, *on el computero, op el muro, out del window*, but also *der telefono, out van der door, der map des Europas*) and for the personal pronoun system (*le obliged, lo rewakened, se mange* vs *sich endormed, sich envolante*) and for the demonstrative (adjective: *aquello augusto postmeridio, quello postmeridio*; pronoun: *dat esse*) a mixed model has been chosen; the termination of preterite tense forms such as *suffoqued, obliged, tinqued, closed, sich endormed, rewekened, responded* has been drawn from English, while "the English verb 'find' is 'europantized' into 'gefinden' for the past participle form by adding the Germanic past form to the English root"; *yesvohl* [sic] e *alstubitte* "are two examples of interjections which, although formed by mixing two Germanic languages, are also widely understood by speakers of Romance languages"; etc.

Marani concludes: "It is clear that great things are going on in the Europanto laboratory and that a new European lingua franca is being created in the most natural way from the magma of multilingualism. Like any living creature, it will contain a number of flaws and contradictions, but, unlike other universal languages, it will be successful because it is being produced from the lowest levels. And just as Vulgar Latin replaced Latin at the beginning of the first century, so Europanto, at the beginning of the third millennium, will cause international English to implode and will prevail over European multilingualism."

This is a quite hasty prediction. Not to mention that, at the state of facts, the comparison with Vulgar Latin and with the conditions which have originally permitted its development do not hold at all.

Massmediatization of experience

For the English sociologist Anthony Giddens, globalization, which would not be simply represented by the creation of a single world-wide market but would also decidedly involve the socio-cultural and political fields (compare Giddens 2000, 74, and in general Giddens 1999/2000), would consist in the "intensification of world-wide social relations that interconnect very far off places, so that local events are shaped by events that are happening thousands of kilometres away and vice versa" (Giddens 1999/2000). A process, that looks a little like the "butterfly effect", thanks to which an event that happens in a certain place of the world is therefore able to condition the course of events, even the farthest ones, that happen at the same time in other places receiving similar conditioning. The electronic media would play a fundamental role within this process; they, allowing the activation of contacts between various individuals independently from the places and the physical times of social interaction, would upset the space-time reference system of those individuals. The space and time categories, as we are accustomed to consider them, would thus appear as images of a "liquefied" modernity (compare Bauman 2000/2002), like the modernity represented by the watches painted by Salvador Dalì (see Fig. 3): hanging or put on uncertain and disturbing surfaces and only partly able to maintain the original solid consistency (compare also Fig. 4).

Therefore, we might end up in many cases perceiving what happens, at a certain moment, even at enormously far away places, as an integral part of our personal experience, equally and even more than local events by which, every day, we are assailed by. At first, the unavoidable reappraisal of the traditional values of our relationships with the surrounding physical world, and, more generally, of the value of belonging to one or the other national community, would have derived. The mass media, in weakening the complex of values, even the symbolic ones, of which the national feeling is made up, might end up in triggering a new process able to favour precisely what, initially, appeared to be particularly threatened by the assault of the global culture: the regional or local particularism. Which basically is what said above commenting on the voice colonialization. However,

Fig. 3. Salvador Dalì, The persistence of memory, New York, Museum of Modern Art.

from the viewpoint of Giddens' thought, the global community would not be the direct consequence of a process of homologation and cultural homogenization, like in most of the theories on the subject, but the effect of becoming aware, by those who take part in the global culture, of the serious risks that nowadays loom over the entire human race. A mankind that tries to take shelter drawing as much information as possible from every, even the farthest, corner of the planet.

The most immediate reflections about language that could be made ensue from the principle of the massmediatization of experience, chosen, as it has just been seen, as the fundamental pillar of the global culture, regards the medium and long range effects caused particularly by the "internetization" of the different languages of culture on the linguistic acquisition and the written/spoken paradigm; whose current transformation, mediated by the use of the web, passes also through the transformation affecting the action of writing itself, that has in the meanwhile become word processing. In fact, who is in front of the computer screen completes a double movement, different from that one, fundamentally "analogue", to which the alphabetic civilization has accustomed us: the continuous, "analogue" movement, by which we operate the mouse, alternate with the discontinuous movement, "digital",

ticked by the pressure exerted each time on the single keys of the keyboard. It is, in many cases, a daily (or nearly daily) practice; no more, as it used to be with typewriting, generally temporary or absolutely occasional. The net and its points: this is what we involuntarily mime when we word processing: the mouse evokes the net, as it is able to reach every point on the screen; our fingers, while hitting the keys, evoke instead the virtual places along which it develops. It is roughly what happens with the pictorial technique of 'dripping', that is, in the realization by Jackson Pollock, an alternation of movements giving the colour coats, that results from dripping the paint itself from a rod positioned over the canvas (compare Fig. 5). Discontinuous, brusque movements alternate with continuous, harmonious movements: with the firstones Pollock makes paint drops fall down on the canvas, that determine as many points, i.e. those on which the drops fall; with the second ones instead, the "thread" that connects those points to one another, prevails on those points themselves.

But another subject, raised by Jakob Nielsen, the most famous American net-philosopher, would deserve being directly connected to the aspect at issue: the danger that the breathtaking increase of information transmission speed, promised since the advent of the Internet (promise, up

Fig. 4. Salvador Dalì, The birth of liquid desires, Venezia, Peggy Guggenheim Collection.

to very recently, substantially kept), meets sooner or later with, or is already partly suffering from, a sharp slowing down. As if the flow of data put in the web, wandering and changeable like a fluid and, therefore, up to now believed unstoppable, was destined to regain the weight and compactness of solids. Not to mention that, together with such slowing down, the message of the mass media is more and more loaded with a low profile of information to which a high profile of the verbal

Fig. 5. Jackson Pollock, One (31), New York, Museum of Modern Art.

material (spent in order to spread it), corresponds. After all, one among the many possible ways, in order to replace a civilization of real *communication* and *information* with a civilization founded instead on the deceits of *emission, declaration* and *disinformation* plotted by the bio-power: "a form of power that regulates society from within, chasing it, interpreting it, absorbing it and restructuring it" (Hardt/Negri 2002, 39).

According to Giannini (2003, 23), "the Empire is the global frame that helps to interpret the new framework of management of bio-power, whose purpose is to absorb the individualities of the subjects and to affirm an international dimension now almost completely lacking mediations between the central dominant paradigm and spatially de-centralized and culturally and politically dominated subjects (...). The powerful and indispensable weapon for the immanence to function is the management of communication and information systems, structured as networks: language and forms of communication, through which the system comes about, are, therefore, key elements in the society of control". Emission is understood as spread of (verbal or non verbal) signals of the most varied kind; declaration is understood as the vehicle for transmission of verbal messages that, afterwards, can be easily "recalled" through the, nowadays more and more widespread, practice of recantation; disinformation is understood as "a tool complementary to the control of social discourse within the bio-political regime" (Giannini 2003, 26).

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Maria Grazia Dongu

Is the English language a useful tool in globalization?

Riassunto

L'inglese è la più diffusa lingua al mondo ed agisce come lingua globale, rafforzando la posizione egemonica degli Stati Uniti. La sua diffusione è ritenuta responsabile dell'estinzione di molte lingue minoritarie, un fatto ritenuto positivo da alcuni in quanto portatore di unità, e da altri considerato invece un fattore di tensione conflittuale. L'insieme dei dati riportati riguardo alla letteratura, al mercato delle traduzioni e all'inglese "cibernetico" di Internet, suggerisce cautela nel trarre conclusioni. La resistenza delle altre lingue è spesso particolarmente forte. Proprio su Internet le lingue neolatine sembrano in ripresa. Inoltre, nel mondo in via di sviluppo, l'inglese subisce profonde alterazioni e mescolanze con le lingue locali. Nonostante ciò, esso continua a funzionare da lingua di collegamento tra paesi, scienziati, intellettuali, diplomatici, commercianti e così via, ciò che lo rende fondamentale come lingua franca, vitale per la gestione del mercato globale. Questo è il motivo per cui i governi dei paesi in via di sviluppo favoriscono l'inglese standard della finanza internazionale, del commercio e della tecnologia piuttosto che l'inglese creolo effettivamente parlato nelle loro culture multietniche.

Introduction

My title might well seem an idle question. It is well known that English is the most widespread language in the world. Contrary to Mandarin Chinese, spoken by the largest number of people but poorly understood outside China, English is native not only to Great Britain, but also to the United States of America, to Ireland, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and the Phil-ippines. Together these countries are home to 322 million of the 6 billion people in the world. Moreover, English is the second language in many countries, such as Nigeria and India, as a result of English colonialism starting in the 16th century. English colonial policy aimed at uprooting native cultures, and the English language proved to be a very efficient tool for the purpose. As Macaulay wrote in his famous *Minute* (1835) in relation to India: "We must at present do our best to form a class who may be interpreter between us and the millions whom we govern; a class of persons Indian in blood and colour, but English in taste, in opinions, in morals and intellect" (cited in Sassi 1995, p. 17). From that time on, it was compulsory for people belonging to the Indian *élite* to be taught in English.

It should be added that English has become an international language, a universal means of linguistic change, which allows people from very distant places to feel part of a global community. We refer, first of all, to the Internet. As Michael Cronin (1988, p. 150) reports, "Current estimates are that 80% of e-mail and data content are in English, a language that is not spoken as either a first or second language by three quarters of the people on the planet." Consequently, people who wish to communicate, trade or get information on the Internet must be able to use and understand at least basic sentences and a limited vocabulary. The more they know, the more advantages they will obtain from their 'navigation' as internauts. Cyber-English, as the most widely-used language online is labelled, is not the only new variety of English. We have air speak, business English and

Euro-speak, used by European bureaucrats in Brussels. Each of them draws on a very specialized English vocabulary, used principally by people living in *English as Foreign Language* (EFL) nations and who were first taught English at school (Mc Arthur in Bolton & Crystal 1987, p. 324).

English is also the most widely-used language for international conferences and diplomatic and business meetings, taking the place held by Latin, Italian and French in past centuries. In 1987, and numbers have risen since then, David Crystal wrote: "Over two-thirds of the world's scientists write in English, three-quarters of the world's mail is written in English [and] of all the information in the world's electronic retrieval systems, 80% is stored in English" (Crystal, cit. in Tomlison 2003, p. 78). In other words, English acts as a global language. In so doing, it contributes to securing America's hegemonic position against all attacks. Imposed on so many nations and people by a strong economic and political power, it strives to perpetuate that system.

The spread of the English language is held responsible for the death of many minority languages and for the homogenization of cultures. In 1998, the UNESCO *Atlas of the World's Languages in Danger of Disappearing* estimated that 3,150 languages were bound to disappear by the turn of the twentieth century and "some linguists claim that a language dies somewhere in the world every two weeks" (Cronin 1988, p. 148). The process started dramatically at the dawn of the modern era, due to the birth of great European nations, and as a consequence of de-colonization in the 19th and 20th centuries. The boundaries of new States were drawn on a map by their former colonizers and included people who belonged to different races and cultures. English was adopted as a *lingua franca* that connected groups which did not share a common language, except the one imposed by the colonial government.

Some intellectuals think that the displacement of all other languages is a positive step in our history, as "we are finally about to become One world, One Government, One Culture" (Weatherford 1993, p. 117. The sentence cited is by J. Tomlison 2003, p. 79). On the other hand, there are those who argue for a multilingual and multicultural world, as they are deeply convinced that "cultural diversity promotes *peace*" (Weatherford 1993, p. 117). In this sense, aggressive nationalist and fundamentalist movements have been considered a reaction to westernization and globalization (Breidenbach & Zukrigl 1998). This last point leads me back again to my title, as it is evidence of the ambiguous function of the English language, which unites and divides, homogenizes and gives rise to differences. My aim is to demonstrate that globalization is hindered by ethnic varieties, and that English helps people to articulate their own identities as part of a global culture, at the very moment it attempts to eliminate their languages and assimilate their otherness. I will restrict my discussion to three main subject areas: Literature, Translation, and Cyber-English.

English or Englishes?

The word Globalization has not yet been precisely defined. It attempts to describe a phenomenon which we are experiencing day by day, and whose ultimate goal cannot be foreseen (Biagini 2004). It certainly refers "to the rapidly developing and ever-densening network of interconnections and interdependences that characterize modern social life." (Tomlison 2003, 2). It is unquestionable that English works as a bridge between people, allowing goods, opinions, images and knowledge to flow freely across territorial boundaries. This fact is thought to cause cultural assimilation with American (or Western) values, and to a certain extent this cannot be denied.

Languages may be considered as symbolic spaces where cultures meet. Going through the *Oxford Dictionary of the English Language,* we can appreciate how much English is indebted to other languages, which gave it new terms and concepts. English is not a monolith, but "currently reflects the background and attitudes of all the groups who have ever used it: the class tensions inside England; the ethnic tensions among English, Scots, Welsh and Irish (which are far from being resolved); residual conflicts between Catholic and Protestant, Jew and Goy; the established rivalry between Britain and America; stresses between English and other languages, as for example with French in Canada and Spanish in the United States; race tensions between black and white in Africa, the Caribbean, the United States and the United Kingdom – and, at the end of the list but by no means insignificant, the built-in Eurocentric bias among the mainly white societies of the ENL nations, setting them apart from the other cultural blocs of Islam, Hinduism, Japan, and so forth." (McArthur, in Bolton & Crystal 1975, p. 335). In other words, the English language has become a place where cultures negotiate words, and in so doing assert their own existence.

As happened to the Latin of the Empire, the

diffusion of the English language led to fragmentation, to hybrid varieties (called Englishes), the result of the miscegenation of forms and terms. The "Creolization" of English in the former colonies testifies to the extreme vitality of languages and cultures which are thought to be on the brink of extinction. By affecting the syntax of the "home variety" (that is, British English), extending its vocabulary and consequently the Western encyclopaedia, old oral traditions such as the Indian one survive thanks to the language of the invader. When Larry Smith speaks of TEIL, the teaching of English as an international language, he wants to stress the fact that travellers and businessmen do link people from distant places, but using different varieties of English. This implies that communication cannot be effective without complex negotiation between knowledge and usages of English. As Thomas McArthur writes, "(...) Indians from Delhi and Madras have to be able to grasp each others' points in English, as well as do business with Japanese and Thais, and make sense to Australians and Turks. The circles constantly meet and mingle, in situations where few have permanent clear-cut advantages, and all have to acclimatize. And this acclimatization is not only linguistic. It is cultural and philosophical as well; world travellers need to be ready not just for unfamiliar accents, grammar and vocabulary but also for special social assumptions, distinct forms of body language, and ultimately different mindsets as well" (McArthur, in Bolton & Crystal, p. 335).

It is unlikely that English will ever eliminate the diversity in the world. Instead, it seems to work as a common medium to express otherness. While speaking to each other in this international language, people define themselves as opposed to other groups and koiné, learning to acknowledge other cultures and to make their own understood (Breidenbach & Zukrigl 1998, p. 23). Culture is not something static, a linguistic, moral and historical heritage, but is continually reshaped by nations, groups and individuals negotiating between global and local values. This work is always in progress and multiculturalism, much more than universalism, seems to be characteristic of the world we live in.

Literature can offer us more evidence of this. Since Salman Rusdie's *Midnight's Children* was first published in 1981, Indian Literature in English has become very valuable on the global market. Rushdie aimed at constructing a new image of India, mixing Bombay street slang and Oxbridge English. In doing so, he created a dialogic

novel which acknowledges that India has a hybrid identity, made up of the heritage of many local situations along with a common colonial past (Gorra 1994, pp. 654-655).

Modern technology has recently allowed young Third World writers, among them Indians, to quickly become well-known all over the world. Regional writers are read by smaller groups, unless translation into English opens the American and Western markets to them. Writing in English means writing to be sold, and to appeal to large audiences which share global values and, sometimes, false images of the East. Arundhati Roy, winner of the Booker Prize in 1997, was accused by many Indian readers of being a slave to the market, and of having painted a picture of Kerala likely to be found in tourist guides. In doing so, she supposedly betrayed her country and renounced "writing back". Postcolonial writers reflect on colonialism and the way it affected the economic, social and political structure of the colonies. Writing in English, they made the point of view of the colonized known in the Western World (On this subject: Ashcroft, Griffiths, Tiffin 1989). However, her inventiveness in manipulating English made Arundhati Roy "a distinctly Indian English voice, one that is at once local and international, of its culture and of the globe (Mandal 1999, p. 26). Like Salman Rushdie, she inserts translations or words borrowed from Malayam into the English text. These borrowings from her native language work as reminders of the impurity of Indian English, the product of the miscegenation of cultures. The use of intertextuality is even more meaningful. Arundhati Roy intersperses citations from masterpieces of English literature, but wastes them by using incorrect pronunciation or intonation, or indulges in childlike plays on words. As Alessandro Monti says: "(...) English is reduced to a nonsensical entity, stressing parody and fun rather than sensible and understandable communication. (...) Arundhati Roy "re-pidgins" English with a vengeance (Monti 1999, p. 384). In other words, English is used to reach global audiences, but while criticizing Western values, questioning their hegemony and showing their relativity.

Reactions to a global and multicultural world are present both in developing countries and in Europe and in United States. The enthusiasts of universalism are in favour of English as a global medium of intercultural communication (Cronin 1998, p. 155). They think that English should not be affected by excessively rapid or radical change, especially as far as the written text is concerned, in order to be an effective international language

(Prat Zagrebebsky & Pulcini 1994, p. 45). On the other hand, many nations try to defend minority languages, thought to be part of the cultural distinctiveness of ethnic groups. Ireland is becoming bilingual thanks to a campaign to save Gaelic from extinction. The ancient tongue is heard in restaurants and shops, and will probably even be spoken in Courts and offices. In 1987, Maori was declared the second language in New Zealand, and as early as 1982, kindergartens where children could learn Maori had been founded. At present, 60% of students learn Maori, and their English is contaminated by Maori words and sentences (Breidenbach & Zukrigl 1998, p. 196). Along the same lines, France expunges anglicisms from its language, coining neologisms to name concepts or objects which were born in the USA. In so doing, it tries to react to a process of anglicization, thought to be a form of imperialism (Breidenbach & Zukrigl 1998, p. 43).

Both of these responses to globalization appear to be wrong. As Michael Cronin says: "Difference does not have to result in the pathology of closure. A celebration of difference can lead to an embrace of other differences, the universalism lying not in the eradication of the other but in sharing a common condition of being a minor other" (Cronin 1998, 156). Bilingualism is the solution to a complex situation: due to the fact that language has become a product to sell on the cultural market, it is also a means of obtaining merchandise and getting information rapidly, as well as being an ideological vehicle. Competence in more than one language will give people the opportunity to mediate between types of knowledge and opinions, and to express their own point of view. The large majority of the world's population is already bilingual. It is quite common for an African to have a good command of six languages, and Europe is trying to cope with globalization by training its students in at least two foreign languages (Breidenbach & Zukrigl 1998, p. 198).

The Internet: has the English retreat been sounded?

Al Gore, coming back from an official meeting in Kyrgyzstan, told us that the President's son, then aged eight, was eager to learn English because "the computer speaks English" (Cronin 1998, p. 150). Using this metaphor, the child was expressing a commonplace. Many scholars have stressed the fact that one has to be competent in English in order to have access to the Internet.

Otherwise he experiences a sense of exclusion, and cannot draw on a large mass of information, especially on scientific subjects. The term Cyber English has been coined to define online English syntax and vocabulary. This language embodies the values of elitist groups. Its frequent use on the Internet excludes whoever is not fluent in it and thus forces him to remain at the margins of the global world and market. In other words: "Non-English speakers have remained the permanent clueless newbies of the Internet, a global class of linguistic peasantry who cannot speak technological Latin. The overt language/classism that shapes the US English advocacy of mandatory English has long been an unstated de facto policy throughout most of the Internet" (Lockard, cit. in Cronin 1998, p. 150).

A global elite recognizes a good command of Cyber English as cultural capital. This leads to a marginalization of other languages, even major European national languages, on the Internet. In this perspective, French, Spanish, Italian and German have become minority languages. Faster translation can slow a process many believe to be unstoppable, in a world where time-to-market constraints are so strong (Cronin 1998, 153).

Minority languages have reacted vigorously against Cyber English hegemony. Funredes is a non-government organization which monitors the presence of Latin languages and cultures on the Internet. Their data reveal that "the relative presence of English on the Web has declined from 75% in 1998 to 50% today (in terms of the percentage of web pages in English)" (available in www.funredes.org). Even the number of users who do not speak English is constantly increasing.

Asia Connect is a Malaysian provider whose purpose is to promote the Internet in its area. It is especially addressed to an Asian audience, and allows Malaysian newspapers and radios to have their own home pages, even if the language used is English. Asia Connect's aim is to offer Eastern users the opportunity to have easy access to scientific and economic information, to trade at greater speed, and last, but not least, to express their own point of view and make it known even in hegemonic countries (Breidenbach & Zukrigl 1998, p. 109). That is why it can be considered a good example of "talking back".

The sum of these, and many other factors has been interpreted as the end of Cyber English domination. Its hegemony seems to be only a transitory phenomenon, and Multilingualism the future of the network. In Daniel Pimienta's words, the Internet might be a striking weapon to assert

national identities and cultural groups and to resist homogenization: "Cyberspace is open to all languages and all cultures: but we must produce content in our own language and which reflects our own culture (...). Each culture must contribute its "storey" to the virtual tower of Babel. Diversity is not to be feared; on the contrary, it is the basis of the capacity of mankind to survive, even as it adapts to new contexts (D. Pimienta, *Put out Your Tongue and Say 'Aaah'. Is the Internet Suffering from Acute 'Englishitis'?*, Consulted 12/06/04. www.funredes.org. Also well-documented: D. Pimienta, *Quel espace reste-t-il dans l'Internet, hors la langue anglaise et la culture "made in USA"?*. Consulted 12/06/04. www.funredes.org).

The translation market: between assimilation and resistance

In *Translations* (1980), Brian Friel portrays the interlingual and cultural conflict between Irish and English people, resulting in the loss of Irish national identity. He sets his drama in 1833 in a hedge-school in an Irish-speaking community in County Donegal. Actors on stage relive the events leading to the drawing up of the first Ordnance Survey map of Ireland, which anglicized Irish names, and to the establishment of the new National Schools, where children were compulsorily taught in English. Hugh, one of the protagonists, beautifully expresses the feelings the two measures kindle in him: "Indeed – he [an English soldier] voiced some surprise that we did not speak his language. I explained that a few of us did, on occasion – outside the parish of course – and then usually for purposes of commerce, a use to which his tongue seemed particularly suited (...). Indeed – English, I suggested, could't really express us." (Friel 1981, p. 23). In saying this, he is drawing boundaries between a practical world, where English must be employed, and an emotional world, where you can live happily using your local language, with your family heritage and ethnic group. He is building a ghetto for his own tongue, and impoverishing it, while trying to defend the Irish. In fact, a language which will not attempt to cope with modernity will not expand its vocabulary, and will renounce naming the new world of the future. However, Hugh's feelings are largely shared by minority language speakers all over the world.

English is considered the scientific language *par excellence*. This is to a certain extent due to the fact that scientists are greatly supported in the United States, and most important research is carri-

ed out there. English has become the international language of the elitist group of scholars, as statistics clearly demonstrate: 80% of conferences are held in English. It has also been stated that this depends on English being a fitter instrument for the modern age than other languages. Michael Cronin argues that English even profited from the progressive mathematicization of scientific knowledge, starting in the 17th century. Mathematics provides scientists with a common language, which can express very complex concepts in very few words. In Michael Cronin's view, this determined "the current hegemony of English as a source language in translation and as a target language in language teaching. The pre-Babelian promise of mathematics is mirrored in *reine Sprache* of English as if, in a sense, the minoritization of all languages becomes the majoritization of one. The condition of mathematical transparency that allows topologists of different nationalities to gather together in a community of understanding around the blackboard or the VDU is the globalizing impulse behind English as the world language." (Cronin 1998, p. 159).

Some scientific essays are vulgarized in order to reach larger audiences. Most of them undergo partial translation. I use the term "partial" because some original words are maintained to convey complex new concepts. Their presence signals the hegemonic position of English and its untranslatability into minority languages, which hints at its being the most useful tool for grasping modern knowledge. Within the symbolic space of the page, English domination is once again proclaimed.

This is in no way surprising: translation proved to be functional to colonial plans and now serves the recent neocolonial projects of transnational corporations. Like translations of scientific essays, advertisements sometimes contain English words even when proposed to a non-native market. In this way, transnational corporations take advantage of language hegemonies to render the advertised object worth having for the anglophone elite and for whoever strives to be coopted by it (Venuti 1998, p. 164).

An unbalanced relationship between languages is also revealed by translation patterns. The world market is dominated by English, and this can be easily demonstrated. According to UNESCO figures, in 1987 half of the global translation output was from English: "The number of translations from English towers over the number of translations made from European languages: around 6,700 from French, 6,500 from Russian, 5,000 from German, 1,700 from Italian. In the geo-

political economy of translation, the languages of developing countries rank extremely low: for 1987 UNESCO reports 479 translations from Arabic, 216 from Chinese, 89 from Bengali, 14 from Korean, 8 from Indonesia" (Venuti 1998, p. 160). British and American publishers translate much less, but prefer to invest in British and American products.

The consequences of this trend on developing countries' native cultures are tremendous. Slaves to the market, indigenous publishers invest in British and American bestsellers, easily sold as they are better known thanks to aggressive worldwide promotion and marketing. As a result, books written in indigenous languages reach only a very restricted audience. It should be added that most of the books translated belong to popular genres, such as the romance and the thriller, which appeal to the reader's imagination, making him part of a fictional world. In that way, Anglo-American values are passed on to indigenous audiences, without being relativized and criticized, as if they were universal values. Thanks to language, cultural dispossesion is achieved.

British and American publishers export translations from the major European literatures, originally addressed to the home market, to India and Africa, where English is the official language. English works as a filter, conveying an Anglo-American canon for foreign literatures. Indian second-hand translators unconsciously transport British and American values into their own country (Venuti 1998, p. 163).

Some British and American publishers have recently shown interest in minority language literatures, translating works from them and putting them on the Western market. Thanks to them, Garcia Marquez is now widely read and appreciated. The influence of his works encouraged experimental writing on the part of American writers. One might conclude that a peripheral community exported its values to a hegemonic country. However, the commercial enterprise was functional to an American project, whose purpose was to revise national literature, saturated by realistic novels. Borrowing Lawrence Venuti's words: "Metropolitan intellectuals have looked to developing countries as sources of cultural and political values that are useful in devising projects at home and indeed in fashioning domestic subjects, their own intellectual identities as well as the ideas and tastes of their audiences." (Venuti 1998, p. 170).

Summing up, translation mediates a partial, consequently false, image of alterity, the one West-ern countries require to construct their own identities, to challenge dominant domestic values hindering change. However, alert translators have found strategies to halt the manipulation of indigeneous cultures through the linguistic transposition of concepts and values into the hegemonic language. The subordinate position every minority country esperiences when its texts are translated into English may be reversed in a process which has been called the minoritization of major languages. Recognizing the hybridity of their cultures, some translators consciously use the English variant which is spoken in their region. In so doing, they affirm their own national identities both as part of, and opposed to, hegemonic Western countries. According to Michael Cronin, this trend will characterize our future: "As a major language like English spreads more and more widely, the phenomenon of heteroglossia is likely to figure even more prominently in discussions on translation and minority languages, and the heteroglossic translation practice of Gregory will become more and more common." (Michael Cronin refers to Lady Gregory, who translated Moliere into Hiberno-English between 1906 and 1926, see Cronin 1998, p. 158).

While statistics demonstrate the domination of English in the translation market, translation itself is a symbolic battle-field between Western and indigenous languages, between English and all minority languages. It creates new identities that both share and reject some hegemonic values. Hegemonic culture is both a winner (it succeeds in imposing its language) and a loser (its language is contaminated and its values questioned) in this battle, proving that globalization does not necessarily lead to homogenization, but is indeed constant negotiation between cultures, thanks to which distinctiveness is recognized and affirmed (Breidenbach & Zukrigl 1998).

A tentative answer

It is now time to answer my initial question. The sum of the data reported suggests caution. It is at any rate evident that English is functioning as a link-language between countries, scientists, intellectuals, diplomats, traders etc. A *lingua franca* understood by large groups is vital in fostering a global market. That is why Third-World governments encourage the Standard English of international finance, trade and technology rather than the English actually spoken in their multiethnic cultures. Referring to Indian English, Dr Jain said:

"(...) we are using English as a window on the world of knowledge. Then it has to be in line with Standard English. Now it is that aspect which is a bit disturbing. There are occasions when Indians are not understood. This is what Mrs Gandhi complained about when she was unable to understand the contribution of an Indian delegate to an international meeting – and the delegate spoke in English (Mc Crum, Cran & Mac Neil 1989, p. 330).

Dr Jain is deeply concerned with the probable break-up of English into mutually unintelligible languages, a fact which would hinder the role of English as an international language and result in a new Babel. However, the development of the English language cannot be controlled by legislation or stopped by the sound advice of intellectuals, politicians and committees. New words coined either at the center or in the peripheral world areas will continue to be proposed to larger audiences thanks to tourism, the Internet, etc. When a particular usage or pronunciation "finds favour or answers a need there will be no controlling it" (Mc Crum, Cran & Mac Neil 1989, p. 351). This process testifies to an inexhaustible negotiation between local and global knowledge and values, which seems to be the true cypher of globalization.

The new usages of English are often generated by ingroups as a code familiar only to initiates. Competence in these codes will ensure admission to these elitist clubs, while ignorance of them will exclude outsiders. In this case, language works as a very effective way of defining a social group or class, as well as nations (Mc Crum, Cran & Mac Neil 1989, p. 347). The spread of English is here fuelled by the outsiders' desire to be coopted by the elite. In this perspective, it is likely that English will continue to work as an international language as long as America's power is undiminished. Conversely, a decline in that power will lead to a serious challenge to English as a world language. Spanish and Chinese might substitute it, as they are spoken by huge populations, and the economic potential of Latin America and China has yet to be completely deployed (Mc Crum, Cran & Mac Neil 1989, p. 341).

The fragmentation of English into new hybrid, locally-functional varieties is a real phenomenon, which cannot be stopped. These new varieties prove to be extremely vital, as they aptly express the new world we live in, composed of both global and local values. As Siaka Stevens, the ex-President of Sierra Leone, stated in relation to Krio, the Englishes born in the former colonies testify to the lushness of local cultures, enriched by the invaders' literatures, ways of life and words: "Once the people chart their own course and know what they are about, they realize that the purpose of education is not to rid yourself of your culture, but to get as much as you can from outside, mix it with your own and get something solid" (Mc Crum, Cran & Mac Neil 1989, p. 321). In Sierra Leone, Standard English and Krio, a mix of Portuguese, French, Yoruba and English, are both spoken, even if in different social situations. Krio is the language of informality and intimacy, while Standard English is mostly heard in public meetings and in contacts with the outside world, the world of international trade.

Sierra Leone appears to be representative of a world-wide trend, which protects English from radical changes in global spaces such as the Internet, but allows distinctive varieties to develop in local situations. In fact, the two levels of English do answer to a special human need of both groups and nations: the need to construct one's own identity as both different and similar to someone else's.

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Luciano Cau

Geographical perspectives on globalization

Globalization is not only a highly controversial concept, able to stir even the most violent debates, as the recurrent protests against the G8 meetings testify, it is also a complex concept, with economic, political, cultural and spatial implications. The analysis of every thread of the concept in isolation from the other, although useful in order to simplify the study of globalization, if carried out to the extreme, undermines its scientific value. The matter of the fact is that each aspect is related to the other: economic factors affect the political ones and vice versa and in turn both influence and are influenced by the cultural aspects of globalization. In turn most aspects have outcomes that affect and shape physical and non-physical spaces at every working scale.

It is necessary a holistic approach to fully understand the complexities and the nuances of this so widespread and far reaching process. Geography is the scientific discipline that more than others has conceptual tools useful to effectively and correctly explore this field of research, although, inexplicably, geographers have not been ready, not just in Italy, to venture in it. This reluctance to take the globalization phenomenon down the earth, to territorialize it, is "quite often due to "philosophizing" attitudes of many geographers hostile to map making and quantitative methods, and lost in 'discourse'" as Pelanda puts it in his contribution to the present volume.

It is a fact that in absolute and relative terms geographers have not taken the lead in carrying out scientific research on globalization. The research centres specifically devoted to globalization are, generally speaking, part of economics facul-

ties (e.g. the Leverhulme Centre for Research on Globalisation and Economic Policy at the School of Economics of the University of Nottingham); but even where the point of view is more spatially oriented, geographers are not particularly numerous (e.g. the CSGR – Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation – at the University of Warwick, the largest of its kind in Europe has staff and associates drawn from the fields of Anthropology, Economics, Law, Politics and Sociology (but no Geography). Besides these academic research centres operate a number of private think-tanks on globalization, and a number of NGO devoted to gather information and data to feed their lobbying activities. In Italy the situation is no better and this special issue of *Geotema* seeks to fill a gap and to kindle the interest and debate within the academic community.

Globalization: a Penelope's web?

As Pelanda in his contribution has shown, there is a wrong belief that globalization has already taken place. As far as the economy is concerned, and particularly the web of commercial flows, it is clear that the majority of trade goes on within, rather than between regional blocks. Most of the inter-block trade, in any case a fraction of the total volume of trade, is polarized on the USA. The same can be said of most other exchanges: tourism, transport, culture.

Some researchers see globalisation as a process that is producing a transformation of the world, although there are many others who point out its

strong limits. Some research suggests that proportionately, the world economy was more integrated and internationalised at the beginning of the 20th century than at the end. Also, global processes impact differentially at the different geographical scales: interlocked causes and effects range at a multitude of scales between the global and the local exist. Cultural distinctiveness is the key to understand the different impacts. Space and scale in broad-based processes matter. In this context, a number of sectors are examined: transport, culture, language, the environment, war and geopolitics, demography and migration.

Transport: the weft of globalization

As globalization is the result of increasing integration and therefore of growing interconnection, transport is a key factor. Since the beginning of the Industrial Revolution transport has enjoyed a significant space-time and space-cost convergence. This process has greatly accelerated after the Second World War and the transport revolution. The great majority of traded goods is waterborne. If it was not for shipping companies moving goods literally to and from every corner in the world, the level of integration would be extremely low. Transport is a facilitator of globalization, and it is helping to shape new spatial relationships and to consolidate their patterns. It is also true the opposite, i.e. if it was not for globalization, the development of shipping would be much lower, as integration creates a demand for ever growing levels of transport. Slack shows that, despite strong evidence for the impact of globalization on shipping, and particularly container shipping, there are significant local and regional distinctions resulting from limits to globalization. Shipping, and the same can be demonstrated for the other international transport modes, is simply mirroring more general trends. Global forces are important but local factors continue to exist and bring to bear a continuing influence. The transport revolution has been completed by the computer and telecommunication development. Internet has nullified the importance of distance as far as transport of information is concerned. The complete effects of the Internet development are still to come and to be fully understood. However, again, a real globalization, even in this dematerialised cyberspace, is a long way ahead: most of the connections are within cultural blocks rather than across the boundaries in the cyberspace. So far, the real world influences and shapes the virtual reality more than the opposite.

Culture and language: globalization's battlefield or meeting square?

Cultural homogenization is one of the most feared supposed outcomes of globalization. Noglobals of every colour accuse the western, Anglo-Saxon, mainly American, culture of annihilating indigenous cultures and languages, and imposing Western values, models of consumption and ways of life. Dongu suggests that a certain degree of cultural assimilation with American (or Western) values is unquestionable because English works as a bridge between people, easing the exchange of goods, opinions, images and knowledge, minimising friction due to cultural distance across linguistic boundaries. However, the statement that English will erase the diversity in the world is a gross simplification. Noglobals frequently draw a parallel between nature and culture, and state that in the same way that globalization is (supposed to be) destroying bio-diversity, it threatens cultural diversity as well. In both these fields the main problem is the conservative attitude shown in these positions: noglobals want to preserve what is currently existent in the present shape, but culture, like nature, is continuously changing and becoming something different. Culture is not a static heritage, but is an inherited set of tools continually reshaped by nations, groups and individuals, useful and used for transact between local action space and the outside, more or less globalized, world. It is sufficient even a superficial historical analysis to find out that lingua francas and vehicular languages have always existed, besides local languages and dialects. Multiculturalism, much more than universalism, has always been the characteristic of the world, probably because it is a deep necessity of the human beings to feel part of an in-group, but to be able to relate to the other out-groups. The action space of most people in the world is at a very local scale for most of the time. Language, and the culture it expresses, serves different functions (maternal, local or regional social relations, religious, trade, national official, diplomatic, international relations, scientific, etc.) and for each function may be used a different one: for example, it is quite common for an African to have a good command of up to six languages.

In the contest between languages, the hegemonic Anglo-Saxon culture is both a winner (as it is succeeding in making its language of widespread use) and a loser (its language is deeply contaminated and so are its values), suggesting therefore that globalization does not necessarily lead, and is

not presently leading, to homogenization. Globalization is instead an opportunity to enrich each culture thanks to the need to negotiate with an increased number of them and to set a boundary of distinctiveness not just between each group and its neighbours, but with the rest of the world.

Both the attitude in favour of English as the global language for every use and the absolute closure against English "contamination" are probably ineffective and useless in the long run. As shown by Arcangeli, even more unrealistic seems the hope of a successful establishment of artificial languages such as Esperanto or Europanto. The fortune of a language is related to the power and, particularly, to the prestige the society it belongs to enjoys. Is it not strange that the Italian language was widely spoken abroad before Italy became unified and ceased to be so immediately after? It is likely that English will continue to be the most spoken international language as long as America maintains its position as the dominant power. Spanish and Chinese might be probable candidates to substitute it, as they are spoken by huge populations, and the economic potential of Latin America and China is still developing. Dongu suggests that bilingualism is probably the solution to this complex situation: competence in more than one language will give people the opportunity to adjust the communication tool to the setting.

The quest for a sound environment

As Biagini pointed out in his contribution *the modern economy is by no means a "zero sum game"*. Which means not only that the rich are not so at the expense of the poor because of the dynamism and work of the society they live in, but also that development is not achieved at the expense of the environment. The true engine of an economic system is innovation, and very often an innovation is a way to satisfy more needs with less, i.e. to make economy more productive and efficient. They are also ways to produce less and less expensive goods granting a better quality of life and better prospects to more and more people.

What is most disturbing is that extremist ecologists, in order to make their point of view heard, do not hesitate to shamelessly lie, on the assumption that if you shout something loudly and obsessively enough people will end up believing you. The so called destruction of the Amazon rainforest, the "green lung of the earth", is just a case in point. The acid rains, that were so fashionable to blame for deforestation have instead a minimal

impact. The application of the Kyoto protocol, that is going to cost hugely on the world economy, aiming at reducing CO_2 emissions by 5.2 per cent, will simply delay the increase in temperatures of the so called "global warming" of six years (Lomborg 2003). Water is another cherished issue of environmental ideology but, instead of stigmatizing water consumption, there should be an interest in enabling people in need to access more water of better quality. Of course this has to be done taking into account the existing resources, soil physical and chemical characters, geology, economics and so on, as Corona has tellingly highlighted in her contribution. Environmental protection is a serious matter and the scaremongers are making a mock of it. Extreme ecologism, far from being science is just fashionable nature-worshipping pompously dressed in scientific jargon.

It is time to admit that in many parts of the world people suffer because of an "excess" of polluting nature. For example, more than 3 million people die each year because of malaria but none of the environmentalists suggests that wetlands should be drained and disinfested.

War and geopolitics: we have to give them a chance

Drawing future scenarios is an exercise clearly open to failure but it helps to make sense of the data at hand and to order them according to a probability scale. One thing is absolutely sure for the future: in the world there will certainly be warfare. War, as old as mankind, constantly present in history, will still be with us in the future. The problem is: who will be involved in it, and what kind of warfare will it be. Will it be a war between enemies divided by matters of interest, a prolongation of politics with other means, within an institutional framework, or between uncompromising enemies divided by reciprocally incompatible *Weltaschauungen* and political systems?

11 September 2001 has brought to the limelight a new enemy: Islamic terrorism. But is it truly a new enemy? Islamic terrorism is just one, although quite visible, thread of a more complex strategy of territorial expansion started in the 7th century. The inclusion of the West within the *Umma*, the Muslim community of the believers, passes through aggression to the *Dar el Harb*, the land of war, as other than *Dar el Salam*, the land of peace. This war is going to be asymmetric in character and its outcome is, in the short to medium range, far from certain. Europe and the West in

general find themselves with a diminished internal strength and will to fight, populated by a fifth column represented both by non-integrated Islamic immigrants and, more surreptitiously, by those who abandon the Christian religious tradition. This widespread attitude of submissiveness and timid attempt to please the invaders defined by Bat Ye'or with the word *dhimmitude,* has led some authors to describe this land slowly but surely acquired to the *Dar el Islam,* as Eurabia (Fallaci 2004).

Demography and migration: the Western sunset

As far as territorial conquests are concerned, the only victories that really last and therefore matter are the demographic victories. From the early 1970s, most western countries have entered a phase of demographic suicide, induced by socio-economic changes, the secularization of society, the introduction of contraception and abortion, the scarecrow, repeated to hysteria, of world overpopulation. Third World countries have instead continued so far to enjoy steady high birth rates and decreasing death rates, resulting in a huge population wave that has increased pressure on the developed countries borders. Strong immigration flows have been activated by differentials in wealth, standard of life, personal security, and possibly by conscious strategy. Official data on immigration are clearly underestimated; its clandestine component is extremely difficult to gauge, although it is clear that the phenomenon is growing fast and becoming a structural dimension of Western societies. Da Pozzo, in his contribution, talks of a paradox: "noglobal" movements find their most powerful allies asking the knocking down of any frontier and the complete right to mobility, in a class of big and small industrial entrepreneurs and their political mentors: precisely those interest groups that noglobals seem to fight against.

The main problem is not with immigration as such, although when huge numbers are concerned, there are always difficulties with inclusion. The problem arises when immigrants do not intend to become integrated, do not wish to become part of society and follow local mores and obey local laws and regulations. Even worse is the case of an explicit statement of creeping low-intensity territorial invasion. This is the case with the Muslim immigration, that is infiltrating most European and American large and medium cities, with its high birth rate that drugs Western birth rates giving an impression of false security: what is growing is not the Italian, German, French populations but an alien society within it. The same is true of the Chinese immigration: there is not a town in Italy of any significant size where there are not Chinese activities and immigrants. The main difference is that the Chinese seem to prefer to use economic warfare to gain political power: there is no price to stop acquiring shops, or sheds, or restaurants.

After all, it is Sun Tzu that wrote: in the practice of the art of war the best thing of all is to take hold of the country of the enemy living it whole and intact", and this can happen only by destroying the enemy and its capability or will to resist from within. The seizure of mass media, the connivance or cooperation of opinion-makers, journalists, intellectual has precisely the role to lower defences until it is to late. A lesson the Chinese, and the Muslims have known from long time, but the Western people seem to ignore. Or is it not? After every terrorist attack, there is no top-rank politician who does not appease his or her public opinion by talking about the involvement of the so called moderate Muslims to isolate terrorism, and sternly deny a clash of civilizations is underway. Why is it that all the footage about the beheadings by the terrorists in Iraq have never been broadcast? The excuse is that these are too strong images for Western stomachs. But the images on the Abu Graib shameful tortures have been obsessively broadcast for days and days. Why is it? Probably Huntighton's theory about the clash of civilizations should include the possibility of inner clashes besides external ones: a conspiracy that begun in the 18th century aimed at seizing power and destroy Christianity, by conquering France, by unifying Italy and deprive the Papacy of its territorial base on the assumption that the Church would then disappear, to destroy the last Catholic empire (Austria-Hungary) by waging the First World War, by infiltrating the Catholic hierarchy and undermine liturgy, by imposing laicist States as the only adequate form of government to grant peace, by destroying religions and using Islam as a battery-ram against Christianity. Islamization of Europe has been wanted, planned by the European rulers as a decisive factor to erase from history the last two thousand years so as to create a 'melting-potted' population with no religious or cultural identity, making the European Union start from year zero (Magli 2004).

Globalization: a land of opportunity for geography

Globalization is a process towards stages of developments where space is more integrated and interconnected. As Biagini pointed out in one of his contributions, "the main points to be borne in mind in a general theory of development are: the nature (static or dynamic) of the society, the interaction of human activity with the physical environment, the Centre-Periphery relationships (essential for historical interpretation), the stages of development, and the unavoidable and ubiquitous conflict". There is plenty of geographical research to be carried out if this definition is applied at the global scale. Also the analysis of the regions which are active or passive globalizers and therefore contribute to the whole picture is still far behind.

Pelanda calls geographers to one of their specific tasks: mapmaking. In fact, a decent representation of the globalization of the economy is needed if we are to plan the governance of that phenomenon, so as to make nation-states and globalization standards become combined. In order to achieve this, knowledge of the nation-states and regions should be promoted. A suitable thematic mapping methodology is needed, showing economic, social and infrastructural variables in such a way as to gauge strength and weakness of each national actor, so that the present conditions, the trends and the needs may be clearly understood, i.e. to know the situation, and the likely advantages and liabilities of the participation to the global system. This is absolutely necessary if a nation-state or a region intends to partake in the global open market founding it on realistic grounds rather than mere political will. Far-reaching revolutionary socio-economic changes such as globalization must be managed rather than denied, but in order to achieve this, suitable tools have to be devised and geographers are called to provide such outfit.

There is a need for scholars and researchers to enter the quest for truth, to gather and analyse data and information as free as possible from the coloured deforming glasses of ideological political correctness. Development is a complex phenomenon and under-development has complex causes; blaming the West for every problem the so called Third World countries experience is simply a comfortable way of dismissing reality and the fastest root to miss solutions and fail the aim. Under-development has cultural causes much more serious than the economic ones. The pretence to have economic aid from the West but no cultural con-

tamination and to trigger development in such a way is vain desire. The Catholic missionaries of the Carmelite, for example, have to pass on cultural values if they want know-how to become effective. In fact, knowing how to do things is not exactly as having done them. If the West stops being proud of its own culture, its roots and its religion the other cultures will stop copying it and the development reached will be fruitless. Strangely enough, nobody questions the right of other non-western cultures to influence and contaminate our and indigenous cultures: the spread of communism was hailed with great satisfaction by the same people that today antagonizes globalization on cultural grounds. In the same way, not many voices are heard to condemn the aggressive and hugely-supported-by-petrodollars Muslim "missionary" effort.

Geographers should also approach the study of the environment that is in need of research aimed at safeguarding nature, not worshipping it, with mankind in focus, from the point of view of human needs. It is far too easy, from our Western comfortable lives, to pretend human beings (the others) do not (or should not) exist and make all the efforts to grant animals and trees a very natural life, while forcing people to live in danger, hunger or disease.

Nobody knows what future lies ahead, whether globalization will go on and allow the achievement of a better standard of living for growing numbers of people or if the disintegration forces will, for the time being, win the contest. In many ways, globalization has been planned by economic and political actors without the due consideration of religious and cultural factors, in other words foregoing identity, on the assumption that a new cosmopolitan human species, with no roots, no ties and no beliefs could be created. As Da Pozzo pointed out, there is a "return of the *espace vécu*, of strict territoriality as a feeling of spatial identity of human groups, through increasing localisms and regionalisms on an ethnic and/or religious base", a trend that calls for the development of a "geographic *glocal*, based on a renewed governance of the territory, the seat of local day to day activity.

There is plenty of scope for geographers and other scholars wishing to forsake the doubtful marshes of the weak thinking, and, as Biagini hopes for, to reject discourse and self-imposed blindness, and at last to look at facts with true faith in human reason.

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